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Abstract 
Despite an increasing number of international state building interventions in post-
conflict countries in the past decade, the prolonged economic, social and political 
issues plaguing the development of these countries into peaceful states has 
brought increased attention on the inability of the institutions carrying out these 
interventions to learn from their past mistakes. The following research contends 
that one of the main issues at the root of such failures, lies in international state 
building interventions framing the (re)construction of state institutions around the 
notion of an ideal-type state that is ahistorical and inherently detached from the 
society it is meant to govern. Instead, this research argues, state building and 
political community construction are two distinct processes, which have historically 
come to be contingent upon each other with the territorialisation of the state; as 
such, for state building to be successful, it needs to focus on the establishment of 
state institutions capable of promoting, within the territory, a sense of citizenship 
that will facilitate the emergence of a political community upon which state 
sovereignty and legitimacy rest. In this light, using the case study of Dili, the capital 
of Timor Leste, this research seeks to demonstrate that urban spaces are 
particularly pertinent contexts to explore the relationship between state building 
and political community. It begins by outlining the impact of the state building 
process on the shaping of state institutions, between 1999 and 2012, and the type 
of policies emerging from such institutions. It then moves on to the analysis of 
social cohesion in two case study areas, highlighting how the implementation of 
state policies on widely diverse urban fabrics – shaped by different economic, 
social, political and historical dynamics – results in different scales and spaces of 
polity construction. 
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NOTE ON TIMORESE TERMS 
Timor Leste has a large number of languages and dialects, however one language 
in particular has emerged to facilitate communication across the island: Tetun. As 
such, upon independence Tetun was made, along with Portuguese, the lingua 
franca of the country.  
There are two varieties of Tetun. Tetun ‘Terik’ is spoken mainly along the border 
with West Timor and some areas on the South coast, but its use is not widespread 
across the territory (Williams-van Klinken, 2003; p.xiv). The other type is referred 
to alternatively as ‘Tetun Dili’, ‘Tetun Prasa’ or just ‘Tetun’; it has evolved from 
Tetun Terik but has become so influenced by Portuguese that the two now bear 
fewer resemblances (ibid). The kind learned by the author during her stay in Timor 
Leste is Tetun Dili, for ease of communication with a wider variety of people, and it 
is the kind used in this thesis when referring to Tetun words.  
Tetun, however, has remained an oral language until very late into Portuguese 
colonisation. There are no certain sources as to who and when it began 
developing as a written language, but the author’s conversations with various 
people appear to point to Portuguese missionaries, who used to teach in schools. 
It has since then continued to evolve, but many different influences have resulted 
in a lack of “generally accepted standard spelling” (ibid; p.279). As a result, it is 
common to notice differences between official Timorese documents and 
newspapers, or across the literature on Timor Leste, especially in relation to the 
“glottal stop” (ibid): for example “this” can be spelled nee or ne’e (ibid).  
For ease of pronunciation and spelling, the author has made the choice to use the 
spelling not marking the glottal stop and the spelling most common across the 
literature she used. The following Tetun words appear in the text: liurai, the 
traditional Timorese ruler; lia nain, the traditional elder; suco/suku1 and aldeia, 
Timorese administrative divisions; and, xefi suku/aldeia, ‘chiefs’ of the 
administrative divisions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Suco will be used when explaining the Portuguese colonial rule, but suku will be used throughout the rest of the text 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
“Each man’s life involves the life of all men, each tale is but the fragment of a tale” 
(Stephen Vizinczey, 1984) 
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1. Introduction 
The worldwide interconnectedness, brought on by globalisation of people, capital, 
goods and services, has led in the past decades to an increased focus by 
international institutions on a wide variety of interventions in conflict affected 
countries. From the implementation of the Marshall Plan after the second world 
war, through conditional financial assistance provided to post-conflict states, to 
state building processes and international transitional administrations, it has 
become evident that in the past century the provision of post-conflict reconstruction 
assistance has moved well beyond the sole realm of international relations. The 
necessity to restore security, not only in post-conflict countries, but within the 
international order as well, has shifted international attention to the belief that, 
“security, development and good governance are the heart of a virtuous circle that 
produces a legitimate and capable state” (Goodhand, 2014; p.1), therefore placing 
state building processes also in the realms of political and social sciences. 
Yet, despite number of state building interventions in the past decades – in 
countries such as Timor Leste, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq – and the increasing 
budgets they are associated with, the harsh reality that decades after these 
interventions those countries continue to be subject to internal struggles, that 
characterise their institutions and plight their development, begs the question of 
why these interventions have failed. Indeed, continued unrest in Iraq – now further 
aggravated by the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – or the 
emergence of parallel administrations established by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs 
as international institutions delayed the implementation of national level authority in 
Kosovo (Lemay-Hébert, 2009; p.31), are but two examples that contribute to shine 
light on the fact that, despite governance and legitimacy clearly pertaining to the 
political and social realms that define state-society relations, international state 
building processes have failed to engage with either of these fields. 
In response to these failures, the past few years have seen an increasing amount 
of literature highlighting the importance, for state building processes, to 
complement efforts at state level with in depth understanding of the societal 
dynamics that make up the context within which these processes take place (Beall, 
Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2011; Chandler, 2012; Fregonese, 2012; Jones, 2012, 
2010 & 2013; Lemay-Hébert, 2009 & 2011; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2007, 2013 & 
2014). They call upon international actors to acknowledge their inability, thus far, to 
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create legitimate post-conflict institutions capable of promoting and maintaining 
liberal peace within their territory, and recognise that assisting in the construction 
of state institutions implies “engaging with state theory […] to understand what 
states are, how they are formed and transformed and what factors lead to their 
stability and fragility” (Jones, 2013; p.70). For instance, Oliver Richmond (2007; 
2013; 2014) and Sara Fregonese (2012) use the contexts of Cambodia, Timor 
Leste, Kosovo and Lebanon to argue that a blank slate approach to the 
establishment of Western-style liberal democracy, in post-conflict countries, often 
leads to the development of hybrid institutions where customary forms of 
governance and authority co-exist with the new institutions, generally undermining 
the legitimacy of the new state.  
In this context, this research is interested in exploring the impact of exogenous 
state building processes on the more endogenous dynamics of political community 
construction. Drawing from a historical account of the development of international 
post-conflict reconstruction assistance since 1945, this research contends that the 
liberal peace ideal, at the heart of the emergence of state building, originally 
placed a significant emphasis on democracy as a process for developing strong 
domestic institutions capable of “promoting the empowerment of the unorganised, 
the poor and the marginalised” (UN Security Council, 1992; p.21) to create a 
political community. The relationship between the state and its political community, 
it was argued, would bring “the social stability needed for productive growth” (ibid), 
akin to the way in which Western liberal democratic states have developed and 
thrived. However, using a review of the literature on state formation and social 
contract theory, this research seeks to demonstrate that the framework within 
which state building interventions are designed moves away from the ideal-type 
state at the core of the liberal peace project; instead, this research argues, the 
territorial states (Agnew, 1994; p.63) resulting from state building processes are 
ahistorical and decontextualised, removed from the daily realities of their citizens, 
and failing to reflect anything of the identity, expectations and political aspirations 
of the many different social identity groups sharing these countries’ territory 
(Neves, 2012). The aim of this research is to explore how the disconnection, 
between the states emerging from international state building and the 
societies they are intended to govern and control, can potentially undermine 
the successful outcomes of the state building process itself by failing to 
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create the conditions for the development of a post-conflict political 
community.  
Understanding how international state building processes may affect the ability of 
new states to build a political community within their territory out of a wide variety 
of – at times conflicting – local polities, however, requires the articulation of an 
analytical framework that can weave the complexities of local polity building with 
the multiple scales and spaces at which state institutions do – whether positively or 
negatively – influence citizens’ daily interactions within the territory. It requires a 
context where the role of institutions and systems in creating and reproducing 
inequalities across individuals and groups (World Bank, 2011; p.11) can be 
analysed to understand its effects on the development of social cohesion and 
political community from the local scale to the scale of the state’s territory. Post-
conflict urban environments, this research argues, are particularly suited for 
understanding these dynamics, for the infrastructural and structural challenges 
facing war-torn countries are further accentuated by the rapid urbanisation brought 
on by a sudden surge in economic opportunities, resulting in the emergence of 
stark socio-economic inequalities and spatial contrasts. For example, Kabul, 
Afghanistan’s capital, “used to be an egalitarian city” (Rasmussen, 2014), but the 
past ten years have seen an increase in inequalities that have redesigned the 
capital’s urban spaces in ways that make it “clear to ordinary people how 
egregiously wealthy some people are” (ibid). 
The importance of urban spaces as presenting both theatres of violence and 
opportunities for building sustainable peace, has been increasingly recognised in 
urban development and urban planning literature (Anderson 2010; Bickford, 2000; 
Bollens, 1998, 2001 & 2007; Esser, 2004 & 2013). They contend that a 
combination of liberal public policy decision-making in political, economic and 
social matters, combined with urban planning strategies that are either absent – 
leading to uncontrolled growth – or divisive – if ethnic differences have been 
institutionalised – contribute to creating “rigid boundaries on highly amorphic and 
dynamic spaces inhabited by different groups” (Esser, 2004; p.2). These spaces, 
in turn, contribute to the development of different social identities that can – and 
often do – run counter to the image of territory-wide political community promoted 
by the state. Daniel Esser (2013; p.3085) uses the example of Kabul to explain 
how international state building in Afghanistan contributed to the establishment of 
liberal market-driven urban planning that, “instead of resulting in greater political 
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and economic participation […] exacerbated local tensions and furthered economic 
and political exclusion”. 
The introduction of urban space within the research’s analytical framework 
therefore provides the nexus between state territory and the local, between the 
state institutions that emerge out of the state building process and the impact of 
their policies on the spaces and scales of interaction that shape the construction of 
the political community. Indeed, the political community related to the state, this 
research argues, is the result of a long process of social construction carried out 
by state institutions, which have penetrated society so as to enable and facilitate 
people’s recognition of their belonging, from the local scale to the scale of the state 
territory, to more than one polity (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; p.1002). It is therefore 
the ability of state institutions to create spaces of daily interaction between different 
groups of people – through policies promoting equal access to political, social and 
economic opportunities – that determines the construction of a political community, 
for “the spatial relations built into modern life cannot be thought of as primarily a 
reflection of desired social relations, […] they also produce and form those 
relations” (Bickford, 2000; p.366) through spaces of inclusion and exclusion.  
Consequently, focusing on state institutions’ ability to foster their own legitimacy 
and sovereignty within a given territory, this research seeks to bridge the gap 
between the pervasive focus on macro-structures at the heart of international 
literature and the more micro bias characterising urban planning literature. The 
analytical framework it develops, puts urban spaces at the centre of an analysis of 
social cohesion within different and often contrasting spaces of interaction 
emerging from state policies. In doing so, it highlights the importance of analysing 
the different historical, political and socio-economic contexts, within which state 
policies are implemented, so as to articulate the relationship between a social 
group’s organisational characteristics, the urban environment resulting from state 
policies and the ensuing spaces and scales of interaction that contribute to 
defining the group’s polity.  
This research seeks to analyse the impact of state building on political community 
in post-conflict urban environments by answering the following three main 
research questions: 
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 How do international state building practices affect the nature of post-conflict 
state institutions? 
 How do the policies emanating from these institutions affect the core functions 
of the state? 
 How does the relationship between the urban environment emerging from state 
policies and social cohesion affect the spaces and scales of socially 
constructed polities? 
As the main research questions highlight, the emphasis of this research lies in 
exploring the dynamics and impacts at play between the complex realities of 
globalisation pressures, national post-conflict reconstruction imperatives, urban 
liberal development priorities and local polity construction. As such, the 
methodology used for understanding these processes was that of undertaking an 
in depth fieldwork in a selected case study to gather the data necessary in order to 
substantiate the arguments made in the literature and framework chapters of this 
thesis. Two areas of research were selected, where interviews based on open-
ended questions were carried out to include a wide variety of views from different 
groups – gender, employment status, employment sector, level of education, age 
group. The aim of the case study research was not that of going into an in-depth 
analysis of a select number of issues unique to the selected country; rather, it 
sought to understand whether multiple variables pertaining to the state building 
process have affected the case study country and how. This methodological 
choice was motivated by a commitment to test the purpose and strengths of the 
analytical framework, and ensure that it can be applied to other contexts, thus 
expanding a theoretical field.  
The case study country chosen for the purpose of this research was Timor Leste. 
Branded as ‘the twenty-first century’s newest nation’, Timor Leste became an 
important milestone in the field of international state building because upon 
emerging, in 1999, from twenty-five years of Indonesian military rule – preceded by 
400 years of Portuguese colonial administration – it became one of the first 
countries – alongside Kosovo – to experience full United Nations (UN) transitional 
administration. That is, for two years, from 1999 to 2002, Council Resolution 1272 
entrusted the UN “with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor”, 
thus empowering it “to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 
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administration of justice” (UN Security Council, 1999; p.2), whilst at the same time 
preparing the new country for democratic self-governance by providing the support 
necessary to build the new state institutions. Endowed with such extensive 
mandate, it was therefore inevitable that the UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) would have far reaching consequences on the nature of the new 
state institutions and, consequently, Timor Leste’s long-term ability to govern itself.  
This became evident as a crisis of state legitimacy nearly brought the country to its 
knees in 2006 and forced its first government to step down. Indeed, sparked by 
protests from a group of soldiers demanding better living conditions in their 
barracks, the 2006 crisis very quickly turned into a political protest against the way 
in which the establishment of the police and the military forces had been handled 
during UNTAET. The progressive involvement of the country’s opposing political 
elites in the crisis, by promoting a divisive ‘East/West Timor’ discourse rooted in 
pre-independence political differences, further highlighted a series of mistakes 
made by the transitional administration in the establishment of the state system, 
which contributed to institutionalising political differences in the country’s state 
building process. Finally, as the crisis turned into a full blown national riot, resulting 
in the displacement of approximately 150,000 people (IOM, 2012; p.16), it became 
evident that what was at stake was not merely an institutional issue; rather, more 
pervasive structural and endemic issues were resurfacing as a result of those 
institutional problems, creating deep divisions in a society believed to have 
become strongly unified by the struggle against Indonesian rule. 
The capital of the country, Dili, played an important role throughout the 
development of the crisis. At the heart of political and economic decision-making 
since Portuguese colonial rule, Dili has developed into Timor Leste’s most 
significant urban area and became the focus, upon independence from Indonesia 
in 1999, of most of the political, economic and social development of the country. 
As such, between 2004 and 2010 the number of people originally from the districts 
living in the capital has increased by 37%, making it home to 21% of the country’s 
population (NDS, 2013) and transforming it into the most diverse urban space of 
Timor Leste. However, despite the strains that such fast urbanisation has put on 
urban infrastructure and services, the development of the urban space has 
remained uncontrolled and has come to be characterised by deep contrasts 
between areas that have managed to become part of the liberal state project and 
those have remained at the margins. Consequently, the concentration of structural, 
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endemic and political issues in Dili has resulted in much of the 2006 violence, 
destruction and displacement, taking place in the capital.  
Therefore, Dili provided an ideal setting for testing the multiscalar and 
multidimentional analytical framework developed in the context of this research. 
The fact that a population, initially strongly bounded by its fight for independence, 
could so quickly identify with divisive political discourses and descend into violence 
indeed begged many questions as to the extent to which international state 
building processes affected the country’s state institutions, and the impact of these 
institutions’ decisions on widely diverse historical, political and socio-economic 
spaces. This research aims to address these questions by testing the analytical 
framework in two selected areas in Dili, Liriu and Metin IV, where contrasting 
histories of development, violence and socio-economic characteristics have 
shaped strongly contrasting urban fabrics. Starting with an understanding of the 
international state building processes that Timor Leste has undergone since the 
arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century, the empirical research subsequently 
provides an analysis of the impact of these processes on the construction of the 
country’s new state institutions. On that basis, it then moves on to analyse social 
cohesion in the two selected areas to draw the link between international state 
building and the processes of local polity construction at play in widely contrasting 
urban spaces between 1999 and 2012.  
To this end, this thesis begins, in chapter 2, with a historical account of the 
development of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance in order to 
highlight the importance of liberal peace within the state building process. It 
subsequently reviews the literature on state formation and social contract theory as 
the basis for understanding how state building’s ahistorical approach to its ideal-
type state affects the construction of a political community in post-conflict 
countries. It does so by using the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and 
citizenship previously highlighted as underpinning the relationship between state 
and political community.  
Chapter 3 draws from the conclusions of chapter 2 in order to develop the 
analytical framework for this research. It articulates the relationship between the 
state and the political community around the notion that states only become actual 
objects if the spaces and scales of local polity construction successfully shape 
citizens’ virtual representations of belonging to a political community. It 
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subsequently introduces social cohesion to facilitate a multidimentional and 
multiscalar analysis of the political, economic and social dynamics that affect the 
construction of these virtual representations through the development of 
citizenship within different urban contexts. 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used for testing the analytical framework 
with empirical research. It outlines the objectives of the research, the theoretical 
approaches that have guided the research methods and the research methods. 
Chapter 5 begins by providing a historical understanding of the way in which 
Portuguese colonisation and Indonesian rule have contributed to shaping the 
citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory of Timor Leste. Subsequently, 
using the same analytical lenses, the chapter moves on to analysing the extent to 
which UN decision-making within the post-independence state building process 
failed to understand and address the impact of the territorial, societal and political 
legacies highlighted previously on Timor Leste’s state and society. 
Chapter 6 explores how the decision-making processes outlined in the previous 
chapter have contributed to shaping Timor Leste’s institutional design. It does so 
by looking at the new state’s ability to fulfil four of its core functions: administrative 
control, legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, management of public 
finance, and investments in human capital. 
Chapter 7 provides an analysis of social cohesion in the two selected case study 
areas in Dili to understand how the urban fabric emerging from different political, 
social and economic dynamics has contributed to shaping contrasting spaces and 
scales of citizenship.  
Finally, chapter 8 concludes this thesis with an analysis of the impact of 
international state building on the construction of a polity in Timor Leste at local, 
urban and national level. It then moves to identifying how these findings contribute 
to validating the research’s analytical framework as a tool for understanding the 
impact of state building on the construction of political community, as well as 
highlighting areas for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“And if these difficulties, whose essence we share, hinder us, it is understandable that 
the rational talents on this side of the world, exalted in the contemplation of their own 
cultures, should have found themselves without valid means to interpret us. It is only 
natural that they insist on measuring us with the yardstick that they use for 
themselves, forgetting that the ravages of life are not the same for all, and that the 
quest of our own identity is just as arduous and bloody for us as it was for them”  
(Gabriel Garcia Marquez, 1982). 
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2. Literature review 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the ahistorical, ideal-type 
understanding of the notion of state, that characterises state building interventions, 
stands in stark contrast with the history of state formation these interventions are 
actually modelled on. It begins with an account of the development of post-conflict 
reconstruction assistance – from the Marshall Plan after World War II (WWII) to 
UN transitional administration in the past decade – to demonstrate that the 
rationales, timetables and institutional contexts framing state building interventions 
are strongly focused on the reconstruction of state institutions, while scant 
attention is paid to the society these new institutions are meant to govern. 
Taking, as a starting point, the notion of liberal peace underpinning state building 
interventions, this chapter subsequently seeks to highlight how the dissociation 
between state and society characterising these interventions is at odds with the 
ideal-type Western state the liberal peace process is modelled on. It begins with a 
review of the literature on state formation and social contract theory, in order to 
illustrate the importance of the relationship between the state and its political 
community in the development and sustainability of state institutions. On this basis, 
the chapter then moves on to demonstrating how state building internventions’ use 
of the ideal-type Western state, when abstracted from its historical context, can 
significantly harm the mutually constitutive relationship between state and political 
community, therefore risking to severely undermine the sustainability of their own 
objectives.  
2.1. From financial assistance to state building – changes in the post-conflict 
reconstruction rationale since 1945 
The following section provides a historical account of the development of 
international post-conflict reconstruction assistance since 1945. Starting with the 
Marshall Plan implemented in Europe after WWII, this section provides an account 
of the evolution of international post-conflict reconstruction within changing 
geopolitical contexts. In doing so, it highlights the shifts in these interventions’ 
paradigms, which have moved from straightforward financial assistance to 
increased interference in the reconstruction of state institutions based on liberal 
democratic rule and market oriented economics.  
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2.1.1. The Marshall Plan – territorial sovereignty and state planning  
The Marshall Plan is widely referred to in the literature (Chesterman, 2005; 
Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Woodward, 2011) as the 
first most important international post-conflict reconstruction effort2.  
Conceived and managed by the United States (U.S) in the aftermath of WWII, it 
aimed at granting and loaning money to European states to assist them in 
rebuilding their economy and infrastructure; reconstruction efforts were centrally 
planned by the states, with little interference from the U.S in the decision-making 
processes if not for a desire to establish new market relations with Europe. 
Therefore, the Plan’s key characteristic lain in the fact that the sovereignty of each 
state benefitting from financial support was to remain unconditional, and as allies’ 
reconstruction efforts were carried out within the pre-war state system, the 
legitimacy of the state within its territory also remained intact. 
The implementation of the Marshall Plan also marked a turning point in the 
international state system. Indeed, whilst “for many in both the U.S and Britain 
‘reconstruction’ meant domestic reconstruction” (Williams, 2005; p.544), the aim of 
this international effort was to cement international political and economic state 
relations for the creation of a “new world that was hopefully to emerge from the 
ashes of the old” (ibid; p.549). Therefore, the emphasis put on the importance to 
create an international political and economic system led to the birth of the United 
Nations from the ashes of the League of Nations created in the aftermath of WWI 
in 1920. Its main aim was to maintain or broker peace in the world through the 
mediation of a wider variety of international interests.  
The particular focus of the Marshall Plan on the importance of developing good 
economic relationships between countries set a precedent for the evolution of 
post-conflict reconstruction assistance within a framework revolving around the 
need to “ensure political stability while promoting a liberal economic world order” 
(Chomsky 1999 in Barakat, 2010; p.13), as already developed in the U.S. The 
influence of this approach transpires clearly throughout the next phase of 
international post-conflict reconstruction assistance within the context of liberation 
wars, in the wake of WWII. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Williams (2005) argues that the Marshall Plan is actually not the first international effort in post-conflict 
reconstruction to have taken place in the new international state system – WWI also saw considerable efforts 
taking place for intra-state support in reconstruction. However, the Marshall Plan remains the most elaborate 
first programme, and is therefore taken here as the starting point to international post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts. 
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2.1.2. Wars of liberation – increased international economic intervention 
Weakened by the destruction of WWII and the resulting post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts, maintaining colonies across South America, Africa and Asia became a 
heavy burden on European countries’ financial and human resources, especially 
as number of these colonies took advantage of such weakening to spark revolts 
against the colonisers, thus requiring even more resources (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica3). Furthermore, political support for colonial projects also became 
increasingly scarce as the two emerging superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, took official positions against colonialism (ibid). As a result, the 
colonisers began withdrawing from their colonies, opening up a new process of 
state formation, in the period between 1945 and 1989, rooted in the construction of 
identity around colonial and liberation collective memory. 
During the same period, mounting tensions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union took shape in the form of the Cold War and materialised, upon 
implementation of the Marshall Plan, into a division of the world order: on one side, 
Western European countries brought under American influence; on the other, 
communist regimes of Eastern Europe the Soviet Union was determined to 
maintain control over (ibid). In the context of this ideological chasm – commonly 
referred to as ‘the iron curtain’ – international post-conflict reconstruction took on a 
new meaning: delivered by one of the two super powers, and driven by declared 
allegiances with either side of the iron curtain, international assistance in response 
to liberation wars became a playing field for the ideological battle between the U.S 
and the Soviet Union, wherein each sought to increase the number of allies. 
Much like the Marshall Plan, post-conflict reconstruction delivered during the Cold 
War to countries allied with the Western block was essentially of a liberal economic 
nature; it was based on the assumption that, as had been the case for Western 
Europe, by providing states with loans targeted at developing national 
infrastructure, and strongly encouraging the adjustment of the local economy for 
export (Barakat, 2010; p.18), development would automatically take place thus 
bringing about the societal changes necessary to ensure peace and stability. 
However, contrary to the Marshall Plan, and despite apparently respecting state 
sovereignty, the participation of the countries that were receiving financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Encyclopeadia Britannica – ‘Decolonization’ (accessed 28/07/14): 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/155242/decolonization  
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assistance was sought essentially in terms of state implementation of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) devised by international financial institutions 
(IFIs) – such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – 
and to which strong conditions of economic and political reforms were attached 
(ODI, 1992; p.2). Indeed, anchored in a belief that the political nature of decision 
making strongly affects economic choices in a society (Drazen, 2000; p.5), the 
main characteristic of these SAPs was the promotion of the liberal ideals of 
“macroeconomic stability, reduction of the role of the state, the squeezing of 
collective and public space, a quest for private affluence, and a reliance on 
privatisation and on exports and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth” 
(Pugh, 2005; p.25).  
In opposition to Western liberal ideals, under the Soviet system post-conflict 
reconstruction was delivered in return for the establishment of strong communist 
rule. This implied supplying the USSR with machinery and raw materials to 
contribute to a reconstruction programme mainly focused on heavy industry, at the 
expense of agriculture and consumer goods (Curtis, 1996). 
Consequently, though not directly intervening on the nature of post-conflict state 
institutions, post-conflict reconstruction efforts during the Cold War already 
emphasized a strong desire to influence states’ internal affairs. 
2.1.3. New Wars – from SAPs to liberal peace 
a) The emergence of the New Wars 
The implementation of the SAPs was firmly grounded within a framework that took 
the state, as it had developed and consolidated in Western Europe, as “an 
idealised decision-making subject” (Agnew, 1994; p.63) in the process of post-
conflict reconstruction. It ran on the assumption that what had worked under the 
Marshall Plan – that is, strong economic reforms in countries run by democratic 
states – would have similar positive outcomes if the conditions of liberal economic 
and political reforms, attached to the loans, were implemented. Such assumption, 
however, failed to account for the fact that, as opposed to Western countries, 
states that have come into being through decolonisation have acquired their 
boundaries and sovereignty from the outside, “without the same internal forging of 
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mutual constraints between rulers and ruled” (Tilly, 1985; p.186)4. These territories, 
therefore, acted as containers for a wide variety of different, and at times 
competing, social identities that had not, however, been renegotiated into a wider 
social identity through the process of delimiting territorial boundaries. Post-conflict 
reconstruction, therefore, failed to view the state in its historical particularity. 
The consequences of the ahistorical (Agnew, 1994; Dinnen, 2008; Isin, 2007; 
Selby 2007) approach to the state in these countries became apparent as the Cold 
War drew to an end in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin wall. With the end of the Iron 
Curtain, the withdrawal of U.S’ and U.S.S.R’s financial and technical assistance 
from their allies, left behind weak institutions that struggled to deal with the 
insecurities associated with globalisation’s strong market driven global economy. 
As these countries opened up to international markets, their populations found 
themselves caught up in a global economy where their traditional sources of 
livelihood were no longer sufficient to make a sustainable living, whilst their 
competences, inadequate in the context of these new markets, did not allow them 
to participate in either production or consumption (Kaldor, 2006; p.78). 
Consequently, “in some underdeveloped countries the nominal state […] ceased to 
be a viable group to which to belong” (Hetcher, 1987 in Stoddard, 2000; p.9), 
leaving room for ethnic and religious factionalism to (re)emerge and shape 
increasingly polarised societies.  
The 1990s, therefore, saw a rapid increase of internal conflicts characterised by 
violent struggles between different identity groups claiming to represent the 
population in order to gain access to state controlled resources. The external 
enemy was suddenly replaced by antagonising national groups, and strategies 
akin to guerrilla warfare emerged where “territory is captured through political 
control of the population rather than through military advance” (Kaldor, 2006; p.8), 
a control gained by sowing ‘fear and hatred’” (ibid; p.9) amongst the different 
groups in the country. As a result, the civilian population was no longer a casualty 
in a bigger struggle for geo-political power; rather, civilians became intentional 
targets in a fight articulated around movements mobilised on the basis of “ethnic, 
racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (Kaldor, 2006; 
p.80). These conflicts came to be known as ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor, 2006) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Such as, for example: Indonesia and Timor Leste, countries in the Congo region such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Angola, etc. 
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brought about a significant increase in the number of refugees and internally 
displaced people (IDPs) between 1970 and 2008, as Figure 1 illustrates.  
Figure 1 – Total refugees and IDPs between 1970 and 2008 
 
Source: Elaborated by Orchard (2010; p.40) on the basis of UN data 
As a consequence of the widespread internal violence on the population and the 
lack of state response to it – whether because unwilling or unable – countries 
affected by the New Wars suffered significant crisis of state legitimacy and 
sovereignty, which often culminated in the complete collapse of state institutions5. 
The breakdown of state/society relationships at the core of state collapse therefore 
brought to the fore the issue of ‘failed states’ whereby “the leadership and 
institutions of the state are weakened and discredited to the point where the state 
can no longer fulfil its responsibilities or exercise sovereign power over the territory 
within its borders” (Stoddard, 2000; p.8). The redefinition of internal conflicts 
around the notion of failed states provided a new rationale for international post-
conflict reconstruction interventions. 
b) Implication of failed states for post-conflict reconstruction 
The notion of failed states brought on an increased reluctance to channel 
reconstruction efforts through state structures, resulting in a dramatic decrease in 
the 1990s in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which fell from over 
$70 billion in 1990 to $50 billion in 1995 – as shown in Figure 2 below. Instead, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For instance: Somalia, Chad and Rwanda, where the nature of state institutions came to be significantly 
detached from the socio-political processes and divisions plaguing society; Congo, Uganda and Haiti, where the 
accumulation of state assets in the hands of a few elites became challenged by liberation fronts (Doornbos, 
2002; p.804) 
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amid growing humanitarian concerns, brought on by the extent of civilian 
casualties and the impact of high numbers of refugees and IDPs in conflict-
affected regions, international post-conflict reconstruction efforts slowly shifted 
from the implementation of SAPs to more humanitarian and development oriented 
concerns: assistance came to be increasingly delivered by Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and international organisations – such as the UN – that 
“were no longer confined solely to the periphery of conflict, but could engage in 
conflict zones” (Duffield, 1994 in Macrae, 1999; p.7) to provide humanitarian 
assistance to affected civilians. 
Figure 2 – ODA from OECD countries since 1960 
 
Source: OECD (2014) 
Furthermore, as the effects of globalisation increased significantly with the end of 
the Cold War6, failed states became a threat to the growing interconnectedness of 
the international state system. This coincided, in the late 80s, with a strong belief 
amongst Western countries that liberal peace, combined with market-oriented 
economics, provided the best solution to sustainable peace – both between and 
within countries (Paris, 2004 in Goetze and Guzina, 2008; p.322). It was grounded, 
on the one hand, in statistical evidence that democracies were less likely to 
collapse internally or wage war against each other (Goetze and Guzina, 2008; 
p.322) and, on the other hand, in the Washington Consensus’ essentially liberal 
prescription for Latin America in 1989 (Williamson, 2004; p.1). As a result, 
international post-conflict reconstruction assistance “became more contingent 
upon [states’ adherence] to the political and economic prescriptions of the major 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 International financial markets, the delocalisation of industrial production to developing countries, and 
significant developments in communication technology (Taylor, 1996; p.1924) 
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donor governments” (Macrae, 1999; p.6) translating, in practice, into the 
withholding of assistance to states that did not conform to these prescriptions – 
such as Idi Amin and Milton Obote in Uganda – limiting intervention to neutral relief 
aid instead – as happened in Ethiopia and Sudan (ibid). These shifts in the nature 
of international post-conflict interventions show that “de facto empirical sovereignty 
of states was under threat” (ibid).  
c) Liberal peace through state building interventions 
However, the poor international success record (de Zeeuw 2001; p.8) of these 
interventions, illustrated in Table 1 below by the fact that between 1990 and 2000 
the percentage of violence onsets in countries with a previous conflict increased 
from 67 to 90, raised significant questions in relation to the nature of aid. It became 
evident that merely imposing conditions of liberal democratic reforms on new or 
existing states was not going to achieve long-term development or peace. 
Table 1 – Violence onsets since the 1960s7 
Decade 
Violence onsets in 
countries with no 
previous conflict 
(%) 
Violence onsets 
in countries with 
a previous 
conflict (%) 
Number 
of 
onsets 
1960s 57 43 35 
1970s 43 57 44 
1980s 38 62 39 
1990s 33 67 81 
2000s 10 90 39 
    Source: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations (Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945) 
Rather, if development was to be achieved through the establishment of liberal 
democratic rule and liberal market-oriented economics, it was going to be 
necessary to make “early efforts to ensure stability, establish peace, resuscitate 
markets, livelihoods and services and build state capacity to manage these 
processes” (Bailey et al, 2009; p.8). In reframing the issue of failed states “in terms 
of poverty and the role of internal reform in its management” (Macrae, 1999; p.10), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Few countries subject to recent conflict are now truly “post-conflict.” The rate of violence onset in countries 
with a recent previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s, and every civil war that began since 2003 
was in a country that had a previous civil war (World Bank, 2011; p.3). 
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the focus of international post-conflict assistance shifted to more interventionist 
post-conflict reconstruction processes centred on the importance of state capacity 
in fostering and ensuring development. Furthermore, the events of 9/11 brought on 
an additional concern for security, not only within those failed states, but also at 
international level. Consequently, a new rationale emerged for “strengthening 
international engagement in fragile states” (Harmer and Macrae, 2004, in Bailey et 
al, 2009; p.3) through a process of state building. 
Consequently, this section has highlighted two main points central to the argument 
of this thesis. Firstly, the development of international post-conflict reconstruction 
since 1945 has essentially focused on the state. Whilst the latest rationales for 
international intervention acknowledge the importance of bringing development to 
the societies of these failed or failing states, there has been little concern for the 
nature of social relations characterising the population, thus precluding the 
emergence of debates over the nature of institutions necessary to bring liberal 
peace in these countries. Secondly, this has translated into similarly little regard for 
“the degree to which local and international power dynamics shape the state, as 
well as the limitations of the normative discourses often applied to rights, law and 
representation in different contexts” (Richmond, 2014; p.3). The following section 
will explore how these two issues underpin the difference between state formation, 
which characterises the emergence of Western states, and state building as 
delivered by the international community in post-conflict countries. 
2.2. State formation and state building 
The two issues highlighted in the previous section underpin the paradoxical nature 
of interventions that take the Western state as their ideal-type for the 
reconstruction of countries after conflict, yet are seen as evolving within 
geopolitical frameworks that mark “enormous departures in practice [from that 
ideal-type] (Caporaso, 2000; p.1), where state building is abstracted from the 
society it is meant to govern. To this end, this section will begin by reviewing how 
the notion of liberal peace is articulated in the context of state building. 
Subsequently, in order to highlight the contradiction between state building in 
practice and the ideal-type state it is based on, this section moves on to reviewing 
how Western states have emerged and the close relationship between states and 
their population that characterised their emergence.   
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2.2.1. State building 
As highlighted in the previous section, state building emerged in the 1990s as a 
response to the increasing occurrence of intra-state conflicts characterised by a 
collapse of state institutions leading to a breakdown in state-society relations. To 
respond to these new challenges, and address the failures of conditional 
assistance in bringing sustainable peace, in 1995 then Secretary General to the 
United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali drafted the Supplement to the ‘Agenda for 
Peace’ – which was published in 1992 – where he affirmed that UN peacekeeping 
operations in countries affected by New Wars should also aim at “ensuring the 
original causes of war are eradicated”, and since “the collapse of state institutions” 
is one of the main features of these wars, peacekeeping should also include “the 
building up of national institutions” (UN Security Council, 1995; II, 22).  
Within this context, the critical issue of the conflict was re-defined in terms of 
states’ institutional strength (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.25), allowing the focus of 
post-conflict interventions to be centred on the necessity to rebuild state 
institutions’ administrative capability and ability to command authority (ibid). States 
were seen as failing because they were “falling short of specific standards of 
social, political and economic performance” (Yannis 2002 in ibid) and, in order to 
prevent a relapse into conflict, it was necessary to rebuild institutions capable of 
providing public goods and services that contributed to improving the country’s 
social, political and economic situation. As such, state building emerged as “the 
task of building functioning and durable states capable of fulfilling the essential 
attributes of modern statehood” (Dinnen, 2007; p.2), which included: providing 
security from external threats and maintaining internal order; raising and collecting 
taxes, delivering essential services such as health and education; the provision of 
transport and communications infrastructure; and, the prudent management of the 
economy (ibid). 
The argument of state building, therefore, was firmly grounded in the belief that if 
state institutions were strong enough to deliver adequate services to the population 
and secure people’s rights and obligations, social conflicts would be avoided, 
stability would be restored to the country and, consequently, to the international 
state system. As indicated in the previous section, this is what the implementation 
of liberal peace sought to address, developed around the notion that “the world 
can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will 
Literature review  
34 	  
is in rebellion, where there is no tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of 
freedom, and of right” (Wilson, 1965 in Paris, 2004; p.41). Western states, 
statistical evidence seemed to prove, were capable of achieving such stability 
because they functioned as democracies where state institutions were 
democratically elected and allowed room for the people – including the more 
vulnerable and marginalised groups of society – to express their will (UN Security 
Council, 1992; p.21). In those countries, social conflicts were prevented from 
evolving into conflicts through processes of voting, negotiating, compromising and 
mediating, processes “enhanced and supported by the restraints on decision 
makers of competitive elections” (Rummel, 1995 in Paris 2004; p.43). 
State building, therefore, emerged as a process that sought to build institutions 
that could replicate the success of Western democracies in preventing social 
conflicts from evolving into internal conflicts. However, one fundamental flaw 
underlines this rationale: the literature demonstrating the correlation between 
democracy and liberal peace “takes the existence of functioning states as a given” 
(ibid; p.46), viewing the state “not in its historical particularity, but abstractly, as an 
idealised decision-making subject” (Agnew, 1994; p.63). It assumes that the 
establishment of a democratic state in a post-conflict society, through democratic 
elections, will automatically bring about the processes of negotiation, 
compromising and mediating that underpin its success in avoiding conflict; in doing 
so, however, it abstracts itself from the key socio-political processes of building 
state institutions, that is, the development of state-citizens relations that 
characterised Western state formation. The following sub-section seeks to 
highlight this point by reviewing the processes that led to the Western democracies 
after which state building’s ideal-type state is modelled. 
2.2.2. State formation 
In everyday parlance and, to a large extent, within international relations literature 
and policy, references to the state seemingly make use of the term as a taken for 
granted concept without ever really defining it. Whilst there is a wealth of 
information on ‘fragile states’, ‘failed states’ and ‘post-conflict states’, the content of 
this information is usually packaged around the notion of the state reduced to what 
characterises it, that is, a core set of institutions that are deemed more or less 
successful at maintaining control over the population within set territorial 
boundaries (Jessop, 2009; Jones, M., 2009). However, these approaches fail to 
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“specify what lends these institutions the quality of statehood and who can 
legitimately be described as an agent of the state” (Jessop, 2009; p.416). Indeed, 
states are inherently historical entities that have evolved with time to accommodate 
widely diverse relations of power within geographical spaces, and in order to 
understand the modern state system it is necessary to first outline the main phases 
that have led to its present form, for indeed, “collective terms like the state are 
empty words unless one can determine what corresponds to them in the empirical 
world” (Dusza, 1989; p.72). 
a) Historical development of Western states 
Across political science and geography literature (Elden, 2013; Mellor, 1989; 
Storey, 2012; Tivey, 1981), the earliest appearance of a form of political 
governance apparatus is related to the emergence of the polis within the Greek 
city-state, some time between the seventh and the sixth centuries BC 
(Papanikolaou, 1991). The word polis referred to “an independent political, 
economic, religious and social unit, with a limited population and a restricted 
geographic area” (ibid) that consisted in an urban centre – asty – and the 
surrounding periphery – chora – over which the urban centre had jurisdiction. It 
was not defined by set territorial boundaries; rather, it was shaped by the extent of 
the community of people who shared a strong commitment to the value of a 
common life (ibid), and belonging to the polis was not determined primarily by 
family relationships or status but rather through participation “in judgement and 
authority, which is to say that [a man had] some role in establishing or applying the 
laws by which the polis [was] governed” (Miller F.D. Jr, 1974; p.64). Women and 
slaves, however, were excluded from the political life of the polis. This system of 
political organisations spread through the Aegean and the Mediterranean (Miller, 
1993; p.218), and was later reproduced in Renaissance Italy (Tivey, 1981; Mellor, 
1989; Storey, 2012). 
As the most powerful city-states, such as Rome or Athens, started encompassing 
other city-states within their territories, thus extending their control to ever-larger 
territorial boundaries, the concept of city-states slowly faded to give way to 
empires, such as the Roman Empire that emerged in 800 (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica8). Empires, or empire-states (Tivey, 1981; p.2), were typically ruled by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Encyclopedia Britannia, “empire” (accessed 15/07/14): 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/269851/Holy-Roman-Empire  
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one ruler – e.g. emperors, kings, etc – and marked a temporary rupture from the 
concept of government developed by city-states. Indeed, empires “overrode local 
rule by military force” (ibid) and led to territories that were often so vast in extent 
that the old structure of government, based on the relationship between the core –
where the government is – and the periphery could no longer contribute to 
effectively maintaining control and power over an ever-spreading number of 
people. As a result of this rule, however, empires started facing challenges 
regarding the provision of food and other supplies, on which the periphery was 
significantly dependent, and, more generally, maintaining the administration of the 
vast territory (Mellor, 1981; p.44). 
As such, it became necessary to fragment the territory so as to regain control, 
thusly providing the basis for the emergence of the feudal state where power was 
“local and personal” (Mellor, 1981; p.44). The power relationship was based on a 
system of protection in exchange for allegiance between the King and his subjects 
through the assistance of different classes of people, distinct from the masses in 
their direct relationship with the monarchy. Thus, because local bodies provided 
sustenance and security, rather than the monarch directly, political loyalty lain at 
different levels – e.g. town, province, guild, overlord or religious body (Tivey, 1989; 
p.18). The feudal system, however, slowly eroded under the pressures of two 
forces, according to Tivey (1989; p.20). On the one hand, rationalism9 stood 
against the idea of a society organised around a monarchy and a system of 
privileges, and therefore argued in favour of the abolition of all the customs that 
regulated the relations between the lord and his tenant – e.g. serfdom, rights of 
tenure (ibid; p.21). The ideals that drove the French revolution and the abolition of 
its monarchy were grounded in rationalist thinking.  
On the other hand, the introduction of capitalism further contributed to eroding the 
system of monarchy and privileges. Indeed, “as the commercial and agrarian 
interests came to dominate social and economic life, they exerted pressure for 
greater involvement in the management of the state” thus leading to the 
development of a “contractual state, where power was shared in a defined and 
constitutional form, recognising at least the rights of the upper and middle ranks of 
society” (Mellor; p.46). Finally, with industrialisation the masses started working in 
factories, becoming “a paid worker, a man not tied to land or locality” (Tivey, 1989; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “A disparate body of ideas on governance, economics, laws and relation; but all focused on one central article 
of faith: that man had a nature obedient to laws, self-regulating and generally benign” (Tivey, 1989; p.20) 
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p.29), thus contributing to the erosion of the feudal system based on land 
ownership and forming the basis for the emergence of the modern state.  
The brief overview of the development of Western states outlined above brings to 
the fore important elements that have seemingly remained a constant feature of 
these developments throughout the centuries, that is: the emergence of the state 
as the product of power relations within a given society – e.g. amongst residents of 
the polis, between emperors or monarchs and their subjects, etc; the state as a 
system of control of the population – e.g. emergence of ruling elites representing 
the link between the king and his subject; and, the territorial extent of authority – 
e.g. asty and chora of the polis, the empire, the fiefdoms. The following sub-
section explores the main theories on the emergence and the nature of the state, 
highlighting the fact that the point of view from which one seeks to understand the 
state can have significant consequences on the way in which one conceives the 
purpose of state institutions and their relation with the population they are meant to 
govern and control. 
b) Theories of the state 
The above shows that the state is a complex web of relationships between one or 
many agents of the state, the society it seeks to control and the space wherein this 
power relation is taking place; no one theory can capture these complexities within 
a single framework (Jones, M., 2009; p.409). As such, the following review of the 
literature, by no means exhaustive, seeks instead to provide the main theoretical 
debates clustering them, acknowledging that there also exists a variety of ways in 
which these theories can be clustered10, each method attempting to tackle states’ 
complexities in different ways, contingent upon “the particular research problems 
being addressed, the time frame in which they are being explored, and the kinds of 
explanations ultimately being sought” (Jones, M., 2009; p.412). Since, within the 
framework of this research, it is the nature of the relationship between the state, 
space and society that is being investigated, the selected theories are organised 
borrowing from the clusters identified by Jones, M. (2009), that is, Marxist and 
Historical Sociology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For instance: Jones, M. (2009) organised them as ‘Marxist’, ‘Historical sociology’ and ‘post-structuralism’; Tilly 
(1975) argued that theories available could be organised as ‘developmental’, ‘functional’ and historical’; and, 
Storey (2012) clustered them under the labels ‘organic development’, ‘functionalist development’ and ‘inter-
state’ 
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The Marxist perspective on state formation revolves around the argument that 
“the state is formed by, and acts in accordance with, the forces of capital and 
class, which are intrinsically interlinked through the ongoing territorialisation of 
political power” (ibid; p.411). Karl Marx’s vision of state formation was inherently 
related to economic modes of production and the division between those who own 
the means of production and the labour force: the state emerges as a result of a 
privileged ruling class, in possession of the means of production, creating the state 
apparatus to serve its own interests by preventing other classes from accessing 
power and therefore reproducing social inequalities. In this sense, “socio-spatial 
relations are constructed and constituted according to the political-economic 
circumstance in and through which they are produced” (ibid), the main function of 
the state system being the organisation of labour and the reproduction of a class 
system (McLellan, 1995 in Dal, N.D; p.2). Marx’s theory, however, says little about 
the formation of the state and its relation to the territory, as it appears that its 
territorial boundaries are already fixed. 
Charles Tilly’s theory of state formation, although rooted as Marx’s in its attention 
to the accumulation of capital, provides more insights on how states have 
emerged. According to Tilly (1985; p.181), states emerged as a product of ruling 
elites waging wars against each other so successfully as to gain power over 
gradually extended territories – war making; however, as the territory they 
protected extended, it became necessary to raise capital in order to continue the 
enterprise of war – extraction. As such, war-making elites established systems for 
the extraction of capital from the population residing in their territory – such as tax 
collection agencies, exchequers, account keepers – offering protection from the 
enemies in return – protection. The resulting system of capital extraction in return 
for protection from the enemy within a given territory is what ultimately led to state 
making. As such, Tilly (ibid; p.170) defines states as “relatively centralised, 
differentiated organisations the officials of which more or less successfully claim 
control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population 
inhabiting a large, contiguous territory”, thus offering an account of the 
legitimisation of state power and the gradual extension of such power across a 
territory that came to be defined in relation to the boundaries of other territories 
ruled by other war-making elites.  
Nevertheless, despite Tilly’s important contribution, his approach to the state 
remains that of an organ of power driven by economic means and removed from 
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the social relations of the territory it controls through coercive means. To this end, 
the Historical Sociology approach provides more of an insight, as theorists 
included in this category “are interested in the polymorphous crystallisation of state 
power” (Jones, M., 2009; p.411), the territorial boundaries of which come to be 
defined by the ensemble of social powers which make up state institutions (ibid).  
One of the most cited theorists in this category is Max Weber, for whom “power 
and struggle are primordial components of social life” (Dusza, 1989; p.73) and 
concrete social actions “give rise to particular structures in which power is 
institutionalised and in the framework of which power is contested” (ibid). In this 
sense, state institutions are constituted as a means through which historical power 
relations between ruling elites are expressed – between rulers and estates in 
feudal times, then between different polities as the feudal system eroded – thus 
lending a more historical approach to the development of the modern state through 
time. However, in Weber’s view, state power is centralised and remains 
autonomous from the population through the monopoly of the means of legitimate 
coercion within its territory (Weber, 1922 in Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.4). Thus, 
once the state is established, the demos – the people – have little power over state 
institutions; rather “it is governed and changes only the manner of the selection of 
executive leaders and the extent to which the demos […] is able, via so called 
‘public opinion’, to influence the content and direction of administrative activity” 
(ibid; p.9).  
Similarly to Weber, Michael Mann conceptualises the state as “an arena, the 
condensation, the crystallisation of social relations within its territories” (Mann, 
1989 in Moran, 1998; p.160). For him, the state is the result of the expression of a 
society legitimating a body external to its relations that is responsible for 
establishing set rules in order to ensure the survival of said society (Moran, 1998; 
p.160). The state is autonomous from the different social groups in that it performs 
functions that “may be greater or smaller than the sectional interests of social 
groups” (ibid). Nevertheless, Mann acknowledges that society is not unitary but 
made up of “a complex set of overlapping networks” (ibid; p.161) where multiple 
forces may exert influence in order to achieve what he believes to be the core 
sources of social power, that is, economic, ideological, military and political 
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resources11. As such, in order to ensure the stability of the state, ruling elites need 
to develop an ideology that penetrates civil society through the establishment and 
repetition of social practices. Therefore, Mann takes Weber’s useful starting point 
of the crystallisation of social relations in the arena of the state, and argues that 
the need to have monopoly over the four sources of social power is the basis to 
clearly move away from a state ruled by economic elites interested in capitalist 
accumulation alone. Furthermore, the introduction of the ideological social power 
provides an innovative relationship between the state and the population thus far 
absent in the other theories.  
Durkheim’s position on the emergence and the role of the state is grounded, much 
like Weber’s, in the critique of the liberalist belief that modern societies are driven 
by economic interests, creating as such selfish individuals that are no longer united 
in a “conscience collective” (Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.3). In his view, the state 
emerges as a sovereign apparatus, which main role is not that of preventing 
individuals from exercising their freedoms and rights, but instead it “creates and 
organises and makes a reality of these rights” (Durkheim, 1957 in ibid; p.9). 
However, unlike Weber and Mann, Durkheim did not think that the state existed in 
autonomy from society, “necessarily and inevitably [lying] in the hands of 
officialdom” (Weber, 1918 in ibid); rather, he sought to conceptualise a state which 
force is counter-balanced by social checks and balances within society through the 
education of the individual as an involved citizen concerned with collective 
interests and the development of ‘secondary associations’ that bring people 
together and provide an intermediary between their common interests and those of 
the agents of the state (Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.10). Therefore, in Durkheim’s 
view the state is, much like for Weber and Mann, a result of the crystallisation of 
social relations, but he differs from them in that he believes that once created, the 
role of the state is to create citizens by “transforming pluralistic concerns to some 
common universalistic commitments [and by putting] the protection of the 
democratic individual at the heart of the political process” (Prager, 1981 in ibid; 
p.17). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As described in his four volumes on The sources of social power where he traces the historical formation of 
the state 
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c) The state in the framework of this research 
The account of the main theories of the state elaborated above provides a useful 
starting point for understanding the main characteristics of the Western state. 
Tilly’s theory that “war made the state and the state made war” (Taylor and Botea, 
2008; p.27) contributes to explaining the emergence of the state apparatus in 
conjunction with flexible and ever growing territorial borders; nevertheless, the 
critique of the Marxist’s structural approach to the nature and role of the state, 
inherent to the Historical Sociology approaches, serves here to provide the basis 
for a conceptualisation of the state more grounded in the social relations of its 
population. The theories developed by Weber and Mann are key here in defining 
the state as the product of ever changing social relations, thereby advancing a 
vision of the state that is not fixed but contingent upon the characteristics of a 
society at a given point in time; however, the state that emerges from these 
theories remains too autonomous from the population, characterised by institutions 
which main role is to maintain authority and control over the population through the 
monopoly over the legitimate means of violence. To this end, Durkheim’s 
conception of a state that emerges out of the crystallisation of social relations, but 
which institutions aim at creating a sense of common interests within the 
population of the territory, provides more useful insights into the direction this 
research wishes to take; that is, that Western states need to be understood in the 
context of their emergence, which is characterised by a long history of interaction 
between state and society within a wide variety of social, cultural, historical and 
political contexts (OECD, 2010; p.17). Consequently, “the state and the political 
system are bound up with the broader geographical ensemble of social relations 
and one cannot adequately describe or explain the state, state apparatus, state 
projects, or anything else associated with the state, without referring to its 
relationship with such ensembles” (Jones, M., 2009; p.409). It is the nature of this 
relationship that the next sub-section endeavours to explore.  
2.2.3. The state as container of society 
The sub-sections above hint at a relationship between states and society 
underpinned by the idea of social relations being fashioned and controlled by a 
territorial entity; the nature of this relationship, however, as the theories on state 
have revealed, has remained flexible and evolved through time. For a large portion 
of the literature on state formation (Caporaso, 2000; Flint and Taylor, 2011; 
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Jessop, 2009; Kratochwill, 1986) the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 164812 
represents a key historical turning point for the nature of state-society relations, as 
they are understood in today’s Western states.  
a) The territorialisation of the state 
By establishing a new European order “parcelled up into 300 sovereign units” (Flint 
and Taylor, 2011; p.121), the Treaty of Westphalia recognised each state’s 
sovereignty to forge policies to rule inside its own territory whilst simultaneously 
preventing other authorities from interfering with those same policies (Caporaso, 
2000; p.1). Under this new European order, the notion of territory gained significant 
importance for it ceased to be merely understood as a flexible geographical 
boundary that delineated the extent of a sovereign’s rule; instead, it became a 
fixed delimitation of a state’s authority within that territory that moved beyond the 
notion of land “in the political-economic sense of rights of use, appropriation, and 
possession attached to a place” (Elden, 2013; p.323) to define a “political 
technology” (ibid) where population control, for the sake of this same population’s 
security, is exercised by a sovereign state. In this context, the notion of 
sovereignty, much like that of territory, also gained a new meaning as it shifted 
from referring to the sovereign, that is the ruler of a group of people, to 
characterising the extent of political authority of a state within its territory. 
Fixing the boundaries of the state and ensuring its sovereignty, that is its authority 
over the population across its territory, had important implications for the 
relationship between a social group and the authority responsible for decision-
making – regarding rules, security, and going to war or political economy – till then 
historically focused on the local level. In ancient Greece, for instance, the polis 
“assumed an identity and a form which reflected the totality of its citizens as a 
body, regardless of their individual inclinations, their ancestral origins, their 
professions or their social positions” (Papanikolaou, 1991; p.26), that is, the polity; 
belonging to the polis was not determined by a territorial delimitation, but rather the 
extent of the polity delimited the extent of the polis so as to ensure direct 
participation of all citizens. Similarly, in medieval Europe, “communities were 
united only by allegiances and personal obligation rather than abstract individual 
equality […] in a geographically circumscribed territory” (Agnew, 1994; p.60). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Treaty that brought to an end the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the Dutch and the German phase of 
the Thirty Years’ War (http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of-Westphalia ; accessed on 
01/10/13) 
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Sovereignty was held by the sovereign but effective rule happened at the local 
level and was determined by particular issues and contexts (Caporaso, 2000; 
p.22); this resulted in shifting allegiances between multiple authorities in widely 
diverse jurisdictional matters and implied that rule was “not limited by a conception 
of permanent borders within which such rule applied and outside of which it did not 
apply” (ibid). The introduction of a fixed space of sovereign rule changed this 
dynamic, replacing local rule with a wider reaching identity rooted in “the principle 
of spatial exclusion” (Walker, 1990 in Agnew, 1994; p.60). 
The Treaty of Westphalia, therefore, marked a turning point in the constitution of a 
polity. No longer defined by local interests and rule, it became characterised by the 
distinction between what was internal to the territory and what was considered 
external (Tilly, 1985; p.184), forming a potential threat to the territory. The notion of 
security in a world divided into fixed territorial units (Agnew, 1994; p.60) came to 
play a central role in the justification of the existence of the state and became a 
defining feature for the cohesion of society. For in order to ensure security within a 
territory, it became necessary to create a political community that could 
encompass all the previously existing local alliances, bringing together a much 
wider population within the territory of the state under the common interest of 
protecting themselves from others. In this context, the political community deriving 
from the territorialisation of the state gave “people a means of locating themselves 
in the world and of distinguishing themselves from others” (ibid; p.226), thus 
legitimising the sovereignty of the state. 
b) From local polity to political community 
The territorialisation of the state, therefore, required that the newly established 
state authority form, out of the wide variety of local polities shaped by local 
alliances and different forms of authority, a political community coterminous with 
the boundaries of the territory. It involved a process of “intense interaction, 
bargaining, tension and conflict between and among different state and societal 
actors that resulted in people coming to accept the state as the highest authority” 
(OECD, 2010; p.16). To this end, the state had to develop, amongst different social 
groups characterised by close alliances, an implicit contract, proximity of social 
relations and exchanges (Beauchard and Moncomble, 2013; p.45), a strong 
commitment to its mode of governance through citizen engagement in policy 
making and implementation (OECD, 2010; p.16). That is, it had to create a new, 
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invisible link throughout its territory that linked these different local polities together 
into a political community characterised by invisible bonds, mobility, the 
manifestation of collective regularity and a common commitment to the same rights 
and duties (Beauchard and Moncomble, 2013; p.45) within the territory of the 
state. 
In this sense, the local polity that defines different social groups is the product of 
social relations, defined both by everyday interactions within a specific setting and 
in opposition to others that are not part of the social group to which people identify. 
The daily interaction of people within space contributes to the construction of 
routines shared amongst a group of people, routines that through time “generate a 
communal way of seeing the world in consistent terms, sharing a host of reference 
points that provide the basis for shared discursive and practical habits” (Edensor, 
2006; p.528). These routines are not only determined by the interaction of people, 
but they are also the product of the environment in which they are shared, for 
indeed people who live in the mountains will form different patterns of interaction 
than people who live by the sea – the former dictated by the harshness of the 
weather conditions whilst the latter shaped by the rhythms of, say, fishing life. 
Through these daily routines and interactions, therefore, “the group’s image of its 
external milieu and its stable relationships with this environment becomes 
paramount in the idea it forms of itself, permeating every element of its 
consciousness, moderating and governing its evolution” (Halbwachs, 1950; p.2); 
that is, the space defines the polity and the polity defines the space.  
As such, local polities are ever changing, constantly fragmenting, emerging and 
conjoining with each others (Edensor, 2009; p.242) in order to tackle a changing 
environment. As they do so, they create new routines and memories that are 
common to multiple groups, thus gradually extending to create a new polity within 
an extended space, without however threatening the nature of each individual 
group. As such, whilst polity emerges naturally as a local phenomenon shaped by 
the space in which daily interactions take place, it is not fixed in time nor space; 
rather, it can come to include new social groups, “such that a smaller identity may 
be contained within a larger identity and that identity may in turn be contained 
within a yet larger identity” (Kaplan, D.H., 2009; p.252).  
In this context, the development of a political community out of these varied local 
polities involves the penetration of state institutions in people’s everyday life in 
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order to induce a sense of self-awareness that cuts across small-scale social 
groups to foster a wider community. It implies the development, at the scale of the 
territory of the state, of “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing 
a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common 
past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself” 
(Guibernau, 1996; p.47). Within this context, the political community therefore 
presents five key characteristics: 
 Psychological – that is, the consciousness of forming a group that induces 
people to “cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people” 
(Mills 1997 in Cline, 2002; p.4); 
 Cultural – sharing with other people “ways of life, language, oral and written 
literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or beliefs, rites 
and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or technology, 
natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter and the arts, 
customs and traditions” (UN, 2009; p.3); 
 Historical – creating a narrative that brings a social group together on the basis 
of “historical events and characters [which] assume huge significance” (Storey, 
2012; p.76); 
 Political – building an institutional system that promotes participation of all 
citizens by facilitating people’s ability to readily express their will (UN, 1992; 
p.21); 
 Territorial – creating a representation of the imagined territory of the state in 
the citizens’ mind. 
If polities are socially constructed and multiscalar, then state institutions can 
intervene to institutionalise shared patterns across the territory of the state  by 
favouring intersubjective communication between different social groups within its 
borders (Jenkins, 1996 in Edensor, 2006; p.528). State institutions can do so 
through the creation of the military, a system of education and media that promote 
shared values, languages and a common civic culture (Penrose, 2009; p.227). 
Moreover, since local polities are also defined by the space people interact in, 
state institutions can establish adequate infrastructure in order to create a 
collective awareness of the political community through mobility and collective 
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awareness of sharing the same benefits, the same repetitive practices and 
experiences within a given space at a given time (Edensor, 2006; p.532). The 
negotiation between the state and society to create an invisible political community 
out of the varied local polities is underpinned by the notion of social contract. 
c) Redefining state-society relations through social contract theory 
Following the territorialisation of the state after the Treaty of Westphalia, monarchs 
became increasingly involved in the management of the political and economic 
activities of their territory through a central agency responsible for creating new 
rules. However, the need to identify with a wider entity within a given territory, as 
opposed to a local one determined by context and needs, brought about the 
necessity to question anew the relationship between the population and authority. 
Indeed, the notion that a sovereign state principally characterised as an entity that 
successfully claims the legitimate use of the means of violence, and represented 
by a ruler, no longer held sway in a new European order where state’s authority 
pervaded every aspect of the economic, political and social life within a fixed 
territory. Slowly, therefore, the population of these new states began questioning 
the conferring of sovereignty by divine right, arguing instead for a system of 
government that should be representative of the people – instead of an elite few – 
and in the interests of the people (Penrose, 2009; p.224). As a result, between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century all European monarchies started falling. 
The shift in the relationship between the sovereign territorial entity and the people 
within that territory consequently “represented a monumental shift in political 
thought and the application of these ideas demanded clarification of just what was 
meant by ‘the people’” (Penrose, 2009; p.224). The emergence of social contract 
theories13, in the sixteenth century, sought to answer this question by redefining 
where state’s legitimacy and sovereignty lain (Hickey, 2011; p.6) through the 
articulation of the relationship in terms of a social contract between the state and 
the people. However, because the different strands of social contract theory go as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Hickey (2011) organised – based on Freeman (2007) – social contract theories in terms of social or rights-
based and liberal or interest-based approaches to contractarianism. The social approach “views social contracts 
in terms of the rights and obligations of individuals, both against political authority and each other” (Hickey, 
2011; p.6), and in this category he includes, amongst others, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls. It is grounded in the 
conception of a state which aim is to ensure social justice within its society, and society itself is made up of 
individuals that are motivated by impersonal aims (ibid; p.8). Conversely, the liberal approach, which includes 
writers such as Hobbes, von Hayek and Buchanan, is much more grounded in liberalist and neoliberalist notions 
of society where “rational agents are presumed to maximise their advantage or self-interest” (Black, 2001 in 
ibid; p.7). Within this view, the state is particularly concerned with the maintenance of order and security, and 
society is characterised by individualistic behaviours and meritocracy (ibid; p.8). 
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far back as the sixteenth century and are deeply grounded in the historical context 
in which they were formulated, each theory seeks to answer different questions 
regarding the nature of the relationship between states and their population14 
(Boucher and Kelly, 2003; p.1). It would therefore be beyond the scope of this 
literature review to attempt to give a full picture; rather, the following review firstly 
presents the distinction between early social contract theorists – such as Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau – and modern social contract theorists – such as Rawls and 
Buchanan – and then moves on to introducing the main strands of theory 
applicable to the nation state within the framework of this research. 
The starting point of early social contract theorists was an attempt to understand 
“the terms of political association” (D’Agostino, Gaus and Thrasher, 2011; p.14). 
Situated in the historical context that witnessed the territorialisation of the state, the 
main theorists of this early period – Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – sought to 
understand the rationale behind the consent given by a group of people to move 
from what they called the State of Nature (SoN) – that is the natural condition of 
mankind – to that of a “body politic” (Locke, 1952; p.50) ruled by a state. Although 
the conceptualisation of the SoN varies significantly from one theorist to another15, 
the main idea behind these theories was that at a moment in time a pre-political 
society decided to form a body politic ruled by a government in the interest of the 
people – here, again, the reasons for this government range from the need for 
protection of individual property to moral values. As such, “the desire for security, 
in one guise or another, and improved material and cultural benefits, acts as the 
catalyst to transform a potentially hostile SoN into multiple political units, the 
legitimacy of which is based upon authority and not force” (Boucher and Kelly, 
2003; p.13). The close relationship between the authority and the people remains 
evident in these theories, perhaps because they pre-date the revolutions that 
brought an end to monarchical rule and the feudal system, thus referring to 
sovereign units of state authority that are pre-eminently local. These theories, 
however, came under severe scrutiny for their characterisation of the SoN as 
inherently apolitical and for assuming that at some given point in time the content 
of a social contract was agreed upon. Instead, as the theories of the state 
presented earlier in section 2.2.1 illustrated, “historically, no such contractual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Some attempted to address the creation of society, civil society or a sovereign, whilst others looked more 
closely at issues related to procedural rules of justice or morality (Boucher and Kelly, 2004; p.1) 
15 E.g. Hobbes saw it as a permanent state of insecurity and war, whereas Rousseau understood it as a time of 
individual freedom threatened by insecurity 
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moment existed” (Paz-Fuchs, 2011; p.3); rather, man is by nature a “political 
animal” (Aristotle, 350 BCE; section 1253a) and the decision to create a sovereign 
state within fixed territorial boundaries was the outcome of external processes of 
war and peace between elites, not the result of a mutual consent within the 
population of that territory. As a result, the idea of the social contract lost impetus 
for some time.  
Social contract theory enjoyed a renewed interest following the publication of John 
Rawls’ A theory of Justice (1971). Key to this publication was the move away from 
the idea of an original consent given by a social group to be ruled by a state, to 
concentrate instead on justifying the choice of government institutions that have 
been implemented. In this sense, it circumvented the issue of initial consent that 
undermined early social contract theorists, by focusing instead on the rationale 
behind the social agreement on “what constitutional order or social institutions are 
mutually beneficial and stable over time” (Buchanan, 1965 in D’Agostino et al, 
2011; p.2). Thus, the central tenet of twentieth century, contemporary, social 
contract theorists is that of justifying the choice of state institutions through a 
process of checks and balances that requires “good faith on the part of officials to 
explain and justify the legal order to those bound to it” (Rawls, 1993; p.57); it is a 
deliberative matter (ibid; p.3) underpinned by the notion that people are all born 
under a state – that is, there is no choice of consent – but they have the power to 
deliberate on state institutions’ ability to promote “justice as fairness” (Rawls, 2001; 
p.3).  
In his theory, Rawls’ point of departure is a hypothetical situation where the 
citizens of a state are asked what is the least advantageous situation they are 
prepared to accept if they had no notion of what their position in society would be; 
this is what he calls the ‘veil of ignorance’, an ideal type situation the outcome of 
which is justice. On the basis of this hypothetical assumption, citizens can 
undertake a series of checks and balances against state institutions to ensure that 
they provide the correct framework for guaranteeing social justice in society. At the 
core of this conception of justice, is Rawls’ belief that since “inequality in positions 
[in society at birth] is both highly likely (perhaps inevitable) and very useful, each 
would want income and wealth generating positions to be open to all on some 
reasonable principle of equality of opportunity” (Martin, 2003; p.252). It is not 
therefore a matter of simply redistributing financial and material resources, but 
rather first and foremost to ensure that everyone, considering their position in 
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society at birth, has equal access to opportunities16. For the purpose of this 
research Rawls’ theory of justice is used to understand how the institutions of the 
state have evolved, in Western countries, from the moment of the Treaty of 
Westphalia through to today. 
2.2.4. States building and political community 
The historical evolution, presented in section 2.2.1, of the relationship between a 
sovereign authority – whether a people, a king, or a state – and the population, has 
shown that the nature of such relationship has been grounded in local interactions 
based on needs and contexts. Consequently, whilst the extent of polities may have 
determined spatial boundaries, spatial boundaries did not necessarily determine 
the polity; territory, authority and social groups evolved together within flexible, 
constantly moving territorial boundaries, whilst legitimation of authority happened 
at varying scales – city, empire or fiefdoms.  
The introduction of fixed territorial boundaries, within which one entity held the 
maximum authority – the state – brought about the necessity to legitimise such 
territorial power through the construction of a political community coterminous with 
the new fixed boundaries of the state. This process, however, much like that of 
state formation, did not happen overnight, and here Rawls’ theory of justice is 
useful in explaining how the necessity to find a system of government that suited 
the interests of all competing local polities within a fixed territory was at the core of 
the legitimisation of the state project. It brings to the fore the role of deliberation in 
shaping a political community where, through a system of checks and balances, 
the population within a given state territory can determine whether the state 
system is a just one, capable of fairly representing the interests of all pre-existing 
local polities. In this sense, Rawls’ contribution is that of solving “a justificatory 
problem by converting it to a deliberative problem” (D’Agostino et al, 2011; p.3) to 
justify state rules and constraints. Therefore, through the contestation of 
monarchical power, the population of the new states exercised pressure for the 
establishment of a system that would allow them to maintain a stake in the 
decision-making – government by the people, to varying degrees.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 A later reworking of this theory, which he called “the democratic interpretation” (ibid; p.253) also took into 
consideration people’s natural abilities; here, he argued that everyone also has different natural abilities but that 
the distribution of these abilities is a collective asset and therefore people should be given access to the 
adequate positions to fulfil this potential so that everyone can benefit in society. This vision, however, reflects 
Rawls’ vision of individuals as inherently motivated by the common good, and has been rejected on that basis 
for the purpose of this research. 
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The ensuing state system, consequently, aims at ensuring equal access to 
opportunities and freedoms for all the social groups within the territory through its 
institutions. It does so by intervening in “spatial, material, performative and 
representational dimensions of everyday life …[that] facilitate communication and 
establish a sense of national belonging” (Edensor, 2006; p.526). In other words, 
the state system penetrates people’s everyday life in a myriad of spatial and 
material ways that facilitate all social groups’ access to opportunities and 
freedoms, allowing them to participate in the state project, thus continually creating 
and maintaining a political community (Kaplan, D.H., 2009; p.248).  
This is what state building originally intended to achieve through the 
implementation of liberal peace in post-conflict countries. The establishment of 
democracy in those countries aimed at fostering “the evolution of the social 
contract upon which lasting peace can be built” (Boutros-Ghali, 1996; p.7). It was 
seen as the only means capable of engendering, through the implementation of 
conditions in which people can readily express their will (UN Security Council, 
1992; p.21), the development of a political community that brought “the social 
stability needed for productive growth” (ibid). The next section will explore how, 
despite these key concepts underpinning the state building process, the 
international community’s taken for granted notion of the Western state, abstracted 
from the historical tensions that built it, has translated in practice into a state 
building process deprived of its necessary political community counterpart.  
2.3. Understanding the impact of international state building on political 
community 
The most recent failures to create functioning states in countries such as Timor 
Leste, Iraq and Afghanistan has brought on a new wave of criticism on “what and 
whom the state is for from the perspective of international actors, and how this is 
commensurate with the views of its citizens” (ibid; p.4), thus affecting its long term 
stability. In an attempt to contribute to such debate, the following section focuses 
on the relationship between the nature of liberal state building interventions and 
their impact on the process of building a political community across the territory of 
the state. Its starting point is the state as the ideal-type used for framing these 
interventions, as defined in section 2.2.2 and framed by four key concepts – which 
have emerged throughout this chapter: territory – as geographical boundaries 
determining the extent of authority; sovereignty – as authority; legitimacy – as right 
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to rule recognised by the population; and, citizenship – as the population’s 
deliberative exercise that determines legitimacy. For each of these concepts, this 
section presents their meaning in the context of the ideal-type state, explores how 
they are actually interpreted in the realm of state building and finally discusses the 
implications of these interpretations for the construction of a political community. 
2.3.1. Territory 
Section 2.2.3 reviewed how the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia contributed to 
the creation of a new European order organised into territorially defined political 
units, legitimised by the creation of a political community that extends throughout 
the whole territory and under the sovereignty of one decision-making entity within 
those borders; that is, the state. Since then, “the model of the [Western] state […] 
has been ‘globalised’ and has become the prevalent form of political organisation” 
(von Bogdandy et al, 2005; p.587); however, in the past few decades, significant 
debates have emerged as to the meaning of the notion of territory arguing that 
different approaches can lead to considerably different outcomes in terms of the 
nature of the state itself. 
a) State 
One of the main fields yielding literature on the notion of territory in relation to the 
state is that of geography – be it political, human or in its own right. In this realm, 
the territory is essentially perceived as being the product of historical processes 
characterised by relations of power and authority that materialise physically as 
borders defined by human strategies. For instance, Elden (2013; p.10) 
understands territory as “dependent on a number of techniques and on the law, 
which are […] historically and geographically specific”; territory here is different 
from the mere notion of land or terrain in that the latter do not refer to any historical 
process, whereas the former implies the notion of political control, built through 
time, over the land and the population within it. Agnew (1994; p.54), understands 
territory much along the same lines, as the product of “different historical 
circumstances”, but moves away from the notion of territory as a bounded space to 
argue that “systems of rule or political organisation need not be either territorial, 
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where geographical boundaries define the scope of membership in a polity a 
priori17, […] or fixed18” (ibid).  
The notion of territory as not being fixed but, rather, defined by the extent of the 
reach of political organisation reflects the historical development of the state as 
discussed in section 2.2.2. It echoes the process of state formation understood in 
the context of this research as the relationship between systems of rule and the 
population these rules apply to and are recognised by; in this sense, authority was 
not defined by a territory, but the territory was defined by the geographical reach of 
groups forming part of this relationship. The introduction of the fixed boundaries 
defining the state introduced the notion of “exclusive and inalienable rights to set 
pieces of land” (Penrose, 2009; p.225), but the historical process that led to the 
creation of a national level authority involved the negotiation of the different types 
of authority existing at different scales into a wider, territorial system of rules. The 
creation of the German state, for instance, started in the mid-19th century when the 
Prussian-dominated reich incorporated many small German-speaking 
principalities, each originally a small territorial state with distinctive origins, 
geographic scale and founding mythology (Agnew, 1994; p.64). Today, the federal 
system allows some of these social identities to continue to function within the 
wider German political community. 
In the context of this research, territory is therefore defined as “the extension of the 
state’s power” (Elden (2013; p.322), which can be coterminous with the territorial 
boundaries of the state if the development of the state has been successful, but 
also involves a combination of nested local, regional and/or federal authorities.  
b) State building 
As introduced at the end of section 2.1.3, state building emerged in the late 1990s 
in response to the growing concern about failed or failing states’ inability to 
promote sustainable peace within their territory. The idea of state building pertains 
essentially to the domain of international relations and as its name indicates, is a 
state centric process where references to the territory of the state are made strictly 
in terms of the “territorial integrity” that must be fully respected (UN Security 
Council, 1992; p.5). It is a notion of the state underpinned by exclusive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “For example in kinship or clan systems space is occupied as an extension of group membership rather than 
residence within a territory defining group membership as in territorial states” (Agnew, 1994; p.54) 
18 “… as with nomads” (ibid) 
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membership to one group governed by the state within its boundaries, and is 
grounded within a framework where “the principle of hierarchical subordination 
gradually gave way to the principle of spatial exclusion” (Walker, 1990 in Agnew, 
1994; p.61). 
In the context of international relations literature, therefore, the notion of territory is 
stripped of its political meaning and reduced to an understanding of fixed 
international borders to be preserved. The notion of security against others is key 
to this literature, thus viewing the state in realist terms as an entity that needs to 
protect its territory from foreign invasion and occupation (Mearsheimer, 1994 in 
Slaughter, 2011; p.1), concentrating on questions of war and peace (Taylor, 1996; 
p.1925). Although not an international relations theorist per se, Schmitt’s writings 
on The Nomos of the Earth have been used within international theory to 
conceptualise the state as a spatially concrete unity within a particular division of 
the international order (Elden, 2013; p.95) and where “territorial preservation [is] 
seen as non-negotiable” (Elden, 2010; p.24). For example, whilst the interventions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan were justified by the fact that their states were failing to 
meet certain international standards, “questioning their spatial constitution was 
entirely off the table” (ibid).  
c) Political community 
As noted in section 2.1.3, the changes in the nature of conflict that took place in 
the 1990s, combined with the failure of ODA to successfully address the root 
causes of these conflicts, led the international community to reframe post-conflict 
reconstruction activities in terms of failed states. Liberal peace was seen as the 
key concept that would contribute to re-establishing trust between the state and its 
citizens and, as such, result in the development of more peaceful relations 
conducive to sustainable peace and post-conflict development. International policy 
documents, published by international organisations involved in governance and 
development, do reference the importance of the construction of a political 
community across the territory of the state for the establishment of legitimate and 
functioning states. The OECD (2010; p.15), for instance, indicates that for a state 
to be legitimate it is not sufficient to focus on normative rules; rather it is crucial to 
understand “whether, how and why people accept a particular form of rule as being 
legitimate”. Similarly, the UNDP (2012; p.49), argues that states need to be able to 
“establish priorities, […] procure equipment and services and deliver services” for 
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all social groups within the territory if they “hope to restore public trust and 
confidence in the government” (ibid).  
However, within the realm of international relations to which state building pertains, 
the ‘international’ is defined as “beyond society” (Taylor, 1996; p.1924), 
constraining state-society relations – and therefore political community – to a 
purely endogenous process separated from international interventions, and 
consequently justifying the possibility “to conduct state building operations from the 
outside without entering into the contested sphere” of political community 
construction (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.26). In this sense, the building of a state 
within fixed territorial boundaries eliminates from consideration the geographically 
variegated forms of local polity pre-existent in the territory, to the benefit of 
territorially homogeneous ones (Agnew, 1994; p.62), precluding the creation of a 
political community across the territory of the state constituted through historical 
processes (Miller F.D. Jr., 1974; p.64). For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq the 
local polities present in the territory upon intervention were to be preserved at all 
costs (Elden, 2010; p.24) to the detriment of the emergence of new ones in 
response to the societal changes resulting from the conflict. The UN itself, in the 
Supplement to its Agenda for Peace, makes no reference to any process of social 
construction taking place in the countries benefitting from state building activities, 
and references to ‘citizens’, ‘population’ or ‘civilians’ strictly refer to either victims of 
violence or subjects of the state. This approach to state building, therefore, results 
in a “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994; p.54) that disregards both the historical 
processes and the geographical scales that characterised the emergence of states 
in Western Europe.  
2.3.2. Sovereignty 
The fixed territorial boundaries characteristic of the state therefore imply, as noted 
above, the notion of authority over a given territory in order to ensure security 
against both internal and external threats. Originally placed within the hands of a 
sovereign, such authority came to be known as ‘sovereignty’; however, the social 
changes brought on by the gradual fall of European monarchies from the 18th 
century onward, have resulted in a shift of sovereignty as being impersonated by 
the monarch and identified with divine cosmos, to sovereignty as being associated 
to the territory of the state and state institutions (Colins, 1989 in Agnew, 1994; 
p.61). Much like the notion of territory to which it is closely intertwined, the notion 
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of sovereignty is open to a wide array of different interpretations that can yield 
significantly different implications for the reconstruction of states affected by 
conflicts.  
a) State 
The notion of sovereignty as it is understood today in relation to the state is 
therefore territorial in nature, and is defined by a dualism between “the inherent 
source of power that alone can authorise the creation of a political order” 
(Jennings, 2011; p.29) and “the sovereign constituted political body that represents 
that power” (ibid); that is, the constituent power and the constituted power. 
Debates in the literature on sovereignty, however, have diverged on two important 
grounds: firstly, on what is the source of the power – the nature of the constituent; 
and, secondly, on the nature of the power held by the constituted.  
For Hobbes and Bodin, for instance, sovereignty did not refer to a historical 
process characterising the evolution of the form of authority of the constituted over 
the constituent; rather, it was a new idea “intended to enable a degree of 
unification and centralisation of power in the emerging monarchies beyond 
anything which then existed” (ibid; p.29). In this sense, the constituted emerges out 
of a social contract with the constituent, wherein the latter relinquishes all the 
power to the former for the purpose of protection within the territory; the social 
contract here is a one time occurrence, and the constituted power is henceforth 
separated from the constituent and has no obligation towards the latter (ibid; p. 
30). Concerned that such conceptualisation of the relationship between the 
constituent and the constituted could lead the latter to act against the good of the 
former, writers such as Rousseau sought to view the nature of this relationship in 
reverse terms, that is, “the only legitimate sovereignty [is] that produced by the full 
constituent power of the people” (ibid; p.31), whereby the authoritative powers of 
the constituted can be removed if they cease to represent the will of the 
constituent. These perceptions of sovereignty are both grounded in the notion of 
territory as defined by state boundaries, and refer to the state as an entity formed 
at a given point in time by the social contract between constituent and constituted 
powers. In this sense, sovereignty is ahistorical. Indeed, for Hobbes once 
sovereign power is constituted, it cannot be changed – it lies outside of society – 
and therefore no historical relations other than the constitutive one exists; in 
Rousseau, on the other hand, “any political order, having been previously created, 
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could never hope to truly represent the will of the constituent power of the moment” 
(ibid), and as such it can be broken and constituted anew. Moreover, the nature of 
the sovereign authority, in these cases, is “to enforce internal order and to protect 
against external threat” (Agnew, 2009 in Fregonese, 2012; p.2) and is understood 
as “an achievable condition of exclusive and homogeneous state authority over a 
territory” (Fregonese, 2012; p.2). 
Both of these views, however, remain locked within a political logic underpinned by 
the opposition of constituent and constituted power, whereby the nature of either 
power rests in its ability to break down the system created by the other. Arendt 
criticised these perceptions by arguing that the two powers need not be mutually 
exclusive. In her understanding, constituent and constituted powers must be 
understood as closely intertwined, as they were in the Athenian polis, where 
constituent power always results in some kind of constituted power that forms the 
local polity and need not be sovereign at the level of the state. That is, in the 
absence of a state, people do not reverse to a SoN where violence prevails, but 
instead form different, smaller polities (Jennings, 2011; p.43); these can then be 
reconstituted into a state sovereign power, “to create a kind of community which 
might best ensure and protect [a people’s] historically contingent conception of 
republican liberty” (ibid). Arguing much along the same lines, Agnew (2005; p.441) 
states that, “political authority is not restricted to states and that such authority is 
thereby not necessarily exclusively territorial”; rather the extent of political power is 
defined historically through a process of legitimation of authority between a 
constituent power and an ever spreading constituted power. For instance, the 
French, Russian and Hungarian revolutions started with local political councils that 
were subsequently co-opted, as their cause gained ground, in their respective 
revolutionary states (Jennings, 2011; p.42); subsequently, through a historical 
process that “did not occur overnight” (Agnew, 2005; p.441), elites were then 
forced to grant increasing infrastructural goods to ensure the legitimation of 
sovereignty (ibid; p.444). The nature of sovereign authority here is still 
characterised by order, but such order is maintained through the establishment of 
a mutually beneficial relationship between constituent and constituted powers. 
Within the context of this research, therefore, sovereignty is understood as 
indicating state’s “supreme authority within a territory” (Philpott, 2014; p.3) – that 
is, centralised power held by the state (Agnew, 2005; p.442) – historically 
developed through the negotiation of “socially constructed practices of political 
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authority” (ibid; p.441), which may be exercised “non-territorially or in scattered 
pockets” (ibid), in order to expand patterns of social association and interaction 
(ibid) across the whole national territory. 
b) State building 
The realism that pervades international relations literature, and consequently its 
application in the field of state building, is locked within a framework defined by a 
national/international polarity (Agnew, 1994; p.59), where sovereignty strictly refers 
to the centralised power held by the state in order to protect its territory from 
internal and external threats. Security is key, therefore, not only in terms of 
preventing external invasions of territorial borders – Schmitt’s friend-enemy 
distinction (Jennings, 2011; p.36) – but also in relation to order inside the territory. 
This view of sovereignty has two important implications for the manner in which 
new states in post-conflict countries come to be recognised as sovereign by the 
international community and, consequently, for state building interventions. 
Firstly, Schmitt argues that political life is defined by “the categorical fact that the 
possibility of violence can never be removed from life” (ibid), and as such 
sovereignty characterises the ability of the state to impose order within a bounded 
space under the control of a group (Elden, 2010; p.22). Political life, in this sense, 
is not about the negotiation of different interests in order to reach a situation that 
can suit the majority of the different groups within a territory; rather, it is about 
“absolute territorial organisation of political authority” (Agnew, 2005; p.439) where 
security – that is, the absence of conflict – prevails. Security, in this sense, is what 
Roberts (2008; p.538) refers to as “negative peace” and is one of the key 
conditions for the sovereignty of a state to be recognised by the international 
community. Secondly, as a consequence, in the context of state building 
interventions “modern states and political authority are seen as practically bonded 
together” (Agnew, 2005; p.439) – as argued, for instance, by Hobbes (1651), 
Schmitt (1985) and Locke (1952) – automatically superseding all other forms of 
political authority. As such, a country presenting other sources of authority within 
local polities, that may have pre-dated the emergence of the country or that may 
have emerged out of a resistance fight – e.g. in Timor Leste and South Sudan – 
but without a central power exercising authority within a state’s territory, is seen as 
displaying a total absence of political organisation (Fregonese, 2012; p.5) and in 
need for international state building intervention. 
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Thus, sovereignty in the context of state building interventions consists of: “the 
notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic jurisdiction 
and territorial preservation of existing boundaries” (Elden, 2007; p.825). As such, 
these interventions abstract themselves from the more historical nature of 
sovereignty as constructed from below, replacing “millennia of development of 
complex political and legal forms of authority (and established modes for 
interpreting them) with one single modern and rational concept for all power – 
[state] sovereignty” (Jennings, 2011; p.30). 
c) Political community 
Too state centred, the type of sovereignty advocated and supported by 
international state building interventions is stripped of “the substance of territorial 
integrity, its social and economic content” (Schmitt, 1950 in Elden, 2010; p.23), 
which actually contribute to ensuring that state’s authority is recognised and 
respected throughout the whole of its territory.  
International state building practices’ focus on security stems from the 
implementation of traditional liberal security mechanisms “that reflect realist 
preoccupation with the military and other disciplinarian arms of the state” (Roberts, 
2008; p.551); in this sense, the authority of the state is not fostered through social 
relations as much as it is feared. In countries recovering from conflict, however, 
particular emphasis should be put on understanding the dynamics of social 
relations not only because they provide a crucial insight on traditional relations to 
authority, but just as importantly because the violence of the New Wars, no longer 
confined to the battlefield, “now flows visibly into houses, communities, schools, 
religious grounds and communal property” (Maynard, 1999; p.33), thus deeply 
affecting state-society relations. 
State building should therefore take into account these cleavages in society and 
attempt to understand the way in which political authority is socially constructed as 
a result. This is what Roberts (2008; p.538) refers to as “positive peace”, that is, 
“both the absence of war (direct violence) and the absence of social injustice 
(indirect violence)”. The focus of positive peace is much more centred on the 
necessity of the state to command respect for its authority through the 
development of positive relations both between state institutions and the 
population, as well as amongst the population; this is achieved through the 
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construction of institutions that do not repress conflict but rather include forms of 
local authority, existing within smaller polities, in the deliberative process of 
democracy to build on the “territorial adjacency” and “common territorial histories 
of struggle and social organization” (Agnew, 2005; p.439) so that state sovereignty 
extends throughout the whole territory.  
The imposition of a negative peace advocated by international state building 
interventions, however, can significantly hinder the extension of state sovereignty 
beyond a small political elite or ensure its spread across the whole territory. In 
Lebanon, for instance, international focus, after the 2006 war, on the inability of the 
state to maintain negative peace within its border overshadowed the importance of 
“understanding the everyday practice of sovereignty beyond official state accounts 
in the city of Beirut” (Fregonese, 2012; p.5). Indeed, state building failed to 
understand how Hezbollah’s provision of infrastructure in certain urban areas of 
Beirut contributed to enhancing its role as a legitimate source of authority within 
some parts of the urban territory, therefore significantly eroding the reach of state’s 
authority in those same areas. This territorial difference between sovereignty as 
understood in international state building and actual political authority across a 
territory is what has been labelled de jure and de facto sovereignty (Murphy 1996 
in Agnew, 2005; p.437), the former referring to the type of sovereignty conferred by 
the international community whilst the latter referring to the actual recognition of 
political authority across a territory.  
Therefore, international state building interventions impose a notion of sovereignty 
that fails to account for the nature of the relationship between the constituent and 
the constituted, as it emerged in Western nation states. It is fixed within an 
understanding of sovereignty that precludes the implementation of a state system 
that can accommodate historical and/or territorial forms of political authority in 
order to establish a dialogue that can allow for the negotiation of different interests 
and contribute to the legitimation of state authority. Ahistorical in nature, it fixes the 
understanding of future opportunities (Walker, 1990 in Agnew, 1994; p.64) to the 
“accepted binaries that mark realist views of sovereignty” (Fregonese, 2012; p.16) 
– that is, national/international and security/conflict – resulting in a de jure 
international sovereignty deprived of its de facto national counterpart. 
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2.3.3. Legitimacy  
The distinction between de jure and de facto sovereignty, therefore, lies in the 
state’s ability to “command loyalty” (Holsti, 1996 in Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.28) 
through the population’s recognition of its authority across the whole territory. Such 
authority must derive “from a mutually acknowledged source of legitimacy” 
(Philpott, 2014; p.3), which varies significantly, however, according to how the 
state is defined in literature and practice and, consequently, to the nature of the 
relationship between the state and its population.  
a) State 
To understand the concept of legitimacy it is necessary to define the nature of the 
relationship between the state and its population – the constituent and the 
constituted – at the core of the state’s basic nature (Jones, 2013; p.70). To this 
end, this research uses Peter’s (2010; p.3) clusters of literature on legitimacy, that 
is: a descriptive account and a normative account.  
Legitimacy interpreted according to the descriptive account “refers to people’s 
beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations” (ibid). Within 
this strand of literature, the state is autonomous from the population in that the 
relationship is not mutually feeding but is top-down and as such, according to 
Weber – who conceived of the state in these terms as seen in section 2.2.2 –, 
legitimacy is rooted in the prestige that is lent by the population to the persons 
exercising authority (Weber, 1964 in ibid). Such prestige can stem from three main 
sources: traditional system of authority, charisma derived from faith in a person’s 
abilities, or recognition of the legality of that person’s position in power (Weber, 
1964 in Spencer, 1970; p.123). In this sense, the source of political legitimacy is 
the consent of the people to be ruled by the person in power, and such consent is 
represented by the social contract between the ruler and the ruled – as Hobbes, 
Rousseau and Locke intended it, as seen in section 2.2.3. The function of political 
legitimacy, in the context of its descriptive understanding, is to justify coercive 
power used to ensure preservation against the SoN (Peter, 2010; p.10). This 
reflects Hobbes understanding of the social contract where “legitimate authority 
depends on the ability of a state to protect its citizens” (ibid), thus corresponding 
also to Weber’s vision of the state as holding the monopoly of force and, therefore, 
supreme authority within a definite territory (Dusza, 1989; p.88). 
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Conversely, legitimacy understood as a normative concept refers to “some 
benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and – 
possibly – obligation” (Peter, 2010; p.3). The relationship between the constituent 
and the constituted here is mutual whereby state institutions need to fulfil certain 
conditions in order to exercise power justifiably and result in the population’s 
obligation to obey. The source of political legitimacy, in this sense, is much more 
related to a Rawlsian understanding of the social contract; that is, legitimacy is 
constituted and maintained through a system where the policies of state 
institutions are constantly submitted to a process of checks and balances where 
the population assesses the fairness of those policies. Consequently, the function 
of political legitimacy is that of justifying political authority “through an ongoing 
evaluation of the performance of a political regime” (ibid; p.7), the outcome of 
which will determine the “joining consent” (Rawls, 2007; p.125) given by individuals 
who “consent to join this or that existing political community” (ibid). 
Understanding political legitimacy in terms of ‘either/or’ descriptive and normative 
explanations has, however, been criticised by authors such as Habermas (1979) 
and Beetham (1991) (in Peter, 2010; p.5). According to them, a view that is strictly 
descriptive omits the importance of understanding what constitutes legitimate 
power – that is, legitimacy is a justificatory process, not just a given – whereas a 
view that is strictly normative “neglects the historical actualisation of the 
justificatory process” (Peter, 2010; p.5) partly grounded in people’s beliefs. Rather, 
political legitimacy is constituted by both descriptive and normative characteristics: 
the historical process underpinning the development of political institutions 
contributes to justifying the nature of appropriately constrained collective decision-
making procedures (Peter, 2008 in ibid; p.24); whereas people’s beliefs about what 
political authority should entail – also rooted in historical justifications – constitute 
the basis for the process of judging the fairness of the decisions made by the state. 
As such, legitimacy “defines which political institutions and which decisions made 
within them are acceptable” (Peter, 2010; p.17). 
In order to understand how the process of legitimation of state authority is viewed 
in relation to the state, this research borrows from Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice 
and loyalty (1970; p.18), which seeks to explain how politics and economics can 
be either “in harmony and mutual support” or “get into each other’s way and 
undercut [their] effectiveness”. Starting with a simple free-market situation where a 
customer is dissatisfied with the product of a firm, Hirschman describes how the 
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low cost associated with the opportunity of looking for that same product 
elsewhere – exit – often trumps the desire to express one’s discontent with the 
product in the hope of seeing an improvement and sticking to the initial firm of 
choice – voice. Here, economics – that is, the ability to exit easily – eclipses 
politics – that is, voicing one’s discontent. Hirschman subsequently analyses the 
dynamics of exit and voice within the realm of politics, arguing that for voice to 
prevail over exit the customers must (a) be willing to trade-off “the certainty of exit 
against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product” (ibid; p.77) 
and (b) estimate that they have the ability to influence the organisation; positive 
fulfilment of these conditions can incur loyalty, which in turn will encourage the use 
of voice rather than opt for an exit.  
In the context of the state, loyalty is the equivalent of legitimacy, and it is incurred 
when the right institutions are in place to give the population a sense that it can 
have a say in how the decisions are made and what kind of decisions are being 
made. If such institutions are not in place or do not reflect, at least in part, the way 
in which people are used to voice their concerns in relation to political authority, a 
feeling of powerlessness in relation to their situation can arise where voice is no 
longer a choice and exit is preferred; in this case, exit can materialise either as 
people leaving the country – which, in his view, is often done by those “who could 
best help it fight its shortcomings and its difficulties” (ibid; p.79) – or by resorting to 
different, more local types of authority. An alternative scenario can also emerge if 
loyalty to the country has been fostered also through the construction of a political 
community in the past through the creation of routines, habits and history across 
the territory of the state. In such cases, when voice is no longer possible but exit is 
not yet the preferred option, boycotting becomes a third choice, “undertaken for the 
specific purpose of achieving a change of policy on the part of the boycotted 
organisation” (ibid; p.86); this can take the form of strikes, demonstrations or, in its 
extreme version, conflict. As such, in Western states, the revolutions or significant 
societal changes that took place in the 17th and 18th centuries have led to the 
creation of institutions that favour the use of voice – point (b) above – whilst history 
has contributed to creating a sense of political community – encouraging point (a) 
above; as such, when institutions in, say France today, fail to provide a viable 
option for voicing the population’s concerns, state-wide demonstrations take place 
– e.g. pro/anti gay rights, European Union constitution, the war in Iraq, etc.  
Literature review  
63 	  
Consequently, legitimacy is the state’s ability to “engender and maintain the belief 
that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for 
society” (Lipset, 1959; p.86) by providing a balance between the options of exit 
and voice. Just how it does so will be discussed later in this section under the 
notion of citizenship. 
b) State building 
Sovereignty within the realm of international relations, it was argued previously, is 
construed exclusively in terms of a state’s ability to maintain security within its 
territory through the exercise of authority. Accordingly, absence of such authority is 
seen as a threat to the international state system and justifies international 
intervention to rebuild a state that is capable of exercising its power to guarantee 
security – understood as negative peace. The type and the manner in which such 
a state is being rebuilt, however, is heavily contingent upon the definition of the 
object of reconstruction (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.23) and, as such, its objective; the 
resulting impact on the potential for exit and voice can therefore have significant 
consequences for the legitimacy of the rebuilt state.  
In the absence of a generally agreed definition of state building, a wide variety of 
approaches have thus been applied that are largely dependent upon different 
understandings of the role of the state and/or the extent of mandate held by the 
organisations carrying out state building activities19. Nevertheless, despite these 
differences, the varying approaches to state building all have in common an 
understanding of the state in Weberian terms, that is: “a set of reasonably stable 
institutions capable for regulating the societies and territories they govern, 
extracting the resources needed to sustain themselves, and providing services to 
their population” (Jones, 2013; p.70). As such, state building is generally carried 
out following an “institutional approach” (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.23) focused on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In section 2.1.3 it was argued that the shift in the nature of conflict that occurred in the 1990s resulted in an 
increasing role for international organisations in post-conflict reconstruction; as such, international organisations 
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UN have become particularly active in the field of state building – for 
instance in Kosovo, Timor Leste and Cambodia – alongside national governments and bilateral organisations – 
for instance the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. The research carried out by Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea 
(2007), on the meaning of the notion of peacebuilding in twenty-four governmental and inter-governmental 
bodies, adequately illustrates this point: For instance, whilst generally all-encompassing UN organisations 
emphasise the need to undertake a wide range of activities to assist “transitions from war to peace” (ibid; p.38) 
– including providing the tools for building on the foundations of peace (ibid) – more economic oriented World 
Bank and IMF focus respectively on socio-economic processes at large and restoring the disrupted economy; 
US bilateral agencies, on the other hand, reflect the country’s generally liberal doctrine of ensuring liberty and 
security through good governance, the establishment of security forces and economic development – see 
appendix 1 for the full list of organisations and definitions. 
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rebuilding the state’s administrative capability (ibid) according to the following 
checklist of core functions (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.6): 
 Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; 
 Administrative control; 
 Management of public finances; 
 Investment in human capital; 
 Delineation of citizenship rights and duties; 
 Provision of infrastructure services; 
 Formation of the market; 
 Management of state’s assets; 
 International relations; and, 
 Rule of law. 
Within this framework, the legitimacy of the state is not based on a mutually 
constitutive relationship between the state and its population; rather, it is much 
more akin to a descriptive approach where legitimacy is understood as being 
guaranteed by the legality of the authority in power, established through a two-step 
process. Firstly, the premise that the previous state system had to be dismantled – 
since it failed to fulfil international standards of liberal democratic values – or 
created – in the case of the emergence of a new country – implies that 
international actors undertake state building in a context that is considered to be a 
terra nulli (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.40). In this sense, new institutions are 
established to replace indigenous forms of authority seen as having failed to 
maintain control of the territory and unable to fulfil the list of core functions 
highlighted above. Secondly, once the basic institutions have been built, and 
security – negative peace – in the country is restored, democratic elections are 
organised to ensure, in the eyes of the international community, that a new state is 
elected legitimately.  
In this sense, the process of state building – as opposed to that of Western state 
formation – has therefore little historical awareness (Richmond, 2014; p.4); it 
focuses essentially on issues of public administration, security, rule of law, 
economic development and service delivery – as illustrated in Figure 3 below – 
thus depoliticising the justificatory process for the development of institutions by 
reducing them to “assemblages of bureaucratic, coercive, judicial and other 
institutions, with representative bodies guiding their work” (Jones, 2013; p.70). As 
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such, it separates the political – that is, the antagonism always present in a society 
and which forms the basis of the constituent – from the politics – that is, the 
institutions that organise human coexistence and represent the constituted 
(Mouffe, 2000; p.149). 
Figure 3 – Domains and actors in the state building process 
 
Source: Fritz and Menocal, 2007; p.24 
 
c) Political community 
The ahistorical nature of the state building interventions highlighted above is, 
however, a contradiction in terms. It uses the state as an ideal-type for state 
building, characterised by a sovereign state within fixed territorial boundaries, but 
abstracts itself from the fact that the legitimacy that characterises sovereign 
Western states today is rooted in a historical process of evolution “that has 
furnished territorially bounded populations with elite leadership, different regions, 
religions, histories and sociologies […]” (Roberts, 2008; p.541), which have 
produced types of governance that, whilst all democratic in nature, are 
underpinned by different types of social contracts. It is an approach that takes the 
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state as it is today – with its liberal democratic characteristics and its position in a 
globalised world – and attempts to replicate it without consideration for the 
mutually constitutive nature of state-society relations on which it rests. 
Within this approach, therefore, state institutions are being built away from the 
political nature of the social relations they are meant to organise and control, 
removed from the varied socio-cultural context where different sources of 
legitimacy coexist, compete, conflict and, occasionally, interact with other sources 
of power and interest (OECD, 2010; p.40). The faith entrusted by the international 
community in the ability of a Western-style democratic system to provide an 
opportunity for voice over exit to the population of the country, therefore, gravely 
overlooks the fact that, in highly politicised and divided contexts, how and by whom 
these institution are built can lead to the institutionalisation of deeper cleavages. In 
Iraq, for instance, the choice of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – the 
transitional government formed by the U.S, the United Kingdom and their allies 
following the invasion of the country – to build the new institutions in partnership 
with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, has resulted in the establishment of 
state institutions that are “seen by the Sunni population as an organ of Shiite 
power” (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.30). Consequently, the failure of the international 
community to involve the population in the process of choosing the type of 
institutions that would come to represent them within their territory has led to the 
establishment of governments which authority is recognised only by part of the 
population, thus severely threatening state legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the assumption that holding elections will provide the state the 
legitimacy it needs to remain sovereign within its territorial boundaries is inherently 
flawed in two critical ways. Firstly, failure to understand the power dynamics 
between different groups, as well as the extent of their reach at the population 
level – through, for instance, politicised village chiefs –, can lead the international 
community to underestimate the extent to which animosities between two groups 
can lead to strong intimidation tactics by either group to coerce the population into 
voting for them. The resulting government may therefore appear democratically 
elected in the eyes of the international community, but it can hardly be deemed to 
represent the true will of the population. In Cambodia, for instance, both the 1993 
and the 1998 elections were “surrounded by uncertainty and threats of violence” 
(Hughes, 2009; p.123) as the two main political parties violently rivalled against 
each other in their contest for state power. Secondly, the conflicting nature of 
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electoral races can pose serious concerns in relation to the quality of the debate 
and the ability, or willingness, of the population to participate. Indeed, locked within 
a framework of negative peace that prioritises security at all costs, the nature of 
the first rounds of elections organised under the trusteeship of the international 
community can severely limit the scope of the debate between candidates. Again, 
in the context of Cambodia’s 1993 and 1998 elections, international democracy 
promoters privileged “choice over debate; discipline and regimentation over 
spontaneity and emotion” (ibid) by limiting debate between candidates and 
reducing the role of the population to that of voting (ibid; p.124).  
Consequently, the institutions built by the international community as part of the 
state building process not only fail to reflect or take into account systems of 
authority and legitimacy that previously existed within the country; they also 
contribute to the establishment of institutions that do not, in effect, provide an 
opportunity for the population to adequately voice their concerns or participate in 
the deliberations over the establishment of the new system. As such, democracy 
and political autonomy are seen as “the end goal, rather than crucial aspects of the 
process of state building itself” (Chandler, 2007 in Roberts, 2008; p.541), yielding a 
type of legitimacy that is recognised internationally but fails to produce the basis 
for the population’s loyalty to the state. 
2.3.4. Citizenship 
According to the previous sub-section, therefore, for a state to be able to exercise 
authority over its territory it needs to be able to foster the recognition of such 
authority within its population. This recognition is rooted in the two important pillars 
of legitimacy as elaborated in section 2.3.3 – (a) and (b): the institutional design 
ensuing from the state building process determines people’s ability to influence 
decision-making and is, as such, “of considerable importance for the balance of 
exit and voice” (Hirschman, 1970; p.86); intrinsically unable to represent, at all 
times, the whole range of interests present at societal level, the institutional design 
needs to contribute to the development of a political community that encourages 
loyalty over exit. Whilst the previous sub-section was concerned with the former, 
this subsection focuses on the latter, that is, the ability of the state to build such 
loyalty through the construction of citizenship.  
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a) State 
Leydet (2014; p.4) argues that there are two main models of citizenship: the 
republican and the liberal. The republican model originated in the Aristotle’s 
Athenian polis and is based on the idea that self-identification as a member of a 
political community lies in the active participation to the processes of deliberation 
and decision-making (ibid). In this sense, citizenship is formed through active 
participation in the polis, as argued in section 2.2.2, and becomes “a source of 
identity by strengthening [a citizen’s] sense of self-respect” (Rawls, 1972 in ibid; 
p.3) within the polis. This model is generally reflected in the writings of Aristotle 
and Rousseau for instance.  
The liberal model, on the other hand, can be traced back to the Roman Empire 
and, later, the medieval city, where “citizenship meant being protected by the law 
rather than participating in its formulation or execution” (Leydet, 2014; p.5). In this 
sense, the citizen is he/she who resides within a pre-determined territory and 
whose individual freedom – from interference by other individuals or the authorities 
themselves – is protected by the laws enacted within that territory (ibid). The legal 
aspect of citizenship prevails here, as the political is regulated by the politics rather 
than shaping them, and membership is an individual right as opposed to a social 
exercise – T.H. Marshall, in his seminal essay “Citizenship and social class” (1950) 
is one of the main proponents of this model. The individual rights within the liberal 
model generally refer to: political, economic, social and cultural rights – see 
APPENDIX I for detailed description of rights. 
These two models of citizenship, however, need not be seen in opposition, as the 
historical development of the Western state given in section 2.2.2 demonstrates; 
rather they correspond to particular stages in the evolution of the relationship 
between the state and society, which eventually culminated in the emergence of 
the state as the triumphant political form, where these two accounts are seen to 
coexist within a territorial sovereign system (Poggi, 1978 in Isin, 2008; p.269). 
Indeed, state institutions are necessary to guarantee individual liberties through 
the establishment of rights and duties – liberal model; however, such liberties need 
to be protected by ensuring that all citizens have access to the opportunities that 
allow them to participate in the established processes of deliberation (D’Agostino 
et al, 2011; p.4) that form the political community – republican model. It is this 
ability to participate – socially, politically and economically – that constitutes the 
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benchmark against which we assess how well our institutions are functioning 
(Miller, 2000 in Leyde, 2014; p.6), and that underpins the sense of belonging to a 
political community, which can be created and maintained amongst its members 
“only if basic standards of social justice are satisfied” (Habermas, 2001 in Leydet, 
2014; p.19). 
Social justice, therefore, is what reconciles the distinction between the two models; 
it sits at the centre of the relationship between state institutions, the impact of their 
policies on the citizens of a state and the resulting sense of political community 
that builds on the citizens’ assessment of their institutions. Indeed, social justice, 
according to Barry (2005; p.16), is about understanding how “the major institutions 
[…] allocate (or bring about the allocation of) rights, opportunities and resources” in 
a manner that is considered fair by the citizens. Akin to Rawls’ conception of 
fairness as justice, fairness here refers to the distribution of material and/or 
psychological resources in a way that allows all the citizens of the state to have the 
same opportunities to fully realise their rights. Opportunity exists “if there is some 
course of action lying within [one’s] power such that it will lead, if [one chooses] to 
take it, to obtaining the [right] in question” (ibid; p.20) 20. Holston and Appadurai 
(1996; p.190) share this concern by drawing a distinction between formal and 
substantive citizenship, whereby formal “refers to membership in the nation state” 
and substantive “to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights 
people possess and exercise” [emphasis added] and which allow them to 
negotiate their belonging to the political community (Taylor, 2009; p.294). 
Consequently, citizenship in the framework of this research refers both to the 
formal/liberal and to the substantive/republican aspects of the process of creating 
a sense of belonging, amongst the people living within a territory, which grants 
legitimacy and therefore sovereignty to the state. It is a constant negotiation of 
“inclusion/belonging or exclusion/not belonging” (Taylor, 2009; p.295) in response 
to processes of checks and balances on state institutions based on the material 
consequences of the actions of individuals, social groups and institutions 
(Chouinard, 2009; Staeheli, 2003). Cities, and the urban space in general, play an 
important role in these processes of identification, where the geography of 
distribution and allocation of resources by state institutions materialises into the 
creation of spatial dimensions where opportunities to effectively exercise one’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For example, ensuring every child’s access to education entails facilitating the child’s access to the resources 
– for instance easy of access and safe transport to school – that give him the opportunity to access education. 
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rights can significantly vary and be in stark contrast, creating “difference-based, as 
well as geographically based proximities [that] can spawn new constellations of 
spatial association, or new modes of belonging” (Taylor, 2009; p.296). As such, for 
the sense of belonging to a political community to devolve to the local level and 
extend across the territory (Edensor, 2009; p.245), state institutions need to 
promote both substantive and formal citizenship in order to create urban realities 
that contribute to citizens’ feeling that the system promotes social justice; only then 
does the place “exceeds its physicality [and] becomes […] an imaginary construct” 
(Taylor, 2009; p.296). 
b) State building 
Since the emergence of the New Wars in the 1990s, the belief that countries run 
according to democratic systems, and interconnected economically and 
geopolitically through the processes of globalisation, do not experience conflict has 
translated into the design of state building processes centred on the notions of 
liberal peace and democracy – as argued in section 2.2.1. The main tenets of 
these processes stem from the liberal political doctrine that has been widely 
applied in Western states since the 1970s, and which consists mainly of: the 
implementation of democratic processes – generally conceived as elections and 
constitutional processes; the establishment of free markets; and, the building of 
institutions with the aim of ensuring the rule of law, human rights and the 
development of a civil society (Paris, 2010; Richmond and Franks, 2007a; 
Richmond and Franks, 2007b). These therefore constitute the three main elements 
the core functions of the state aim to realise (Gilbert, 2009; p.195). 
However, whilst Western states have reached liberal democracy through a long 
historical process of debating and contesting the meaning of democracy as the 
“rule by the people” – through constant negotiations of what is meant by ‘rule’ and 
‘the people’ as well as who is included – the international state building process 
applies liberal democracy within the assumed framework of the territorial state 
(Barnett and Low, 2009; p.70) automatically bringing with it assumptions about 
membership to a political community, modes of governance and the benefits of a 
market-driven economy. Thus, within the state building process, democracy is no 
longer conceived as a constant “disagreement over basic definitions, concepts and 
institutions” (ibid); rather, it is designed as it if were an end in itself.  
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In practice, therefore, the citizen is no longer an agent who exercises his rights as 
part of a political community in order to keep checks and balances on the 
institutions that protect his freedoms; rather the state is the political container 
“within which individual rights and freedoms have been made achievable and 
understandable” (Gilbert, 2009; p.200) and within which security has become the 
key precept for the protection of these rights. This is particularly evident in the 
application of liberal principles to the economy, for indeed the main role of the 
state, consistently revolving around the idea of the citizen as an individual, focuses 
on security to protect private property and facilitate the conditions for individuals to 
thrive in their personal enterprises within self-adjusting markets – for instance, the 
notion of supply and demand. The application of rights within this framework 
follows the UN’s universal understanding of human rights, in that they are 
accorded to all members of the polity (Leydet, 2014; p.9), and remains grounded in 
a notion of formal citizenship; here, the laissez-faire approach to the free-market is 
expected to regulate substantive citizenship.  
More recent international state building interventions carried out in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s – for instance, Cambodia, Iraq or Timor Leste – have continued to 
pursue the goals of the liberal peace – individual, governance and market – but 
their approach has shifted onto an even more market-oriented, individualist 
application of its political and economic principles; that is, neoliberalism. Generally 
speaking, “whereas classical liberalism saw markets as naturally occurring 
phenomena, neoliberalism is premised on the idea that the conditions can be 
created that will encourage people to act in a more marketlike fashion” (Larner, 
2009; p.386). In practice, a neoliberal approach to state building is characterised 
by (Brown, 2005; pp.40-44): 
 The recasting of all dimensions of human life in terms of market rationality, so 
that the political is submitted to an economic rationality; 
 The main role of the state is that of fashioning society around economic 
rationales, so that the health and growth of the economy are the basis of state 
legitimacy; 
 The individual is fully responsible for him/herself as a citizen-subject, so that 
success and failure are recast in terms of economic rational choices; and, 
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 Checks and balances against state institutions’ actions are carried out within a 
framework where good social policy is understood as one that creates the 
appropriate conditions for the development of a citizen-entrepreneur. 
As such, the role of the states being built in the latest state building interventions 
has been “rolled-back” in relation to Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist 
institutions (Peck and Tickell, 2002; p.384), and “rolled-out” in terms of institutions 
created for the purpose of regulating neoliberal forms of governance (ibid)21.  
The strong neoliberal emphasis on economic growth has brought about an 
increased role for cities in the state building process. Indeed, the “World Report on 
the Urban Future 21”22, which Jessop (2002; pp.465-467) analyses, points out that 
cities are key centres of economic, political and social innovation. Their position as 
sites of economic growth and competitiveness turns them into an interface 
between the local economy and global flows (ibid) – especially in countries 
recovering from conflict where most of the initial international economic activity 
takes place. Furthermore, as governance is slowly taken away from the state and 
devolved to cities in the action of rolling-back its interventions, cities are expected 
to increasingly adopt a managerial attitude (Purcell, 2008; p.11), competing – 
against each other and amongst different neighbourhoods within cities – to attract 
capital in order to promote growth; as a result, they are encouraged to become 
pilot sites to develop partnerships between the public and private sectors and 
between government and civil society” (Jessop, 2002; p.466). Finally, the 
networks, stemming from the opportunities for proximity and daily interactions 
created by cities, and the strong market influence should be used in order to 
replace state welfare. Therefore, whereas cities were once the sites of daily 
interactions within a political community, as well as sites for checks and balances 
on state institutions, the move from a system of formal state government to one of 
formal city governance arrangements with different non-state partners (ibid; p.12) 
has contributed to further institutionalising the citizen-subject. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In Iraq, for example, this approach was particularly evident in the way in which, just weeks after US 
intervention to remove Saddam Hussein, the country was declared “open for business” (Bremer, 2003 in ibid; 
p.48). This implied, amongst other things, the opening of state borders to duty-free imported goods as well as 
multinationals, and the use of foreign direct investments (FDIs) to “replace and privatise state industry” (Brown, 
2005; p.48). Within the framework of the rational, entrepreneurial citizen, new Iraqi citizens had little stake in the 
definition of these goals or the constitution of the institutions – since most were privatised; rather, they were 
expected to fit into the market system and use their newly acquired citizenship rights to improve their own socio-
economic situation.  
22 A report especially commissioned for the Urban 21 conference in Berlin in June 2000 and written by the World 
Commission 
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c) Political community 
The adoption of liberal and neoliberal – hereafter referred to as (neo)liberal23 – 
policies within the state building process has significant implications for the 
process of building a political community across the territory of the state. Their 
focus on the individual, governance and market economics strongly affects the 
type of citizenship that is being fostered in countries emerging from conflict, and, 
consequently, also affects the nature of the relationship between the citizens and 
the new state. Indeed, the roll-back of the state translates into the devolving of 
some of the state’s core functions through privatisation – of, for instance, 
education and health – as well as outsourcing – for example delivering 
infrastructure projects through tendering processes – as this is believed to produce 
more competitive markets and cut state funding in many sectors. Similarly, the 
provision of welfare, also considered a potential significant drain on state 
resources, is kept to a minimum and often distributed more in the form of peace 
dividends than as traditional social security. On the other hand, the roll-out of the 
state for the purpose of regulating (neo)liberal individual aims is reduced to that of 
denying, defusing or displacing “the possibility of political conflict, choice or 
decision” (Clarke, 2004; p.34) so as to ensure a secure environment in which 
citizens can fully realise their rights as citizens-entrepreneurs; it contends that 
whilst violence ‘scares’ capital away, long debates for decision-making delay big 
decisions targeted at increasing growth. 
As a result, the emphasis on formal citizenship, which is expected to provide 
citizens with the rights necessary to perform within the new market economy, 
effectively translates into a situation where the state “leads and controls subjects 
without being responsible for them” (Lemke ND in Brown, 2005; p.43). Citizens are 
locked into a framework that encourages them to principally work for, and worry 
about, themselves in order to become successful entrepreneurs; human 
misfortune is interpreted as the failure of individuals to “navigate impediments to 
prosperity” (Brown, 2005; p.42), thus in cases where the circumstances hinder 
equal access to resources and opportunities, and where people fight for their daily 
survival in a system that excludes ‘losers’, social problems are criminalised 
(Giroux, 2005; p.8).  The individual is therefore slowly “detached from social 
relationship” (Clarke, 2004; p.31), lost in a race for survival within a highly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As each state building process demonstrates varying degrees of liberal and neoliberal policies, the term 
“(neo)liberal” is here used to encompass these variations. 
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competitive environment where social and economic powers have been 
depoliticised (Brown, 2005; p.43) and where “a fully realised neoliberal citizenry 
[…] barely exists as a public” (ibid). 
Furthermore, by contracting to, and partnering with, other organisations, the state 
shifts from government to “a technique of governing” (ibid; p.44). However, this 
form of governance means that where before people had leverage against the 
state - e.g. because people paid taxes for services and infrastructure they could 
complain to the state if those functions weren’t performed successfully – they are 
now incapable of putting pressure on one or many of the partners providing those 
services: by being private, they do not hold the same level of accountability as the 
state did. Thus, an increasing democratic deficit comes to characterise these new 
states as “the market place rather than the ballot has become the medium of 
popular expression” (Storey, 2012; p.178). 
Finally, an analysis of past interventions shows that “[(neo)liberal] state building 
has struggled to promote economic development in post-conflict states” (Barbara, 
2008; p.310). Indeed, the high reliance on private investment, combined with a 
lack of material means characteristic of states emerging from conflicts, has meant 
in practice that in countries where this investment failed to materialise – since the 
market situation of countries emerging from conflict is often unattractive to 
investment – there has been a failure “to redress regional disparities or to promote 
redistributive policies that might reduce horizontal inequalities” (Putzel, 2005 in 
Barbara, 2008; p.310), thus leading to considerable developmental gaps (ibid; 
p.308). Moreover, as the majority of the population in these countries is generally 
trying to recover from the devastating effects of the conflict on their livelihood, 
investment in private enterprises usually relies on attracting Foreign Direct 
Ivestments (FDIs); this is, however, frequently done at the expense of attempting 
to provide the resources and opportunities necessary to develop the population 
skill-set and make the country more attractive to private investment, thus 
“aggravating local political tensions and complicating the prospects for indigenous 
economic development” (ICC, 2004 in Barbara, 2008; p.311)24.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For example, in East Timor Barbara (2008; p.312) argues that the lack of adequate attention by the 
government to its “small market, high costs, low skills base, poor physical infrastructure, and fragile legal 
institutions” has been a significant obstacle in attracting foreign private investment, at the same time as it has 
failed to provide its own citizens with opportunities – that is, skill-set – to contribute to the country’s economy. 
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Cities, as indicated previously, have come to play a significant role as focal points 
of (neo)liberal economic, political and social development, they have “become key 
factors for the inclusion of countries into the international political economy” 
(Potter, 1990 in Esser, 2004; p.8). This unique position, in contrast with rural 
areas, makes them particularly interesting sites for analysing the impact of state 
building (neo)liberal policies on the development of a political community in 
societies which tissue has been deeply affected by conflicts. Indeed, the failures of 
the post-conflict (neo)liberal practices highlighted above materialise immediately in 
city contexts where shanties of migrants sprout next to the mansions of successful 
citizen-entrepreneurs, the factories of industrial state capitalism and the 
skyscrapers erected as smokescreens of national success to attract foreign 
investors (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.196). The stark contrasts that emerge 
therefore become symbols of state institutions’ inability to ensure social justice 
through the provision of equal access to resources and opportunities for its citizens 
– substantive and formal citizenship; as a result, they produce new urban 
landscapes of difference where “new kinds of citizens engage each other in 
struggles over the nature of belonging to the national society” (Holston and 
Appadurai, 1996; p.196).  
2.4. Conclusion – where is the political community in international state 
building? 
Through a review of the development of international post-conflict reconstruction 
assistance, this chapter aimed to highlight the paradigm shifts underpinning the 
rationale for post-conflict interventions. Whilst initially, under the Marshall Plan, 
international post-conflict reconstruction assistance was delivered in a framework 
that respected the historicity of the emergence of the state, the geopolitical context 
within which it evolved led, however, to the emergence of a paradox. Indeed, 
maintaining the Western state as an ideal-type for the reconstruction of post-
conflict countries, the nature of international post-conflict reconstruction gradually 
moved from financial state assistance to more interventionist approaches to the 
reconstruction of state institutions. As a result, locked into a territorial vision of the 
sovereign state (Richmond, 2014; p.10) and firmly grounded in the “unquestioning 
belief in the universality of [(neo)liberal] state structures and the technology of 
institutional transfer” (Dinnen, 2008; p.8), state building interventions operate 
within a framework where the historical relationship between state and society has 
lost its importance.  
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The second part of this chapter argued that whilst initially state building was 
elaborated within a framework that put liberal peace, and consequently democracy 
and social justice, at the centre of its rationale for intervention, the implementation 
of state building to date has significantly moved away from the processes it 
originally sought to strengthen. Through a review of the literature on the 
emergence of states, this chapter aimed to demonstrate the mutually constitutive 
relationship between state and society that defined the development of the state 
system on which today’s world order continues to function. It placed the state back 
into its historical context, and argued that while states cannot be seen as a mere 
set of institutions controlling, protecting and regulating an internationally 
recognised territory, similarly the emergence of a political community cannot be 
taken for granted. 
Rather, state and society are highly contingent notions at the heart of the 
development of the state (Dinnen, 2007; p.1). Their close relationship has been 
defined throughout history by the necessity of groups of people, living within 
flexible territorial boundaries, to organise themselves; such organisation was 
entrusted – through various means – to sovereign bodies – of different nature – 
who maintained their authority by legitimising their position of power. This chapter 
argued, however, that whilst these relationships were originally flexible and were 
constantly subject to change, the territorialisation of the state fixed them within a 
territory. As such, it forced sovereign authorities to establish systems of rule that 
could facilitate the peaceful coexistence of a wide variety of local polities. Within 
this new framework defined by fixed territorial boundaries, the notions of 
sovereignty and legitimacy acquired new significance: sovereignty progressively 
ceased to refer to a divine right to rule, and was replaced by sovereign entities’ 
necessity to build respect for their authority across the territory; such authority now 
stemmed from the sovereign’s ability to garner support from all the different social 
groups it governed through the establishment of legitimate rule.  
Citizenship gained a central position within this new territorial organisation of 
power. The relationship of the population with authority was no longer restricted to 
that of subjects consenting to sovereign rule, but instead evolved to be mutually 
constitutive as defined by a social contract. Thus, as sovereign authorities 
gradually transformed into states, their institutions aimed at protecting citizens’ 
rights – formal citizenship – in order to form a citizenry “better equipped to 
consider, discuss, and construct a social order based on justice” (Paz-Fuchs, 
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2011; p.7) against which to assess the fairness of state institutions. To facilitate 
such process, however, it is crucial that state institutions function to create a 
system providing citizens with the opportunities to access those rights – 
substantive citizenship. Consequently, within a fixed territorial framework, the 
ability of state institutions to foster substantive citizenship established dynamics 
that facilitated the interaction of a wide variety of social groups across different 
spaces within the territory, creating “constant processes of social construction” 
(Penrose, 2009; p.226) where local polities became nested into a political 
community that extended to the whole territory. The establishment of formal 
citizenship, on the other hand, extended the scale of state institutions’ reach from 
the state to the local level.  
Consequently, using the state’s historically characteristic notions of territory, 
sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship – both substantive and formal – to define 
the relationship between state building and the construction of a political 
community – as illustrated in Figure 4 below – this chapter has demonstrated that 
the ahistorical nature of state building interventions can have a significant impact 
on the ability of the new states to create the representations of a political 
community in their citizens’ minds. The consequences on legitimacy and 
sovereignty can therefore have a negative impact on the state building process 
itself and its initial objective of liberal peace. 
Figure 4 – The relationship between state building and political community 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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Urban spaces, as opposed to the territorial state, offer the opportunity to explore 
how the implementation of ahistorical state building processes within historically 
charged environments – socially, economically and politically – can significantly 
affect the development of citizenship across different spaces and at varied scales. 
They offer a context where the impact of (neo)liberal state policies materialises in 
the production of new spaces where inequalities between residents become too 
gross, and “the areas of commonality too few” (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; 
p.192), leading to the realm of the political, within which “identities are formed and 
new agendas are generated” (Barnett and Low, 2009; p.72), becoming 
increasingly divided. As a result, new “life-worlds [emerge] constituted by relatively 
stable associations, relatively known and shared histories, and collectively 
traversed and legible spaces and places” (Appadurai, 2003 in Esser, 2004; p.9), 
which contribute to the disintegration of social representations of a political 
community (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.192). The next chapter aims to 
develop an analytical framework that facilitates an analysis of the way in which 
these new urban spaces contribute to fragmenting local representations of 
citizenship and political community as citizens’ lack of voice in their new state 
system leads to exit in the shape of “oppositional, marginalised or resistant 
identity-based belonging […] at least partially constituted and framed by the shared 
experience of social exclusion” (Taylor, 2009; p.295). 
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CHAPTER 3 – PNALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you 
so sick at heart, that you can't take part; you can't even passively take part, and 
you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, 
upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to 
the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machine 
will be prevented from working at all!” 
(Mario Savio, 1964) 	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3. Analytical Framework 
This chapter builds on the previous argument that the notions of state and political 
community at the heart of the state project are characterised by a historical, 
mutually constitutive relationship; accordingly, in the context of international post-
conflict reconstruction interventions, any decision affecting the nature of state 
institutions inevitably deeply pervades the societal and political dynamics (Lun, 
2009; p.9) that constitute the development of a political community. On the basis of 
these assertions, this chapter sets out to develop an analytical framework aimed at 
facilitating the analysis of the impact of state building on the construction of a 
political community through an exploration of the construction of citizenship within 
urban spaces.  
It begins by defining the relationship between the notions of state and local polity in 
terms of actual and virtual. That is, state institutions only exist as actual objects if 
the processes of polity construction, that emerge from citizens’ day-to-day 
interaction as influenced by state policies, contribute to shaping citizens’ virtual 
representations of belonging to a political community. It is, however, the scales 
and spaces of these representations that determine whether the state is successful 
in creating the imagined space of the political community (Taylor, 2009; p.296). As 
such, this chapter introduces the idea that whilst substantive citizenship favours 
the spatial extension of state authority, formal citizenship facilitates state’s reach at 
different scales. Finally, social cohesion is introduced here to facilitate the 
articulation of political, economic and social dynamics at different scales and within 
different spaces in order to understand whether “various strategies and 
technologies of citizenship” (Isin, 2002 in Secor, 2004; p.353) might constitute 
themselves “differently from the dominant images given to them” (ibid).  
3.1. Actual and virtual 
According to Gilles Deleuze (1996), the concepts of actual and virtual are 
complementary and cannot be dissociated from each other; “purely actual objects 
do not exist” (Deleuze, 1996; p.148), but instead “every actual surrounds itself with 
a cloud of virtual images” (ibid). Objects, he argues, can only become actual if they 
are “actualised in sensible composites” (Deleuze, 1994 in Marston, Jones III and 
Woodward, 2005; p.425) through virtual representations. There exist, however, “a 
vast regime of differential potentialities” (ibid) through which virtual representations 
can actualise objects, so that virtual reflections of an object in one context may 
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differ significantly from virtual reflections of the same object in another context 
where “other combinations of potential and actual relations” (ibid) result in different 
actualisations of that object. Therefore, the actual is not in opposition with the 
virtual; rather, the two terms are mutually constitutive as the actual is mirrored in 
the virtual where all the possibilities for change of the actual lie, so that “there is 
[…] oscillation, a perpetual exchange between the actual object and its virtual 
image: the virtual image never stops becoming actual” (Deleuze, 1996; p.149). 
The relationship between the actual and the virtual is therefore akin to the 
understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and the 
political community at the heart of the ideal-type Western state. Indeed, since 
within the ideal-type state it is “impossible to lay a claim to a state without 
grounding this claim in the demonstrable capacity” to represent a political 
community (Penrose, 2009; p.226), states can only become actualised if their 
existence finds representations in the image of the political community. However, 
as seen in the previous chapter, the historical emergence of the state required the 
progressive encompassing of a wide variety of local polities within newly fixed 
territorial boundaries; this meant that each of these social groups, albeit sharing 
the same internationally recognised territory, reflected their own virtual image of 
polity served to actualise their own authoritative figure within specific spaces. 
Consequently, the process of state formation entailed the development of state 
institutions that could penetrate all these different groups, with the aim of fostering 
new potentialities to actualise authority at the higher scale of the state – that is, 
legitimacy – and across the whole territory – that is, sovereignty. 
It is within this framework of actualisation of the state through the virtual 
representation of a political community that citizenship gained its central position. 
As argued in 2.3.4, in order to expand the spaces and scales at which its authority 
is recognised, a state needs to foster both substantive and formal citizenship 
amongst its population. Substantive citizenship is the virtual image of the state’s 
ability to promote social justice across its territory. Social justice, however, is highly 
contingent upon the context within which state policies are implemented; that is, 
the wide variety of social, economic, historical and political contexts within which 
state policies are implemented across the territory, represent a vast regime of 
potentialities that significantly affect how these policies materialise. As such, whilst 
certain emerging physical environments facilitate access to opportunities, therefore 
Analytical Framework 
82 	  
fostering the virtual image of substantive citizenship, others might instead hinder 
such process.  
Formal citizenship, on the other hand, is the virtual image of the state’s ability to 
reach its citizens at different scales with the establishment of a system where 
citizens can exercise the rights they have accessed through the realisation of 
substantive citizenship. That is, state institutions must allow enough room for 
citizens to exercise their social, economic and political rights so that they can build 
virtual representations of their membership to the state. The actualisation of the 
state takes place when both substantive and formal citizenship are realised so that 
citizens across all spaces and scales build representations of a sense of belonging 
to the imagine space of the state (Taylor, 2009; p.226); only then does state 
sovereignty extend across the whole territory and legitimacy reach all scales of 
society, turning the state into an actual object.  
In the context of this research, urban spaces are the locus where the 
materialisation of state policies affects the “material actualisation of potentialities” 
(Marston et al, 2005; p.425); that is, as described by Isin (2007; p.212), urban 
spaces represent both the wide variety of physical environments shaped by the 
materialisation of state policies – urbs – and the resulting multitude of 
combinations of potential and actual relations (Marston et al, 2005; p.425), 
contingent upon those environments, that define formal and substantive citizenship 
– civitas (Isin, 2007; p.212). As such, the inequalities emerging from the 
(neo)liberal processes of state building may result, as seen in the previous 
chapter, in the creation of contrasting urban spaces where access to opportunities, 
and therefore the ability to exercise one’s right, vary significantly. Consequently, if 
the state building process produces areas with limited spaces and scales of 
interaction that allow groups of people to participate only on highly unequal terms 
or are denied access altogether (Kabeer, 2005; p.22), these groups may create 
new representations of civitas resulting, not from their ability to participate in the 
new state, but from “their attempts to challenge these exclusionary processes and 
bring about change” (ibid); such process can happen at the local scale, thus 
resulting into exit – as people build different social identities – or at the scale of the 
state, resulting into boycott – whether as demonstrations or sparking new conflicts.  
The interaction between urbs and civitas will therefore determine whether 
emerging virtual representations of citizenship will result in the actualisation of the 
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state through its political community, or whether fragmented representations of 
legitimacy and sovereignty will fragment the urban territory and therefore threaten 
the actualisation of the state. Consequently, the use of urban spaces as the locus 
for analysing the different potential representations of the political community 
provides the adequate context to understand how state building can the 
construction of a political community in ways that undermine the success of 
international post-conflict reconstruction assistance; for indeed, “the exclusions 
and discriminations that occur within society” (DRC, 2006; p.5), and materialise in 
the urbs, “affect state capacity to be responsible, legitimate and accountable to all” 
(ibid), that is civitas. Figure 5 below illustrates how actual/virtual and urbs/civitas 
fit within the relationship between state building and political community as 
elaborated in section 2.4. 
Figure 5 – State building and political community as actual and virtual 
	  
Source: elaborated by the author 
3.2. Scale and the social construction of space 
The articulation of the mutually constitutive relationship between states and the 
political community around the notions of actual and virtual, brought to the fore two 
important dynamics for the construction of the ideal-type state: the state is 
actualised when it succeeds in building “the social imaginary” (Holston and 
Appadurai, 1996; p.192) of a political community in its citizens. Building a political 
community, however, requires that the state successfully penetrates society 
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establishing structures and implementing policies that facilitate the negotiation of 
several loyalties existing at several virtual “spatial scales” (Kaplan D.H, 2009; 
p.252) – that is, loyalty across different spaces and at different scales. The 
following section therefore reviews the literature on scalar thought as a mode of 
geopolitical organisation, and argues that the notions of space and scale, whilst 
distinct, are interrelated and key to understanding the relationship between state 
building and political community. 
3.2.1. Scalar thought 
The notion of scale gradually emerged in the 17th century as dominant groups 
sought to consolidate their territories (Isin, 2007; p.215) in the context of the 
progressive establishment of the international state system. As states became 
“containers of society” (Agnew, 1994; p.68) within a new organisation of European 
order characterised by fixed territorial boundaries, scale emerged in parallel to 
mapmaking (McMaster and Sheppard, 2004; p.3) as a “technique of government” 
(Isin, 2007; p.215); that is, the establishment of maps and scales allowed them to 
organise their territory according to nested administrative units that ranged from 
the local – household, neighbourhood – to the urban – city, metropolitan area – to 
the much wider national and international scales – state, continent (McMaster and 
Sheppard, 2004; p.4). Sovereigns – and, subsequently, states – used these 
administrative units for the purpose of “transmitting, containing, controlling, 
regulating and instantiating power relations” (Isin, 2007; p.217).  
According to Isin (ibid; p.215), to facilitate this organisation of the territory under 
the new international state order, scale was articulated in a three-step process 
(ibid; p.215): it became ahistorical, as though the distinction between local, urban, 
regional and national had always been a given; it was formulated in exclusive 
terms, in that the relationship between the different scales was not mutually 
constitutive; and, it was framed exclusively in hierarchical terms, with “the state as 
the creator of all scales” (ibid). As such, from the 17th to the mid-20th century, 
geographic scale became “a familiar and taken-for-granted concept” (Delaney and 
Leitner, 1997; p.93) across a wide variety of disciplines, such as political 
geography, international studies and urban planning.   
The notion of scale as described above remained unquestioned in its application 
across these fields for nearly three centuries. However, its acceptance as a 
“nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing sizes” (ibid) progressively brought 
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to the fore questions as to the nature of scale seen in solely hierarchical terms; 
rather, for the state to be actualised it needs to create “in the minds of [the 
population] a kind of mental map or image” (ibid; p.94) through the penetration of a 
wide variety of spaces at different scales, each actualised by their own virtual 
image. It is the relationship between virtual representations of social identity and 
the local spaces in which they are constructed that triggered increasing critiques of 
scalar thought. 
3.2.2. Critique of scalar thought 
In the middle of the 1970s, the notion of scale came under severe scrutiny in a 
wide variety of fields. Human geographers, for instance, began questioning the 
notion of spatial scale as distance – that is, urban scale is bigger than local scale 
because the distances are wider on maps; they argued that, for instance, whilst 
“black and white neighbourhoods may only be across the street from one another, 
[…] the effective social distance separating them, as indicated by minimal social 
interaction between them, can be enormous” (McMaster and Sheppard, 2004; 
p.15).  In the field of urban planning, writers such as Lefebvre (1974) contested the 
notion of scale as spatially fixed, conceiving it instead as spatially produced 
through “the characteristic political-economic processes of a certain societal 
system, such as capitalism” (ibid). Finally, within the field of political geography, 
writers such as Taylor (1982) and Smith (1984) recast scale as a political project, a 
container of ideologies and identities within given spaces of control.  
The introduction of the spatial concern into the notion of scale is what came to be 
known as the “spatial turn” (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.9). Critics were 
concerned, as highlighted above, with the exclusively hierarchical understanding of 
scale; they sought, instead, to reconceptualise scale as the product of the 
relationship between social interactions and the spaces in which they take place. 
As such, Swyngedouw (2004 in Marston et al, 2005; p.418) argues that, “scale 
configurations change as power shifts, both in terms of their nesting and 
interrelations and in terms of their spatial extent”. Similarly, Jones (1998, in ibid; 
p.416) stated that scale is not “an ontological structure which ‘exists’, but […] an 
epistemological one – a way of knowing or apprehending”. The spatial turn, 
therefore, moved away from the notion of scale as “ontologically given” (Delaney 
and Leitner, 1997; p.93) to introduce instead the notion of scale as “socially 
produced” (ibid). 
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To say that scale is socially produced as a result of social interactions within 
different spaces has important consequences for the relationship between states 
and the political community; it brings to the fore once more the mutually 
constitutive nature of the two concepts, reconciling the verticality of the state “as 
an institution somehow ‘above’ civil society, community and family” (Ferguson and 
Gupta, 2002; p.982) and its spatiality as fused with the political community “located 
within an ever widening series of circles that begins with family and local 
community and ends with the systems of nation states” (ibid). Indeed, spaces and 
scales are virtual representations of how the state affects the physical 
environments within which social interactions take place, and how such 
environments shape behaviours, thinking and identity consciousness (Soja in 
Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.10) amongst citizens. Thus, to create a political community 
out of the nested smaller scales of polity emerging in local spaces, it is crucial that 
places and spaces are no longer taken as “self-evident and static backdrops, sets, 
or stages on which human events happen” (Taylor, 2009; p.296); rather, places 
need to be “recast in dynamic relationship with the people that inhabit them” (ibid) 
so as to understand how state policies affect formal and substantive citizenship, 
and how, in turn, these affect the spaces and scales where local polity is 
constructed. 
3.2.3. The social construction of polity, spaces and scales 
Following from the spatial turn described above, scale is understood in the context 
of this research as being “constituted through its historically evolving positionality 
within a larger relations grid of vertically ‘stretched’ and horizontally ‘dispersed’ 
sociospatial processes, relations and interdependencies” (Brenner, 2001 in 
Marston et al, 2005; p.418). That is, horizontal and vertical relations are 
intrinsically interwoven, and for the state to succeed in maintaining control of the 
population at all scales, it needs to be able to penetrate and shape relations across 
all spaces. To do so, Marston (2000; p.221) argues that there are three main 
principles to understanding the construction of scale, drawn from Marx and 
Lefebvre: firstly, scale is a virtual representation of “a way of framing conceptions 
of reality” (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; p.94) resulting from social interactions; 
secondly, this virtual representation is the product of, and materialises into, 
“everyday life and macro-level social structures” (Marston, 2000; p.221); and, 
thirdly, because scale is socially constructed and social relations are subject to 
Analytical Framework 
87 	  
constant changes, it is transient by nature, open to contestation and change. 
These principles are analysed in more details hereafter. 
Bringing back the notions of actual and virtual, the first point made my Marston is 
that the scalar administrative units devised by the state, to control and organise its 
population, can only become actual objects – that is, they only function – if they 
are actualised by virtual representations of the citizens they are supposed to 
control. Formal and substantive citizenship are key to this relationship. That is, if 
the state wishes to reach its population at all scales, it needs to act on the spatial 
relations that characterise its population: socially constructed local polities. As 
argued in section 2.2.3, local polities are constituted through engagements and 
practices of interactions that take place between different groups (Massey, 2004; 
p.1). These interactions are facilitated by the development of a substantive 
citizenship grounded in a notion of social justice, which allows people to build 
representations of belonging to a wider, just political community. The successful 
development of a substantive citizenship across the whole territory will 
subsequently facilitate citizens’ relations with the state as it provides them with the 
tools to participate in the checks and balances against the state, thus developing a 
representation of formal citizenship. Consequently, whilst substantive citizenship 
enables the construction of a political community across all spaces, formal 
citizenship facilitates the relationship between states and citizens across all scales. 
Shaping substantive and formal citizenship, however, “begins with the notion that 
space is socially produced, that we make our geographies, shape our spaces from 
the local to the global; and they simultaneously shape us, shape our behaviour and 
our thinking, shape our identity and our class consciousness” (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 
2002; p.10). That is, state policies inevitably shape the physical environments in 
which scalar and spatial relationships take place; the “practices, trajectories and 
interrelations” (Massey, 2004; p.1) produced by these physical environments 
contribute to creating representations of social justice based on “more or less 
unjust or oppressive geographies” (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.10) that feed the 
development of substantive citizenship. However, the development of substantive 
citizenship also contributes to shape spaces; that is, unjust geographies, 
compounded with an inability to trigger the necessary changes through formal 
citizenship, can lead to representations of smaller spaces and scales of 
interactions by the citizens. When these spaces and scales are in opposition to the 
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state established structures, these structures fail to foster their representations and 
therefore fail to be actualised.  
Indeed, the notion of citizenship, as understood within the context of this research 
in its substantive and formal form, is a process that “assembles identities […] and 
disciplines space” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985 in Secor, 2004; p.352). Therefore, if 
the state creates, whether willingly or unwillingly, spaces of difference within a 
wider territory – substantive citizenship – and the state system does not allow 
room for citizens’ ability to influence decision-making – formal citizenship – then 
citizens might assemble to organise against unjust geographies; that is, new 
spaces and scales of identities are formed around “politics of everyday practices, 
the tactical trajectories through which citizen-strangers trace unintended, 
heterogeneous spatial stories within and against an imposed political terrain (de 
Certeau, 1984 in Secor, 2004; p.353). Therefore, citizens’ representations of 
spaces and scales are contingent upon the historical, economic, social and 
political context within which state institutions implement policies that shape 
different physical environments; as such, the state’s ability to actualise spatial 
identities such as places, regions, states (Massey, 2004; p.1) through citizens’ 
virtual representations of spaces and scales, is regularly contested and “inevitably 
historically changing” (ibid) as the spaces and scales of citizenship vary. 
The state-centric approach adopted by international post-conflict reconstruction 
assistance, however, remains fixed within the pre-spatial turn scalar hierarchy. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the space of the political community is 
merely the one defined by the internationally agreed territory, and scale refers 
uniquely to the establishment of nested administrative control units. As a result, 
this approach abstracts itself from the many potential representations of citizenship 
that state policies in different political, economic, social and historical environments 
can produce; the actualisation of the state may therefore be significantly 
threatened by an absence of the development of a political community across 
scales and spaces. Figure 6 below illustrates how scale and space fit within the 
relationship between state building and political community as elaborated in 
section 2.4. 
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Figure 6 – Space and scale as substantive and formal citizenship 
	  
Source: elaborated by the author 
3.3. Social cohesion 
The previous section has highlighted that, through its impact on physical 
environments, state policy can influence the spaces and scales at which citizens 
build their representations of formal and substantive citizenship; this, in turn, can 
significantly affect the virtual representation of the political community and, 
consequently, the actualisation of the state. This has considerable implications for 
the argument, developed in section 2.3, that state building contributes to shaping 
the institutions and policies of post-conflict countries; it implies that “decisions 
affecting local communities are increasingly made elsewhere” (Soja in 
Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.7). The following section introduces social cohesion as a tool 
that facilitates an analysis of the interrelation between scalar and spatial processes 
in order to understand, within the context of urban spaces, how an ahistorical 
approach to the construction of the state system can not only miss, but also run 
counter, to the processes of local polity construction inherent to societies. 
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3.3.1. Debates on social cohesion – a framing tool 
The concept of social cohesion has gained particular attention in the policymaking 
sphere since the early 1990s. It has been used both at the national – e.g. 
Canadian research on identity, culture and values25, Dutch government’s invitation 
to social scientists to analyse social cohesion – and international – e.g. OECD, 
European Union – levels to warn against the negative effects of economic 
restructuring and to bring more attention to societal cohesion “in order to sustain 
that very restructuring” (Jenson, 1998; p.3). Yet, despite such widespread national 
and international attention, a study carried out by the Canadian Policy Research 
Network (CPRN) on mapping social cohesion26 reveals that not only was there, as 
of 1998, still little academic research exploring the concept, but that the definition 
of such concept remained elusive at best, and confusing for the most part. Table 2 
below offers an overview of three different definitions that reveal social cohesion 
as a complex web of inter-connected elements. 
Table 2 – Examples of definitions of social cohesion as of 1998 
Source of the research	   Definition of social cohesion	  
Canada’s Policy Research Sub- 
Committee on Social Cohesion27	   The ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity 
within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and 
reciprocity among all Canadians. 
Commissariat général du 
Plan of the French government28	   Set of social processes that help instil in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the 
feeling that they are recognised as members of that 
community. 
OECD29	   The link to social cohesion is the belief that, “... it is safe 
to assume that most people prefer a world where life is 
characterised by stability, continuity, predictability, and 
secure access to well-being. Societies with such 
attributes garner more easily the commitment and 
adherence that sustain societal cohesion over time” 
   Source: Adapted from Jenson (1998), pp.4-5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Canadian Heritage (1996), Canadian Identity, Culture and Values: Building a Cohesive Society, 13 
September  
26 Jenson, J. (1998), Mapping Social Cohesion: the State of Canadian Research, CPRN Study No. F/03 
27  Policy Research Sub-Committee on Social Cohesion (PRSub-C) (1997), Social Cohesion Research 
Workplan, March. 
28  Plan – Commissariat Général du Plan (1997), Cohésion sociale et territoires, Paris: La Documentation 
Française. 
29  OECD (1997), Societal Cohesion and the Globalising Economy, Paris: OECD. 
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These definitional variations raise two important points in relation to social 
cohesion, as identified in a follow up to the CPRN study published30 in 2002. 
Firstly, the wide variety of debates has allowed for a wide range of interpretations 
that are all heavily dependent on the entry point of the research31; it is thus more 
accurate to qualify social cohesion as a ‘quasi-concept’ (Bernard, 1999 in ibid; 
p.1), which “serves usefully as a framing concept [original emphasis] for thinking 
through the complexity of policy issues” (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; p.V). Its 
main attribute is that it serves as an instrument to correlate different aspects of 
society and the economy, reintroducing “non market variables into accounts of 
human behaviour” in order to draw attention to “neglected non-market conditions of 
economic growth and social development” (Mayer, 2003; p.109). Secondly, social 
cohesion is used in policy and academic circles to “make sense of a wide range of 
challenges” (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; p. VI), in opposition to “single-focus 
policies such as anti-poverty, employment, community development, and so on (all 
of which are in themselves complex and multidimentional) do not seem to work as 
they should” (ibid).  
Within the context of this research, therefore, social cohesion provides the 
adequate tool to analyse the impact of state building on the construction of 
representations of citizenship in post-conflict societies: it recreates the connection 
between scales and spaces, between state policies and local polity construction, 
and comes to fill the gap left by too much emphasis, put in the past decade, on the 
role of social capital (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000; p.391) in post-conflict 
reconstruction. Indeed, social capital is seen, within the context of these 
interventions, “as providing the basis for communities […] to act together to 
address violence and disorder” (World Bank, 2011; p.31) through “networks, norms 
and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 
1993 in ibid). It has come to be criticised, however, for “paying scant attention to 
issues of power, inequality and social differentiation” (Goodhand et al, 2000; 
p.391) as conditions fostered by state policies and that can potentially affect the 
development and nature of social capital.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Beauvais, C. and Jenson, J. (2002), Social Cohesion: Updating the State of the Research, CPRN Discussion 
Paper No. F/22 
31 For instance, research focusing on social cohesion as a factor contributing to growth or well-being understand 
social cohesion in terms of social capital (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; p.V), whereas other analyses focusing 
on strategic action for fostering social cohesion approach the concept from an agency point of view and focus 
on the actors – e.g. state, civil society (ibid; p.IV). 
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As such, social cohesion maintains the spatial dimension of local polity 
construction through notions of trust, belonging and well-being within communities 
– as illustrated by the definitions presented in Table 2 – and complements it with 
the scalar dimension by providing a link to understand the effects of the state’s 
circumscribed role in supporting development (Barbara, 2008; p.309), within the 
framework of (neo)liberal state building, at the local scale. Urban spaces, this 
research argues, are the appropriate locus to analyse social cohesion for they are 
“prime sites where identities are staked, belonging is negotiated, and rights 
pursued” (Secor, 2004; p.353).  
3.3.2. Definition of social cohesion in the context of the research 
a) Defining social cohesion 
In the context of this research, the actualisation of the state is premised on the 
virtual representation of the image of the political community in its citizens’ mind; 
such image is grounded in the state’s ability, as highlighted in the notion of liberal 
peace, to build socially just environments where people can develop 
representations of substantive citizenship – across spaces – and, consequently, 
formal citizenship – across scales. As such, this approach “stresses the 
disintegrative effects of social inequality and exclusionary dynamics with regard to 
access to resources and markets, in contrast with solidarity and the reduction in 
wealth and income disparities that are required to create equal opportunities and a 
sense of fairness and belonging” (Miciukiewicz et al, 2012; p.1858).  
The introduction of social cohesion within the framework of this research, 
therefore, serves as a tool to understand how the implementation of state policies 
within different social, economic, political and historical environments can lead to 
the creation of contrasting environments of opportunities – substantive citizenship 
– thus upholding or running against the social contract between state and society 
and leading to different representations of formal citizenship – through the ability to 
exercise one’s social, economic, political and cultural rights. In this context, the 
definition of social cohesion developed by Forrest and Kearns (2001; p.2129) is 
particularly adequate as four of its five domains – as illustrated in Table 3 below –
reflect these dynamics. The domain of “place attachment and identity”, however, 
has been removed from the context of social cohesion for the purpose of this 
research; rather, it will be used instead in the following section to understand how 
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social cohesion dynamics at urban level can contribute to, or hinder, the creation of 
a political community.  
Table 3 – Domains of social cohesion 
Domain Description 
Common values and a 
civic culture 
Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes 
of behaviour; support for political institutions and participation in 
politics 
Social order and social 
control 
Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; 
absence of incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; 
respect for difference; intergroup co-operation 
Social solidarity and 
reductions in wealth 
disparities 
Harmonious economic and social development and common 
standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; 
equal access to services and welfare benefits; ready 
acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist 
others 
Social networks and 
social capital 
High degree of social interaction within communities and families; 
civic engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of 
collective action problems 
Place attachment and 
identity 
Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place 
identity 
Source: Forrest and Kearns (2001; p.2129) 
b) Understanding the four elements of social cohesion 
A society can claim to have common values and civic culture, Forrest and 
Kearns (2000; p.997) argue, when it is characterised by, on the one hand, 
common aims, objective, moral principles and codes of behaviour, and, on the 
other hand, a “widespread support for political institutions and general engagement 
with political systems and institutions” (ibid). Post-conflict countries, however, are 
generally characterised by a societal tissue that has been torn by years, 
sometimes decades of war, and where common aims, objectives, moral principles 
and codes of behaviour might have been lost or, as war created societal 
cleavages, been recreated at more local scales. As such, the establishment of 
state institutions in post-conflict countries also entails building institutions that 
provide citizens with political arenas that are “open and sufficiently democratic to 
have the potential to reach consensus on the collective action and policies” 
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(Miciukiewicz et al, 2012; p.1859); this way, through collective participation, 
different groups can mediate their differences and build new common aims and 
objectives, whilst state institutions promote common moral principles and codes of 
behaviour.  
As argued in section 2.3, however, international post-conflict assistance delivered 
as state building does not prioritise the establishment of a state system that can 
best represents all the expectations of its diverse society. Rather, faced with 
“ridiculously short timetables” (Ayoob, 1995 in Taylor and Botea, 2008; p.31), state 
building processes establish institutions that most efficiently deliver the core 
functions of the state, as dictated by Western liberal democratic concerns, and that 
often bear little resemblance to citizens’ expectations. As a result, to understand 
whether a society is cohesive, it is not enough to look at the effectiveness of state 
institutions as they are being ‘advertised’ by the state and international community; 
it is also crucial to understand citizens’ representations of the system’s ability to 
foster formal citizenship through an investigation “citizens’ knowledge of the 
system, their feelings towards it and their judgement of it” (Almond and Verba, 
1963 in Kearns and Forrest, 2000; p.997). 
The analysis of state formation, presented in section 2.2.2, highlighted that states 
are actualised when “the authority of the governing organisation is accepted, 
governments are trusted, and […] collectively agreed rights and responsibilities are 
mostly met” (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; p.997). For these conditions to be met, the 
state needs to be able to maintain social order and social control through 
legitimate and recognised means. That is, if the state develops regulations and 
institutions that favour dialogue within and between communities affected by 
conflict, inequality and unequal distribution of power are less likely to result in 
violent conflict. Furthermore, it increases citizens’ sense of security and fairness, 
therefore building trust in state institutions and facilitating social control. If, on the 
other hand, state institutions are designed, within a (neo)liberal framework, to 
protect individual rights and repress conflict criminalising those that are seen as 
failing to take part in the system – failing to become citizen entrepreneurs, as seen 
in section 2.3.4 – and disrupting it through violence, they fail in creating 
representations of a common project. Rather, unfair social control procedures 
encourage passive citizenship and estrangements amongst “quasi-members of 
society (those people with partial involvement in the formal labour market, low 
educational qualifications, low involvement in voluntary associations and poor 
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health)” (ibid; p.998), a lack of voice that might in turn lead to exit or boycott 
“expressed as disorder or petty crime” (ibid). This is particularly relevant in 
countries emerging from conflict where relations to state authority are often marred 
by years of state violence. 
Indeed, as seen in section 2.2.1, in the context of liberal peace the ability of the 
state to maintain social order is often directly related to its ability to promote social 
justice by increasing social solidarity and reducing wealth disparities (Wold 
Bank, 2011; Goodhand et al, 2000). That is, violent conflicts, as much as relapses 
into violence in post-conflict countries, are seen as a result of income and wealth 
inequalities that bring about “a breakdown of in social cohesion through the stress, 
frustration and family disruption they cause, in turn leading to problems of crime 
and violence” (Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997 in Forrest and Kearns, 2000; p.999). 
Consequently, as argued in section 2.3.4, it is crucial for post-conflict states to 
promote social justice through the development and implementation of policies that 
foster equal access to opportunities through a fair delivery of services. This, in 
turn, leads to a more harmonious economic and social development that 
contributes to building a representation of state institutions as promoting 
democracy through substantial and, consequently, formal citizenship – as access 
to opportunities facilitates access to economic, social and political rights. However, 
the establishment of (neo)liberal states, through state building processes, can 
severely damage this goal through its market laissez-faire approach; therefore, in 
order to ensure social cohesion, new states need to promote social solidarity by 
promoting the development of social obligations amongst the population, for “the 
most impressive developmental progress historically has not come through free 
markets alone but through state intervention and strategic political economy 
reflecting popular aspirations” (Murray, 2009; p.379). 
Social capital plays a key role in understanding whether the state’s ability to 
promote the three previous domains leads to the development of representations 
of formal and substantive citizenship that cut across “identities and loyalties at 
several spatial scales” (Kaplan, D.H., 2009; p.252). Much like social cohesion, 
there exists now a vast literature on the notion of social capital (Ostrom, 1994; 
Putnam, 1995; Lin, 1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Fukuyama, 2001; Adler 
and Kwon 2002; Mayer, 2003) and there is a wide variety of definitions that vary 
according to the point of emphasis of the research field (see APPENDIX II for a 
comprehensive list of different definitions). For the purpose of this research, a 
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combination of two definitions will be used to define social capital as “the 
information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social networks32” 
(Woolcock, 1998; p.153) that are developed by “individuals spending time and 
energy working with other individuals to find better ways of making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” (Ostrom, 
1994; p.528). The combination of these definitions accurately reflects the social 
aspect of this notion – people’s interactions – and the economic aspect 
encompassed by capital – as a result of these elements people are capable of 
achieving economic ends they would not have achieved alone. 
Therefore, in countries recovering from internal conflict, understanding the stock of 
social capital characterising society can become a decisive factor in the success of 
a state building intervention. Indeed, in these societies networks of information and 
trust are often already well established as a result of pre-colonial societal 
organisation – such as traditional leaders, kinship ties, etc – or networks that have 
emerged as coping mechanisms during the conflict – such as resistance 
movements, political affiliations; understanding how they function, and using them, 
would facilitate the state’s ability to reach its citizens across all spaces.  For 
instance, Robert Putnam (1993) carried out a research in Italy to understand why 
the regional governments set up in the 1970s were successful in promoting 
democracy in some regions, whilst failing in others. The results of the research 
showed that “some traditions of civic engagement are the hallmarks of a 
successful region” (Putnam, 1993) where pre-existing systems of information – 
such as newspaper readership –, networks of trust – such as membership in 
choral societies – and norms of reciprocity – such as engagement in common 
matters – have facilitated adaptability to the new system.  
Similarly, the ability of international organisations to understand pre-existing social 
arrangements is critical to establishing a system of governance that distributes 
resources and opportunities in a manner that facilitates the coexistence of 
customary and state-based governance (Cummins, 2013; p.144); this, in turn, will 
determine whether the emerging state will permeate all scales of society or 
whether new hybrids of governance will emerge. In this context, Ostrom (1994; 
p.528) provides the example of government engineers in Indonesia who attempted 
to improve the operation of a water system by removing the old system and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This definition itself encapsulates the main elements of the definitions of the major contributors to social 
capital theory 
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replacing it with a more modern one; the failure of government officials to take into 
consideration traditional farmers’ allocation of water meant that they were no 
longer able to allocate it fairly in the way that had previously been agreed upon 
and which was more efficient for everyone. 
Consequently, for social capital to facilitate the development of social cohesion, 
“top-down efforts are usually needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalise 
‘bottom-up’ development” (Uphoff, 1992 in Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; p.14); 
this is what Woolcock and Narayan (2000; p.7) refer to as the ‘network’ 
approach’33. It argues that there exist two types of community ties – community 
understood here as a local polity – that is, ‘bonding’ – intra-community relations – 
and ‘bridging’ – inter-community bonds. Intra-community ties might emerge more 
easily between people interacting daily within given spaces, but these ties might 
sometimes lead to communities that are very closed-off if they are not 
complemented by inter-community bonds. The latter, however, might not 
materialize as easily as the former and may, therefore, be engendered by national 
policies aimed at facilitating interaction between the different communities. Indeed, 
relations between different communities that are ‘bonded’ might at times be 
contentious – for historical, security and/or socio-economic reasons – but conflict 
need not be a negative thing; rather, if the right processes are in place conflict “can 
create opportunities for bridges to other networks and can displace relations that 
tend to build dependency, limit access to new information and opportunities and 
retard change” (Colletta and Cullen, 2000; p.93).  
The impact of international state building interventions on shaping state institutions 
is critical in defining the ability and willingness of the state in facilitating bridging 
between communities. Indeed, the current focus on (neo)liberal projects, with their 
emphasis on market driven approaches and individualism, often incurs significant 
resistance from communities where the state does not reach society or does so in 
a negative way (Richmond, 2014; p.10). As a result, more hybrid forms of 
governance emerge instead to respond to state building projects that fail to engage 
with “history, identity, social justice and emancipation” (ibid) thus producing socio-
economic inequalities; these bonds, in turn, reinforce bonding at the expense of 
bridging so that “poor people may have close-knit and intensive stock of ‘bonding’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 There are different schools of thought regarding the way in which social capital can be understood and 
facilitated; the main ones identified by Woolcock and Narayan (2000; pp.6-15) are: Communitarian view (social 
capital is inherently good); Network view (bonding and bridging); Institutional view (social capital is facilitated by 
government institutions); and, synergy view (social capital is both bottom-up and top-down) 
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to get by but be lacking ‘bridging’ to get ahead” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; 
p.3). It is the difference between bridging and bonding of social capital that 
determines whether a state is capable of developing social cohesion across 
different spatial scales or, on the contrary, is creating spaces of difference where 
strongly cohesive bonded neighbourhoods are conflicting with one another, thus 
fragmenting the images of the state territory. The analysis of social cohesion within 
urban spaces is therefore useful in determining at what spatial scale citizenship is 
developing and the relative strength of the contrasting local polities operating at 
each scale (Kearns and Forrest, 2001; p.2129). 
3.4. The construction of citizenship in urban spaces 
The introduction of social cohesion in this research’s analytical framework serves 
as a tool to understand how the state policies, emerging from international state 
building processes, can affect the spatial scales within which citizens interact and 
build their representations of citizenship. It highlighted that the extent of these 
states’ ability to promote voice, ensure social order and control and facilitate 
access to opportunities in order to reduce inequalities, can lead to either positive or 
negative social cohesion – depending on whether social capital is exclusively 
bonded or both bonded and bridged. Analysing social cohesion, therefore, enables 
an understanding of the virtual representations of spaces and scales citizens build 
through their daily interactions within the physical environments where state 
policies materialise. Urban spaces, this research argues, are ideal sites to carry 
out an analysis of social cohesion emerging from state building (neo)liberal 
practices, for everyday spatial interactions amid growing inequalities determine 
“the common ways in which hegemonic notions of citizenship are both 
accommodated  and disrupted across [these] spaces” (Secor, 2004; p.365). 
3.4.1. From cities to urban spaces as sites for local polity construction 
Section 2.2.3 argued that polities emerge at the local level as the product of 
everyday interactions between people living within given spaces; it is the 
reorganisation of the world order into territorial states that made it imperative for 
these local polities to become nested in a political community congruent with the 
territorial borders of the states they found themselves in. It introduced the notion of 
citizenship as “that identity which subordinates and coordinates all other identities” 
(Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.187), aiming to erode all other forms of 
hierarchies in favour of a social contract binding citizens and their state in a 
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territorial relationship characterised by equality of rights (ibid). The creation of the 
territorial state codified the political community through the establishment of formal 
citizenship. 
Nevertheless, political community remains a relational concept, and even the 
political communities of the state continue to be defined by a multitude of 
interactions that take place in a wide variety of spaces. These spaces have, 
through time, come to represent “symbolic areas and sites, serialities, 
constellations, pathways, dwelling places, and everyday fixtures” (Edensor, 2009; 
p.242) shaped by historical relationships of economic, social and political 
struggles. Thus, as the thoughts and movements of a group have come to be 
ordered, through time, by these spaces of interaction (Halbwachs, 1950; p.3), the 
spaces themselves have become the physical expression of images and 
representations of a local polity. This is what Halbwachs (1994 in ibid; p.72) called 
“social frameworks of memory”; that is, the internal points of reference that are 
grounded in an individual’s interactions with other people and which constitute that 
individual’s identity (Arraou, 1999; p.73). They are the product of individual 
memories that emerge and exist in relation to an ensemble of notions, that many 
other individuals possess, built around individuals, groups, places, dates, words 
and language forms (ibid; p.73). As such, frameworks of memory vary according to 
places, with their historical and physical context, thus entwining imaginings of 
place attachment with understandings of identity and one’s place in the world 
(Taylor, 2009; p.296). 
In this context, the construction of a political community requires the ability to 
devise policies and governance systems that can bind together these different 
spaces so that the existing scales of belonging (Taylor, 2009; p.295) come to be 
encompassed within the notion of citizenship; that is, state policies need to be 
designed so as to ensure that no space of interaction precludes a social group 
from being able to access the resources and opportunities inherent to the rights of 
a  citizen of the state. Formal citizenship can only contribute to the development of 
a political community if it is grounded, at the local scale, in inclusive relations 
guaranteed by a socially just substantive citizenship. 
Cities, in this context, are particularly interesting sites for exploring the ability of 
state policies to foster the kind of formal and substantive citizenship that 
characterises the political community, for they are a concentration of “the non 
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local, the strange, the mixed, and the public” (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.188) 
producing local polities that “decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and 
practices of citizenship” (ibid). This is particularly evident in post-conflict countries 
where the establishment of (neo)liberal states, as well as the rapid urbanisation 
that accompanies post-conflict development, attempt to establish a social order  
where “traditional ties to the community – shared space, close kinship links, shared 
religious and moral values – [are] replaced by anonymity, individualism and 
competition” (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; p.2125). In this context, cities become 
sites where social power, material wealth and authorisation of belonging meet with 
contestations over marginalisation and exclusions (Taylor, 2009; p.295) producing 
new forms of substantive citizenship in opposition to a strongly individual formal 
citizenship.  
The use of the term ‘city’, however, would be inappropriate in the framework for 
this research because generally references to the city merely refer to its physical 
characteristics – urbs. Rather, in the context of this research the city shapes 
different forms of citizenship through both its urbs – such as houses and roads – 
and its civitas – which citizens acting within these spaces contribute to shaping 
(Rousseau, 1923; p.244) as the virtual arena where the “drama of life” (Mumford, 
1937; p.92) takes place. Consequently, the term ‘urban space’ is used in order to 
combine both the physicality of the city as well as the social relations that such 
physicality produces, and which produce it, thus reflecting the notion of a civitas 
with flexible imagined boundaries according to citizens’ representations of their 
political community and belonging at different spatial scales.  
As such, the notion of ‘urban’ refers here to “an area of continuous development” 
(Demographia website)34 characterised by a “density of human structures such as 
houses, commercial buildings, roads, bridges, and railways” (National Geographic 
Education)35 and referring to towns, cities and suburbs (ibid). It is through the 
urban that state policies materialise through their social, political and economic 
impacts. ‘Space’, on the other hand, recalls the idea of civitas shaped by 
processes of exclusion and inclusion through which individuals “articulate 
themselves as citizens, strangers, outsiders and aliens as possible ways of being 
as identities and differences” (Isin, 2007; p.222). ‘Space’ does not exist in itself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 http://demographia.com/db-define.pdf (accessed 28/08/13) 
35 http://education.nationalgeographic.co.uk/education/encyclopedia/urban-area/?ar_a=1  
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(Duncan and Savage, 1989; p.181), but is instead the virtual product of the 
interaction of social, political, economic and historical relations that take spatial 
forms wherein the political mobilisation of social groups is distributed (ibid) to “give 
birth to bodies politic and social” (Isin, 2007; p.222). It is the constitution of ever 
widening spaces that determines the emergence of the political community, and, 
conversely, it is the construction of a polity limited to a local scale that turns a 
space of interaction into a place of attachment, which furnishes to those social 
groups a sense of belonging as well as a sense of community with others 
(Pacione, 2009; p.22). 
In other words, in the context of this research ‘urban space’ is used not only in its 
“actual form with a spatially enclosed structure (urbs) but also includes its virtual 
form as relations, symbols, imaginaries, representations, categories, ideas, and 
ideals (civitas)” (Isin, 2008; p.266) that contribute to shaping individuals into 
citizens. 
3.4.2. Formal and substantive citizenship in post-conflict urban spaces 
Urban spaces are therefore key sites to explore how state institutions can affect 
the construction of different formulations of citizenship (Staeheli, 2003; p.98) 
through the implementation of (neo)liberal policies that cause significant 
developmental disparities – e.g. criminalisation of certain areas, favouring of 
others, privatisation of services – particularly visible and tangible in the way in 
which they shape spaces of interaction into “interlacing grids of difference” (Secor, 
2004; p.358). But whilst in Western countries there already exists a vast range of 
literature dealing with the impact of state policies on urban space (Lefebvre, 1974; 
Brenner, 1999; Marston, 2000; Purcell, 2007; Isin 2007), these have been much 
less explored in countries recovering from internal conflict.  
Instead, this research argues that it is precisely in countries where the social fabric 
has been damaged by years, sometimes decades, of war, and where it is 
imperative to (re)build a sense of political community across the whole territory, 
that the analysis of the construction of both formal and substantive citizenship in 
urban spaces is particularly useful. Indeed, the rapid social and economic 
development of the capital of the country – and, at times, other main cities – 
attracts large numbers of people who never had to interact before – in fact may 
even be in conflict with each other for historical reasons – and who suddenly find 
themselves sharing the same urban space and having to compete against each 
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other to become citizen entrepreneurs. Thus, it is by understanding the politics of 
everyday practices enacted by citizens interacting in these spaces that one can 
become aware of the emergence of unintended and heterogeneous “spatial stories 
within and against an imposed political terrain” (de Certeau in Secor, 2004; p.353). 
The following points therefore articulate how a combination of historical 
developments and state building impacts on the urban environment can contribute 
to the creation of different urban spaces within a given urban area. 
a) Urban spaces’ historical development 
In countries undergoing state building processes, it is key to understand how 
different physical contexts carry within them the history of social relations that 
characterise the local polity of the people living and interacting within them as 
citizens on a daily basis. These interventions need to recognise that the 
construction of political community is a perpetual re-adaptation between spatial 
and temporal conditions (Arraou, 1999; p.71); that is, every time there is an impact 
on the physical context where relationships take place, the place transforms social 
representations and social representations, in turn, contribute to transforming the 
place (Halbwachs, 1994 in Arraou, 1999; p.76). This implies, therefore, 
understanding the relationship of an area with the colonial past as well as the 
migration patterns that have shaped its population’s characteristics.  
Whilst the significant urbanisation that characterises post-conflict urban 
environment often leads to an ever-increasing urban sprawl – see APPENDIX III – 
the core of the urban space that already existed during colonial times is often the 
result of a divided world where “the settler’s town is a strongly built town, all made 
of stone and steel… The town belonging to the colonised people […] is a place of 
ill fame” (King, 2009; p.321). South African urban areas are a particularly good 
example of these spaces of exclusion, where apartheid has been built into the 
urban fabric to ensure a clear division between white citizens and non-citizens of 
other ethnic backgrounds. But the distinctions need not be as clear-cut and visible 
to be represented in the minds of the population; for instance in Dili – Timor Leste 
– one area has been clearly marked by its being the locus of colonial power – 
Portuguese and Indonesian – whilst another emerged as a result of Indonesian 
techniques of population control, thus significantly impacting the way in which the 
areas are connected and developed within the urban space.  
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Migration patterns also have an important impact on social frameworks of memory 
for they determine whether an area is homogeneous or heterogeneous. That is, 
whilst in some areas groups of migrants develop a bonded social capital that 
attracts more migrants from their same areas of origins – homogeneous areas – in 
other areas the historical, political and development contexts impede the 
development of such bonded social capital and therefore receive migrants from 
more diverse areas of origin – heterogeneous areas. Indeed, “migrant social 
capital resources can work in different ways for different groups of individuals or in 
different settings” (Garip, 2008; p.592). For example, in Dili there are areas that 
are known to be particularly homogeneous and where, as a consequence, 
customary conflict mediation and resolution processes continue to have much 
more legitimacy than the new justice system; conversely, in more heterogeneous 
areas these customary ties may be eroding, but the new justice system may not 
yet have become effective, thus creating a justice gap that can significantly affect 
security in the area.  
b) State building’s impact on urban development 
The sudden, important flows of rural-urban migration that often characterise post-
conflict urban areas can prove to be a considerable strain on the institutions of 
newly elected and established governments; indeed, the elaboration of an urban 
development plan, that would substantially contribute to the management of these 
flows, demands technical and financial resources that are not readily available – 
for instance, lack of skilled personnel, different development priorities. When these 
deficiencies are compounded with (neo)liberal policies that promote public-private 
partnerships for development that are strongly determined by a market laissez-
faire attitude rather than a stronger state-wide vision, urban development very 
quickly shapes urban spaces according to market priorities and historical relations, 
rather than human development needs.  
Indeed, the implementation of (neo)liberal policies contributes to creating new 
windows of opportunities where patronage can have devastating impacts on 
service and infrastructure delivery. For instance, corrupt political elites in Kenya 
and Cote d’Ivoire, during the 1960s and 1970s used state resources to deliver 
benefits – as public services – to clients in return for political support (OECD, 
2010; p.38). This attitude can be particularly evident in relation to areas that have 
historically been more related to colonial or state power, since they are often more 
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central than others, therefore attracting more investment and development. 
Furthermore, if the political elite of the new state is essentially related to one 
ethnic, religious or social group, and this elite – or people connected to the elite – 
choose to reside in those areas, these areas may benefit from more infrastructure 
development than areas that do not possess such connections.  
In this context, the nature of the governance system established as a result of the 
state building process plays a significant role in tilting the fragile balance between 
voice and exit/boycott. As argued in section 2.3.3, the way in which state 
institutions are built during the state building process – that is, who is involved, 
how and to what extent this reflects popular aspirations – as well as the timing and 
nature of the elections – that is, whether people are fully free to choose or the 
reasons why they elect their leaders – can at times produce systems of 
governance that promote, much as what happened in Iraq, patronage through 
traditional kinship ties or power relations tied to resistance (OECD, 2010; p.28). 
Consequently, if the system does not provide for adequate institutions – either at 
local or national level, or both – for citizens to voice their concerns in relation to the 
state of development of their area, there is little that the local leaders – whether 
they are part of the new decentralised system or are customary leaders that still 
hold a lot of power in people’s imaginaries – can do to trigger top-down changes 
and improvements. In this context, the issue of repression in lieu of security has a 
strong impact on people in poor areas who feel disenfranchised and outside the 
project of the state; that is, as citizens resort to contestation and conflict in 
response to their voices remaining ignored, these outbursts of violence are not 
treated as symptoms of a much bigger societal issue, but are instead categorised 
as “civil disobedience” (Zinn, 1968) thus assigning them “their ‘proper places’ in 
the established order, and therefore, de-politicis[ing] them” (Dikeç, 2002; p.95). 
c) Creating urban spaces 
The understanding of the state articulated in chapter two highlighted the fact that, 
in order to be able to create the overlapping networks of experience that 
characterise the building of a political community out of multiple local polities 
(Edensor, 2006; p.537), states need to build institutions that penetrate local worlds 
to create national habits, routines, representations and images that incorporate 
local experiences into the national […] mosaic (ibid). The implementation of social, 
political and economic rights alone cannot achieve this goal, for indeed the fact 
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that state institutions are built to ensure the implementation of rights does not 
mean that these rights will lead to opportunities for the whole population (Barry, 
2005; p.19). Rather, states that are too weak or indifferent to develop institutions 
and policies that can adequately ensure social justice – through equal access to 
resources and opportunities for citizens to exercise their rights – have “a 
profoundly different effect on community life […] than governments that respect 
civil liberties, uphold the rule of law, honour contracts, and resist corruption” 
(Woolcok and Narayan, 2000; p.3). Consequently, the combination of historical 
developments with the impact of (neo)liberal policies on the urban environment, as 
described above, create fundamental differences in the urban fabric of an urban 
area.  
In fact, some areas’ connections with political elites and/or position in the wider 
urban area facilitate their access to crucial infrastructures and services that in turn 
provide them with better resources to access opportunities and exercise their 
rights as citizens. For instance, in these areas citizens benefit from a good 
education system that provides them with writing, reading and critical thinking skills 
– resources – which they can then use in order to access the employment market 
as well as information about the government – opportunities – so as to exercise 
their economic and political rights. As such, through their political, economic and 
social interactions, which extend not only to other areas of the urban environment 
but also to participation in state-wide debates, citizens in these areas build new 
representations of their belonging to a political community; that is, by exercising 
their formal rights they develop new bridges that link them to new polities, so that 
they feel that they are tackling the world around them with manoeuvres that are 
familiar to other people with whom they do not necessarily interact directly 
(Frykman and Löfgren, in Edensor, 2006; p.532). Here formal citizenship is 
complemented by substantial citizenship in a process that creates wide urban 
spaces of interaction.  
Conversely, people who reside in areas where deficient patterns of infrastructure 
and service delivery result in a lack of education and employment opportunities, 
may fail to imagine themselves as part of a bigger political community than their 
own. Indeed, their inability to access adequate employment and education 
opportunities may result in their increasing disconnection from the economic and 
political development of the country, thus limiting their potential to “grasp the 
significance of interests beyond the narrow horizons of their own selfish concerns” 
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(Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.10). Furthermore, the lack of development in their 
area may easily translate into an urban fabric that differs significantly from other 
more included areas; as such, “familiar institutions, chain stores, post offices, 
public houses, workplaces, sports venues, entertainment centres, parks, service 
stations, streets and numerous other regular settings” (Edensor, 2006; p.537), 
where national habits can be enacted, repeated and assimilated at numerous 
points throughout the territory (ibid), do not exist – or are in short supply – in those 
areas. Finally, economic development calls economic development, and when a 
lack of economic opportunities is combined with a lack of political and/or social 
connections, then the economic development of certain areas may become 
significantly hindered.  
The type of citizenship that develops in these sites is therefore inevitably very 
different from the national project. Instead, far from the wider political community 
promoted by state institutions, citizens in these areas accumulate different 
repetitive practices and experiences that produce collective assumptions and 
unreflexive orientations (ibid; p.532) defined by, and confined to, bonded spaces of 
interaction of these social groups. Their lack of mobility across the urban 
environment affects how they organise, assemble together (Isin, 2008; p.266), 
turning them into “active participants in the production of difference, identity and 
citizenship” (Secor, 2004; p.358) as they shape representations of a local polity 
intrinsically linked to their daily interactions, and which limited extension beyond its 
imagined boundaries contributes, in turn, to the creation of urban spaces of 
exclusion.  
Consequently, the failure of state institutions to shape urban spaces that can 
facilitate, through shared routines, habits and practices, the representation of a 
wider social group pertaining to a political community results in a fragmented 
loyalty across the urban territory. When this is compounded with the presence of 
institutions that fail to engender the belief that they are the most appropriate ones 
to facilitate citizens’ checks and balances on their government, then voice and 
loyalty slowly give way to the possibility of exit. Indeed, urban spaces can be seen, 
in the context of this research, as spaces of “attention orientation” (Bickford, 2000; 
p.356) that shape “citizens’ sense of what people, perspective, and problems are 
present in the democratic public” (ibid); however, if within those spaces they 
understand that their voice cannot contribute to such democratic public, but that 
the social capital they develop by acting together is much more effective in 
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improving their living conditions, citizens will “no longer fight for change from 
within” (Hirshman, 1970; p.83). Rather, they are likely to create new, alternative 
forms of citizenship through urban spaces that act as “pretext and context, form 
and substance, stage and script” (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.202), thus 
creating places of attachment that contribute to fragmenting the sovereignty of the 
state across its territory. 
3.5. Conclusion – Articulating the research’s analytical framework 
Grounded in the notion, developed in chapter two, that the mutually constitutive 
nature of state building and political community makes it essential to understand 
the impact of state building on the construction of a political community in post-
conflict settings, this chapter has sought to develop an analytical framework that 
articulates the different theoretical tools helpful for analysing such relationship.  
The notions of actual and virtual have been introduced in the framework to 
describe, in theoretical terms, the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
state and the political community. The state, in the context of this research, is 
understood as being actual: based on the notion that territory is not merely a 
terrain but rather the product of historical circumstances that have come to define 
the boundaries of political spaces, for the state to function its institutions need to 
build representations of state authority in the imaginaries of its citizens throughout 
the whole territory. In other words, for state institutions to be actualised, it is 
imperative that the state fosters a political community that bounds the whole 
territory under its authority in its virtual representation and effects (Isin, 2007; 
p.212).  
In chapter two, the political community was articulated as the product of social 
relations that take place in everyday settings and through which people define 
themselves “in terms of attachment to geographic entities above, below, and 
including the scale of the nation state” (Flint, 2012; p.3). The emphasis, in such 
articulation of the concept, is on the idea that individuals construct their belonging 
to a local polity as a result of their daily interactions; however, depending on 
whether these take place face-to-face, virtually and/or through the consciousness 
that they are carrying out habits, routines and patterns that are being reproduced 
at the same time by other individuals in the country, this will result in more or less 
nested polities. At the core of the notion of political community within the state, 
therefore, lies the notion of scale, that is, the ability of the state to command the 
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loyalty of its population by ensuring that formal citizenship is actualised in such 
way that substantive citizenship is continuously reconfigured from the bottom-up 
(Secor, 2004; p.365) so as to create an ever-widening series of scales of 
belonging that start from the local and reach the national scale (Ferguson and 
Gupta, 2002; p.982). 
Formal citizenship, in this context, refers to the ability of state institutions to ensure 
that social, political and economic rights are not merely stated in documents that 
draw the contours of the state’s social contract, but are also implemented in such 
way that citizens are able to exercise those rights. This relationship between the 
state and its citizens is what was defined in chapter two in terms of legitimacy, that 
is, the ability of citizens to keep checks and balances on the actions of the state by 
voicing their concerns so as to influence national debate. However, for formal 
citizenship to enable the process of legitimation of state institutions it needs to be 
complemented by substantial citizenship; the latter emerges when state institutions 
develop and implement socially just policies that ensure citizens’ access to the 
resources and opportunities they need to be able to exercise their formal 
citizenship rights. For indeed, “even where groups may have full citizenship, this 
may not be enough to prevent them from being treated as second-class citizens” 
(Storey, 2012; p.63), whether purposefully through various forms of discrimination 
or merely as a result of economic, political and social policies enacted within 
(neo)liberal frameworks where the state has little room for manoeuvre. 
Thus, the right and possibility for citizens to voice their concern alone cannot 
guarantee that, if one or many local polities do not deem the conditions in which 
they live adequate, they will choose voice over exit or boycott; in this sense, formal 
citizenship is no longer a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship” (Holston 
and Appadurai, 1996; p.190). Instead, it is crucial for states to build territory-wide 
loyalty through the creation of socially just living conditions for all citizens, so as to 
ensure that state institutions are represented, in the imaginaries of the population, 
as embodying the interests of all different local polities across the territory. It is in 
the relationship between social justice and the development of a substantive 
citizenship that lies the nature of sovereignty as the recognition of authority across 
the whole territory; that is, if state institutions succeed in reaching out to all social 
groups in the territory, the spaces in which authority is socially constructed through 
everyday practices expand from the local space to the territory of the state. Indeed 
social justice, this research argues, can be ascribed to actions by institutions that 
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can then be judged “by their effects on the distribution of rights, opportunities, and 
resources” (Barry, 2005; p.18). 
As such, social cohesion was introduced in the framework of the research as the 
tool to analyse the effect of state institutions on the creation of virtual sovereignty 
and legitimacy. By reconciling the need to understand both social and economic 
effects of state policies on the population of a state, as the basis for liberal peace, 
social cohesion provides in this framework the link between the impacts of the 
state and the virtual image these impacts contribute to creating in the imaginaries 
of the citizens, so as to reveal “the fragility and partiality of liberal conceptions of 
‘the public’ and ‘the subject of rights’ (Secor, 2004; p.365). Furthermore, the 
combination of multiscalar and multidimentional elements, that characterise social 
cohesion as a tool of analysis, make it particularly adequate for exploring the 
impact of state institutions on the urban environment as urbs, the representations 
of state authority these urbs engender in citizens’ imaginaries and, consequently, 
the spaces of substantive citizenship that emerge within different urban spaces; 
the civitas of urban spaces is consequently used to understand whether state 
institutions are contributing to the construction of political community or 
undermining it. Figure 7 below provides an overview of the analytical framework for 
this research. 
Figure 7 – Analytical Framework 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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In the context of state building and political community discussed in chapter two, 
this framework serves to explore how, through the patterns of service delivery, 
security and individualism established by (neo)liberal strategies in cities, processes 
of dissolution of existing solidarities and creation of new polities take place. The 
(neo)liberal practices implemented in the process of state building stress 
“autonomy, the ability to act without constraint or attending to others” (Young, 1990 
in ibid; p.367) leading to inequalities and exclusions that result in different 
strategies of everyday life, different interactions and negotiations between citizens, 
which themselves “produce territories” (De Certeau, 1984 in Secor, 2004; p.360). 
More specifically, within urban contexts, this framework serves to explore how 
post-conflict states, undergoing state building processes, fail to penetrate citizens’ 
everyday lives through the creation of urban spaces where citizens can exercise 
their rights within the family, the workplace, the home or the street (Edensor, 2006; 
p.529); as such, local polities are prevented from being contested and transformed 
between different social groups – the bridging of substantive citizenship – resulting 
in a state that “is all but meaningless to its citizens – perhaps except as a national 
symbol, as a system of governance mainly aimed at (sometimes) alien forms of 
rights and law and a way of organizing institutions, markets and security” 
(Richmond, 2014; p.3). 
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY 
 
“Remember your humanity and forget the rest” 
(Russel-Einstein Manifesto, 1955) 	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4. Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the methodology developed by the author in 
order to apply the analytical framework articulated in the previous chapter for the 
purpose of understanding the impact of state building on the construction of a 
political community in the context of post-conflict countries. The first part of this 
chapter frames the objective of the research by clearly stating the gap that has 
been identified in the literature and policy on international state building and the 
development of a political community. Using this gap as its starting point, the 
chapter subsequently moves on to articulating the objective of the research and 
enunciates the research questions that have been developed in order to guide the 
investigation that aims to fill the gap. The second part of this chapter frames the 
research methodology in theoretical terms, using social constructivism, the 
processes of abduction, deduction and induction as well as the exercise of reading 
the urban fabric, in order to illustrate the intellectual processes around which the 
methodology of the research has been organised. Finally, the last part provides a 
description of the research methods that have been used to answer the research 
questions presented hereafter. 
4.1. Framing the objective of the research 
4.1.1. Research purpose 
The initial interest that sparked the intellectual process for this thesis lies in the 
author’s long-standing concern for the growing evidence on international state 
building missions’ failure to establish post-conflict states which capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy are driven by state-society relationships (OECD, 2008; 
p.1). In the process of investigating the causes of such failure, the interchangeable 
use of the terms state building and nation building, in both academic and 
international policy literature, brought to the fore the need to undertake a more in-
depth analysis of the differences between the two processes in order to argue 
more convincingly about the dangers of focusing international efforts solely on 
state institutions to the detriment of societal processes. The intellectual process 
that led to the development of the analytical framework, however, progressively 
moved away from the notion of nation building – as focused on nations; rather, the 
fieldwork in Timor Leste highlighted the importance of citizenship and the 
construction of political community out of different local polities. As such, the focus 
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of the research was shifted to the mutually constitutive nature of state building and 
the construction of a political community. 
Since the elements that characterise these concepts are multiple and closely 
intertwined, they require that any analysis of their mutually constitutive relationship 
be set within a context where a wide variety of study fields – such as political 
science, sociology, history and international relations – apply. Thus, the literature 
review provided in chapter two has introduced cities as important sites in which to 
analyse the encounter of state building activities with the daily realities of 
indigenous social processes inherent to the construction of political communities. 
By placing citizenship as the nexus between the different key notions underpinning 
the relationship between states and society – that is territory, sovereignty and 
legitimacy – it explored the potential for international state building interventions to 
negatively affect the process of constructing a political community key to 
establishing sustainable peace in post-conflict countries. 
In this light, a further review of the literature on state building and urban post-
conflict reconstruction revealed that the two fields have generally approached post-
conflict reconstruction in ‘either/or’ terms. In the international relations and political 
science literature on state building, the focus is generally centred on national level 
dynamics and institutions (OECD, 2008; UN Security Council, 1995; World Bank, 
2012), with reference to the local context generally restrained to that of an 
essential variable to take into consideration – but without much further 
consideration as to how. Conversely, urban development and urban planning 
literature situated in the field of post-conflict reconstruction has shown a tendency 
to focus in particular on the processes of urban planning in divided cities 
(Anderson, 2010; Bickford, 2000; Bollens, 1998; Bollens 2007) or the importance 
of cities in both triggering and solving conflicts (Esser, 2004), without, however, 
drawing links between the impact of state building policies on urban areas and, 
therefore, the development of local polities within the urban spaces of a state. As a 
consequence, both centres of interest have shown the potential to have perverse 
outcomes, where localism can contribute to reinforcing state-society cleavages 
whereas the elimination of local community, to the benefit of a notion of national 
citizenship, risks precluding active participation in the process of state building 
(Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.191). 
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Only in recent years has there been a growing body of literature highlighting the 
importance of local and indigenous processes in complementing state building 
strategies (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2011; Chandler, 2012; Fregonese, 
2012; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2014; UNDP, 2012; World 
Bank, 2011). Similarly, in the urban planning literature there has been a rising 
interest in relation to the importance of urban environments as critical sites for 
understanding the impact of (neo)liberal state building policies on the development 
of a democratic society (Bollens, 2013; Esser, 2013). It is therefore in this context 
that the research framework developed in chapter three of this thesis comes to fill 
a gap identified regarding the relationship between (neo)liberal state building 
processes, their impact on the urban environment, and the importance of the 
ensuing socially constructed urban spaces for the relationship between state 
building and political community.  
4.1.2. Objective of the research 
In light of the literature review, theoretical framework and research purpose 
outlined thus far, the objective of the research is: 
To understand how the process of state building affects the process of developing 
a political community in the context of post-conflict urban spaces. Using the case 
study of Dili, the capital of Timor Leste, the research focuses on investigating how 
the impact of state policies at local level contributes to shaping different spaces of 
daily interaction and how these spaces, in turn, affect people’s representations of 
their sense of belonging, thus resulting in the construction of multiple polities at 
different scales – local, urban, state – which can potentially hinder the emergence 
of a  political community across the territory of the state. Grounded in a social 
constructivist approach, the research takes place in two areas, within Dili’s urban 
space, presenting different socio-economic, historical and development 
characteristics, and uses semi-structured interviews with a wide variety of people 
in order to explore how a combination of environment and state actions can shape 
the spaces and scales of people’s allegiances – that is, citizenship – and, 
consequently, affect state sovereignty and legitimacy. 
The following section presents the research questions elaborated in order to 
further define the objectives of the research. 
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4.1.3. Research questions 
On the basis of the research objective stated above, the author elaborated a set of 
research questions to facilitate the process of investigating how the disconnection 
between the states emerging from international state building and the societies 
they produce emerges in post-conflict urban environments, and how this can 
contribute, as a result, to significantly undermining the development of the virtual 
political community through which the state should be actualised. 
Firstly, the research sought to explore the process of institutional development 
within the context of international state building, therefore the first research 
question asked: 
How do international state building practices affect the nature of post-
conflict state institutions? 
To understand these dynamics, two subsidiary questions have been outlined that 
guided the research process: 
Who takes part in the process of institutional development? 
How do these institutions reflect pre-existing historical and political 
dynamics? 
Secondly, the research sought to understand the relationship between the process 
through which institutions have been designed and the impact of such process on 
the development of state policies within the country’s historical context, therefore 
the second research question asked: 
How do the policies emanating from these institutions affect the core 
functions of the state? 
Answering this question required gathering a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of the state process of policy making through the investigation of two 
subsidiary questions: 
How are state policies defined by the institutions designed within the state 
building process? 
How do these policies affect the social, political and economic development 
of the post-conflict context of the country? 
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Finally, as the investigation moved from the state level to the urban level, the 
research sought to understand the nexus between the urban environment shaped 
by state policies and the urban spaces emerging from daily interactions in these 
environments, therefore the third research question asked: 
How does the relationship between the urban environment emerging from 
state policies and social cohesion affect the spaces and scales of socially 
constructed polities? 
However, in order to facilitate the establishment of a connection between social 
cohesion and the socially constructed polities emerging from the materialisation of 
state policies with urban spaces, three subsidiary questions have been developed: 
How does the urban fabric emerging from historical and state building 
developments affect social cohesion in different urban spaces? 
How do these urban spaces contribute to shaping people’s spaces and 
scales of interaction? 
How do people's spaces and scales of interaction shape their sense of 
belonging to a political community and, consequently, their representation 
of the state? 
These research questions emphasise the impact of state building processes on the 
building of state institutions and, subsequently, the impact of those institutions on 
the urban environment and the construction of polities within. As such, it is 
important to specify that the aim of this research is not that of selecting specific 
state building policies and studying their impact on people in an urban 
environment; rather, the overwhelming interest of the research lies in exploring 
citizens’ narratives emerging from the case study analysis and understanding their 
implications for the spatial scales at which the processes of polity construction take 
place. The case study developed in the next three chapters will serve to apply 
these research questions in practice and, on the basis of the outcomes of the 
analysis of the fieldwork findings, will contribute to understanding whether the 
research framework successfully articulates all the connections between different 
spatial scales or whether further refinements are necessary to implement it 
elsewhere.  
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4.2. Theoretical approaches guiding the research methods 
The aim of this section is to articulate the theoretical approaches that have been 
used to guide the intellectual process of testing the research framework on a 
chosen case study. 
4.2.1. Abduction, deduction, induction 
In order to understand the impact of state building on the construction of a political 
community, the author built an analytical framework that explores social cohesion 
in urban contexts in the hope of discovering a new hypothesis that can contribute 
to improve state building processes in post-conflict countries.  
The interest in “forming an explanatory hypothesis from an observation requiring 
explanation” (Flach and Kakas, 2000; p.7) is what Peirce (1958) had in mind when 
he formulated the idea of ‘abductive observation’. In his view, the abductive 
observation comes to the observer ‘like a flash’ (Peirce 1958 in ibid), it is an 
intuition that behind the new observed facts there potentially is a new order of 
things (Reichertz, 2004; p.163). However, Peirce himself recognised that 
abduction alone is insufficient for creating a new order around the new observed 
surprising fact(s); rather, it merely asks what possible explanation there can be 
around this(ese) fact(s) (Minnameier, 2010; p.242).  
In order to overcome the limitation of the abductive observation, Peirce included it 
as part of a three-phase system of observation, rule making and testing. Indeed, 
since abduction allows for the emergence of new facts that, however, need a new 
order or rule to “remove what is surprising about [them]” (Reichertz, 2004; p.163), 
it is necessary to create a new rule that can be reproduced in a general context, 
that is, it is necessary to enter a process of deduction aimed at making predictions 
about these new facts (Minnameier, 2010; p.241). Subsequently, this new rule 
needs to be tested against reality through an inductive process in order to explore 
whether the theory works or requires further refinement. In Peirce’s view (1958 in 
Flach and Kakas, 2000; p.8), the induction process requires the observer to put a 
question to Nature: if the experiment does not work, a new step has been taken 
into acquiring knowledge on the surprising facts; if, however, the experiment 
against reality succeeds, then the new rule is further engrained. In other words, 
“induction consists in starting from a theory [emerged from abductive observation], 
deducing from it predictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena in 
order to see how nearly they agree with the theory” (ibid). 
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In the context of this research, therefore, the initial observation that emerged from 
the literature review on state building and nation building is that the two concepts 
are being used interchangeably and that, as a consequence, the process of state 
building can have a negative impact on the societal processes at stake. Further 
exploration of the literature on post-conflict reconstruction revealed that research 
carried out at the more local level of post-conflict urban areas held significant 
potential for investigating how the notion of political community, at the core of state 
formation, is contingent upon varied ideas and interpretations as well as actions 
and reactions (Hague, 2005; p.7) across different spaces and scales. Thus, at the 
abduction stage, the research questioned how these two approaches to post-
conflict reconstruction could benefit from being interconnected.  
Investigating such potential meant moving into the realm of deduction; that is, in 
order to be able to make predictions (Minnameier, 2010) about the way in which 
international state building processes affect the construction of a political 
community in the context of post-conflict urban areas, it was necessary to develop 
a framework that would organise, and facilitate an analysis of, all the different 
elements potentially affecting the mutually constitutive relationship between states 
and political community. Consequently, social cohesion was introduced into an 
analytical framework with the purpose of attempting to deduct a rule of how state 
building in urban spaces can affect territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship 
through the constitution of local polities that can undermine the political 
community.  
Finally, a process of induction was necessary to test whether the analytical 
framework, developed to create a rule – deduction – to understand the processes 
in question – abduction – could indeed contribute to filling the knowledge gap 
identified in the literature review. For this purpose, the analytical framework has 
been tested within the context of a case study country: if the analysis of the 
fieldwork findings appear to provide a clear link between the elements identified in 
the framework, then a new theory can potentially be elaborated; conversely, if the 
fieldwork findings reveal caveats in the organisation of the framework, a new 
process of abduction-deduction-induction needs to take place to further refine the 
research. 
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4.2.2. Reading the urban fabric 
Within the framework of this research, the connecting element between the 
processes of state building and the construction of a political community is 
grounded in the idea that the local polities they are constituted from are processes 
of belonging in constant flux; they originate within spaces of every day interactions 
but, within certain conditions aimed at facilitating bridging over bonding, these 
polities can continue extending to ever-widening spaces. In the context of the 
ideal-type state used in the context of state building, however, this bottom-up 
process can only develop if it is facilitated by top-down practices that create, 
through the development of habits, routines, memories, etc, the representation of 
an imagined political community in the minds of people who may never meet but 
reside within the single territory of the state. In other words, it involves the 
implementation of a substantive citizenship that creates the conditions for a formal 
citizenship to emerge, so that the memories, sensual experiences and 
interpretations, that transform a space into a place, create in the minds of citizens 
the idea of a political community attached to the territory of the state (Hague, 2005; 
p.4). In this light, so as to understand the dynamics whereby “interpretation and 
narrative […] give identity and it is identity that transforms space into place” (ibid; 
p.4) the research methodology needed to include a reading of the urban fabric 
where these relationships took place.  
Much like the rest of the investigative methods used for the purpose of this 
research, the exercise of reading the case study’s urban fabric revolved around a 
three-phased process of abduction, deduction and induction. Indeed, as stated by 
Jane Jacobs (1961; p.440), in order to understand cities one must think about the 
processes at play within an urban space – that is, abduction – then “seek for 
‘unaverage’ clues involving very small quantities, which reveal the way larger and 
more ‘average’ quantities are operating” (ibid) so as to attempt to create rules that 
fit the new facts learned from the processes observed – that is, deduction – and, 
finally, “work inductively, reasoning from particulars to the general” (ibid), thus 
testing the new rules in all three different areas – that is, induction. Consequently, 
reading the urban fabric entails that the observer does not limit her/himself to an 
appreciation of the built environment, focusing solely on the physical features of 
the areas; rather, as implied by this research’s definition of the urban space as 
something that is lived, produced and reproduced by people’s everyday activities, 
reading the urban fabric also requires that the observer engages with the 
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population in order to understand how their interactions within it contribute to 
producing different – or similar – representations of their state. This is what Kallus 
(2001; p.130) refers to as “objective” and “subjective” reading of the urban fabric. 
The objective reading is what Allan B. Jacobs (1984; p.34) understood as the 
search for a “combination of clues, the patterns and the breaks in the patterns that 
are most useful in gaining an understanding of the dynamics of an area”, that is, 
the first stage of observation of the processes within an urban space. These clues 
range from the observation of people, buildings, streets patterns and service 
infrastructure to the analysis of the uses of land, landscapes and buildings (ibid), 
for A.Jacobs believed, just like J.Jacobs, that one can tell many things about an 
area just by looking at it: “something of its history, when it was built, for whom, 
what physical, social and economic changes have been taking place, who lives 
there now, major issues and problems that may exist, and whether the area is 
vulnerable to rapid changes” (Jacobs, A. 1984; p.32). The objective reading was 
complemented by photographs taken by the author during each field visit; these 
photographs aimed to “create the experience of process, to evoke a feeling of tone 
and texture of entering another culture” (Harper, 1987 in Banks, 2008; p.97). 
Together with the text accompanying them, the photographs of the research areas 
helped construct initial perceptions of the social processes at play (Ali, 2004; 
p.271) in the spaces of polity construction.  
The objective reading of the urban fabric presents, however, only an initial basis on 
which to formulate hypothesis on any clues observed through the analysis of these 
processes. Therefore, in order to be able to formulate rules that may explain these 
observations, it is necessary to complement the initial exercise with a subjective 
reading of the urban fabric, that is, colouring the objective observations with “the 
voices and opinions of people living in the city as related to their everyday life 
experience” (Kallus, 2001; p.136). Indeed, through interviews with all the different 
groups inhabiting those spaces – e.g. male/female, employed/unemployed, 
youth/elderly, etc – it becomes possible to understand not only people’s 
interactions with each other and how these contribute to creating images of local 
polities – bonding – but also how they relate as a group to other areas within the 
same bigger urban area through their abilities, opportunities and willingness to 
travel across other urban spaces and interact with new groups – bridging. In other 
words, talking to people also opens up the opportunity to identify their movements 
through the wider urban area, thus offering the observer an insight into the “spatial 
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stories” (Secor, 2004; p.357) created by people’s mobility, stories that contribute to 
linking or fragmenting spaces of interactions to shape “the variously fluid and 
fortified boundaries of urban space that provoke a range of identity performance” 
(ibid).  
It is the spaces emerging from people’s movements and interactions, that offer the 
observer the opportunity to create new rules on the impact of state building – 
through the objective reading of the urban fabric, that is the impact of the state 
policies on the people’s every day life – on the construction of a political 
community – through the subjective reading of the urban fabric, that is how these 
impacts affect the way in which people build representations of each other and the 
state. 
4.2.3. Social constructivism 
The subjective reading of the urban fabric, therefore, is grounded in the notion that 
citizens’ interactions, through time and space, turn these spaces into places where 
a group has developed a local polity and ascribed it to their physical environment; 
that is, since polities “are a social construct, ascribed by people to an area, not 
natural and not objective” (Hague, 2005; p.10), in order to understand how social 
groups develop bonding and bridging relationships it is necessary to explore their 
relationship with the built environment and the meanings they ascribe to it. Since, 
within the analytical framework developed for this research, social cohesion has 
been included as the tool necessary to investigate how state policies can impact 
people’s interactions in the urban environment, at the methodological level it was 
necessary to frame the fieldwork with a theoretical approach that understands 
social relations –and the emergence of local polities – in their context. 
As such, social constructivism was chosen to assist in the interpretation of 
people’s voices and opinions about living in the city (Kallus, 2001; p.136) for the 
purpose of understanding the spaces and scales at which they construct their 
sense of belonging to a polity. Indeed, social constructivism “offers a framework for 
thinking about the nature of social life and social change” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001; p.393) by focusing on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and 
political arguments in shaping intersubjective meanings (ibid; p.392). 
Intersubjective meanings, as “shared meanings among individuals whose 
interaction is based on common interests and assumptions that form the ground 
for their communication” (Rogoff, 1990 in Kim, 2001; p.3), emerge through 
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individuals’ daily interactions within constantly changing spaces thus shaping 
shared beliefs at the core of local polities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; p.393). 
These intersubjective meanings correspond to what was referred to in the 
analytical framework as frameworks of memory. 
In this sense, social constructivism therefore rejects the notion of objective truth 
(Jackson and Sorensen, 2006; p.167); rather, within “the social constructivist 
worldview” (Creswell, 2009; p.8), the products of relationships between individuals 
are social facts characterised by their absence of “materiality but exist only 
because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 2001; p.393). Consequently, within the framework of this research, state 
policies have an actual impact on the urban environment in which people interact – 
urbs; urbs become spaces of daily interaction between individuals and social 
groups where varying degrees of social cohesion develop across space and time, 
thus contributing to the constitution of intersubjective meanings that ascribe a 
virtual identity to a place. In other words, the articulation of formal and substantive 
citizenship in the notion of social cohesion – through wealth disparities, social 
order and control, common values and civic culture, social capital – provides the 
nexus between the physical environment and the virtual civitas ascribed to it; the 
social constructivist approach is here introduced to facilitate the conceptual 
transition from virtual – political community – to actual – state building.  
4.3. Research methods 
4.3.1. Selection of case study 
Yin (2009; p.8) argues that the selection of a research method – for instance 
experiment, survey, history or case study – can be done on the basis of three 
principal elements framing the type of research being carried out, that is: the form 
of the research question – in terms of how, why, who, what or where; whether the 
research requires control of behavioural events – that is, changing variables; and, 
whether the research focuses on contemporary events – as opposed to solely 
historical facts. In these terms, the choice of the case study as a methodological 
approach to research is an obvious one when the research asks how and why a 
contemporary event, over which the researcher has no control, has taken place. In 
other words, if the research questions and purpose point to seeking explanations 
for a current state of affairs, then the case study is the adequate methodology.  
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Indeed, a case study can be defined as an empirical inquiry “that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context” (ibid; p.18) 
without clearly defined boundaries between phenomenon and context. Moreover, it 
is a particularly adequate method of investigation when the research contains 
more variables of interest than data points, thus relying on multiple sources of 
evidence, and where the prior development of theoretical propositions guides data 
collection and analysis (ibid). As such, within the context of this research, the case 
study was the most appropriate methodological approach to investigate the 
viability of the analytical framework in answering the research questions; the 
exploration of the multiple relationships within this research – between 
international state building, state policies, their impact on the built environment and 
the outcome of these relations on people’s construction of their belonging to a 
political community – in fact required not only the analysis of historical documents 
to understand what happened in the past, but also extensive interviews at both 
state and urban level to understand the impact of these events on a contemporary 
situation. 
The reasons outlined above for selecting the case study also serve to explain why 
some limitations, generally attributed to case study approaches, have been 
managed within the context of this research. Case studies can be seen as 
providing “little basis for scientific generalisation” (ibid; p.15), however in this 
context the aim was not to select a widely representative sample to enumerate 
frequencies but to test, expand and generalise theories (ibid). Criticism has also 
been expressed in terms of the validity of case studies in assessing how much the 
variables matter to the outcome (George and Bennett, 2004; p.25); the aim of this 
research, however, was that of assessing whether and how state building had an 
influence on the construction of a political community, not how much.  
Consequently, for the purpose of this research, the case study of Dili, the capital of 
Timor Leste, has been selected. The remainder of this section aims to present the 
rationale behind the choice of Timor Leste, as a country, and of Dili as an urban 
context. Furthermore, this section also provides the justification for the decision to 
subdivide the area of research into three areas within Dili and the rationale for the 
selection of the specific case study areas. 
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a) Timor Leste 
Since its independence from Indonesia in 1999, Timor Leste has gathered 
significant international media and academic interest as one of the first countries to 
be, for a given period of time, under direct international governance. Indeed, during 
the transitional period between 1999 and 2002 – date of the first official elections 
held in the country – the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) “exercised full legislative and executive authority […] running both the 
security forces and an international peacekeeping mission […] while seeking to 
build new governmental institutions for the emerging state and overseeing the 
formation of a constitutional assembly in 2001” (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; p.2). 
In the early 2000s, the extent of the UN’s involvement in Timor Leste was 
unprecedented and was only matched, during approximately the same time, by the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). As such, since 
the end of the mission, there has been extensive literature on the successes and 
failures of UNTAET; but a review of the literature reveals that, although what was 
originally hailed as an international success has now been recognised for what it is 
– an ambitious attempt by the international community to be heavily involved in the 
state building project of a new country, with its subsequent successes and failures 
– the focus of the research carried out thus far centres essentially, much like the 
state building process did, on institutional and political issues at large.  
The view from the ground, however, concerning how these processes have been 
experienced by the population and continue to impact their daily lives today, has 
been the focus of too little research, much less the consequences of these 
different experiences on the legitimacy and the sovereignty of the internationally 
built and backed institutions. But the social and political crises that have taken 
place in Dili in 2002, 2005 and 2006 (dos Santos Monteiro, 2010; p.40) bring to the 
fore issues of social divisions compounded by competition for resources (Leach 
and Kingsbury, 2012; p.5) that regularly threaten the stability of the new 
institutions; they make it clear that the sustainability of the state building process 
does not lie solely in the hands of the international community and the institutions, 
but also on the ability of the population to feel connected, not only to their state, 
but to each other as well. As such, the interesting and unique circumstances of the 
UNTAET mission, combined with the gap in the research on the country 
highlighted above, provide an excellent rationale for choosing Timor Leste as a 
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case study country for the analysis of the relationship between state building and 
the construction of a political community. 
Timor Leste is also a very interesting case because it was a territory before it was 
ever a country in its own right. Indeed, the Portuguese arrived on the island of 
Timor at the beginning of the 1500s and found a territory divided into small, 
interconnected kingdoms. The division of the island into East and West Timor took 
place in the mid-1600s with the arrival of the Dutch – who had colonised Indonesia 
and were seeking to expand their control over the entire archipelago – and was 
officialised by a border treaty between the two colonisers in 1859. The official 
division of the island also marks the birth of the territory of Timor Leste – ‘leste’ 
means ‘eastern’ in Portuguese – but the birth of the country itself was to come only 
a century and a half later, as the independence handed by the Portuguese to 
Timor Leste’s population in 1975 – when they were forced to retreat by the 
Carnation Revolution taking place back home – was condemned to be short-lived 
by the Indonesian military invasion of the territory in December 1975.  
Timor Leste became officially a country in 1999 and its first state was born in 2002. 
The birth of the political community itself, however, remains a complex endeavour, 
for whilst internationals and East Timorese affirm that the twenty-five years of 
resistance against the Indonesians have given the population the strong bond 
characteristic of a political community, the reality on the ground ten years later 
suggests that it is not as straight-forward a process as it appears. Rather, a 
combination of political divisions originated during the brief independence of 1975, 
combined with social divisions emerging from increasing unequal opportunities, 
have started to create cleavages within the population that reveal a tension 
between the very western oriented development of state institutions and the very 
demanding process of shaping a political community out of varied histories, 
alliances and languages.  
Finally, at a personal level, the choice of Timor Leste was also motivated by its 
geographical position in an area where the author already had research, working 
and living experience. Having spent six months working on the ceasefire process 
in the Philippines in 2006, the author felt comfortable moving back to the 
Southeast Asia/Pacific region where she felt she could adapt to the culture. 
Furthermore, the author felt at ease with both national languages: she already 
understands Portuguese and Tetun was easy to learn within a short timeframe. 
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b) Dili 
The rationale for the choice of Dili as the case study is two-fold. Firstly, as the 
capital of Timor Leste it has attracted large numbers of people, both internationals 
and nationals, which has led to very rapid growth and urbanisation: between 2001 
and 2004, the urban population of Dili increased from 123,474 inhabitants to 
175,730 (National Directorate for Statistics (NDS), 2004 in Jütersonke et al, 2010; 
p.18) and had reached a total population of 234,026 by the year 2010 (NDS 2013). 
For a country counting 1,066,409 inhabitants in 2010, the presence of 21% of its 
population on a 12km wide and 3km deep stretch of land (Carapic and Jütersonke 
2012; p.14) has many implications. The main one is that Dili is also the most 
diverse district of Timor Leste, as shown by the migrating patterns illustrated in 
Map 1 and Map 2 below, thus forcing people from different backgrounds, 
traditions and histories to live closely together, side-by-side, and share their daily 
lives. Furthermore, as Dili is the political centre of the country where all the main 
institutions are located, it has also become the main location of political protests 
and violence, and the urban population’s diversity is at times used in political 
discourse to ignite passions – as was the case in the 2006 crisis. 
Map 1 - Population flows between districts in 2004 
 
Source: Census Atlas, 2004; p.31 
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Map 2 – Population flows between districts in 2010 
	  
Source: Timor Leste Housing and Population Census 2010, Vol.7, p.17 
Secondly, although the land area on which Dili stands is very clearly demarcated 
by its geographical characteristics – it is set between mountains on southern and 
eastern sides and sea on its northern and western sides, since it is a bay – it is 
never categorised as a ‘city’. Rather, the history of migration compounded by the 
original governance divisions – it is constituted of six sub-districts, themselves 
subdivided into 48 sukus and 243 aldeias36 – have led to Dili being considered by 
its inhabitants – both nationals and foreigners – as “a series of interlinked local 
barrios (neighbourhoods) or aldeias (hamlets or villages)” (ibid).  
Consequently, Dili’s very mixed nature, violent past and historically overlapping 
territorial and governance organisation, make it the most interesting urban context 
– rivalled only, far behind, by Baucau at the east of Dili – to carry out the fieldwork 
of this research. 
c) The two case study areas: Liriu and Metin IV 
This thesis has argued that the construction of political community within urban 
spaces is mutually constitutive in that, just as urban space is the product of history, 
development and interaction, so are local polities constructed through “social 
frameworks of memory” (Halbwachs, 1994 in Arraou, 1999; p.72) pertaining to 
different groups and including different histories, traditions and memories of past 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 These administrative divisions stem from Portuguese colonial territorial organisation, which have been 
maintained through time. They are explained in more details in chapter five. 
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events. Therefore, the author chose to select two aldeias within Dili in order to 
explore how different urban environments shape local polities across different 
spaces and scales. To this end, the post-conflict urban environment characteristics 
identified in section 3.4.2 as likely to have the most significant impact on shaping 
the emergence of formal and substantive citizenship, were used as selection 
criteria: history of the aldeia and migration in that aldeia. Furthermore, because 
initial interviews at national level and literature review revealed that aldeias across 
Dili have experienced conflict – during the Portuguese, Indonesian and 2006 crisis 
periods – in different ways, the history of violence was added as a selection criteria 
to ensure a more comprehensive range of factors likely to affect the construction of 
social identities. Finally, to account for the developments that have taken place 
since independence, the geographical position within the wider urban context and 
the socio-economic characteristics of those aldeias were also used as selection 
criteria. Table 4 below provides a brief overview of the two aldeias that were 
chosen according for the four characteristics – these will be developed into more 
details in the case study part of the thesis. 
Table 4 – Criteria for choosing case study areas 
Aldeia History of violence Historical development Socio-economic Position in Dili 
Liriu 
Very little violence 
since independence 
Developed during 
Portuguese times; 
administration staff 
residence 
Generally high 
level of education 
and employment, 
with pockets of 
lower income 
In the middle of 
Dili with good 
transport 
connections 
Metin 
IV 
Much violence since 
independence, 
which is still 
ongoing 
Developed during 
Indonesian times; 
Indonesian military & 
Timorese 
Low level of 
education and 
high 
unemployment 
Isolated by the 
river with no 
transport 
connection and 
long walks 
   Source: Valenti (2014), p148 
APPENDIX IV provides an overview of the national level as well as area interviews 
that have been carried out – a total of 74 interviews were carried out over the 
course of the fieldwork. 
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4.3.2. Period of research 
The fieldwork for this research was carried out in three subsequent phases.  
The first phase took place in May 2012 with a preliminary three weeks trip to Dili in 
order to establish a first contact with people in the field – this included both 
internationals working for bilateral and multilateral organisations as well as 
nationals working for local NGOs – and get acquainted with Dili’s urban space, its 
different levels of development and its challenges. This visit also proved very 
useful in refining the focus of the research and gathering initial information to start 
preparing for the core part of the fieldwork. Indeed, first contact meetings – at this 
stage one could not speak of interviews per se – allowed the author to gather a 
general overview of the main historical points as well as the main challenges 
facing Timor Leste since independence.  
The second phase took place from September 2012 to April 2013 and represented 
the core of the fieldwork. Since circumstances allowed, the author chose to live in 
the country over a period of eight months so as to have enough time to understand 
the dynamics of East Timorese’s everyday lives in Dili, mostly, but also in other 
towns and rural areas across the country. Although a comparison between Dili and 
the rest of the country was not the focus of the research, it served to set Dili into a 
wider context and get a better grasp of the unique characteristics of life in the 
capital.  
The second phase was sub-divided into two stages of research. The first four 
months, the author spent time interviewing a range of East Timorese and 
foreigners working in a variety of positions – e.g. civil society, NGOs, bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, presidential advisers and parliamentarians – in order to 
collect information regarding decision-making during the state building process as 
well as the challenges currently facing Timor Leste from different points of view. 
More informal discussions with East Timorese and foreign acquaintances also 
contributed to gather a good understanding of the dynamics within Dili and the 
varied characteristics of the different sukus and aldeias; this process facilitated the 
selection of the two aldeias for the case study research. The last four months 
constituted the essence of the fieldwork talking to people in the selected case 
study aldeias in order to gather their narratives of their lives in Dili as well as 
understand the dynamics at stake. During these four months, interviews with 
Methodology 
130 	  
people working at national level also continued, often triggered and informed by 
new data collected in the selected aldeias. 
The third and last phase of the fieldwork took place in July 2013 over a period of 
three weeks. Sparked by the opportunity to come back to the country to present at 
a conference37 a paper on the initial – rough – findings of the research, this final 
trip was a unique chance to get national and international academics’ thoughts on 
these initial findings. Incidentally, it also provided the opportunity to fill some gaps 
in the research that emerged in the preliminary data analysis carried out in 
May/June – an analysis that was also informed by a further refinement of the 
analytical framework. 
Secondary data was collected throughout the period of research from May 2012 to 
July 2013, as much of the information was available online in the form of journal 
articles critically analysing the state building process, but a number of books and 
project reports were more easily accessible on the ground speaking to the relevant 
persons. 
4.3.3. Data collection: primary and secondary sources 
The nature of the research is essentially qualitative, as it focuses on understanding 
the relationship between state building and the construction of a political 
community through an analysis of people’s experiences and their relationships with 
others as well as with the state in an urban context. Thus, although it has been 
complemented in parts with a brief analysis of statistics gathered on Timor Leste, 
Dili and the areas of research, the methods used to build the case study and carry 
out the fieldwork are effectively qualitative research methods to gather primary 
data. These therefore included (Creswell, 2009; p.15): 
 Open-ended questions; 
 Interview data, visual data – photographs taken by the author; and, 
 Themes, patterns and interpretations. 
Figure 8 below illustrates the process of gathering data at three levels: national 
level; reading of the urban fabric; and, collecting information in case study aldeias. 
Gathering primary data at the national level was the author’s entry point into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Understanding Timor Leste Conference, organised and co-hosted by the National University of Timor Lorosae 
(UNTL), Swinburne University of Technology and the Technical University of Lisbon: http://www.tlstudies.org/  
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fieldwork: it allowed, during the first trip, to clarify questions that had emerged from 
the literature review on Timor Leste and the state building process, and also 
provided a first overview of the main challenges facing the country in the 
reconstruction process. This primary information was subsequently fed back into 
further literature review and a refinement of the analytical framework. The second, 
more substantial, round of open-ended interviews with people at the national level, 
during the second trip, served to gather information on the challenges facing Dili as 
an urban space and to identify the gaps in the research concerning the country’s 
capital. At this stage, the author sought to both consolidate the knowledge on 
historical issues undermining the state building process – through interviews with 
East Timorese – and understand the dynamics of migration as well as the tensions 
characterising Dili’s urban space – this information was gathered through open-
ended interviews with both foreigners and East Timorese working across all 
sectors. Consequently, the information gathered at the national level informed the 
drafting of a set of themes to be approached with the community leaders – i.e. xefi 
suku, xefi aldeia, youth leaders and de facto community leaders – in the case 
studies selected on the basis of information gathered and personal observations. 
Reading the urban fabric was initially approached as an exercise of objective 
personal reading. Based on the information gathered through national level 
interviews on Dili’s main areas of violence or peace as well as on migration 
patterns, the author undertook a series of walks around the potential areas of 
interests in order to gather a sense of the socio-economic characteristics and 
contrasts, as well as a first impression of people’s lifestyles and dynamics in those 
areas. On the basis of these observations and further informal conversations with 
East Timorese, the two case study aldeias were selected. The subjective reading 
of the urban fabric on the conditions, challenges, historical development and 
infrastructure upgrading in the aldeias was subsequently gathered through 
interviews with community leaders and elderly aldeia residents. As shown in the 
figure below, when themes, patterns and interpretations (Creswell, 2009; p.15) 
emerged in the interviews or observations regarding the urban fabric, these were 
fed back into more interviews at the national level in order to understand their link 
with state policies and the state building process, and were then used once more 
to refine research on the ground.  
Entry into the case study aldeias was planned as a two-stage approach in order to, 
firstly, follow East Timorese protocol and, secondly, offer the opportunity for people 
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living in those aldeias to get acquainted with the presence of the author. As such, a 
first official visit to the aldeias aimed at meeting with the main community leaders 
who acted as gatekeepers controlling researchers’ access to the aldeia (Saunders, 
2006) – that is, xefi suku, xefi aldeia, youth leaders and, where applicable, de facto 
leaders38. This first round of open-ended interviews was based on the main 
themes drawn from national level interviews and based on the objective reading of 
the urban fabric; open-ended interviews were chosen again, for this stage, in order 
to offer interviewees the opportunity to tell their story, offer their views on the 
situation in their aldeias and their country and, where needed, allow for new 
themes and patterns to emerge. The first official visit also served to ensure that 
community leaders approved the presence of the author in their aldeia and 
introduced her generally to the community, presenting her work and asking for 
their participation.  
Information gathered in interviews with community leaders was then fed back into 
additional literature review on the themes and patterns that had emerged, 
potentially leading to other interviews at the national level with government officials 
or international organisations when, as previously stated, some themes required 
additional clarifications with regard to state policies and the state building process. 
A second round of interviews in the case study aldeias was then undertaken to talk 
to people living there and gather their views. In some areas people were selected 
at random, walking door to door, whereas in others the xefi aldeia provided support 
and contacts for meeting people according to the author’s criteria, which aimed at 
ensuring a wide variety of views in the aldeias, as follows: 
 Employment status – employed, unemployed39; 
 Employment sector – government, private, street vendor; 
 Level of education – primary, secondary, university; 
 Gender; and, 
 Age group – youth between 15 and 35 years old, middle-aged between 35 and 
50 years old, and elderly, 50 years and above40. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In some areas de facto leaders emerge as a result of the trust they inspire in people and, consequently, their 
constant involvement in community matters and conflict resolution. 
39 In order to ensure that both categories were interviewed, the author went to the areas both during the week, 
in order to speak to the unemployed and women, and during the weekend in order to get a chance to meet with 
the employed. 
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The interviews were, again, open-ended with broad and general questions so as to 
provide the opportunity for people to express their views and construct their 
meanings (Creswell, 2009; p.8) around the issues, challenges and aspects that 
were most significant to their conditions and lifestyles. Furthermore, in consistency 
with the other rounds of interviews, additional information on identified themes, 
patterns and interpretations (ibid) was fed back into a documentation review and 
other interviews with relevant people at the national level. 
Consequently, what emerges from the data gathering process – and is shown 
clearly in Figure 8 elaborated by the author below – is that emerging patterns, 
themes and interpretations (ibid) were constantly fed back into a documentation 
review and additional interviews with relevant people at the national and 
international level. This feedback loop process was key in order to “inductively 
reorganise [information] into categories, patterns and narratives” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967 in Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.5) so as to draw more clearly 
the connections between the daily experiences of state policies’ impacts and their 
effects on people’s interactions with each others and with their state. A copy of the 
guidance note used for research area interviews can be found in APPENDIX V. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As indicated by article 3 of the 2004 law on “The election of suku chiefs and suku councils”: “For the purposes 
of this law, a young person is an individual aged between 17 and 35 on the polling day, and an elder is an 
individual aged over 50 years on the polling day […]”. 
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Figure 8 – Data gathering process 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Secondary data, or documentation review, essentially concerned information 
relating to the history of Timor Leste – mostly from 1999 onward, but also between 
1975 and 1999 in order to understand specific processes that are known to 
continue to influence East Timorese politics today – as well as the development 
and critical review of state policies and the state building project. Additionally, 
when notified by an interviewee, the author also referred to project documents 
gathered in the field where information concerning particular dynamics within Dili’s 
population or specific characteristics of Dili’s governance might be available. 
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4.3.4. Limitations of research approach 
a) Language 
Timor Leste finds itself in a very peculiar situation in relation to the main languages 
spoken on the island. Although it is home to eighteen mother tongues41 (Hughes, 
2009; p.41), Tetun developed over the course of the island’s history in order to 
allow communication between all the different groups and as such, most of the 
communication with East Timorese is carried out in Tetun. However, until fairly 
recently, Tetun has remained an oral language only, becoming written only since 
independence in 2002 when it was officially declared one of the two lingua franca 
in the country. The second official language of the country is Portuguese. This 
choice was made, in part, to consolidate the cultural relations with the ex-
colonisers, but also because Tetun did not have the vocabulary used for 
administrative purposes. The issue of language differences in Timor Leste will be 
further discussed in the presentation of the case study country, however at this 
stage it is important to note that only a very small minority of people, outside 
government officials, currently speaks Portuguese. Therefore, for the purpose of 
collecting primary and secondary information, the author needed to be able to read 
and/or communicate in Portuguese and Tetun. 
The author is French and has an elementary to intermediate level of Portuguese 
and therefore had no issues reading the documentation – much of the literature on 
Timor Leste is in English, French and Portuguese42 allowing to circumvent the 
issue of Bahasa Indonesia – and carrying out a couple of interviews in Portuguese 
– most government officials also speak English. It was, however, more crucial that 
the author learn some basics of Tetun to be able to both function in her everyday 
life in the country and, if not carry out the interviews in Tetun, at least be able to 
introduce herself and loosely understand the responses of the participants in the 
case study areas. Fortunately, Tetun is a relatively simple and logic language, 
which meant that two weeks of intensive language classes at the beginning of 
September, and as much interaction as possible with East Timorese in order to 
practice, were sufficient to ensure that the author developed an elementary level. 
However, it was not sufficient to carry out case study area interviews alone. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “Estimates of the number of indigenous East Timorese languages differ according to ways of classifying 
languages and dialects (Bowden & Hajek, 2007, p. 265): ethnologue (Gordon, 2005) lists 19 living languages, 
while Hull (1998) identifies 16 languages with dialectal variations.” (Taylor-Leech, 2011; p.292) 
42 As the proceedings of the Understanding Timor Leste Conference (2009; 2011; 2014) demonstrate 
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As such, the author sought recommendations for a good interpreter, that is, 
someone who not only had a good level of English, but also could gather a good 
understanding of the research, “be socially aware and interested in other people’s 
views” (Bujra, 2006; p.177) and be able to anticipate the questions following 
participants’ responses. Luckily, the interpreter recommended presented all the 
aforementioned characteristics and developed a very good relationship with the 
author, to the point that she was, indeed, often capable to recognise when a 
follow-up question was needed or if clarification was necessary – either from the 
participant, if something was unclear, or from herself, if the response referred to 
something cultural or historical that needed to be explained to the author.  
The author recognises the importance of discussing with the interpreter her views 
and understanding on the issues of the research in order to grasp potential 
differences “in understandings of words, concepts and worldviews across 
languages” (Temple and Young, 2004; p.171). This was addressed by allowing 
ample time, before and after the interviews and fieldwork day, to debrief about the 
interpreter and the author’s understanding of the discussions as well as the non-
verbal communication of the participants (Bujra, 2006; p.178). The author’s basic 
knowledge of Tetun also allowed her to follow enough of the conversations 
between the interpreter and the participants so as to ask for additional clarifications 
when needed or ensure that all parts of the response had been translated. 
Moreover, each round of interviews – local leaders, community – was first carried 
out in the area where the interpreter was originally from43, thus ensuring that she 
could familiarise herself with the process in an environment she was comfortable 
with. 
Finally, as noted in section 4.1.3, the overwhelming interest of the research lies in 
understanding the narratives of the interviewees in the selected aldeias, not in 
collecting accurate data on facts and figures. As such, whilst the author 
acknowledges that “there is no neutral position from which to translate” (Temple 
and Young, 2004; p.164), and potential differences in interpretations have been 
discussed with the interpreter and taken into consideration, issues that may at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This area was chosen for the purpose of testing the interviews with the interpreter and ensuring that (1) she 
understood the purpose and meaning of each question and (b) she familiarized herself with them in order to feel 
comfortable once entering the research areas. Material from these interviews has been put aside and will likely be used 
for further publications and research 
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times arise from the use of an interpreter – e.g. lack of specific details – were 
irrelevant in the context of this research. 
b) Accessibility of participants in certain areas 
Table 4 presented in section 4.3.1 offers an overview of the main characteristics 
of the aldeias, based on the criteria designed for the selection of the case study 
areas, and shows that one aldeia has been relatively peaceful in the past six years 
whilst one is still subject to episodes of violence. It was therefore to be expected 
that access to participants in the more violent aldeia might prove more difficult and 
that, due to the conflict dynamics of the place, some participants may be reluctant 
to express more freely their opinion.  
Section 4.3.5 below will give a more thorough description of the steps taken to 
ensure that access to participants in Metin IV – the more violent aldeia – was not 
an issue for the author – and indeed, it generally wasn’t. At this stage, however, it 
is important to note that there is one specific group that has been much less 
accessible in Metin IV than the others, and that is young men involved in the 
violence. This is due mostly to the fact that many of these young men are part of a 
martial art gang and that a significant part of the violence experienced by the 
aldeias – though not all – is a result of different martial art groups fighting each 
other. As such, these men are known to be much more reserved in relation to their 
opinions, not in the least because many of these martial art groups have political 
affiliations with some of the parties represented in the parliament. Furthermore, 
being a young white female amongst young Timorese men might have been an 
additional obstacle to getting information. This gap, however, has been partially 
filled by research carried out on urban youth violence in Dili by James Scambary 
who has been carrying out research in the country for many years and has been 
able to build a stronger relationship with people in those areas, including Metin IV 
as it is known to be one of Dili’s most unsafe aldeias. The use of the word ‘partially’ 
is used here because conflict dynamics in Dili’s unsafe aldeias are very complex 
and include a mixture of gang related and social jelousy induced violence, 
therefore the findings of a research are very much directed by the entry point of 
one’s research and James Scambary’s research has been particularly focused on 
martial art gangs. Nonetheless, this has provided excellent background to 
complete some of the gaps in this research. 
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Another potential issue regarding access to participants was the urban fabric 
distinguishing high-income households from lower income ones. In Metin IV much 
of the life of the aldeias happens outdoors, on people’s front porches and gardens, 
at the sede suku – the office of the xefi suku – or on the streets, thus facilitating 
access to potential interviewees. Conversely, the urban fabric of Liriu presented 
some difficulties to access people, and whilst this will be discussed in more details 
in the case study areas’ introduction in section 5, it is worth mentioning here the 
two main features that constituted a challenge to accessing participants: 
architecture and living habits. Indeed, Liriu was built during Portuguese times as 
the main living quarters for Portuguese administration staff, and as such many of 
the houses in Liriu are bigger than normal, surrounded by gardens and separated 
from the streets by medium-height fences or walls. These houses are now 
inhabited by high-income households, generally characterised by their absence 
during the week – since parents work and children go to school or university – and 
by a propensity to live within the property rather than on the streets. Approaching 
these households was therefore more delicate since it required entering their 
property, and more difficult since they were not often there. Makeshift fences often 
surrounded medium-income houses, although these were less of a deterrent and 
people were seen more often interacting with their neighbours in their gardens. 
Finally low-income houses were characterised by a sort of inward-looking 
compound-like feature, but their residents generally lived outside and were 
therefore very easy to access.  
The aforementioned issues meant that in some areas access to participants 
required a little more time and effort, nonetheless the author and her interpreter 
managed to speak to a wide range of different groups and it was possible to draw 
patterns and themes from the interviews in each of the two areas. 
c) Complexity of political, social and economic issues related to violence in 
Timor Leste 
As briefly stated previously, the aim of this research is not that of analysing and 
critically assessing state building interventions in Timor Leste from an external 
point of view and across all sectors – that is, economic, social and political – but 
rather to understand what issues within the state building process are understood 
by the population as problematic in relation to their everyday life and activities. 
This approach therefore implies that the author link the themes, patterns and 
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issues, regularly emerging from the interviews at the research area level, to the 
way in which the state building process was carried out and how this affected the 
specific state policies relating to those issues. For instance, remote and/or violent 
areas lacking infrastructure relate to infrastructure projects being contracted out to 
private companies that refuse to work in those areas, and this organisational form 
is a direct result of international pressure for a (neo)liberal type of market-led 
development.  
The author, nevertheless, acknowledges that each set of issues is also closely 
related to a wider context and issues within other realms of the country’s political 
life as well as economic and social policies. For example, as mentioned above, the 
author is aware that violence in certain areas is not only related to issues of social 
jealousy repeatedly mentioned by the participants, but also to martial art gang 
dynamics. However, since the issue of social jealousy was more often pointed out 
than the one relating to gangs, the author chose to emphasise this aspect of the 
violence and relate the discussions with participants to state building policies. 
Therefore, since participants believed that social jealousy came mainly from the 
lack of opportunities for young people in the area, this was linked to both 
employment policies from the government as well as education policies – which 
are also related, as the case study analysis will show, to the way in which state 
building was carried out. 
Finally, the author is aware that the issue of peace dividends – that is, state 
financial assistance – is a very important topic in a country where “nearly 
everybody regard[s] – or claim[s] to regard – himself or herself as a hero, each 
with responsibility for winning independence equal to that of others who had been 
involved” (Hughes, 2009; p.45). Furthermore, as people can see that some groups 
are getting more than others, it is evident that peace dividends have as much of a 
possibility to bring peace as they have to create further divisions within a 
precariously united society. Nonetheless, as for other issues, peace dividends 
were not brought up by participants as a major issue or impediment in the carrying 
out of their daily activities or participation in the new nation, consequently this topic 
has been merely investigate for context purposes rather than as a main thread in 
the research. 
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d) Over reliance on primary sources for historical facts 
There is little to no documentation on the development of Dili as an urban area 
during Portuguese and Indonesian times. Whilst it has been possible to obtain 
Portuguese urbanisation plans from a source at the Ministry of Education, 
conversations with other researchers have revealed that the little secondary data 
that exists on Dili and its historical development is scattered and it is difficult to 
understand who holds it. Therefore, in order to provide the information on the 
development of the aldeias, presented in chapter seven, it has been necessary to 
rely on the stories shared by the interviewees. Furthermore, much of the 
documentation accumulated during the Indonesian military rule on life during those 
25 years was stored in the government buildings that were burnt during the 
scorched-earth campaign carried out by the pro-Indonesian militias in the 
aftermath of the vote for Timor Leste’s independence in 1999. Consequently, much 
of the information about those 25 years, as well as regarding the violence of 1999, 
has been destroyed, forcing researchers to rely heavily on testimonies and stories. 
An in depth review of the literature on Timor Leste shows that, to a certain extent, 
general facts and traditions as recounted by East Timorese are quite consistent 
with each other: patterns and themes appear from the stories told and the little 
written information that can be found. Issues arise, however, in relation to historical 
dates, names, localities and specific facts. This can be seen in the discrepancies 
between the different dates given for specific events during Portuguese times in 
different documents – e.g. dates given in a chronology of Timor Leste’s history 
presented in the journal Latitudes44 differ in some respects from the chronology 
given by Irena Cristalis in her book “East Timor A nation’s bitter dawn” or in the 
historical information included in the CAVR (Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation)“Chega!” report (2005).  
Additionally, Timor Leste being a very mountainous region where much of the 
population has dispersed itself during different episodes of violence throughout the 
history of the country – e.g. during Indonesian invasion in 1975, during the 1999 
violence – it has been difficult to obtain accurate data on the number of refugees or 
displaced during those episodes. As such, much of the figures given are 
approximate – and some also diverge considerably from one document to the next, 
in which case the author chose to use the figures that were used most often. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 N°8, May 2000 (accessed 16/02/14): http://www.revues-plurielles.org/_uploads/pdf/17_8_4.pdf  
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4.3.5. Ethical considerations 
The main aim of the primary data collection was, at national level, to gather a 
better understanding of the conflict dynamics as well as the state building process 
and, at the level of the case study areas, the interviews aimed at collecting 
people’s perceptions of their living environment – its history, evolution, tensions –, 
their movements within Dili’s urban space at large and their representations of 
Timor Leste’s three governments since 2002. Whilst data gathering at the national 
level presented little to no risks for the interviewees expressing their opinion – 
since they were first and foremost asked to confirm facts or present their versions 
of events – the author understands that the data gathering process at the level of 
the research areas could have presented some grounds for concern; however, 
these potential issues were given due consideration and were dealt with in the 
following ways. 
Firstly, whilst the author exchanged names with the participants as a way to build a 
rapport upon approaching them, the identity of the participants has remained 
confidential: the list of interviewees presented in APPENDIX IV has codified 
participants with numbers. As such, information reported in the appendix refers 
only to participants’ gender, education level and employment status. Furthermore, 
the information gathered during interviews has been recorded solely on the 
author’s notebook and has not been re-transcribed anywhere else – no interview 
has been recorded by the means of a digital audio recorder. Finally, since the aim 
of both national and aldeia interviews was to identify patterns, the analysis of the 
information and its use did not require at any time to mention the identity of the 
information source. 
Each and every participant for the purpose of this research – whether at national or 
case study area level – was introduced, prior to commencing the interview, to the 
aims of the research by the author and, in order to ensure that the information was 
clear, her interpreter in the field. At national level, participants were initially 
approached through an email sent by the author, which presented the research 
aims into details and offered the participants an overview of both the topics and the 
questions that would be raised during the interview. This therefore left them the 
opportunity to decline or accept to participate in the research, although it is worth 
noting that all participants at national level felt the research was most needed in 
the context of Timor Leste and were particularly encouraging and happy to take 
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part in the endeavour. Upon meeting formally, additional information was offered 
regarding the research aims as well as confidentiality of the information gathered, 
such that participants could be fully aware of the nature of the research and their 
role within the primary data gathering process. 
At the level of the case study areas, one of the two aldeias did not present any 
potential security issues since they have been relatively peaceful for quite a 
number of years – see table in section 3.2.1. Nonetheless, the author was 
conscious that, in order to ensure that people would feel as safe and comfortable 
as possible in sharing their views with the author and her interpreter, it was 
necessary to follow Timor Leste’s implicit protocol that requires researchers to first 
approach community leaders as gatekeepers – in this case xefi suku and xefi 
aldeia – in order to explain them the research being carried out, what is expected 
of participants and how the interview process will be carried out. As far as the 
aldeia of Liriu is concerned, it has been very peaceful since independence – it is 
indeed regarded as one of the safest aldeias in Dili – therefore community leaders 
gave their consent very easily.  
The aldeia of Metin IV was the biggest concern for the author as it is known to still 
be, at times, an unsafe area, and it was therefore essential, both for the safety of 
the author and her translator as well as to ensure access to participants, “to enter 
into partnership with a local counterpart who would assist in gaining access” 
(Barakat and Ellis, 1996; p.151). Consequently, the author first contacted the de 
facto community leader of the aldeia in order to explain to him the aim of the 
research and the role and use of the interviews to be carried out (ibid; p.154). He 
then spoke to the xefi suku who gave his approval to meet with us in the presence 
of the de facto community leader. After our first exchange, the xefi suku approved 
the aim of our research and gave us permission to come and speak to people, but 
did, nonetheless, accompany us the first morning of interviews in order for people 
to see us with him and know that he approved and it was safe to speak to us. 
Consent from all the other participants in the research areas was gathered through 
a two-stage introduction. Firstly, the author presented herself and her interpreter to 
the participant in Tetun – name, nationality, reason for the presence – and gave a 
very brief introduction of the research being carried out; this stage served to show 
the participants that the author was not just a researcher with no knowledge of 
their culture, but rather that she had taken the time to learn their language and 
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understand their customs to make them feel comfortable in her presence. 
Secondly, once participants agreed to sit down with the author and her interpreter, 
the interpreter presented the details of the research and the aim of the interview in 
more details in order to ensure that they were clear about the reasons for our 
presence and agreed to share their opinion. This two-stage introduction worked 
very well to make people comfortable – they were particularly touched that a malae 
(foreigner) had learned their language – and only one person out of all the people 
approached did not give consent to their participation in the research – this was a 
young woman in Metin IV who was prevented from her mother to contribute. 
The nature of the research carried out in the case study areas did not require any 
specific personal information from the participants; rather, it offered them the 
opportunity to express their opinion on matters generally relating to their everyday 
lives – matters that did not require them to specifically criticise or put anybody 
else’s life in danger – and allowed them room, through the use of a survey 
guideline rather than a specific questionnaire, to discuss what they felt most 
comfortable with sharing whilst remaining within the realm of the topics in question. 
Therefore, the informal character of these interactions made people feel that they 
did not have to discuss any matter they felt would cause them stress or would put 
them or their family at risk. At any rate, East Timorese were generally very happy 
to participate in the study and offer their opinion on the topics presented to them; 
the vast majority gave a sense that they clearly understood what the aim of the 
research was about and they strongly supported it because they understood that it 
was their chance to be consulted at last on what they thought about their area, 
their country and their government(s). Amongst participants who had higher levels 
of education – i.e. university – there have been many who have also expressed 
their interest in reading the main findings from the research. Therefore, there was 
no doubt that people understood that participating in the research was also in their 
interest. 
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CHAPTER 5 – STATE BUILDING IN TIMOR LESTE 
 
“If we accept that East Timorese nationalism grew in part out of the coercive effect of 
the Indonesian state then it is possible for a sense of modern simultaneity to be freed 
from the focus that Anderson gives to language alone. What is important is not the 
cultural artefact in itself – for instance a prayer book – but the subjective response to 
it; a silent acknowledgment that thousands of others are participating in the same 
process”.  
(Damian Grenfell, 2008) 	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5. State building in Timor Leste: colonial, military and international 
administrations 
The aim of this chapter is to explore how the institutional and ahistorical approach 
to state building, within which international post-conflict reconstruction assistance 
operates, affects the establishment of post-conflict state systems – that is, 
research question number one. To this end, it introduces Timor Leste, the case 
study country chosen for the purpose of this research, through a review of the 
three subsequent exogenous interventions that have attempted to control 
Timorese society since the 16th century. 
As such, following the structure used in section 2.3 for understanding the impact of 
state building on the construction of political community, this chapter begins by 
analysing the impact of Portuguese colonial administration and Indonesian military 
rule on the citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory of Timor Leste. On the 
basis of the historical context provided by these first two sections, the chapter then 
moves on to exploring how post-independence international state building, led by 
the UN, unfolded over the period of transitional administration. That is, continuing 
with an investigation of citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory, this 
chapter seeks to understand the extent to which UN decision-making processes 
acknowledged and anticipated the impact of the territorial, societal and political 
legacies of Portuguese and Indonesian rule on Timorese post-independence state 
building.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State building in Timor Leste 
146 	  
5.1. Portuguese colonial rule – “devide et impera” 
Timor Leste, shown in Map 3 below, is located on the Eastern half of the island of 
Timor – bahasa word for ‘East’ – and is approximately 14,874km2 (CIA, 2014) with 
a population of 1,066,409 inhabitants (GDS, 2010). 
Map 3 – Map of Timor Leste 
 
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations (Map No. 4117 Rev.6) 
Historically, the creation of the territory on which Timor Leste now stands owes 
much to the presence of Dutch and Portuguese colonisers, who shared the island 
from the early 16th century through to Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 
1945. Indeed, when the first Portuguese traders reached the island of Timor in 
1515 – with the original aim of engaging into a spice trade with the neighbouring 
archipelago of the Moluccas45 – the land was divided into approximately 40 
autonomous kingdoms, each ruled by a king with absolute powers over his 
population (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.39). Upon their first two centuries of colonial 
rule, the Portuguese interfered very little with the indigenous territorial 
organisation, even when driven away from Oecussi – where they had first settled, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Upon discovering that the island was rich in Sandalwood the Portuguese decided to settle and start a trade in 
Sandalwood. The resources were quickly depleted, however, but Portugal having eventually established a 
colony on the Eastern part of the island, they started instead coffee plantations. 
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on the Western part of the island46 – by the Dutch in 1653 to relocate into Dili, on 
the Eastern part. It is only after the island’s official division into West and East 
Timor – the former becoming part of the Dutch colony and, subsequently, 
Indonesia, whilst the latter renamed Timor Leste, in Portuguese – on 20 April 1859 
(Cristalis, 2009; p.VIII), that the Portuguese colonial administration began 
considering the implementation of a more effective territorial management within 
what were now the official borders of its colony. 
5.1.1. Citizenship 
As most colonisers around the world, the Portuguese used the technique to divide 
and conquer in order to remain in power, thus creating two divisions within the 
population of Timor Leste that had a significant impact on Timorese identity. The 
first difference was that of firaku and kaladi, although there is still much debate 
going on as to whether these two terms originated in the indigenous language or 
whether they were a product of Portuguese rule. One theory is that firaku is a 
Tetun translation of the Portuguese word ‘vira-cu’, meaning ‘turning the back’, 
whilst kaladi is a Tetun translation of ‘calado’, that is quiet, two words that were 
used by the Portuguese to describe, respectively, the population on the Easter part 
of island – considered defiant in nature – and that on the Western part of the island 
– considered much more quiet and obedient (Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.23). 
Another theory is that the translation actually happened the other way around: 
firaku is a Makassai word – dialect from Timor –, which means ‘we comrades’, and 
kaladi is a Tetun version of ‘keladi’, a Malay word referring to ‘yam’ (Castro Seixas, 
2009; p.74). Regardless, these two words show that the Portuguese purposefully 
employed them to create a difference between the Eastern and Western 
population of Timor Leste.  
The second ‘othering’ produced by the Portuguese during their colonial rule is the 
distinction between Maubere and Assimilado. This distinction has its origins in the 
Colonial Act passed in Portugual in 1930, which stipulated that the Portuguese 
nation “perform the function of acquiring and colonising overseas dominions and 
civilising the natives which are contained in them” (Mendes, 1940 in Taylor-Leech, 
2008; p.157). Thus, the ‘natives’ that were civilised would become ‘assimilado’, 
and those that weren’t would be referred to as indigenous, or in Timor Leste as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Even before their official denominations, the Eastern and Western parts of the island of Timor were defined by 
the 125th longitudinal line on the map which runs straight through the middle of the territory 
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‘Maubere’ – a word that was originally used in Tetun to refer to the people of the 
mountains. Amongst Timor Leste’s population, this distinction not only managed to 
create a difference between those that could speak Portuguese and work with 
them and those who couldn’t, but also took a Timorese word and gave it a 
negative connotation, therefore further affecting the identity of the people of Timor 
Leste. 
Finally, the aforementioned distinction was reinforced by a language policy that 
was clearly aimed at fostering a “discursive construction of identity” (Taylor-Leech, 
2008; p.154) rooted in the use of Portuguese being reserved only to the 
assimilados. In this context, Taylor-Leech (ibid) uses the notion of discourse as 
understood by Chick (2002) to mean the “ways of using language and other means 
of expression to construct social identities and social relations of power”. For 
indeed although Portuguese was taught in schools, only those that were 
assimilados or mestiços – that is mixed-blood – were allowed to attend them, 
therefore making Portuguese not the language of the colony per se, but rather 
turning it into an identifier of the Portuguese-speaking Timorese elite.  
Consequently, these policies of territorial administration and education show that 
the Portuguese “did little to promote either institutions or infrastructure that might 
advance a national identity or a nationalist cause” (Hughes, 2009; p.34) – in the 
early 1970s, 90 percent of the Timorese people were illiterate and only ten East 
Timorese held university degrees in 1964 (ibid). Instead, as in Rwanda where the 
tutsi were considered superior to other ethnicities, the distinctive Timorese 
identities drawn by the Portuguese, as well as Portuguese indirect rule through the 
assimilados contributed to determining who was inside and outside the nation 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2006; p.101); those that were outside the nation continued to live 
and interact within much the same spaces and scales as it had before the arrival of 
the Portuguese. As such, one cannot speak of substantive citizenship during 
Portuguese rule. 
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5.1.2. Legitimacy 
In addition to the absence of substantive citizenship highlighted above, Portuguese 
colonial rule made no attempt at building a system of governance that allowed for 
any level of participation from the Timorese population. Rather, the Portuguese 
initially interfered very little with the indigenous system of governing and left the 
kings – liuriai – to rule their kingdoms. Kingdoms were divided into villages – sukus 
– headed by a village chief – dato – responsible for all the hamlets comprised in 
the village; oral stories from those times collected by Tanja Hohe and Sofi Ospina 
(2002; p.40) reveal that the relationships between kingdoms were characterised by 
numerous conflicts and peace agreements.  
It is only one year after the official demarcation of East and West Timor, in 1860, 
that the newly appointed first governor of Timor Leste, Alfonso do Castro, decided 
that if Portugal was ever to take economic advantage of its colony – where it had 
introduced the production of coffee after indigenous sandalwood reserves had 
dried out – it needed to increase its control over the population and limit the 
fighting between kingdoms. As such, he devised a system of administration 
organised around the division of Timor Leste into 11 districts47, each headed by a 
Portuguese commander whose main task was to maintain peace in the districts 
and work with the local liurais (ibid). In this sense, the indigenous organisation 
remained “largely untouched” (ibid). 
Do Castro’s successor, Celestino da Silva, took more significant steps in altering 
Timor Leste’s traditional power structures upon his appointment in 1894. Indeed, in 
1906 he replaced the payment of tributes the population had to make to its liurais 
by a system of taxation by head, the proceedings of which were then partly 
redistributed to the liuriais and the datos, with the aim of inducing the population to 
work and produce more rather than just for themselves (ibid). The introduction of 
this system was the first official move by the Portuguese to turn traditional powers 
into a link with the Portuguese administration, but did not yet impact on the 
legitimacy of the liuriais and the datos amongst the population; rather, it is the 
introduction, in 1908 and then 1934, of a Portuguese system of governance 
making use of the strong ties between the population and their liurais and datos 
that affected more significantly traditional relationships with authority. For clarity’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Dili, Manatutu, Vemasse, Lautem, Viqueque, Allas, Bibissuco, Cailaco, Maubara, Batugade and Oecussi 
(Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.40) 
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sake, these are outlined in Table 5 below and their impacts subsequently 
discussed in more details. 
Table 5 – Portuguese administration structures (1860 to 1974) 
Administrative structure 
Year 
Level Power holders 
District Portuguese commander 
Kingdom Liurai (traditionally appointed) 1860 
Village & Hamlet Dato 
Conselhos (four units) & 
Comandos militars (eight 
units) 
Municipal administration & Central 
administration (respectively) 
Sub-districts (postos) (no information available) 
Kingdom Liurai (traditionally appointed) 
Village (suco) 
Chefe do suco (appointed by 
Portuguese) 
1908 
Hamlet 
Chefe do provoaçaõ (appointed by 
Portuguese) 
Conselhos Portuguese administrator 
Sub-districts (postos) 
Chefe do posto (some liurais took 
up this post) 
1934 
Village (suco) Chefe do suco 
Source: adapted from Ospina and Hohe (2002; p.41) 
The information gathered during Ospina and Hohe’s research is at times 
inconsistent and incomplete because it relies essentially on people’s memories 
and the oral history that has been passed on to them48. As such, some people 
remember the liurais as maintaining significant importance in terms of traditional – 
and at times modern – powers; they remember the Portuguese to have altered 
very little of the indigenous power structures and the liurais to have provided a 
good and fair link between the Portuguese colonial and the rest of the population. 
Other informants of the aforementioned research expressed their discontent with 
the power the liurais were given to become the link between the population and the 
Portuguese colonial rulers. In their opinion the liurais “did not pay attention to 
people’s needs” and “they coordinated only with the Portuguese” (ibid; p.44). 
Similarly, some informants said that the Portuguese were very respectful of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Through the account of the informants of the study, it remains unclear whether the liurais were replaced, in 
1934, with new, appointed, leaders or whether they remained and changed title. What is most likely to have 
happened, and what Hohe (2002; p.574) cautions, is that in some cases the sub-districts’ borders matched 
those of the old kingdoms, and therefore liurais became part of the system, whereas when this was not the 
case, new leaders could be appointed. 
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local customs and systems, or at least did not interfere much with them, whereas 
others argue that the way in which the liurais were inserted in the new system of 
colonial administration – e.g. changing the titles of the rulers such as liurais at 
times becoming chefe do posto – was disrespectful to their ancestral system (ibid) 
and created conflicts 
Therefore, the system of administration described above shows that the 
Portuguese did very little to penetrate Timorese society and provide them with an 
opportunity to define “which political institutions and which decisions made within 
them are acceptable” (Peter, 2010; p.17). Rather, the decision, very late into their 
colonial rule, to use customary forms of leadership in order to control the 
population managed only to maintain the status quo of the leadership system at 
best, and to create more animosity against the rulers in the worst case scenarios. 
The colonial system of rule enjoyed limited legitimacy only in the eyes of the 
privileged assimilados elite.  
5.1.3. Sovereignty 
The lack of substantive and formal citizenship characteristic of the Portuguese 
colonial regime therefore failed to create a system of nested socially constructed 
practices of political authority (Agnew, 2005; p.442). Instead, in the absence of a 
system that allowed them to voice their concern, and firmly grounded in social 
identities that very much reflected their nature prior to the arrival of the 
Portuguese, the population of Timor Leste simply remained characterised by a 
wide variety of autonomous polities that rarely sought to boycott the system in 
order to change it. As such, Portuguese sovereignty was neither pervasive nor 
violently contested. 
Indeed, resistance to Portuguese colonial administration did happen, although the 
history collected thus far on that period of Timor Leste’s history shows that it 
manifested itself mostly through episodes of violence in specific regions and was 
generally triggered by liurais. The lack of wide-spread, organised resistance 
against the Portuguese is generally attributed to the differences between the liurais 
who fought each other quite regularly, as well as to the use by the Portuguese, 
later on, of these differences to divide and conquer – that is, by integrating the 
loyal liurais in the new administration whilst replacing the disloyal ones. Only two 
episodes seem to have triggered a more widespread and organised resistance. 
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The most important one is known as the ‘Manufahi war’, named after the kingdom 
– located on the southern part of the island of Timor – of the liurai who initiated the 
war, Dom Boaventura. It is said that in 1911, Dom Boaventura managed to 
convince all the liurais that they would be stronger and more successful in their 
endeavour if they fought the colonial powers together. As a result, they entered a 
blood oath to fight against all the Europeans in Timor Leste and began “attacking 
Portuguese posts, burning houses and killing Portuguese” (Ospina and Hohe, 
2002; p.39). The war lasted one year, but eventually led, counter-productively, to 
the strengthening of the divide and conquer rule of the Portuguese who, one by 
one, won over the kingdoms of Timor Leste so that, eventually, all liurais 
surrendered and the new system of administration was established where sucos 
were given more power so as to reduce that of the liurais (CAVR, 2005; p.9).  
The second most significant rebellion against Portuguese rule was inspired, in 
1959, by the independence movement taking place at the time in neighbouring 
Indonesia. It is said that a small group of anti-colonial activists had already been 
forming in the outskirts of Dili since 1958 and, inspired by a group of Indonesian 
activists that had fled to Baucau, in Timor Leste, had begun planning an uprising 
against colonial rule: “a group including nine of the Permesta Indonesians would 
march Baucau to Dili and begin the uprising, seizing installations; a concurrent 
uprising would be taking place in Aileu [south of Dili, in the mountains]” 
(Chamberlain, 2010; p.175). The rebellion, however, never took the proportions 
that it aimed for as the Portuguese forces, tipped by someone in Dili, repressed the 
rebellion in the capital without much violence, arresting the rebels; Viqueque fell 
shortly afterwards (ibid). 
5.1.4. Territory 
What the analysis of citizenship, legitimacy and sovereignty in Portuguese ruled 
Timor Leste demonstrates is that, although the geographical boundaries of the 
country, as it stands today, emerged out of Portuguese decision-making, the 
manner in which the colonisers administered the population within those 
boundaries failed to create a territory. Instead, the deliberate implementation of a 
system aimed at creating divisions amongst the liurais in order to divide and 
conquer more easily resulted in practice in the perpetration of the status quo in 
relation to local authority: as people continued to relate to their liurais and saw very 
little development that could be attributed to the Portuguese, colonial rule did not 
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engender any type of legitimacy. Furthermore, the lack of a system that could 
potentially open room for participation from the population, combined with the lack 
of a project that aimed at developing a wider social identity that would encompass 
all the various existing ones, resulted in a situation where people could not express 
their concerns but at the same time did not have the knowledge or communication 
tools to build a widespread resistance. Sovereignty of the Portuguese, thus, failed 
to emerge. 
As such, Portuguese colonial rule by no means was recognised across the whole 
territory other than through a few specific policies such as taxation and forced 
labour; however, as those were implemented within a system that did not 
guarantee – nor did it seek to build – any legitimacy across the population, the 
authority of the colonisers meant little to the population. In this context, as of the 
mid-1970s Timor Leste did not present any of the characteristics of a territory as it 
is understood in the context of this research. 
5.1.5. Portuguese withdrawal – Timor Leste’s first independence 
On 25 April 1974 a military coup took place in Lisbon, Portugal, to overthrow the 
authoritarian regime that had been ruling the country since 1933, thus starting a 
turbulent period of change in Portugal’s history also known as the Carnation 
Revolution. While the coup was originally organised by the Armed Forces 
Movement to overthrow the authoritarian regime, it soon turned into a peaceful civil 
revolution to free Portuguese colonies, where the state was seen to spend 
significant amounts of human and financial resources to fight independence wars 
thus severely affecting Portugal’s economy (Le Monde Diplomatique, 2004).  
As with all other Portuguese colonies, the outcome of the Carnation revolution in 
Timor Leste was decolonisation with, however, one important distinction: no 
independence struggle had been taking place in the country, thus the absence of a 
unified struggle against the outsider meant that there was no strong unity in the 
territory amongst the population, and no one – or more – leaders to follow. 
Nonetheless, Timor Leste’s first attempt to independence between 1974 and 1975, 
although brief, is a crucial point in understanding the process of the country’s 
“political awakening” (Rod Nixon in Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.24) and the 
divides this period has created within its ruling elite. Indeed, as independence was 
handed to a Timorese population that was neither prepared nor organised for it, 
thus throwing Timor Leste “into a pit of independence” (Gusmão, 2000 in Hughes, 
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2009; p.35), very different ideas for the future of the country emerged. These are 
reflected in the three main parties that emerged as a result of Portuguese efforts to 
encourage educated Timorese to form political parties: Frente Revolucionaria do 
Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN), União Democratica Timorense (UDT) and 
Associação Democratica de Timor (Apodeti). Table 6 below presents a brief 
overview of their main positions regarding independence and their political 
stances. 
Table 6 – Differences between three main political parties in 1975 
Party Position on independence Political stance in 1975 
FRETILIN 
Strong position on 
independence from 
Indonesia 
 Radical social, political and 
economic change 
 Undertook literacy and other 
development projects 
 Strong grassroots following in rural 
communities 
UDT 
Self-determination in 
support of independent 
federation with Portugal 
 
 Accelerated social, economic, 
cultural and political development 
 National use of Portuguese 
 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and democracy 
 Just distribution of income 
 Good neighbour policies 
 Cooperation with other political 
parties 
 Primary support from Timorese with 
strong links to the Portuguese 
Apodeti 
In favour of becoming part of 
Indonesia 
 Introduce compulsory Indonesian in 
schools 
 Uphold essential human rights, 
 Just distribution of wealth,  
 Minimum salary,  
 Right to strike,  
 Free education and health,  
 Freedom of expression, of religion 
and opposed racial discrimination but 
had a declared bias towards the 
Catholic Church 
Source: adapted from Walsh (2001), Kiernan (2003) and Carapic and Jütersonke (2012) 
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What the table highlights is that the three parties that emerged were not only 
characterised by their very different positions in terms of independence – fully 
independent, strong ties with Portugal or strong ties with Indonesia – but that these 
differences accordingly led to strong divergences, on issues of language and 
relations with the grassroots and their needs, that would have a significant impact 
on the social identity of the Timorese in very different ways. Furthermore, the 
political awakening triggered by the Portuguese withdrawal was managed in much 
the same way in which the Portuguese had dealt with the Timorese population, 
that is, focused on the Portuguese speaking elite. Therefore, the parties and their 
political stances reflected the aspirations of an elite few, with little concern as to 
the desires of the Timorese population.  
However, these differences amongst emerging leaders were only the tip of the 
iceberg looming on Timor Leste’s path to peaceful independence, for the political 
turmoil that followed the Portuguese organised elections of March 1975 led to a 
three-weeks civil war, which contributed to creating divisions amongst Timorese 
leaders that still bear significant divisive potential today. In fact, shortly after 
winning the local elections in 1975, FRETILIN agreed to rule with UDT in order to 
form a unified front against Apodeti; however, when the then President of 
Indonesia, Suharto, returned from a trip in the United States where he had 
managed to convince then U.S President Gerald Ford that FRETILIN presented a 
communist threat – thus justifying Indonesia’s invasion – UDT leaders perceived a 
threat for the future of Timor and organised a coup against FRETILIN. The coup 
took place in Dili in the night of 11 August 1975, resulting in the arrest of more than 
80 FRETILIN members (Kiernan, 2003; p.205) and UDT regaining control of the 
port, the airport, the radio and the telephone facilities (University of New South 
Wales, 2014). But UDT’s overthrow was short-lived, as remaining FRETILIN 
members fled to the mountains and appealed successfully “to the Portuguese 
trained East Timorese military units” (Kiernan, 2003; p.205) for their help, leading 
to a three-weeks civil war that eventually saw UDT defeated and many of its 
members fleeing to West Timor. On 28 November 1975 FRETILIN declared Timor 
Leste’s independence and started taking the first steps towards building a state49.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 It is not the aim of this section, or of this thesis, to go in-depth into the description of FRETILIN’s initial attempt 
at building state institutions in 1975. Nonetheless, parts of this process will be explored throughout the analysis 
of the case study as a comparison with the state building exercise undertaken by the United Nations. 
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5.2. Indonesian military rule  
Unfortunately for Timor Leste, the timing of its political awakening coincided with a 
wider geopolitical context that quickly cut short the country’s aspirations for 
independence. Set during the Cold War, in a geographical area where U.S forces 
had been waging a fight against communist forces for over two decades, 
FRETILIN leaders’ belief that “they could draw on Marxism and adapt it to 
nationalist ends” (Joliffe, 1978 in Kiernan, 2003; p.206) rose significant concerns 
amongst anti-communist neighbours. General Suharto in particular, a fierce anti-
communist who had successfully crushed Indonesia’s left in a violent repression in 
1965-1966 and become Indonesia’s first president in 1967, was concerned with 
FRETILIN’s policies; “the socio-economic transformations including land reform, 
the establishment of cooperatives and an end to elite rule” (Jones, 2010; p.554), 
advocated by the party, sat rather uneasily against his plans, financially and 
politically backed by the US, to implement a “capitalist social order” (ibid) in the 
region.  
Consequently, upon FRETILIN’s victory of the 1975 elections, General Suharto 
began lobbying then U.S President Gerald Ford, and his Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, for their approval to intervene in order to avert another communist 
threat. The US eventually gave their green light, and on December 7th, 1975, 
Indonesian forces landed in Dili and launched a full-scale invasion of Timor Leste. 
5.2.1. Citizenship 
Indonesia’s plan to integrate Timor Leste originally rested on two important pillars 
that would have allowed it to maintain control over the population across the whole 
territory of Timor Leste: infrastructure as well as economic development, and 
education. Indeed, in order to facilitate movement of military troops across a 
territory that had originally seen very little development during Portuguese times, 
the Indonesians constructed a wide network of roads. Furthermore, the role of 
education in a country that was primarily illiterate was seen by the Indonesians as 
a major factor in integrating East Timorese in Indonesia: through the establishment 
of schools throughout the whole territory, and by making education in Bahasa 
mandatory for everyone, the Indonesians thought they could achieve a 
“comprehensive resocialisation of the territory” (Aditjondro, 1994 in Jones, 2010; 
p.555). Finally, as Timor Leste was part of the territory, the Indonesian government 
also took control over most of Timorese’s main businesses and plantations, 
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integrating them together under the PT Denok holding company, which eventually 
also became the monopoly exporter of coffee (Jones, 2012; p.99). 
But these extensive efforts to resocialise East Timorese, however, backfired 
significantly against Indonesia as the resistance, instead, used them to organise its 
fight more efficiently. Firstly, the far-reaching road network built for the purpose of 
facilitating Indonesian military’s movement across the territory also “entailed new 
types of mobility for locals, which paralleled the pyramid of subdistrict, district, and 
provincial/national hierarchies” (Hughes, 2009; p.38) developed by the 
Indonesians to govern the territory. Therefore, where previously it had proven 
difficult for Timorese to travel, they were now able to move around and 
communicate more easily amongst each other, facilitating the establishment of a 
clandestine resistance network between towns and villages across Timor Leste. 
Secondly, the compulsory education, complemented toward the end of the 1980s 
by new opportunities for youth to access universities in Indonesia, led to a new 
East Timorese youth that was “imbued with Indonesian ideas concerning the 
importance of independent nationhood” (ibid; p.41), and which returned to the 
country with new ideas for independence and statehood for Timor Leste. Thirdly, 
the economic monopoly exercised by PT Denok not only forced Timorese farmers 
to sell their coffee harvests at much lower prices (Jones, 2012; p.99), but the 
extensive plundering of economic resources by the Indonesians to fund their 
military activity on the territory brought about unemployment and economic 
stagnation throughout most of the territory, thus contributing to a growing “popular 
resentment at being colonised by government-backed monopolies”, especially 
amongst the youth (ibid; p.101). 
In addition to these issues, Indonesia’s rhetoric and attitude toward Timor Leste 
and its population produced, in the long run, a counter-citizenship that eventually 
reinforced anti-Indonesian sentiments amongst the Timorese. As Anderson (2001; 
p.236) points out, “the Indonesian government has been unable to incorporate 
[Timor Leste] imaginatively, in the boarder, popular sense”: what should have been 
Indonesian territory was never referred to in any other way than as ‘Timor Leste’ 
by Suharto and his military, and the population within was persistently called ‘East 
Timorese’. Moreover, Indonesia’s deployment of violence on a vast scale, 
including “the use of aerial bombardments, the napalming of villages, the 
systematic herding of people into resettlement centres leading to the terrible 
starvation famines of 1977-1980” (Anderson, 2001; p.235), differed significantly 
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from Indonesia’s policies in the rest of the archipelago. The consequences of these 
policies, that appeared to be more “for enemies than for national siblings” (ibid), 
were crucial for shaping representations of belonging in the minds of both 
Indonesians and Timorese; people on either side of the original border continued 
to feel as though that border strongly defined their identity, both amongst 
themselves and in the eyes of the Indonesian government. 
In contrast with these extremely isolating Indonesian policies, the strong leadership 
of the resistance movement and the Church within Timor Leste contributed to the 
emergence and reinforcement of a new nationalist sentiment. Indeed, the “new 
equality that transcended any pre-existing social cleavage” (Hughes, 2009; p.38), 
resulting from Indonesian policies in Timor Leste, provided an opportunity for 
FRETILIN to develop programmes that aimed at raising an East Timorese 
consciousness amongst the population (Hughes, 2009; p.39). For example, in the 
early years of the invasion, as mass displacement of population arrived in the 
zones still under FRETILIN’s control, “mountainous liberated zones” (ibid) were 
created where FRETILIN organised food production, education services, health 
care, and political education programmes (ibid) “designed to encourage the spirit 
of nationalism and support the national liberation struggle” (CAVR, 2005 in ibid). 
According to some testimonies received by CAVR, these liberated zones marked 
an important step forward toward the development of East Timorese nationalism, 
starkly in contrast with Indonesian resocialisation policies within the territory.  
Furthermore, as Indonesia required that everyone in its territory choose one of five 
registered religions – which included Catholicism but excluded animism, Timor 
Leste’s main religion – the vast majority of East Timorese joined the Catholic 
Church, since relations with the Church during Portuguese times had remained 
good. The role of the Church took on special meaning when, at the beginning of 
the 1980s, it became particularly indigenised through two main events: the 
appointment of East Timorese Bishop Belo, which contributed to increasing the 
number of East Timorese priests in the territory; and, the authorisation from the 
Vatican to use Tetun – the indigenous lingua franca – during mass, since 
Portuguese had been banned by the Indonesians. Thus, churches became “the 
only places in which Timorese could congregate as a community without arousing 
the suspicion of the Indonesians” (Hughes, 2009; p.43), a sentiment that played a 
key role in the development of a Timorese sense of belonging to a polity that 
transcended the local to form new representations of a wider society. As new safe-
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heavens, churches became the primary site where people belonging to the 
resistance movements felt they could discuss strategic matters, share information 
and build a strong network. Finally, the use of Tetun across all the churches in the 
territory contributed significantly to the spread of the language, which soon 
became the language of the resistance and, as such, an identifier of Timorese 
polity. 
Consequently, whilst Indonesia initially organised its administration of Timor Leste 
in a way that aimed at transforming the variety of local kingdoms into a unified 
extension of Indonesia’s territory, its rhetoric and attitudes toward the population of 
the territory eventually achieved the opposite. Indeed, despite attempting, much 
like the Portuguese did although on a wider and more consistent scale, to promote 
formal citizenship for those who allied themselves with the regime, many of its 
tactics served instead to facilitate the development and strengthening of a 
resistance movement that came to define Timorese polity. The notion that the vast 
majority of Timorese were suffering from the same brutal and unfair rule across a 
contained geographic space served to build representations of a wider political 
community. Additionally, the development of a common language that came to 
define the resistance movement contributed to the development of a substantive 
citizenship that ran counter to the formal one extended only to a few. 
5.2.2. Legitimacy 
Suharto’s policies towards Timor Leste were mirrored in the way in which military 
administration of the territory was organised: in order to ensure control of the 
population over the whole territory of Timor Leste, the previous administrative 
structures were maintained, safeguarding the many layers running from district to 
hamlets; however, since Timor Leste was now Indonesia’s 27th province (Ospina 
and Hohe, 2002; p.47) a combination of both Indonesian and Timorese powers 
were now responsible for these different administrative layers, as shown in Table 
7 below. 
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Table 7 – Indonesian administration structure 
Unit Indonesian term Head 
District Kabupaten Bupati 
Subdistrict Kecamatan Camat 
Village Desa Kepala desa 
Hamlet Dusun Kepala desun 
Neighbourhood Rukun tetangga (RT) Kepala RT 
Source: Ospina and Hohe (2002) p.47 
Informants in the study carried out by Ospina and Hohe (2002) pointed out that the 
Indonesians understood the importance of the local level within Timorese 
traditional power structures. They had realised that if they wished to maintain 
control over the population at those levels it was necessary to implement a system 
that could, on one hand, give the Timorese the impression that they could still 
choose who would have power, whilst on the other hand leaving room for 
Indonesians to ensure that power holders would work with them rather than 
against.  
As such, the village chief – which had become the new title of many liurais under 
Portuguese administration – was no longer to be appointed according to royal 
family ties but, rather, would be elected by the population. The candidates’ 
appointment process maintained a semblance of traditional system in that “the 
power holders of the village, who decided still in accordance with the traditional 
power structure, chose the candidates” (ibid; p.48), and did so in traditional 
Timorese ways, respecting the importance of descent in the selection of the 
candidates – an important feature in Timorese culture, as noted in the previous 
sections. Village inhabitants were then called on to vote for their village chiefs and 
it is at this level, informants of the study indicate, that Indonesians sometimes 
interfered to adjust elections results in favour of the candidates that showed most 
allegiance to them. Views vary at this stage with regard to whether the Indonesians 
interfered often with elections results or not, and whether they respected traditional 
systems and elders’ choices; nonetheless, general consensus remains on the fact 
that Timorese generally felt that their leaders were still traditionally chosen, 
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although now elected, and their authority consequently remained intact to a 
significant extent. 
This mode of administration by the Indonesians appeared, initially, as the only way 
to penetrate Timorese society and control it. The system relied heavily on an anti-
FRETILIN elite to join the administration and form alliances in order to maintain 
existing businesses or form new ones, thus leading to the creation of a “web of 
patron-client relationships [which] comprised of members of the local government, 
distinguished military [officers], technocrats in charge of firms, influential families, 
political and traditional leaders and business elites” (Pedersen and Arneberg, 1999 
in Jones, 2010; p.556). However, whilst this division between elites working with 
the Indonesians and FRETILIN and its social base worked at the beginning, the 
penetration of Timorese society with its ideological or historical divisions into the 
new system of administration eventually translated into a loss of control by the 
Indonesians. Furthermore, the aforementioned election system, which the 
Indonesians thought they could continue to control, also eventually undermined 
Indonesian control as some local chiefs pretended to work for the Indonesians 
while in reality working for the resistance. Consequently, despite Indonesia’s best 
efforts to use the local system to maintain control and penetrate Timorese society, 
“Indonesia’s state project was modified by the newcomers’ need to compromise 
with pre-existing powerful social groups to constitute local power” (Jones, 2010; 
p.557), a system which in the end worked against Indonesia. 
Therefore, it appears that by building a governance system based on pre-existing 
Timorese customary authority relationships, Indonesia initially sought to guarantee 
the legitimacy of its presence in the territory. However, much like what has been 
highlighted previously in relation to citizenship, the actual way in which the 
Indonesian military governed the population and exercised their authority 
eventually turned against Indonesian rule in the long run. Indeed, cognisant that 
the institutions, originally meant to provide them with the opportunity to participate 
and keep checks and balances on the governance system, were in reality a façade 
aimed at maintaining closer control over their daily activities, the Timorese 
population began using them to its own advantage; as such, the legitimacy these 
structures contributed to building was not that of the Indonesian ruler but rather 
that of FRETILIN-led’s resistance.  
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5.2.3. Sovereignty 
The politicisation of Timorese society upon Portuguese withdrawal, compounded 
with Indonesia’s violent repression tactics, contributed to the development of a 
strong resistance movement which lasted 25 years and eventually succeeded with 
the referendum for independence in 1999. Resistance to Indonesian military rule 
can be divided into three main phases (Hughes, 2009; p.35), which roughly 
correspond to the three main fronts that had developed: the military front organised 
by FRETILIN’s armed wing, the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor 
Leste (FALINTIL), a clandestine structure involving civilians also organised by 
FALINTIL, and a political and diplomatic front headed internally and abroad by 
FRETILIN’s Portuguese educated elite (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.50).  
In the first years of resistance, between 1975 and 1979, FALINTIL was successful 
on the military front in its fight against the Indonesian military and in 1976, as 
much as 80% of Timor Leste’s territory was still under FRETILIN’s control 
(Kiernan, 2003; p.210), thus perpetrating the image of “FRETILIN as a legitimate 
government under attack, rather than a resistance force” (Hughes, 2009; p.35). 
However, closer to the end of the 1970s, Indonesia’s retaliation against FALINTIL’s 
military efforts became even more violent, including both assaults on FALINTIL’s 
bases and air attacks on the civilians in the areas under its control; in 1978 the 
death of FALINTIL’s commander Nicolao Lobato marked the end of a relatively 
successful phase and the beginning of the most difficult period of the resistance 
movement. 
Between 1979 and 1987, “FRETILIN relinquished control of the territory and 
FALINTIL retreated to secret hideouts in the mountains, from where its members 
mounted sporadic guerrilla raids on the Indonesian army” (ibid). But the raids 
continued to decrease as Indonesia’s violent repression brought the number of 
FALINTIL fighters from approximately 5,000 in 1979 to about a 100 in 1987 (ibid). 
Furthermore, ideological disagreements between FRETILIN leaders contributed to 
further weakening the resistance movement, a split which became particularly 
clear at a FRETILIN Central Committee’s conference convened in 1981, where 
FALINTIL’s commander in chief Xanana Gusmao’s push for the adoption of a 
Leninist-Marxist ideology within the resistance created significant differences 
between FRETILIN’s leaders who did not want the fight to become political and 
those who did, insisting that a peasant militia be trained (Kiernan, 2003; p.208). 
State building in Timor Leste 
163 	  
The creation, during that same conference, of an umbrella organisation 
encouraging a more united resistance front – the Revolutionary Council of National 
Resistance (CRRN) – did little to reconcile those differences, and for a few years 
the resistance movement was forced to remain disaggregated into small cells that 
moved around the territory and relied more heavily on the participation of a 
clandestine resistance movement amongst the population.  
The period between 1987 and 1999 marked a new impetus for Timorese 
resistance, characterised by the combination of an urban clandestine resistance 
and the support of a political and diplomatic front, both at home and abroad. In 
1989, Suharto began opening up Timor Leste to the rest of the world, increasing 
the number of opportunities for Timorese youth to go and study in Indonesian 
universities (Hughes, 2009; p.41). This, however, also opened up the Indonesian 
regime to renewed, stronger criticism as a growing number of unemployed 
Timorese youth became increasingly frustrated with the significant gap between 
Indonesia’s promises of “development and enhanced job prospects” (Jones, 2012; 
p.101) and the reality of mass unemployment; as a result, many youth organised 
themselves into an urban clandestine movement. 
On the political front, by the mid-1980s it had become evident that, due to a 
decreasing number of guerrilla fighters, a military victory would not be possible. 
Thus, FAILINTIL, still under Xanana’s command, changed tactics. First, the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology that had proved so divisive was dropped and replaced by 
a more nationalist discourse of independence (Philpott, 2006; p.141) at the centre 
of which “FALINTIL operated as a symbol of Timorese resistance, and a reminder 
to the outside world of the illegality and brutality of the Indonesian regime” 
(Hughes, 2009; p.40). Second, toward the end of the 1980s Xanana had become 
convinced that, in order to win the struggle against Indonesian rule, it was 
necessary to create a more united front including other key actors such as UDT, 
the Church and the student urban clandestine movement (Philpott, 2006; Hughes, 
2009). Consequently, despite persisting differences between leaders’ political 
tactics – which culminated into FALINTIL and FRETILIN separating in 1987, 
creating animosities between Xanana and other leaders that continue to 
characterise Timor Leste’s politics today – the National Council of Maubere 
Resistance (CNRM) was formed in 1988, and took the lead “in promoting the 
struggle for independence on the international stage, under the auspices of Jose 
Ramos Horta from 1989” (Hughes, 2009; p.40). 
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It is, however, a student demonstration organised in Dili’s Santa Cruz cemetery on 
12 November 1991, that revealed Indonesia’s violently repressive military rule to 
the international community; that day the massacre of over 200 people by 
Indonesian police, who attempted to suppress the rebellion, was filmed by British 
journalist Max Stahl who happened to be visiting Timor Leste at the time and was 
present in Santa Cruz, filming the protest. The film was subsequently successfully 
released internationally to raise awareness of the Timorese plight, a release which 
coincided, to Timor Leste’s advantage, with the end of the Cold War and, as such, 
a reversal of the situation for the country within the geopolitical arena. No longer 
concerned with the possibility of a communist threat, the international community 
was suddenly shaken by the evidence brought forward that the military regime 
implemented by Indonesia in Timor Leste in all these years had turned into “a 
highly repressive, deeply corrupt and fairly ramshackle entity, which systematically 
failed to develop the local economy and thereby cultivate popular legitimacy” (ibid). 
Consequently, Timor Leste found itself at the forefront of the international stage, 
which significantly facilitated the task of the diplomatic front led by Jose Ramos 
Horta and Bishop Belo.  
The financial crisis of 1997-1998 eventually gave the final blow to Suharto’s 
government in Indonesia, as international actors used Indonesia’s increased 
reliance on IMF and World Bank assistance to pressure Suharto into retreating 
from Timor Leste. Simultaneously, in Timor Leste in 1998, the CNRT (National 
Council of Timorese Resistance) replaced the CNRM, encompassing the five 
political parties that had been created in 1975, in order to present Timor Leste as a 
united front to the international community and presenting the basis for a future 
government of national reconciliation (Philpott, 2006; p.142). In May 1998 Suharto 
stepped down and his successor, President Habibie, offered East Timorese the 
opportunity to vote in a referendum for independence from Indonesia. 
The development of a well-organised, widespread resistance throughout Timor 
Leste during the 25 years of military rule clearly demonstrates that the legitimacy 
and sovereignty originally conferred to the Indonesian regime by the U.S did not 
match the situation within the country’s boundaries. Rather, Indonesian’s extensive 
and brutal repression of any form of dissent only contributed to reinforcing, in 
contrast, the sovereignty of FRETILIN across Timor Leste’s society. 
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5.2.4. Territory 
The case of Indonesia’s military rule in Timor Leste is particularly interesting for the 
purpose of this research because it brings to the fore clear evidence of how an 
extremely repressive military regime can masquerade as a state building exercise 
and gather the international legitimacy and sovereignty it needs to maintain control 
within internationally defined geographical boundaries. This example also 
contributes to show, however, that such international legitimacy and sovereignty 
do not necessarily result in the creation of a territory as defined for the purposes of 
this research. 
Indeed, whilst Suharto’s claim that it was better for Timor Leste – and the 
international community as a whole – if the country became part of Indonesia may 
have won him US approval for a full-scale invasion, the border between the two 
territories remained a reality in the hearts and minds of both Indonesian and 
Timorese population throughout the 25 years of military rule. As such, the fierce 
resistance struggle led, over those 25 years, by FRETILIN and the population’s 
clandestine movements, shows very clearly that despite some initial level of 
support from a small share of the population, Indonesia’s attempt to annex Timor 
Leste not only failed, but managed to foster a new sense of national unity that was 
“still quite thin on the ground” (Anderson, 2001; p.237) in 1975. Fascinatingly, 
therefore, Suharto did manage to create a territory, yet what emerged was not a 
bigger Indonesia but the 21st century newest nation, Timor Leste. 
5.2.5. Timor Leste’s independence from Indonesia  
Keen to show the international community his intentions for a much more 
democratic rule, B.J. Habibie, Suharto’s successor in 1998, immediately agreed to 
open negotiations with Timor Leste regarding its independence from Indonesia. 
Thus, backed by the UN, which had refused from the very beginning to recognise 
Indonesia’s annexation of Timor Leste’s territory (Smith, 2004; p.147), and by 
Portugal, which had maintained legal ties with Timor Leste in the eyes of the UN 
and had regularly argued for its self-determination (Ingram, 2012; p.3), Indonesia 
signed on 5 May 1999 an agreement that set the legal grounds for a popular 
consultation that would give the people of Timor Leste the opportunity to decide 
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the future of their country – that is, special autonomy within Indonesia or 
independence (ibid)50. The CNRT, however, was left outside of the negotiations. 
Preparations for the popular consultation started as soon as the United Nations 
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in June 1999, but security 
issues marred the process from the beginning. Indeed, security in the run up to, 
and during, the popular consultation was entrusted to Indonesian military troops – 
a decision resulting from Jakarta’s refusal, at the time of the agreement, to allow a 
UN blue beret force (Smith, 2004; p.148) – and was characterised, as early as 
July, by regular pro-Indonesian Timorese militias attacks and intimidation, which 
Indonesian military troops did little to stop. Despite these warning signs, however, 
Xanana Gusmão insisted that the people of Timor Leste were ready (Chopra, 
2002; p.983), and the consultation was held on 30 August 1999.  
Whilst the consultation was a success, with 98.6% of registered voters turning out 
to cast their ballot (Philpott, 2006; p.144) of which 78.5% were in favour of Timor 
Leste’s independence from Indonesia (Ingram, 2012; p.1), the feeling of happiness 
was short-lived. Between September 1 and 3, “terror started even before the votes 
were counted” (Cristalis, 2009; p.206), with militiamen attacking UNAMET district 
offices in an attempt to drive UN staff – mostly volunteers – away from their bases 
and, eventually, the country. On September 4, upon announcement of the results, 
pro-Indonesia militiamen started a campaign of violence against the East Timorese 
population – “Operation Clean Sweep” (Chopra, 2002; p.983) – which lasted three 
weeks, the time it took for the international community to build a response. Indeed, 
ill prepared for the violence that followed the ballot (Dinnen, N.D.; p.2), UNAMET 
evacuated most of its staff; simultaneously, UN response was delayed by concerns 
from Malaysia, U.S, China and Russia over negatively affecting their relationship 
with Indonesia by intervening in what could be conceived as sovereign territory 
(Suhrke, 2001; p.5). The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was finally 
authorised and deployed on 15 September, as Indonesia publicly acknowledged 
the involvement of its military and police personnel in allowing militiamen’s 
violence in Timor Leste (UN, 1999 in Ingram, 2012; p.1); INTERFET was tasked to 
“take all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor” (Gorjão, 
2002; p.315) and peace was restored shortly after. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The agreement stipulated that should East Timorese people vote for independence from Indonesia, “the 
Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful 
and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations” (UN, 1999; p.7) 
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Fifteen days for the authorisation and deployment of an international force may 
appear a “swift reply” (Philpott, 2006; Ingram, 2012) by international standards, but 
to the East Timorese the destruction that took place between September 4 and 15 
left a gaping hole in the country’s physical and human resources: close to 2,000 
East Timorese were killed while over 250,000 refugees fled to West Timor (Gorjão, 
2002; Ingram, 2012); and, around 70% of the country’s physical infrastructure - 
public buildings, and therefore government records, communications, water supply 
and electricity infrastructure – was destroyed as villages, towns and cities were 
burnt to the ground (Chopra 2002; Ingram, 2012). Consequently, the physical, 
human and political devastation that occurred in September 1999 laid the 
foundation for the international community to consider Timor Leste a tabula rasa 
(Chopra, 2002; Jones, 2010) or terra nullius (Suhrke, 2001; Lemay-Hebert, 2011). 
5.3. United Nations Transitional Administration – post-conflict state building 
Six weeks after INTERFET’s intervention to restore peace in Timor Leste, on 25 
October 1999, UN Resolution 1272 established UNAMET’s successor and, as 
such, set the foundations for the first ever most comprehensive exercise of 
transitional administration to be undertaken by the UN: UNTAET. The Resolution 
stipulated that it “will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration 
of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive 
authority, including the administration of justice” (UN Security Council, 1999; p.2). 
In these terms, Resolution 1272 turned UNTAET into Timor Leste’s effective 
formal government and the individual responsible for the mission, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator Sergio 
Vieira de Mello, into Timor Leste’s sovereign. But UNTAET’s task was not solely 
that of administrating the country whilst the foundations for state building were 
being laid; it was also responsible for laying those foundations, and was therefore 
in charge of “establishing an effective administration, assisting in the development 
of civil and social services, […] supporting capacity-building for self-government, 
and assisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development” 
(Gorjão, 2002; p.314). In this light, UNTAET’s mandate was without any precedent 
both in breadth and content (ibid). 
As such, UNTAET’s position during Timor Leste’s transitional administration is 
both highly complex and also crucial to analyse for the purpose of understanding 
how the international state building process has affected – and indeed continues to 
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affect today – the emergence of a national citizenship and the development of a 
sense of political community amongst the Timorese population. Because the 
mission acted, for two years, almost like a state, this sub-section will analyse its 
main actions through the lenses of citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and 
territory; however, its ambiguous position between having full authority over the 
territory for two years whilst building national institutions, had subsequent 
significant consequences on the sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship – as 
section 5.3.1 will illustrate. As such, the order of analysis has been inverted. 
5.3.1. Territory 
Section 5.2.5 demonstrated that the networks and practices inherent to the 
resistance movements against Indonesia, as well as the knowledge that other 
people within the same bounded space were suffering in the same conditions 
without distinction for ethnicity, class or political orientation (Hughes, 2009; p.38), 
fostered representations of a wider social Timorese polity, creating a link between 
society and space (Soja, 1971 in Storey, 2012; p.27). The overwhelming majority 
in favour for Timor Leste’s independence from Indonesia in 1999 marked the 
culmination of this new “mapped imagination” (Anderson, 2001; p.237) within the 
now internationally recognised boundaries of the country’s territory.  
In this context, UNTAET’s mission included all the classical powers of a state, as 
indicated in the aforementioned Resolution, but they were to be “exercised as a 
trustee rather than a sovereign” (Stahn, 2001 in Ingram, 2012; p.3). In other words, 
UNTAET was left with a very delicate balance to strike within the new territory: it 
needed to display enough authority to be able to manage the country whilst the 
new institutions were being built, simultaneously ensuring that its authority did not 
undermine the relationship between the Timorese population and its emerging 
political elite. As a consequence, with the intent to leave the creation of a territory 
to the Timorese society, UNTAET purposefully chose to abstain from engaging 
“with the deeper political history of Timor and the corrosive relationship between 
prominent elite personalities and their supporters” (Ingram, 2012; p.2). This 
decision, however, had devastating consequences for the institutional design that 
took place over the next two years of transitional administration and, as a result, on 
the extension of state’s power across the whole territory.  
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5.3.2. Sovereignty 
In order to have the fastest and most effective reach at the local level, UNTAET 
made a decision early on to maintain the Indonesian system of governance – that 
is, district, sub-district, village and hamlet; maintaining a strong central authority at 
national level, it created the position of international District Field Officer (DFO), 
which was meant to become a link between these local levels of governance and 
central authority. At the same time as the DFOs were being set-up, however, a 
parallel structure based on existing clandestine structures re-emerged under the 
leadership of the CNRT (Hohe, 2002; p.579). Also using the same levels of 
governance established by the Indonesians, it established a system where sub-
district and village chiefs were appointed following a procedure that combined 
customary and resistance related authority: village elders made initial 
appointments according to customary practices, then FALINTIL consulted with the 
CNRT to validate the final choice (ibid). As such, the parallel structure set-up by 
the CNRT held much more authority than the DFOs, whom many people felt “did 
not have sufficient cultural knowledge” (ibid) to gain such authority. 
Faced with the evidence of CNRT’s authority on the ground, the international 
community entered a very divisive debate about the way in which to handle the 
CNRT; whilst some organisations, such as the World Bank, argued against dealing 
with a single interlocutor, others were in favour of capitalising on the sense of unity 
that the umbrella organisation appeared to bring to Timor Leste’s political realm. 
The UN, with whom the decision ultimately rested as the transitional administrator, 
remained however stuck within a binary approach to the problem: “either there is a 
sovereign government for the UN to relate to as a national institution, or else there 
is an illegitimate faction fighting on the ground” (Chopra, 2002; p.997), two 
categories within which the CNRT did not fit; thus, in the absence of a formal 
decision and faced with the fact that the CNRT was the only coherent and 
pervasive entity on the ground (ibid), INTERFET and DFOs dealt with the CNRT 
as the most effective way to manage day-to-day activities.  
Whilst this approach proved useful in ensuring a certain level of interaction 
between internationals and locals on the ground, as well as in preserving 
relationships with authoritative figures the Timorese population could understand, it 
mistakenly assumed that within the political elite there was a broad consensus 
about the new state’s institutions design (Ingram, 2012; p.4). Instead, deeply 
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rooted in a “diplomatic habit to remain removed from local politics and not to 
participate in the social process behind it” (ibid), UNTAET left many of the divisions 
that characterised CNRT unaddressed. This proved to be a significant issue when, 
early 2001, old rivalries re-emerged as UNTAET started preparing the ground for 
the elections of the constituent assembly – the body subsequently responsible for 
drafting the constitution – leading, in June 2001, to the disintegration of the CNRT: 
on the one hand, the irreconcilable differences between Mari Alkatiri – secretary 
general of FRETILIN, the main component of the CNRT – and Xanana Gusmão – 
President of the CNRT – led to the departure of FRETILIN from the CNRT; on the 
other hand, historical differences between Xanana Gusmão and UDT leaders – 
who were, in 1975, pro-integration with Indonesia – resulted in the UDT also 
leaving the CNRT to become its own political party.  
Consequently, UNTAET’s refusal, upon establishment of its mission, to officially 
accept the CNRT “as the primary legitimate Timorese body” (Roland and Cliffe, 
2002 in Ingram, 2012; p.5), compounded with international staff’s actual 
engagement with it on the ground to run local administrative structures, initially 
allowed the CNRT “to capitalise on the extent of their own support and create the 
space to develop their own parallel structures” (Richmond and Franks, 2007b; 
p.10). From the start, therefore, UNTAET held de jure sovereignty over the territory 
of Timor Leste but the CNRT was indeed the de facto sovereign. However, as the 
CNRT split during a crucial electoral process – the first ever to be held in Timor 
Leste – failure to have engaged officially with the CNRT led to UNTAET’s inability 
to predict that most of the CNRT support base was in reality mostly made up of 
FRETILIN supporters, since it was the only party the majority of the population had 
ever heard of (Hohe, 2002; p.581). Furthermore, as Xanana Gusmao remained 
UNTAET’s primary interlocutor throughout the whole process, and since Gusmao 
continued to benefit from its charismatic leadership of the resistance struggle, the 
split within the CNRT only contributed to creating additional tensions in relation to 
authority within the territory, therefore creating the framework for a struggle over 
contested authority, and ambiguous sovereignty, that continues to characterise the 
Timorese political community today.  
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5.3.3. Legitimacy 
Strikingly, although UNTAET’s mandate revolved around transitional administration 
whilst preparing the country to administrate itself, a reading of Resolution 1272 
reveals that the Timorese – both political elite and population – were mostly absent 
from the process (Ingram, 2012; p.3). Indeed, despite provisions that stipulated the 
need to regularly “consult and cooperate with the East Timorese people” (UN 
Security Council, 1999; p.3), the rest of the Regulation clearly entrusts all the 
powers to the Transitional Administrator. This is also clearly reflected in the way in 
which the process of ‘Timorisation’ of the mission took place.  
a) Timorisation of the state building process  
From December 1999 to July 2000, UNTAET took a series of steps toward the 
Timorisation of the state building process – outlined in Table 8 below – that 
proved unsuccessful in establishing the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the 
population. Indeed, both the NCC and the NC, its replacement, merely allowed 
Timorese political elites to “participate in the decision-making process” (UNTAET 
Regulation No. 1999/2 in Ingram, 2012; p.5) or contribute to a “forum for all 
legislative matters” (UNTAET Regulation No.24/2000 in Gorjão, 2002; p.319); both 
were equally regarded by the Timorese – the political elite as much as the 
population – as not representative enough of Timorese society and affording it only 
a consultative role, rather than active participation in shaping the policies that 
would come to define the future country’s political landscape. Even the 
establishment of ETTA, which initially appeared to meet East Timorese demands – 
both political elite and population – to actively contribute to the process of building 
state institutions, was quickly criticised as it became increasingly clear that 
international staff continued to maintain, whether overtly or covertly, the essential 
decision-making power in the Cabinet. 
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Table 8 – Timorisation of state building through consultative bodies 
Date Name of the consultative body Composition 
December 1999 National Consultative Council 
(NCC) – all members to be 
appointed by the Transitional 
Administrator  
UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/2 
7 representatives of the CNRT 
3 representatives of pro-integrationist 
groups 
A representative of the catholic 
church 
3 members of UNTAET staff 
Transitional Administrator  
July 2000 National Council (NC) – all 
members to be appointed by the 
Transitional Administrator 
UNTAET Regulation No. 
24/2000 
10 representatives from civil society51 
1 representative from each of the 13 
districts 
7 CNRT representatives 
3 representatives from other political 
parties 
A representative of the catholic 
church 
July 2000 East Timor Transitional 
Administration (ETTA) – to 
replace UNTAET pillar of 
governance and to be 
administered by the Transitional 
Cabinet 
UNTAET Regulation No. 
2000/23 
Transitional Cabinet comprised eight 
portfolios, four of which assigned to 
East Timorese  
 
Source: adapted from Ingram (2012) and Gorjão (2002) 
In addition to these frustrations with the Timorisation process, the increasing 
contrast in Dili between the lifestyle upheld by international staff – who lived in the 
nicest houses, dined in the nicest restaurants, and drove around in their big cars – 
and the high unemployment still experienced by the Timorese population, 
contributed to a mounting discontent with the way in which the state building 
exercise was being carried out and impacting the population (ibid). Finally, the 
ultimate blow to UNTAET’s legitimacy in the country came as East Timorese 
discovered that the UN planned to leave the country as soon as the first elections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 One representative for each of the following groups: women, youth, Protestant churches, Muslim community, 
NGO forum, professional associations, farming community, business community, labour organisations 
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were held; in the words of Lucas da Costa – Rector of the Higher Institute for 
Economics and Management – in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, withdrawal 
of the UN upon the first country elections would leave a considerable “gap 
between UNTAET’s original mandate and the persisting debris of a nation unbuilt, 
the ruins of which the Timorese would inherit while the UN presented itself 
externally as successful” (Chopra, 2002; p.994). 
Thus, in light of the mounting discontent toward the way in which UNTAET’s state 
building operations were being carried out, pressure to speed up the process of full 
Timorisation – that is, to become fully independent – resulted in the decision by the 
NC, on 22 February 2001, to organise a Constituent Assembly, comprising 88 
members that were to be voted in on 30 August 2001 by the East Timorese, 
responsible for drafting the Timor Leste’s constitution (Gorjão, 2002; p.321). The 
way in which the Constituent Assembly was to be voted, however, would 
eventually have significant consequences on the way in which the Constitution was 
to be drafted – that is, how the different powers were to be divided.  
Indeed, for 75 of the 88 seats the system required voters to cast their ballot for a 
party, rather than a single candidate, and seats where thereafter allocated in 
proportion to each party’s share of the total vote (Ingram, 2012; p.11); as such, 
those chosen to seat in the Assembly owed their allegiance more to the party that 
placed them there than to the people, to whom they were not directly accountable. 
Furthermore, in a concession to members of the NC in favour of local 
representation, the 13 additional seats were to be filled by one representative of 
each of the 13 districts, voted on a first-past-the-post basis (ibid). This voting 
structure, however, turned out to be problematic in light of the CNRT split 
described previously; indeed, “utilising networks neglected by other CNRT parties 
[after the division], FRETILIN won the territory’s first post-occupation elections […] 
taking 57.4 per cent of the vote and 55 of the 88 seats in the constituent assembly” 
(Jones, 2010; p.560). Furthermore, by creating a coalition with a smaller party with 
similar political inclinations – the Social Democratic Timorese Association (ASDT) 
– achieved majority in the Assembly with the required 60 seats (ibid). Therefore, 
with so little significant opposition, and consequently so little incentive for 
compromise, it should have been clear that the Constitution would be drafted 
essentially with regard to FRETILIN’s interests. 
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b) Resistance heroes or armed civilians? The politicisation of the armed 
forces 
UNTAET’s failure to address power dynamics also had a significant impact on the 
security sector in Timor Leste. Much like it did with the CNRT, UNTAET and 
INTERFET did not recognise FALINTIL as an indigenous partner in the 
reconstruction of the country – in this case the security sector; rather, upon arrival 
in September 1999 FALINTIL personnel “were treated as armed civilians in need 
of being disarmed and disbanded” (Carapic and Jütersonke 2012; p.35). FALINTIL 
members initially refused demilitarisation and considered it “deeply insulting” 
(Hughes, 2009; p.114) to be regarded as a mere armed group when in fact they 
had been the core of the resistance forces fighting on the ground for the majority of 
the resistance years. This was also Xanana Gusmão’s position as he strongly 
opposed UNTAET’s decision-makers arguing that FALINTIL was not to be 
considered “a group of bandits” (ibid) and argued for the integration of ex-
FALINTIL combatants into Timor Leste’s military force – a decision that had been 
originally excluded on the ground that Timor Leste did not want any more wars, but 
was quickly put back on the negotiation table as Indonesian militias continued to 
attack the border.  
Whilst UNTAET and the Timorese political elite sought to find an agreement on 
how to best deal with FALINTIL soldiers, the soldiers themselves had been 
cantoned out of sight in Aileu (Ingram, 2012; p.7). The cantonment last eighteen 
months, during which not only did soldiers had to live in poor conditions – food was 
in short supply whilst malaria and tuberculosis pandemics started spreading in the 
camp (Hughes, 2009; p.116) – but it forced FALINTIL commanders, who had 
worked directly together during the resistance years, to live together in 
confinement. As a result, an escalating sense of grievance (Ingram, 2012; p.7) 
seeped through all levels of FALINTIL and spread across the camp, leading to 
declining discipline and increasing divisions amongst soldiers and commanders, 
mostly along political lines. Finally, under pressure from Xanana Gusmão, in June 
2000, UNTAET hired a team of consultants from King’s College in London to 
advise them on the best course of action to follow in the creation of the military 
(Carapic and Jütersonke 2012; p.35). The report produced by the team proposed 
three options to the matter at hand, and the solution eventually selected by 
UNTAET “provided for the demobilisation of more than half the FALINTIL forces 
and the retention of 650 soldiers to form Battalion 1 of the new Forças de Defesa 
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de Timor Leste (FDTL)” (Hughes, 2009; p.116) – later renamed F-FDTL, 
controversially highlighting the strong FALINTIL component of the force and 
politicising it – while a second battalion, to be recruited subsequently, would be 
open to all applicants (Ingram, 2012; p.8). 
That only 650 soldiers out of 1500 were to be chosen, was controversial enough 
for ex-resistance fighters who perceived themselves – and in fact were perceived 
by most of the population – as the heroes who had freed Timor Leste from 
Indonesia; but the way in which the selection of the 650 soldiers was undertaken 
further contributed to aggravating resentment. Indeed, FALINTIL High Command 
only agreed upon the demobilisation of the rest of the soldiers on condition that it 
be allowed – without any kind of consultation with the veterans or the wider 
community – to select the soldiers to be included in the new army (Hughes, 2009; 
p.116); consequently, Battallion 1 comprised only soldiers loyal to Xanana 
Gusmão (ibid), which incidentally were also mostly from the Eastern districts 
(Ingram, 2012; p.8). The rest of the veterans, already aggrieved by having been 
excluded from consultation and from the force, only received a sum of money to 
reintegrate into civilian life; no further action was taken by either UNTAET, 
INTERFET or even FALINTIL’s High Command to create processes through which 
these disgruntled veterans could voice their concerns, therefore leaving them 
vulnerable to recruitment from dissident groups or other politicians (Hughes, 2009; 
p.118). Which is, in fact, precisely what happened when former FALINTIL 
commander Rogerio Lobato rallied ex-FALINTIL soldiers to participate in a 
demonstration in Dili in May 2002, thus calling FRETILIN’s attention on his ability 
to be a powerful leader and successfully earning him the position of Minister of 
Interior a few days later (ibid) – where he would subsequently form the police force 
(PNTL) as a “rival power-base to the F-FDTL” (Jones, 2010; p.561).  
Consequently, by wishing to remain a-political and, therefore, refusing to deal with 
FALINTIL as a legitimate military force, UNTAET stripped FALINTIL of its identity 
as a National Liberation force enjoying popular legitimacy; instead it contributed to 
the development of an army with a more elitist orientation (Lao Hamutuk, 2005 in 
Huhges, 2009; p.117), opposed to the police force and within which the Timorese 
were no longer capable of recognising themselves. Consequently, the design of 
Timor Leste’s new state reflected much more political interests and quarrels than it 
did Timorese needs and hopes for the future. 
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5.3.4. Citizenship 
Citizenship in the context of UNTAET is treated in this section in relation to the way 
in which the decision-making processes allowed, or failed to allow, room for the 
Timorese population to build its representations of what it expected Timorese 
political community to be into the institutional framework that emerged from the 
state building process. 
a) Timor Leste’s constitution – a rushed milestone towards independence 
The drafting of the Constitution was initially scheduled by UNTAET to be done 
within 90 days, but was subsequently extended by a further three months to allow 
time for an additional round of consultation at the Constituent Assembly. With a 
total of six months – between the election of the Constituent Assembly in August 
2001 and the signing of the Constitution in March 2002 – to draft a constitution that 
would determine the way in which the country would be run, the church, minor 
political parties and Timorese civil society were particularly concerned that the final 
document would hardly reflect the needs and wishes of the Timorese people 
(Ingram, 2012; p.12). In this light, they wrote a letter to the head of UNTAET’s 
Political Affair Unit to ask that the Constitution to be adopted at the end of the six 
months be only a temporary one, a first draft to be amended later, following 
additional rounds of consultation; the request, however, remained unheard.  
Furthermore, the fact that “of the five constitutional drafts brought forward by 
political parties in the initial weeks of the Constituent Assembly, the FRETILIN draft 
prevailed as the primary text” (Garrison, 2005 in ibid; p.13) raised significant 
concerns in relation to the content of the final document. These were confirmed 
when it became evident, to all non-FRETILIN members both within the political 
elite and amongst the population, that “the Constitution that passed was based on 
it” (Ingram, 2012; p.12). 
Finally, in view of avoiding further delays to independence with additional 
elections, UNTAET had included in its Regulation 2001/254 an article stipulating 
that the Constituent Assembly “shall become the legislature of an independent 
East Timor, if so provided by the Constitution” (ibid; p.12). It should, however, have 
been obvious that, having managed to secure a majority during the Constituent 
Assembly elections, FRETILIN would have chosen to become Timor Leste’s first 
government in order to remain in power. Even more predictable should have been 
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the negative outcome of a request, by Xanana Gusmão, Bishop Belo and civil 
society organisations, to hold parliamentary elections, as it was redirected from 
UNTAET to the Constituent Assembly as “the legitimate representative body for 
the Timorese people” (ibid) – that is, mainly FRETILIN. As a result, Timor Leste’s 
first government was an essentially hardly legitimate FRETILIN government. 
b) Official and working languages  
The choice of Timor Leste’s lingua franca and working languages also reflects a 
decision-making process where the view of the Timorese political elite significantly 
prevailed over that of the population. Indeed, while the Constitution (Part I, Section 
13) recognises that “Tetum and Portuguese shall be official languages in the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor”, it also stipulates that “Indonesian and English 
shall be the working languages within civil service side-by-side with official 
languages as long as deemed necessary” (Part VII, Section 159).  
Because of the important role it played during the independence struggle, as 
mentioned in section 5.2.1, as well as its widespread use throughout the island, it 
was crucial to maintain Tetun as one of the lingua franca of the country. However, 
because it had remained an oral language throughout the centuries, the simplicity 
of its grammar and vocabulary made it inappropriate for administrative use; a 
period of transition of five to ten years was therefore allowed for the development 
of Tetun (CNRT congress, August 2000 in Ingram, 2012; p.7), during which time 
Portuguese was to be used as the other lingua franca. This choice was motivated 
by the mostly Portuguese educated Timorese political elite – such as Xanana 
Gusmão, Jose Ramos Horta and Mari Alkatiri – but failed to account for the fact 
that for the majority of the population had been educated in Bahasa by the 
Indonesians (Richmond and Frank, 2007b; p.6) and spoke little to no Portuguese. 
Finally, the use of English was introduced in the Constitution as a reference to the 
many international advisors that would be working alongside the Timorese to 
rebuild their state institutions, as well as to Australia’s significant involvement in 
state building and development aid in the country. Much like Portuguese, however, 
English was mostly spoken by the political elite. 
On the ground, however, the language choices made in the Constitutions became 
controversial; it created deep cleavages between the state and its population, as 
most people saw in those choices the desire of a small but powerful Lusophone 
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elite minority of leaders to impose Portuguese without any regard for the 
population’s familiarity with the language (Schulz and de Freitas, 2002 in 
Borgerhoff, 2006; p.113). Indeed, Bahasa and Tetun were the languages “of the 
street, the village and the marketplace” (ibid; p.114), themselves reflecting many 
language differences amongst the population, as illustrated in Table 9 below. 
Table 9 – Mapping the use of Timor Leste’s official and working languages in 
everyday life 
Use EN PT BA TE 
Everyday interactions   √ √ 
Administrative papers  √   
Parliament  √  √ 
Timorese political elite √ √ √ √ 
Elderly  (few) (few) √ 
Youth   √ √ 
Note: EN= English, PT=Portuguese, BA=Bahasa, TE=Tetun 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Consequently, the choice of an official language in Timor Leste was never going to 
be an easy matter to resolve. Caught between indigenous multilingualism – Timor 
Leste counts 32 endogenous language varieties in use (Taylor-Leech, 2008; 
p.155) –, a heavy colonial past and the necessity to use English to deal with the 
international community’s heavy presence on the ground, the question of the 
official language was always going to require decision-makers “to find a path 
through the wider political ideologies represented by three dominant exogenous 
languages” (ibid; p.174). This was a path “that no external actor could impose, 
irrespective of mandate” (Harland, 2005 in Ingram, 2012; p.7), but which outcome 
eventually created deep cleavages that continue to characterise Timorese society, 
and political community, today – as chapter six will explain. 
In relation to UNTAET, however, the decisions described above had two important 
effects. Firstly, the use of English and Portuguese that pervaded the decision-
making mechanisms of UNTAET automatically excluded the vast majority of the 
population from the processes of institutional and constitutional design. Secondly, 
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the choices made, with little to no consultation of the population, with regard to the 
national languages, have contributed to creating deep cleavages between the 
older and younger generations – as shown in Table 9 above: whilst “the old 
generation of the resistance struggle and the diaspora favoured Portuguese as the 
expression of their patrimony and symbol of the resistance; the younger 
generation, who had carried the resistance struggle forward through the 1990s, 
were educated in Bahasa Indonesia” (Ingram, 2012; p.7).  
In this sense, citizenship during the transitional administration was not developed 
neither formally – as people could not contribute to the state building process – or 
substantively – as the inability of the vast majority of the population to speak the 
two languages in which decisions were made contributed to creating different 
representations of Timorese political community between population and elite.  
5.3.5. UNTAET’s legacies for the 21st century newest nation 
The decision-making processes detailed in this section clearly highlight two 
important issues with the way in which UNTAET’s tabula rasa approach to Timor 
Leste impacted the state building process in post-independence Timor Leste.  
Firstly, caught in a dilemma characterised by its imperative to carry out a 
successful short-term mandate to govern Timor Leste and its longer-term strategic 
objective of preparing the country for democratic self-government (Beauvais, 2001 
in Gorjão, 2002; p.316), UNTAET made a number of decisions that facilitated its 
task while simultaneously severely undermining the outcomes of both objectives. 
Putting a blind faith in the united front the CNRT had demonstrated during the last 
years of the resistance, the mission overlooked the importance of analysing in 
depth the political dynamics that had developed during Timor Leste’s political 
awakening in 1975 and during the first twenty years of resistance, mistaking “the 
absence of government as a political vacuum” (Ingram, 2012; p.4). As a 
consequence, it assumed that by dealing essentially with certain political elites 
who showed leadership – in particular Xanana Gusmão – it was taking into 
account the essential needs and requests of the population at large, therefore 
enjoying automatic legitimacy to enforce top-down policies (Lemay-Hebert, 2011; 
p.199). In this context, Timorese participation in the process of state building 
remained “mainly cosmetic” (Gorjão, 2002; p.320), resulting in a process that 
significantly lacked political legitimacy in the eyes of a population sidelined from 
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the start, and left wide open the door for an institutional design that strongly 
reflected political divergences between the political elite of the country.  
Secondly, the decision-making process that accompanied the election of the 
Constituent Assembly, the drafting of the constitution and the selection of the 
official languages of the country were characterised by a significant lack of 
concern, by UNTAET, as to their effect on both formal and substantive citizenship 
during and after the transitional administration period. Dictated by the principle of 
impartiality (Suhrke, 2001; p.14) pervading UN missions, UNTAET’s decision not 
to engage in the politics of Timor Leste – and, by extension, not to delve into in 
depth historical research – had a profound effect on the drafting of the constitution; 
indeed, political rivalries amongst Timor Leste’s political elite seeped through the 
electoral process for the Constituent Assembly, resulting in a constitution drafted 
essentially following the interests of the main party, FRETILIN, and representing 
very little of the population imagination for the country’s future. As such, the 
institutional design embedded in the document as well as, incidentally, the 
language of the document itself, set up a system where “the political life of the 
population becomes cut off from the ‘state’ and a gulf is created between the new, 
technical version of state institutions and the forms and language of political 
community that make sense to people” (Brown, 2009; p.148).  
Thirdly, the choice of Portuguese and Tetun as official languages, complemented 
however by very little support for the establishment of institutions that could ensure 
the development of Tetun, laid the basis for a political community characterised by 
a strong language division: on the one hand, the decision-making process would 
essentially be carried out in Portuguese by the political elite; on the other hand, the 
inability of the population to participate in the decision-making due to their lack of 
knowledge of the political community’s language. As a result, “the continued use of 
Portuguese, Indonesian and English on the grounds that Tetun is not ready for use 
in the modern world undermines its status, impedes effective corpus planning and 
obstructs its use in education and in other high status domains such as the legal 
system” (Taylor-Leech, 2008; p.174). 
Therefore, throughout the process, UNTAET failed to take into account the extent 
to which the Timorese population consented to or even supported the framework 
rules within which political institutions are designed and function (Kaldor, 2000 in 
Lemay-Hebert, 2011; p.193); the state building process reflected little of the ideas 
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or values widely held by a population that been united by a struggle for 
independence (ibid).  
5.4. Conclusion – “East Timor is between three giants. We need to manage 
the giants”52 
Using the analytical lenses of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship 
developed in chapter two, this chapter has demonstrated how Timor Leste’s state 
building process, implemented by UNTAET during the transitional administration, 
has failed to lay the basis for the emergence of state institutions that could 
capitalise on the sense of unity pervading post-independence Timorese society 
and, consequently, build a system of governance with which the population at 
large could identify.  
Table 10 below presents an overview and comparison of the main impacts of the 
three exogenous interventions that have contributed to shaping the citizenship, 
legitimacy, sovereignty and territory throughout Timor Leste’s history. It highlights 
a crucial fact: by approaching Timor Leste’s state building exercise as though it 
was intervening in a terra nullis, UNTAET inadvertently reproduced the same 
mistakes made by the Portuguese and the Indonesians; as a result, the impact of 
those previous mistakes were carried through into the post-independence state 
building exercise, with significant consequences for the institutional design of the 
new state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Participant in the study “Language identity in East Timor – The discourses of nation building”, Taylor-Leech, 
K. (2008), p.174 
State building in Timor Leste 
182 	  
Table 10 – Comparing the three administrations 
 Portuguese  Indonesian  UNTAET 
Citizenship Division firaku/kaladi 
Division assimilado 
(taught Portuguese & 
worked with 
Portuguese)/maubere 
(no Portuguese 
education & did not work 
with Portuguese) 
=> Divide and conquer 
Widespread education in 
Bahasa 
University education in 
Indonesia 
Building infrastructure 
Importance of Tetun and 
church 
=>All used against 
Indonesian rule 
Language of UNTAET 
decision-making excluded 
population 
Language choice in 
Constitution reflect socio-
economic and generational 
differences 
Little popular consultation 
=> Institutional framework 
does not reflect popular 
aspirations 
Legitimacy Used existing 
organisation of society 
(although attempted to 
use liurai for their 
interests) 
Adapted existing 
system, maintaining 
appearance of traditional 
legitimacy through 
elections (tried to use 
chides for their interests) 
Centralised decision-making  
Institutionalised political 
differences 
Sovereignty Resistance is 
fragmented & occasional 
Portuguese authority 
imposed by violence, but 
not respected 
Resistance created 
differences amongst 
leadership 
But also created unity 
against ruler throughout 
the country 
Used CNRT local networks 
without however giving 
authority to CNRT = CNRT 
de facto sovereign, UNTAET 
de jure sovereign 
Territory Representation 
remained local in 
population’s mind 
Emergence of 
representations of Timor 
Leste territory 
Took for granted political 
and popular unity created for 
resistance  
Assumed territorial 
representation without 
understanding importance of 
local networks 
Legacy Political awakening, with 
divisions along pro-
independence, pro-
Indonesians, pro-
federation with Portugal  
Imagining of a nation 
Political divisions 
Fragmented political elite 
Institutional design 
disconnected from popular 
expectations  
Identity divisions through 
language choices 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Regarding citizenship, UNTAET’s choice, not to interfere into what were inherently 
polity defining decision-making processes, was however offset by the legacies of 
the two previous administrations’ policies. Indeed, failing to understand the 
complex language dynamics of the country, and consulting essentially with a 
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limited political elite, UNTAET facilitated the resurfacing of Portuguese language 
divisions. Compounded with Indonesia’s language policies, these divisions 
contributed to redefining Timorese political community along socio-economic and 
generational differences, thus creating new societal cleavages. 
Similarly to its predecessors, UNTAET’s administration sought to use the existing 
societal organisation mechanisms in order to facilitate the implementation of its 
mandate. Unfortunately, and similarly to what happened during Portuguese and 
Indonesian rule, the use of these networks worked against the initial objectives; in 
fact, through the use of these networks, and blind to the power dynamics that 
characterised the leadership UNTAET regularly consulted with, the state building 
process successfully institutionalised the political differences that had emerged 
after the Portuguese withdrawal and during the resistance against Indonesia. As a 
result, both legitimacy and sovereignty of UNTAET’s institutional design were 
severely questioned by the population. 
Finally, as it took for granted popular representations of sovereignty and territory, 
UNTAET’s administration underestimated the importance of local networks of 
relationships and social organisation pervasive throughout Timor Leste’s history. 
By assuming popular and political unity, and therefore taking for granted popular 
imaginings of belonging to Timor Leste’s territory, UNTAET failed to engender a 
widespread societal project that could reflect popular aspirations and trigger the 
process of nation state building. 
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CHAPTER 6 – THE IMPACT OF POST-CONFLICT STATE 
BUILDING ON STATE INSTITUTIONS 
“Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the 
quality of their education or the joy of their play.  It does not include the beauty of 
our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or 
the integrity of our public officials”. 
(Robert Kennedy, 1968) 
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6. The impact of post-conflict state building on Timor Leste’s state 
institutions 
This chapter builds on the argument developed in the previous chapter that the 
decision-making processes adopted by UNTAET, for the purpose of building Timor 
Leste’s state system, have significantly contributed to shaping the institutional 
design of the new country. It argues that not only did the state building process 
have profound consequences on the decision-making processes of the newly 
established institutions, but also that these processes themselves affect state 
policies implemented to fulfil its core functions – that is, research question number 
two.  
To this end, based on the literature review and the interviews carried out at 
national level during the fieldwork for this research, this chapter focuses 
individually on four core functions – as outlined in section 2.3.3 (Ghani, Lockhart 
and Carnahan, 2005; p.6) – that have been affected the most by the issues 
highlighted in chapter five. It begins by exploring how the decisions made during 
UNTAET’s state building have affected state’s administrative control and legitimate 
monopoly on the means of violence. Subsequently, it reviews the way in which 
Timor Leste’s first two governments – FRETILIN and the Aliança Maioria 
Parlamentar (AMP) – have managed public finances between 2002 and 2012, 
highlighting also the role of continued international assistance in the country – see 
APPENDIX VI for a list of the main multilateral and bilateral organisations active in 
the country. Finally, it investigates how a combination of institutional design and 
spending policies has been significantly affecting investments in human capital. 
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6.1. Administrative control 
Administrative control, as defined by Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005; p.7), 
refers both to the “breadth and depth of the reach of a state’s authority over its 
territory”. The ability of a state to retain control over its territory is as much 
dependent upon the development of a coherent set of rules used to define 
governance responsibilities at horizontal and vertical levels, as it is upon citizens’ 
acceptance of those rules and the way in which they are enforced (ibid). 
Consequently, a state capable of promulgating and enforcing rules that are 
understood by its citizens as serving the interests of the majority (ibid) is a state 
capable of building a relationship of trust with its citizens and fostering a sense of 
belonging amongst them; conversely, a state that is perceived as unfair and unjust 
is likely to lose control over large sections of the population. 
6.1.1. The organisation of Timor Leste’s governance structures 
This sub-section articulates the way in which UNTAET’s apolitical approach to 
institutional design has had a significant impact on the organisation of Timor 
Leste’s governance structures at both national and local level. 
a) At national level  
One of the main impacts of UNTAET’s failure to understand and address the 
power struggles within the CNRT is undoubtedly the way in which Timor Leste’s 
constitution was drafted. Left in the hands of a constituent assembly predominantly 
made up of FRETILIN members who knew that they would subsequently become 
Timor Leste’s first government, it was clear from the start that the decisions made 
in the process of drafting the document would have reflected FRETILIN’s power 
ambitions. Predominantly based on the Portuguese Constitution, as a result of the 
largely Portuguese educated FRETILIN elite, the new Constitution of Timor Leste 
established a semi-Presidential system composed of (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; 
p.14): a President, to be elected by national vote; a National Parliament, to be 
elected by legislative elections based on party-list; and, a Prime Minister, to be 
designated by the National Parliament and subsequently appointed and sworn in 
by the President – as illustrated in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9 – Distribution of powers within Timor Leste’s Constitution 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Since FRETILIN was to become the first National Parliament, it was obvious that 
the first Prime Minister to be appointed would be FRETILIN’s Secretary General 
Mari Alkatiri. On the other hand, Xanana Gusmão, whose charismatic leadership 
during the resistance years and after independence made him “the ordained leader 
of the nation” (Ingram, 2012; p.13) in the eyes of the population, was sure to be 
elected Timor Leste’s first President. Thus, cognisant of the differences that would 
oppose the two leaders of the nation, the distribution of government powers in the 
Constitution reflects very clearly FRETILIN’s will to make most of the decisions 
without too much interference from Xanana Gusmão: the semi-presidential system 
concentrates legislative and executive powers in the Prime Minister’s office (ibid), 
granting the President a veto power (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; p.14).  
The implications of this distribution of powers are clear: whilst it aims at rendering 
the President “effectively totally subordinate to the Prime Minister” (International 
Commission of Jurists, 2002 in Ingram, 2012; p.14), the ability of the President to 
veto the legislative decisions made by the Prime Minister has paved the way for a 
power struggle between the two positions (Richmond and Franks, 2007b; p.10), 
which has often resulted in cumbersome and protracted decision-making 
procedures stalled by disagreements between leaders, with significant implications 
for the sovereignty and legitimacy of the government.  
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b) At local level 
From its arrival in 1999, through to independence in 2002, the UN approached 
Timor Leste as a tabula rasa or terra nullius, considering that “one of the 
consequences of the violence [of 1999] was that practically overnight [Timor Leste 
was] stripped of its entire administrative and executive super-structures” 
(Strohmeyer, 2001 in Lemay-Hebert, 2011; p.195). This approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction in Timor Leste reveals two important facts about the way in which 
the UN carried out state building in the country. First, by assuming that the extent 
of the destruction on the ground – e.g. infrastructure – was a reflection of a 
complete disintegration of the social and political tissues of Timorese society, the 
UN justified its intervention as a transitional administration with the goal of 
rebuilding a Timorese state following liberal peace democratic standards and 
checklists – e.g. political parties, multiparty elections, market economy. Secondly, 
this assumption is firmly grounded in UN’s state centric approach to state building, 
which essentially focuses on the importance of rebuilding state institutions to the 
detriment of any pre-existing local institutions, social organisation or networks on 
which the population was used to rely. Therefore, this approach “altogether missed 
the fact that the population continues to exist […] and that the social structures of 
indigenous communities invariably generate sources of political legitimacy 
according to their own paradigms” (Chopra, 2002; p.980).  
As a result, the systems of governance emerging from the state building process 
reflect a profound paradox. Basing itself on the evolution of the structure of local 
governance during Portuguese and Indonesian times, UNTAET recreated a 
system that reflected the different layers of administration – that is, district, sub-
district, suku and aldeia – with their respective administrative positions – district 
and sub-district administrators, xefi suku and xefi aldeia. However, in the process 
of establishing this organisational framework, UNTAET failed to carefully analyse 
both the meaning of these structures for the colonisers – that is, how they related 
to central power – and their relation with Timorese customary social organisation – 
that is, how the leaders come to acquire their position and what these positions 
mean for the Timorese. As a result, “the superficial uniformity of suku structures, 
by which the state seeks to render national socio-political order ‘legible’ from the 
centre, covers an extraordinary variety of accommodations and experiences” 
(Brown, 2012; p.57). 
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The organisation of local leadership is set out in the law on “Community 
leaderships and their election” (Law 3/2009 of 8 July 2009) and clearly stipulates 
the rights and duties of the local leaders as well as their elections. As such, 
community leadership comprises: 
 A Xefi Suku who is elected by the population residing in the suku on the basis of 
his leadership skills and his list for the Suku Council; and, 
 A Suku Council, comprising two women, two youth leaders – one man and one 
woman – one elder, the lian nain and the Xefi Aldeia. 
The role of the Xefi Suku is primarily that of implementing the decisions made by 
the government as well as any decision regarding the suku more specifically made 
by the Suku Council; its role also includes providing support to any initiatives 
undertaken in the suku as well as promoting peace – the latter two being often 
linked. The Suku Council has an advisory role only, with the aim of supporting the 
Xefi Suku in his/her activities in particular in relation to health, education, 
environment, employment and food safety. Finally, the Xefi Aldeia, is responsible 
for representing the interests and needs of his/her own aldeia within the suku – 
both on an ad hoc basis and on the basis of regular aldeia meetings with the 
population – as well as facilitating conflict resolution – including domestic violence, 
family feuds, minor disputes. Figure 10 below provides an overview of the 
functioning of local governance institutions. 
Figure 10 – Organisation of local governance 	  
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
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A closer reading of the law on “Community leaderships and their election” and the 
Constitution of Timor Leste, reveals, however, that there is no formal link between 
the local government and the national government. Rather, the functioning of the 
government appears to be top-down, whereby Xefi Sukus are responsible for 
implementing government decisions at the suku level, but there is no formal 
channel for citizens to voice their concerns to any layer of the government higher 
than the suku. Similarly, in order to maintain the structure of Districts and Sub-
districts that had been established during Portuguese and Indonesian times, the 
state building project of Timor Leste included a District Administrator and a Sub-
District administrator; however, their role appears to remain, much like the Xefi 
Suku’s, that of administering funds distributed by the national government and 
implementing government policies, whilst there is no structure or place for citizens 
to dialogue in the government framework53. A simplified illustration, in Figure 11 
below, of the government structure – that is, not including all the sub-levels of 
national government such as ministries and secretaries of state – clearly shows 
the disconnection between the local level and the national level. 
Figure 11 – Overview of government structure with all the administrative layers 
 
Source: elaborated by the author 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The role of the District and Sub-District administrators is not clearly defined by law. It is worth noting that interviewee 
34 indicated they play an important role in the districts as a link between the xefis and the national administration; in Dili, 
however, they appear to have very little power.  
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The current set-up therefore fails to fully engage citizens not only in voicing their 
concerns about their own aldeia’s needs, but also in participating and engaging in 
discussions regarding the future of their country, as pointed out by interviewee 
number 43: “we are never asked our opinion, we are only told what decisions have 
been made, and we don’t know how to share our problems with the government”. 
In a country where centuries of colonial rule and decades of violent military 
occupation have shaped a culture with very little space for discussion and dissent, 
these national interventions at local level cannot take for granted the existence of a 
dialogue between the two parties; rather, “the potential for effective exchange […] 
has to be made” (Brown, 2012; p.59), putting the onus – at least at the start – 
essentially on government officials to set up communication models that provide 
such room for public debate.  
Furthermore, this system also reflects UNTAET’s inability to fully grasp the 
importance of the village level – that is, aldeia – in Timorese culture and history. 
Indeed, throughout the history of Timor Leste the village has been a “point of 
systemic articulation between locally established governance practices and 
successive waves of occupation by, or interpenetration with, powerful other forces 
– a key site of resistance, accommodation and re-interpretation” (ibid; p.61) that 
has permitted the Timorese population to continue functioning under Portuguese 
colonial rule and to fight against Indonesian military occupation.  
The result of this failure to fully engage the village level has been that the 
population, instead of attempting to engage with institutions that they do not fully 
understand and that are far removed from their everyday life, has created a hybrid 
situation whereby local leaders work with both formal and customary forms of 
governance in order to respond to the needs of their population as efficiently as 
possible. “In this context, the balance found in meeting the requirements of state-
based and customary governance is created through local leaders’ interactions 
with their community and with each other” (Cummins, 2013; p.143), thus engaging 
into a form of local polity characteristically disengaged from the political 
community. 
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6.1.2. FRETILIN and the Crisis of 2006 
Since its independence in 2002, Timor Leste has seen a number of episodes of 
violence that have given cause for concerns in relation to the state’s administrative 
control over its population. The violence that erupted in 2006 following a petition 
filed by 159 members of the F-FDTL (ICG, 2006 in Hicks, 2009; p.85), which 
resulted in a communal conflict that nearly brought the country to a halt, is often 
analysed in hindsight as the inevitable conclusion of a long period of discontent 
amongst Timor Leste’s population. Indeed, prior to those events – hereafter 
referred to as the ‘2006 crisis’ – Dili had already been the stage for the expression 
of such discontent: December 2002, a riot broke out in Dili in response to the killing 
of two students who had been demonstrating against the government (World Bank, 
2011; p.13); in April/May 2005, Catholic Church leaders organised a three weeks-
long demonstration to protest against the government’s decision to make religious 
education optional (dos Santos Monteiro, 2010; p.40). Although neither of these 
events escalated into violence to the extent that the Crisis of 2006 did – 
approximately 150,000 people were forcibly displaced from their homes (IOM, 
2012; p.16) – national and international experts recognise that most donor partners 
failed to read into them the signs of an “evolving political situation, the divisiveness 
within society, and the latent discontent and disaffection among sections of the 
population (including youth)” (World Bank, 2010; p.13). 
One of the main faults in the FRETILIN government’s administrative control came 
as a result of the mishandled demilitarisation of ex-FALINTIL fighters during 
UNTAET’s transition period. Indeed, as detailed in section 5.3.3, only 650 ex-
FALINTIL fighters – out of over 1500 – were selected by Xanana Gusmão to be 
part of F-FDTL’s first battalion, most of them from the Eastern part of the country 
with well-known allegiance to him; soldiers in other battalions, on the other hand, 
were recruited through a process open to all applicants, more mixed in terms of 
districts of origin (Ingram, 2012; p.7) and many of them aggravated by their 
exclusion from Batallion 154. By contrast, the recruitment of PNTL personnel, 
carried out by disgruntled ex-FALINTIL fighter Rogerio Lobato, included between 
350 and 400 officers from the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) as well as 
FALINTIL veterans who had been excluded from the F-FDTL selection process 
(Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.34), resulting in a police force coming mainly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 According to a UNMISET issue paper quoted in ICG (2006; p.6), Easterners in the F-FDTL represented 56% 
of the force but, perhaps most importantly, 85% of the officers  
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from Western districts and historically as well as politically prone to be pitted 
against the military. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a demonstration held on 
24 April 2006, outside the Parliament, by a group of soldiers dismissed from F-
FDTL for desertion – after having complained of living conditions in their camp – 
quickly escalated, within the space of a month, into a confrontation between the F-
FDTL and PNTL – as illustrated in APPENDIX VII. Much more surprising was the 
way in which the government proved unable – in fact, even unwilling – to regain 
control of the situation and restrain the violence, allowing riots to unfold into a full-
blown crisis shaped along alleged ethnic identities. 
In this context, the “ethnic-territorial dimensions of the Lorosae [easterner] and 
Loromonu55 [westerner] division in the military” (Grenfell, 2008; p.181) were quickly 
re-appropriated and adapted by the wide variety of social and political groupings 
that soon joined into the widespread violence that was to last – albeit intermittently 
– until December 2007; this led many international observers to mistakenly 
conclude that the crisis was of ethnic character and was threatening to turn Timor 
Leste’s success story in that of a failed state. The reality on the ground, later 
studies and researches would demonstrate (Scambary, 2009; Carapic and 
Jütersonke, 2012), was much more complex and depicted not a failing state, but 
rather a government which administrative control was pervaded by historical power 
struggles that found their expression in the instrumentalisation of ethnicity “at 
different times and in different forms” (Scambary, 2009; p.266). To be sure, the 
division between lorosae and loromonu, originally used by the Portuguese to 
distinguish between ‘law-abiding’ and more rebellious Timorese – respectively 
kaladi/Westerners and firaku/Easterners –, has become integral part of the variety 
of ways in which Timorese may refer to their origins, as indicated by respected 
Timorese consultant Alex Tilman (in Hicks, 2009; p.84); but until 2006 it was never 
used as a divisive feature within the Timorese population – nor has it been used 
since – for it merely refers to a geographical indication – as illustrated in Map 5 
below – and does not reflect any inherently ethnic differences, such as language – 
as illustrated in Map 4 below. The reality, therefore, is that the two opposing 
powers within the government – President Gusmão and Prime Minister Alkatiri – 
used this rhetoric to foster allegiances creating “a conflict triggered from within the 
state, fuelled by rivalries about how and by whom the country was run” (Grenfell, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Lorosae is the tetum word for ‘easterner’ and literally means ‘rising sun’ (loro=sun; sae=rise); Loromonu is the 
word for ‘westerner’ and literally means ‘sunset’ (loro=sun; monu=to fall) 
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2008; p.85). Consequently, whilst “changing the territorial domain of Timor Leste 
never surfaced as a question through the crisis” (ibid), the government failed to 
maintain administrative control over it.  
Map 4 – Principal ethno-linguistic groups on the island of Timor 
 
Source: Hicks, 2009; p.83 
Map 5 – Generally understood distinction between eastern and western districts 
 
Source: Hicks, 2009; p.83 
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At the level of the population, the wildfire-like propagation of the 2006 crisis, to a 
wide variety of social and political groups acting along dividing ethnic lines, 
revealed much deeper issues relating to a “weak and fractured sense of national 
unity” (Leach, 2008 in Scambary, 2009; p.266). Ethnicity, Eriksen (1993 in ibid) 
argues, “is not an absolute category, it is constructed and relational, […] contingent 
on the situation” much like the concept of national unity, thus the ease with which 
ethnic rhetoric was used to fracture unity in Timor Leste in the Crisis can be read 
as a reaction by Timorese citizens to the structures that framed the country’s first 
steps into independence. Indeed, Scambary’s (2009) analysis of the evolution of 
the crisis throughout 2006/2007 shows the fluidity of a wide variety of groups in 
assembling and disassembling, forming different allegiances at different times, 
seemingly following different claims. As such, whilst institutional issues within the 
security sector sparked the first phase of the crisis, the collapse of the police force 
following the events of April/May marked a second phase whereby a general 
sense of lawlessness allowed ample room for the involvement of political groups, 
veterans groups, martial arts groups, small street corner gangs and youth groups 
(Scambary, 2009; p.267) each holding different claims, ranging from their role in 
the resistance – e.g. veterans, youth – to socio economic problems – e.g. youth 
with high level of unemployment – to land property issues – as a result of the 
superimposition of Portuguese and Indonesian land titles. Many of these claims 
continued to be made following the lorosae/loromonu divide. A respite in the 
violence came as Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri stepped down from his position in 
June 2006 to be replaced by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Ramos Horta for 
an interim period, and as the Presidential Office initiated dialogue between 
antagonistic groups. The dialogue, however, quickly turned into an effort from 
President Gusmão to reinforce or build new allegiances by offering construction 
and catering contracts to the leaders of some of those groups (ibid; p.278), a tactic 
which soon reignited the violence, leading it into a third phase that ostensibly 
rejected national authority by resorting to practical kinship alliances that reflected 
“the most basic unit of East Timorese society: genealogically related, village-based 
family units” (ibid; p.283). 
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6.2. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence 
The legitimate monopoly on the means of violence relates to “the legitimacy of the 
state’s monopoly on violence as perceived by the citizens of the state” (Ghani, 
Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.6). That is, a state that retains legitimate control 
on the means of violence maintains social order and social control by building 
trust, between its citizens and the institutions responsible for their security, through 
the implementation of visible and transparent checks and balances (ibid) on those 
institutions. Conversely, a state that develops a security apparatus perceived as 
unfair by a large section of the population – as a result of corruption and/or heavily 
repressive measures – can leave room for other informal security providers to step 
in, thus leading to a whole new set of security issues at all levels – national, 
regional, urban and local. 
6.2.1. Overlapping and contradictory mandates between PNTL and F-FDTL 
The issues undermining the legitimacy of the police – PNTL – and military – F-
FDTL – forces in Timor Leste are not only political. They also fall within the realm 
of policy design and implementation in relation to the mandate and authority of 
these forces as outlined in the Constitution: the police is “essentially responsible 
for internal security” (Wilson, 2008) whilst the military is in charge “for external 
security” (ibid). The competencies of each force are further detailed in, 
respectively, Decree Law 8/2004 – repealed by Decree Law 9/2009 following the 
events of 2006 – and 15/2006. However, the events of the crisis of 2006 revealed 
a deep flaw in the definition of the competencies and responsibilities between the 
two forces, in particular with regard to their cooperation in a time of crisis - that is, 
“state of siege and state of emergency”56 (Section 25 of the Constitution of the 
RDTL).  
Indeed, while F-FDTL forces are mandated to be involved in all matters relating to 
the protection of Timor Leste’s borders, and PNTL’s guiding principle is community 
policing – “where proximity patrolling is given preference” (Decree Law 9/2009) –, 
the definition of their interaction in a time of crisis was, as of 2006, still rather 
vague. On the one hand, Decree Law 15/2006 (Art.2(4))stipulates that “the use of 
F-FDTL in situations of State of Siege or State of Emergency shall be regulated by 
a specific nature”, without however specifying what that nature might be or how it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Section 25(2) of the Constitution: “A state of siege or a state of emergency shall only be declared in case of 
effective or impending aggression by a foreign force, of serious disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to 
the democratic constitutional order, or of public disaster” 
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ought to involve the PNTL; on the other hand, Decree Law 8/2004 (Art.2(1)) only 
goes so far as to provide that in the event of a State of Siege or Emergency, the 
competencies of the PNTL “are those that arise from legislation on national 
defence”, that is to say the same that regiment the F-FDTL. Interestingly, the 
Constitution itself remains vague on how the State of Siege or Emergency is to be 
dealt with and by whom, as it merely indicates that, “authorities shall restore 
constitutional normality as soon as possible” (Section 25(6) of the Constitution of 
the RDTL) – without any further specification as to what is meant by ‘authorities’. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the view of the crisis of 2006, whilst the 
PNTL is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and therefore the Prime Minister, 
the President is “the Supreme Commander of F-FDTL by right of office” (Art.5 of 
Decree Law 15-2006); thus, at a time of crisis where the offices of the President 
and that of the Prime Minister were interlocked in a battle of power, these 
distinctions paved the way for the crisis that unfolded.  
In the aftermath of the crisis of 2006, cognisant of the uncertainties highlighted 
above and worried that new power battles may lead to other episodes of violence, 
international and national leaders alike put particular emphasis on the clarification 
and strengthening of the relationship between the two forces. As such, the “Joint 
Command” was created in order to facilitate the execution of security operations 
conducted jointly by the PNTL and the F-FDTL during a State of Siege or 
Emergency (Wilson, 2008), providing at least “the appearance of a ‘unified front’ to 
the population in times of crisis” (Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.44) although not 
dealing directly with the more profound cleavages between the two forces. 
Furthermore, the new Decree Law 9/2009 removed the PNTL from the 
subordination to the Ministry of Interior, and put it under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Defence and Security, equally responsible for the F-FDTL. 
Despite these efforts, however, the involvement of the two security forces – not 
just as security forces but as catalysts – in the events that led to the crisis of 2006 
produced profound doubts amongst citizens as to the trust that could be put in 
those institutions. The fact that “individuals and groups coming from the same 
district […] organised and sought to protect themselves during the breakdown of 
social order that characterised the Crisis” (ibid; p.43) by resorting to more local 
security providers – at times identified also as violence experts – is revealing not 
only of a crisis of legitimacy for the security forces, but also of a fragmentation of 
the sense of national unity. The following points will highlight how the development 
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of the PNTL and the oversight of informal security groups by international and 
national leaders during the reconfiguration of the security sector have contributed 
to this fragmentation. 
6.2.2. The PNTL and customary forms of dispute resolution 
As already seen in section 5.3.3, the international community has heavily 
influenced the establishment of the security forces – both F-FDTL and PNTL – in 
Timor Leste; but to a large extent it also had a significant impact, post UNTAET, on 
the policy developments in relation to the functioning of the PNTL. This had a 
significant impact on the way in which citizens engage with their security forces. 
a) Varied approaches to PNTL training  
From its establishment in August 2001 through UNTAET Regulation 2001/22, the 
PNTL has worked alongside, and been trained, by a wide variety of international 
actors with diverging approaches to the principle of community policing – PNTL’s 
guiding principle as indicated in the previous sub-section. International influences 
included (Wassel, 2014; p.5):  
 UN civilian police forces deployed after independence (CIVPOL) and after the 
crisis of 2006 to provide support in maintaining order (UNPOL);  
 Japanese development agency (JICA) in 2001 to establish a Koban system – 
Asian-type community policing through the deployment of community based 
police officers;  
 Australian-led Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP) in 2004;  
 UNMIT in 2006 to establish International Community Police officers in all 
districts;  
 New Zealand police in reinforcing community policing practices; and,  
 UNMIT again in the development of the Decree Law 15/2009 where community 
policing has become fully integrated in the legislation. 
As a consequence of these disparate and varied approaches to engaging with, and 
training, the PNTL, it has become “a service whose units engage with the 
community in different ways” (ibid; p.9). The absence of a national level 
coordination of the units, complemented by a lack of nationwide agreement on the 
The Impact of State Building on State Institutions 
199 	  
nature of the relationship between PNTL community units and local leaders as well 
as the population, often results in very different perceptions of the police force from 
one community to the next – for instance, while in some areas PNTL units engage 
actively and build relationships with the community, in others people have reported 
having problems with the police in relation to corruption, violence and intimidation 
(ibid). Thus, a survey of community police perception carried out by The Asia 
Foundation (TAF) in 2008 found that although the population in 2008 generally felt 
that the performance of the PNTL had improved since the Crisis, people are 
nevertheless “four times more likely to identify community leaders, rather than the 
PNTL, as the individual/institution which has primary responsibility for maintaining 
security in their locality” (Chinn and Everett, 2008; p.8).  
b) PNTL and local security and conflict resolution mechanisms 
As highlighted repeatedly across this chapter, “local communities’ ongoing efforts, 
under diverse and difficult circumstances, to shape their governance in ways that 
work for them – while certainly not always successful – underscore East Timorese 
as generators of political community rather than passive recipients of the state 
building project” (Brown, 2012; p.57). As a result, whilst Timorese society appears 
to have fully, and relatively peacefully, embraced the institutionalisation of 
democratic governance, a closer look at governance at the local level reveals that 
the norms, values and leadership that constitute the framework within which 
people interact is a complex combination of customary and state-based 
governance complemented by a wide variety of relationships that have evolved 
through time, and within social groups, to respond to community needs (Cummins, 
2012; p.111). Operating across three layers, local security in Timor Leste is no 
exception. 
The first layer relates to the customary practice of dealing with conflict resolution in 
Timor Leste, known as lisan – system of law and rituals. The lisan refers to “social 
structures that guide relationships between members of a community and between 
the natural, social and ancestral worlds” (Tilman, 2012; p.192); it has traditionally 
ruled the social, political and economic life of the suku in Timor Leste and authority 
within a suku to maintain peace and stability as well as taking an informal role 
resolving problems or conflicts rests within the elder leader, the lia-nain – literally 
translated ‘owner of the words’ (ibid; p.193). As seen in section 5.3.4, the structure 
of the Suku Council was organised so as to maintain the presence of the lia-nain 
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as well as the xefi suku within local governance structures in order to bridge state 
structures and customary systems (Wassel, 2014; p.10); however, in view of the 
institutional challenges facing the PNTL to organise a cohesive and coherent 
community policing policy, as well as the limited resources available to the police57 
that have “prevented the police from developing a more clearly defined and 
understood role in society”(ibid; p.12), the lia-nain and other community leaders 
remain a crucial first point of reference for maintaining social order within 
communities58. As a result, whilst the PNTL may become increasingly involved in 
the resolution of conflict within communities, it is usually in guise of support to 
traditional conflict resolution ceremonies rather than to play an active role. Finally, 
the important role of the community leaders also plays a significant role in 
determining the quality of the relationship between the police and the community 
itself, depending on whether they wish to cooperate with PNTL units or not – and 
depending also on the will of the PNTL unit itself. 
The second layer relates to the importance of relationships amongst social groups 
in ensuring security within their area. In a survey carried out by TAF in 2013, a 
telling 51% of the respondents indicated that they consider citizens to have primary 
responsibility for security in their area compared to 19% indicating this 
responsibility to lie within the PNTL (Wassel and Rajalingam, 2014 in ibid; p.9). 
This corresponds to the security advice the author was given when moving to the 
country: it is crucial to build very good relationships with all the members of the 
local area in order to ensure not only peaceful cohabitation with them – and avoid 
potential issues relating to social jealousy or resentment toward the malae – but 
also become part of a powerful mechanism of neighbourhood watch. Indeed, 
whether within urban or rural environments, streets and roads in Timor Leste are 
constantly filled with life as children play in gardens and on the streets, youth ‘hang 
out’ on front porches and women sit on porches and in public spaces to play bingo; 
therefore ensuring a good relationship with everyone is one of the best guarantees 
that one’s home will be under constant surveillance. Similarly, even “the ubiquitous 
kiosk [is] at one level answering to a security dimension of daily life with [its] close 
proximity to homes” (Grenfell and Winch, 2013; p.142), and maintaining good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “The vast majority of police (91%) say the resources allocated to them to help ensure security in the area in 
which they work are inadequate in a wide-range of areas, including staff levels, communications equipment, 
vehicles, and weapons, among others” (Chinn and Everett, 2008; p.8) 
58 Participants for this research have all indicated that if there is a problem in their community they first refer to 
their xefi aldeia, xefi suku or lia-nain, depending on the nature of the problem and how successful the closer 
layers of authority have been. The police has usually been referred to as a last resort. 
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relations with the owner of the kiosk – through, for instance, regularly buying small 
groceries from them – is crucial to security in the neighbourhood.  
Finally, in addition to neighbourhood relations, informal security groups constitute 
the third layer of security provision in Timor Leste. Although often reductively 
portrayed as “products of poverty, social disintegration, or a weak state” 
(Scambary, 2012; p.198), informal security groups have actually been part of 
Timorese society long before independence in 1999 and include “rural-based 
millenarian groups; protest movements and veterans groups; mass-scale, national 
martial art groups; political-front groups; and street corner gangs” (ibid; p.197). 
Each of these groups has the particularity of having emerged at different times 
throughout Timor Leste’s history59 in response to specific policies or social needs; 
similarly, many of them have, through time, evolved and changed to become 
protest vehicles or political parties “as the only way to influence a centralised 
development and political process [most people] feel they have little participation in 
or control over” (ibid; p.214). At community level, they play a key role not only as 
social movements to voice demands, but also as security providers where the 
communities do not trust authorities or where the police are simply absent.   
6.3. Sound management of public finance 
According to Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005; p.7), the sound management 
of public finances refers to the state’s ability to find a careful balance between 
generating its own revenue, as opposed to depending on international aid, and 
developing an economy that generates growth as well as wealth and ensures the 
distribution of resources. Therefore, a state proficiently manages its public finances 
when it is capable of generating revenue from tax collection and, if relevant, the 
extractive industry, whilst simultaneously demonstrating its ability to spend this 
revenue in a transparent manner on development priorities aimed at increasing 
citizen’s access to opportunities. Conversely, “no state can be sovereign while it 
relies on an external source to fund its ongoing operations” (ibid), nor can it be 
legitimate if its revenue is not duly and transparently accounted for in its public 
budgets and/or if it is being spent on matters that are not considered national 
priorities by its political community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 E.g. originally martial art groups are the product of a social control tool by the Indonesians, whereas veterans 
groups emerged in response to the unfair treatment many feel they have received in return for their 
involvement, and losses, during the resistance years. 
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The following points analyse the drafting of the National Development Plan (NDP) 
during the UNTAET period as well as the main spending policies upheld by Timor 
Leste’s first two governments (FRETILIN and the ANP). The discussion that 
follows is by no means a comprehensive assessment of the policies developed by 
these two governments; rather, it merely aims at understanding the general line of 
thinking that characterised their decision-making procedures. 
6.3.1. Timor Leste’s National Development Plan – setting priorities for the 
country’s future 
Much of the literature on Timor Leste’s state building process (Barbara, 2008; 
Hughes, 2009; Jones, 2012, 2010 and 2013; Moxham, 2008) argues that the 
economic system that was set up followed closely the neoliberal inclinations of the 
international organisations that provided their funding and inputs to the process. 
Indeed, as of 2007, that is to say prior to the establishment of Timor Leste’s oil 
fund, the government remained quite dependent on international aid: 
approximately 82% of external financial assistance was bilateral; on the other 
hand, multilateral assistance represented 16% of the international assistance 
received by Timor Leste, not directly channelled to the government but instead 
delivered through three Multi-Donor Trust Fund modalities60 under the trusteeship 
of the World Bank (Myrttinen, 2009; p.238). Therefore, the National Development 
Plan (NDP), adopted in 2002, was drafted during a period where Timor Leste “did 
not quite have its full sovereign voice” (Anderson, 2012; p.223).  
Aimed at “at formulating a twenty-year vision, identifying key development 
challenges, and evolving strategies and programs of action for the next five years 
(2002 – 2007) to take the nation forward economically, socially, and politically” 
(NDP, 2002; p.14), some of its priorities do reflect to some extent the wide-ranging 
consultation that involved “representatives of the Church and members of Civil 
Society, national and international NGOs, the private sector and public interests 
groups” (NDP, 2002; p.XVII). This is particularly evident in its emphasis on 
education and health in order to facilitate “access to economic and social goods 
and services as well as to remunerative jobs, in participation in social and political 
processes, and in other life choices” (ibid; p.32). Similarly, its focus on the 
importance of the agriculture, fisheries and forestry in the first years of the country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 TFET- Trust Fund for East Timor; TSP-Transitional Support Programme; and CSP- Consolidated Support 
Programme 
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reflects the reality of Timor Leste’s economic sector in 2002, where 76% of the 
population lived in rural areas and the majority of households were engaged in 
subsistence agriculture (UNDP, 2002; p.15). The role of the state, in this context, 
was to remain a key feature of the management of public finances for 
development. 
However, the strong economic liberal component focused on a market-led 
economy, in relation to investments in infrastructure and human development, 
reveals the strong influence of World Bank in the management of public finance in 
Timor Leste since 199961 (Anderson, 2012; p.223). This is particularly evident in 
the consistent reference, throughout the whole document, to the role of the 
government in assisting the development of a market-based economy (NDP, 2002; 
p.43) through in particular: transforming subsistence production into a market-
based economy; emphasising the importance of the private sector in “the 
development effort” (ibid; p.5) and the role of the Government in “creating an 
enabling environment […] for the private sector to gain confidence and strength, 
and to become the engine of economic growth” (ibid; p.28); and, in order to 
achieve the latter, stress the need – especially in the early years – to have “an 
open approach to foreign investment and foreign trade that will help build [Timor 
Leste]’s international competitiveness” (ibid; p.11). 
The following sections will analyse how these international influences impacted the 
management of public finance for Timor Leste’s first two governments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Through the management of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (World Bank 2010; p.102) 
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6.3.2. The FRETILIN government – caught between a rock and a hard place 
The description of FRETILIN’s development policies detailed below begins by 
highlighting the government’s desire to achieve the priorities set out in the NDP. It 
then moves on, however, to reveal how budgetary concerns led to a significant 
change in decision-making priorities that eventually strayed from the NDP. 
a) Making good on NDP promises – the rock 
Mari Alkatiri’s policy for Timor Leste’s first government was firmly grounded in the 
conviction that the country should avoid the loans and debt that were being 
advocated by organisations such as the WB and the IMF at all costs – even for the 
Timorese population. In his view, not only would debts have contributed to adding 
another burden on a new country with so many other issues to struggle with, but 
also the conditionality that would inevitably be tied to those loans would eventually 
become an obstacle to the government’s independence and sovereignty. Instead, 
while the government aimed to develop a market economy, it sought to do so by 
maintaining a strong role in regulating the market and planning resource 
allocations – including creating “the networks and mean by which to guarantee 
social security during the most difficult times” (Alkatiri, 2006 in Anderson, 2012; 
p.225).  
The first step toward these ambitious goals was to develop, against WB and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) advice62, a food security policy quite separate from the 
market economy and which focused on rehabilitating irrigated rice fields and 
supporting small-scale farming63. In a country where the vast majority of the 
population’s livelihood revolves around farming, this policy went a long way in 
securing the population’s support. Furthermore, the government remained 
particularly conscious of avoiding private takeovers of key services such as water 
and electricity. Finally, the establishment of Sector Investment Programmes 
(SIPs), elaborated by each ministry, in consultation with the population, to identify 
the key areas in which to channel donor money (Hughes, 2009; p.151), 
represented the government’s commitment in practice to include the population in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Who had already rejected such proposal, put forward by UNTAET and Timorese leaders, on the basis that it 
would involve state ownership of revenue generating enterprises and would, therefore, inhibit private 
entrepreneurship (Hughes, 2009; p.225). 
63 This included “land use policy, support for community organisations and cooperatives, and roads to [facilitate 
mobility for isolated villages]” (Anderson, 2012; p.226) as well as early warning systems that required strong 
involvement from the villages in the management of grain storage (ibid). 
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the process of reconstructing the country; “unsurprisingly, the public was most 
interested in education, health and agriculture” (ibid; p.152). 
In the first two years, the state managed to show some progress on agriculture, 
education and health, thus initially making good on NDP promises. In relation to 
agriculture, rice production – mostly irrigated fields – had increased strongly from 
36,000 in 1998-99 – a very low level – to 65,000 in 2004 (UNDP, 2006 in 
Anderson, 2012; p.226). In schools, enrolment rates increased from 59% in 1999 
to 66% in 2004 (ibid; p.228) and a school-feeding programme was implemented to 
encourage school attendance and combat malnutrition (MAAF, 2005 in ibid). In 
relation to health, children mortality rate – under-five years-old – fell from 159 to 
136 death for thousands between 1999 and 2004 (UNDP, 2006 in ibid; p.228), 
while a health-cooperation programme to send young doctors to train in Cuba with 
scholarships had successfully awarded 900 scholarships by 2008 and by 2006 the 
first 300 – approximately – Cuban-trained health doctors were back to practice in 
Timor Leste (Anderson, 2012; p.228).  
However, whilst laudable at first, the government’s determination to remain 
independent of external policy influence proved unsustainable and subsequently 
came at a very high price for the Timorese population. Indeed, unable yet to 
access the revenue from Timor Leste’s oil and gas resources – as will be 
discussed in the next sub-section – the FRETILIN government found itself with 
very few financial resources, forcing it into a combination of tight fiscal policy and 
strong dependence on Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). In practice, the fiscal 
policy translated into the implementation of drastic austerity measures that 
severely hampered the development of infrastructure and services so crucial not 
only for the improvement of Timorese wellbeing, but also to attract FDIs.  
Thus, in order to gather revenue, Mari Alkatiri adopted a series of policies with a 
strong focus on maximising revenue through the collection of user fees for the 
services provided by the government, such as electricity, and on imposing fees 
and taxes on foreign investors and agencies (ibid; p.145). Whilst the former was 
poorly received by a Timorese population already struggling to make ends meet, 
the latter was the source of equally significant discontent amidst foreign investors. 
Furthermore, cognisant of the imperative to avoid corruptions scandals – for the 
benefit of its legitimacy internally but also, perhaps most importantly, abroad in 
order to attract FDIs – the governance and spending style of the government 
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became extremely centralised and bureaucratised, carried out by “very 
inexperienced staff members” (ibid; p.149). This resulted in prolonged and 
convoluted administrative procedures that led to Timor Leste ranking second from 
the bottom in the WB’s perception-based “Doing Business” survey (ibid), thus 
failing to attract the investments it badly needed in order to keep its economy 
growing. 
Consequently, as the funds available to the government remained limited due to 
national and international constraints, education and agriculture budgets became 
increasingly limited, falling short of initial targets: in the 2004-5 budget, from the 
11% that had been promised through SIPs for agriculture, only 8% spent; whereas 
from the 35% the government had committed to spend on education, only 27% 
was actually allocated (RDTL State budget 2004-5 in ibid; pp.226-227).  
b) Negotiating oil revenue – the hard place 
As state revenue continued to represent a significant issue for the development of 
the country, it became imperative for the government to make successful and swift 
progress on the negotiation for the exploitation of oil and gas, as well as perception 
of the revenue they would yield; however, as these negotiations proved 
increasingly complex and protracted, the government “found itself trapped in an 
economic context in which [its] efforts to achieve greater independence simply 
entangled [it] deeper in the dilemmas associated with dependent governance” 
(Hughes, 2009; p.144). 
Timor Leste sits in proximity of a large oil field – also known as the ‘Timor Gap’ – 
the maritime boundaries of which have been in question between Australia and, 
successively, Indonesia, Portugal and Timor Leste since 1972. In 1989, Australia 
signed the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia, which “divided the Timor Gap region 
into three sections: petroleum production in the largest area, Area A, was to be 
equally shared by the two countries; in Area C, closest to East Timor, 90% of the 
production would go to Indonesia and 10% to Australia; [and] in Area B, Indonesia 
received 10% and Australia 90%” (Lao Hamutuk, 2002) – as shown in Map 6. 
Exploitation began in 1992, but the Treaty was soon contested by Portugal64, 
which brought Australia in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 It is important to remember that Portugal never recognized Indonesian’s occupation of the territory and still, by 
virtue of international law, held Timor Leste as a non-self-governing territory (Ingram, 2012; p.3).  
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that “the Treaty violated the rights of both Portugal and the people of [Timor Leste]” 
(ibid)65. After independence, the Treaty came under renewed scrutiny by Timor 
Leste’s leaders as it transpired that Australia had successfully managed to claim 
shared exploitation of the largest production area on the basis of the continental 
shelf argument66; an argument that, however, did not appear to hold against the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates that 
“for countries with less than 400 nautical miles of sea between them, the 
international boundary [is] the mid-point” (ibid) – that is, the median line originally 
drawn by the Portuguese – thus  effectively excluding Australia from Area A – as 
shown in Map 7.  
Map 6 – Existing boundary arrangements between Australia and Indonesia 
 
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaye (N.D.), presentation for the Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 A case which the ICJ was unable to rule as Indonesia did not recognize its jurisdiction 
66 Which argues that a seabed boundary should follow the deepest point on the ocean floor between the 
countries (La'o Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002) 
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Map 7 – Area of dispute 
 
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaye (N.D.), presentation for the Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia 
Post-independence negotiations about the Timor Gap, between Timor Leste and 
Australia, were kick started by the Memorandum of understanding between 
UNTAET and Australia67, “formally proposing that on independence a new 
agreement, the ‘Timor Sea Agreement’, be considered for ratification” (ibid); but 
the process proved to be difficult and prolonged. Indeed, Australia repeatedly 
undermined the process by refusing to discuss maritime boundaries, concerned as 
it was that changes in those boundaries would decrease its access to the oil fields 
and, consequently, to its revenues. As such, it became crucial for Timor Leste to 
garner “international support for its position on the question of sovereignty [over 
the oil fields] and revenue sharing” (Hughes, 2009; p.147). This support, however, 
met with strong international concerns in relation to the possibility that access to its 
oil revenues would plague Timor Leste with the natural resource curse68; in order 
to demonstrate that this would not be the case, Alkatiri would have to show a 
willingness to conform to international demands on its public finance management. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 “Under this Arrangement, which replaces the February 2000 MOU, East Timor will receive 90% and Australia 
10% of oil and gas revenues from the JPDA. The JPDA inherits the ZOC from the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty, 
altering only the division of revenues. The largest gas field, Greater Sunrise, is deemed to lie 20% in the JPDA 
and 80% in Australian territory. Although the Arrangement is "without prejudice" to a future seabed boundary 
delimitation, it does not question Australia's claim to fields outside the JPDA” (The La'o Hamutuk Bulletin Vol. 3, 
No. 8: December 2002 (2/3) - http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/Dec/bulletinv3n8b.html#Chronology). 
68 A thesis that holds “that the exploitation of large amounts of valuable natural resources can undermine 
economic and political institutions, owing to the distorting effect on the rest of the economy; the potential for 
large fluctuation in revenue; and the likelihood that political constituencies at home will engage in aggressive 
contention in an attempt to capture the profits” (Hughes, 2009; p.146). 
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Consequently, the final Treaty signed by Alkatiri in 2006, under increasing 
pressure both at home – as elections were looming – and abroad – regarding 
public finance management – came at a very high price for the country’s 
independence from aid and its sovereignty over the Timor Gap. 
Firstly, the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS), 
signed in Sydney on 12 January 2006, whilst apportioning equal revenue shares 
between Australia and Timor Leste from extraction of the resources, required 
Timor signing away sovereign rights (ibid; p.149) whilst deferring “the more 
intractable issue of a permanent maritime boundary for half a century or more, until 
all petroleum resources in the Timor Sea are likely to be exhausted” (APSN, 2006). 
Secondly, in order to garner international support in the negotiations, Timor Leste 
had to agree to place oil revenues in a Petroleum fund – maintained outside the 
country – from whence it would withdraw 3% of the revenues each year (Hughes, 
2009; p.149), therefore ensuring sustainability of the fund and avoiding 
disproportionately large sums of money fuelling a potential natural resource curse. 
Finally, international support also signified that international agencies could weight 
in more on public finance management decisions; as such, the ADB and some 
individuals at the WB, encouraged the government “to focus on facilitation of the 
private sector, as a solution to unemployment, rather than attempting much active 
intervention in the economy” (ibid).  
Aware that the limited development, engendered by the strict austerity measures 
and (neo)liberal policies encouraged by donors, contrasted strongly with “publicity 
surrounding gains in the Timor Sea negotiations and reports of donations 
apparently flowing in from bilateral or multilateral agencies” (ibid; p.150), Alkatiri 
sought to implement the SIPs; however, the fact that this impetus came four years 
after the initial consultation proved that progress on the ground was slow whilst 
often projects “bore prominent signs attributing them to the generosity of one donor 
or another” (ibid; p.152), much to the detriment of the government’s visibility at the 
local level. As a result, by early 2006 the disastrous economic situation of the 
country and the apparent lack of attention by the government to its population’s 
needs led to a significant crisis of legitimacy, which culminated in the Crisis and 
the resignation of Mari Alkatiri in June 2006. 
The Impact of State Building on State Institutions 
210 	  
6.3.3. The AMP coalition   
Following the resignation of Mari Alkatiri, Timor Leste prepared for its first ever 
parliamentary elections and its second presidential elections; and although these 
took place in the midst of the crisis of 2006, violence seemed to subside around 
election time, likely as the population overwhelmingly welcomed an upcoming 
change in government and policies. The outcome of these elections saw the 
Aliança Maioria Parlamentar (AMP – Parliamentary Majority Alliance) come into 
power, with Xanana Gusmão as Prime Minister, and Jose Ramos Horta as the 
second President of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. This shift in the 
country’s political history brought about two major, interrelated, changes in the 
governance of the country in relation to management of public finances. 
Firstly, with the Timor Sea Treaty finally in force Timor Leste gained access to its 
oil revenue, with a significant impact on its budget: “the state budget almost tripled, 
from US$120 million in 2005 to $348 million in 2008; by 2010, the budget had risen 
to US$660 million” (RDTL state budgets in Anderson, 2012; p.229). As a 
consequence of such increase, and very much in line with IMF policy for the 
country, the government sought to establish a much more liberal economic 
approach focused on “ramp[ing] up public spending in […] pursuit of economic 
growth” (IMF, 2007; p.5). Said economic growth was seen primarily as stemming 
from FDIs and the development of private businesses, an approach that led the 
AMP government to make a very strong commitment to spending on infrastructure. 
Consequently, as Table 11 below illustrates, government spending on key sectors 
– originally identified as such by the previous government and the population at 
large during the NDP consultation – decreased significantly between 2006 and 
2010, whilst infrastructure spending rose steadily, representing over a quarter of 
the government budget in 2010. 
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Table 11 – Public spending in key sectors in Timor Leste from 2004 to 2010 
Spending as % of combined 
sources (CS)69 and state budget 
(SB) 
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2008 2010 
Education (% of CS)  14.9 13.4 10.7 11.7 11.3 
Education (% of SB) 15.3 15.1 11.1 13 10.2 
Health (% of CS) 12.2 11.3 9.2 8.2 6.9 
Health (% of SB) 9 11.9 8.1 6.9 5.4 
Agriculture (% of CS) 8.8 4.6 5.8 5.9 3.7 
Agriculture (% of SB) 1.5 3.7 4.4 4.8 2.5 
Infrastructure (% of CS) n.a. n.a. 8.8 13.2 26.6 
Infrastructure (% of SB) n.a. n.a. 15.8 12.8 28.5 
 Source: RDTL state budgets combined in Anderson, 2012; p.228 
Furthermore, cognisant of the fact that it might take a few years to develop the 
infrastructure at the level it needs to be in order to attract FDIs, Jose Ramos Horta 
introduced a drastic tax reform in July 2008 aimed at cutting the profit tax rate from 
30% to 10% (PWC, 2010; p.12) making the country “almost tax free” (ABC in 
Anderson, 2012; p.231). Whilst this move was praised by the World Bank, which 
qualified Timor Leste of ‘top reformer’ (PWC, 2010; p.12), its effect on the 
country’s economy remains highly debated to date: in a country where nearly 80% 
of the population works in subsistence agriculture, nearly half of the population 
lives below the national poverty line – 49% in 2007 and 41% in 2009 (UNDP, 2011; 
p.111) – and ‘natural persons’ only start paying taxes above $6000 of annual 
income (PWC, 2009; p.19), it is safe to say that the tax reform has significantly 
narrowed down the tax base whilst there is little purchase power available to keep 
the economy at large growing.  
In the mean time, however, the decrease in agriculture spending has marked a 
“shift away from agricultural and food security policy based on domestic crops as 
the core of food security” (Anderson, 2012; p.232), leading to a food shortage that 
has been compensated with an increase in food import – as seen in figure below, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 “Combined sources” is the state budget plus contributions from outside agencies; autonomous agencies are 
included in combined sources, but not in state budgets (Anderson, 2012; p.228) 
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in 2009 rice was one of the country’s main imports, representing 27.28% of imports 
– thus creating a dependency on imported products. Similarly, the significant 
increase in infrastructure spending has meant that more materials have been 
imported in Timor Leste in order to accommodate the demand – as shown in 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 below, in 2009 construction vehicles, cement and raw 
iron bars were also amongst the highest imports with respectively 1.21%, 2.82% 
and 2.31%. The figures for 2011 show that, whilst rice imports no longer represent 
the highest share, food imports – marked in orange and beige and headed by rice 
and poultry/meat – continue to represent a significant proportion of the country’s 
import – nearly 10%; similarly, iron structures, metal and cement also make up a 
large share of imports. 
Figure 12 – Timor Leste’s imports in 2009 
 
(Figure removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Observatory of economic complexity (OEC) 
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Figure 13 - Timor Leste’s imports in 2011 
 
(Figure removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 	  
Source: OEC 
Secondly, the crisis of 2006 brought to the fore severe societal problems related to 
poverty, economic exclusion and social cohesion. Thus, “in an effort to rapidly 
resettle the displaced [of the crisis], lower tensions and promote social cohesion, 
the government [established the] post-crisis National Recovery Strategy [which] 
focused on five areas: transitional shelter and housing, social protection, security 
and stability, local socio-economic development and confidence-
building/reconciliation activities” (Dale, Lepuschuetz and Umapathi, 2014; p.2). 
Whilst initially the focus remained on the first objective in order to return people to 
their homes as soon as possible, as the situation improved in 2008 and the 
Petroleum Fund began yielding higher returns – in response to increasing global 
fuel prices – the government shifted its focus on social protection through the 
delivery of cash transfers (World Bank, 2013; p.26). The cash transfers targeted 
the vulnerable population of Timor Leste, namely the elderly, people with 
disabilities, children in vulnerable households – through the Bolsa da Mãe or 
Mother’s Purse programme – and the veterans and survivors families – although 
the latter is considered more as a recognition of their fight for independence – 
APPENDIX VIII presents an overview of the main characteristics of such 
programmes.  
Both approaches, however, have come under heavy criticism in relation to a sound 
management of public finances. Indeed, the narrowing of the tax base has 
translated into a large dependence of the Timorese state on oil revenues, with 
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“98% of state revenues and 83% of Gross National Income coming from 
converting non-renewable oil and gas resources into cash revenues” (IDPS, 2010; 
p.14). Furthermore, the high levels of imports to satisfy food and infrastructure 
needs has resulted in a balance of trade consistently in significant deficit as shown 
in Figure 14 – in 2014, Timor Leste’s trade deficit reached approximately 
$41million (Trading Economics) – and the country’s dependence on food imports, 
such as rice, makes it highly vulnerable to food prices on the global market, a 
vulnerability that consistently needs to be palliated through government 
spending70. 
Figure 14 – Timor Leste balance of trade 
 
   Source: Trading economics 
Furthermore, the focus on the rebuilding of infrastructure led, in 2009, to the 
creation of the “Referendum Package” so as to “bolster local infrastructure in rural 
communities, increase employment opportunities and empower the private sector 
with small to medium size projects” (IDPS, 2010; p.18). The Package, however, 
came under severe national and international scrutiny when it became clear that a 
large number of projects were being allocated outside the government tender 
process (Tempo Semanal, 28 March 2010) to private companies that either had 
“good family and political connections” or had “proven potential to use violence 
against the state” in 200671 (ICG, 2013; p.6). The situation was further aggravated 
when it became clear that “about 60% of the Referendum Package Projects [were] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For example, when rice prices rose dramatically in 2008, the state subsidized the import of rice in order to 
respond as soon as possible to the otherwise inevitable food shortage crisis (IDPS, 2010; p.18) 
71 Some of the contractors have been known to be directly linked to the 2006 violence such as Lito Rambo, an 
influential gang leader in the suku of Becora – where violence was quite high during the Crisis – and Rai Los, 
who had been convicted and subsequently released for leading a hit squad during the Crisis (ICG, 2013; p.6) 
The Impact of State Building on State Institutions 
215 	  
of bad quality” as then Secretary of State of public works, Domingos Caero, noted 
(in Anderson, 2012; p.230), and that they did not appear to respond to any of the 
pressing infrastructural needs of the population. 
Finally, there are considerable doubts as to the real impact of cash transfer 
programmes on reducing poverty. The haste with which they were designed and 
deployed in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis “contributed to a lack of an overarching 
programme strategy, and insufficient attention to operational processes and 
guidelines to ensure appropriate targeting, programme management, and 
accountability” (World Bank, 2013; p.30). As such, one interviewee at national level 
– number 30 – indicated that “there is no real strategy for determining priority 
groups, such as young people, and the government tied itself with large and 
expensive programmes targeted at groups that are not priority, therefore reducing 
the impact”. It is therefore no surprising that a research carried out by Dale, 
Lepuschuetz and Umapathi (2014) revealed that the Bolsa da Mãe and disability 
pension have barely impacted national poverty – as shown in Figure 15 below.  
Figure 15 – National poverty averted due to social assistance programmes 
(percentage points) 
 
Source: Dale, Lepuschuetz and Umapathi, 2014; p.5 
In light of the key points highlighted above, the management of public finances 
under the AMP government has not only moved away from the strong push from 
financial independence, originally advocated under the FRETILIN government, into 
a much more IMF-style of liberal economic approach dependent on imports and 
vulnerable to global markets; it has also been characterised by a ‘big money’ 
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approach aimed at attracting private businesses and FDIs whilst buying off the 
most potentially troublesome groups amongst the population through, cash 
transfers – also called peace dividends by numbers of national level staff 
interviewed for the purpose of this research. The result of this style of public 
finance management has been the creation of “a dependent population with high 
expectations of government handouts and of easy contracts to build second-rate 
infrastructure” (ICG, 2013; p.6), which reflects to the international investor a 
climate of fragile stability resting mostly on oil revenues that are forecasted to be 
sustainable only if managed with care. As a result, FDIs have not been flowing and 
Timor Leste’s economy remains reliant on a source of revenue that is only 
projected to last for another 10 years. 
6.4. Investments in human capital 
Investment in human capital refers to the state’s ability to invest in policies for the 
development of skills that will enable its population to become citizens, that is, 
“actors in the economy, polity and society” (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; 
p.7). Thus, in order to achieve this goal, the state needs to invest consistently in 
education and training policies that will provide citizens with the skills required to 
participate in the economy – as producers of goods and services, as consumers 
who can afford these goods and services with their wages and as tax payers. 
Furthermore, education need not be limited to merely fulfilling the basic human 
right to education; the education system “should be devoted to compensating, as 
far as possible, for environmental disadvantages” (Barry, 2005; p.58) by ensuring 
that all schools in the country provide the same level of education regardless of 
their location – e.g. remote rural villages, conflict affected urban areas – and by 
ensuring that children evolving in more difficult environments are adequately 
attended to in schools. Finally, education needs to provide all citizens with the 
ability to critically and actively contribute to the political community, not only 
through active participation but also by affording them the means to remain 
informed about policies that impact their everyday lives. A state failing to provide 
these opportunities cannot produce responsible citizens with marketable skills, 
thus rendering administrative reform and competitiveness unrealistic goals (Ghani, 
Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.7). 
This section argues that despite the progress registered in Timor Leste since 
independence in relation to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of education, 
The Impact of State Building on State Institutions 
217 	  
the decisions made by the Timorese elite in relation to the national languages – as 
explained in section 5.3.4 – are significantly impacting the education system in 
Timor Leste, leading to important differences in equality of opportunity. 
Furthermore, the section goes on to understanding how training is being 
organised, delivered and promoted in Timor Leste, arguing that the government’s 
efforts have so far fallen short of creating a skilled labour force capable of 
contributing to the economy. 
6.4.1. Language of education policies from 1999 to 2012 
Section 5.3.4 highlighted the main issues related to the language choices made by 
Timorese political elites upon drafting the constitution. It emphasised the fact that 
in a country boasting 32 endogenous language varieties, any choice regarding the 
lingua franca would already inevitably imply a set of significant challenges in 
relation to the development of an education curriculum; the choice of Portuguese 
as one of those lingua franca, in a country where only 5% of the population spoke 
the language at the time of decision-making (Nicolai, 2004; p.120) represented an 
additional challenge.  
But upon independence, language issues were not the only matter of concern for 
the Timorese Ministry of Education. Indeed, in the aftermath of the violence that 
erupted in 1999, a ten days Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), organised to assess 
the damage that had been done to the country’s infrastructure72, brought to the 
fore crucial findings in relation to the education sector: “approximately 95 per cent 
of schools and other education institutions were destroyed in the post-ballot 
period” incurring the loss of furniture and teaching materials as well (World Bank 
1999 in ibid; p.73), and “at least 75% of primary school teachers remain in the 
country, whilst less than 20% of secondary and vocational training teachers are 
available” (Annex 1, World Bank, 1999; p.12). As such, as early as 2005, the 
Ministry of Education began expressing concerns about “how the process of 
embedding the new curriculum in the system and ensuring that it is adequately 
supported in the classroom will be financed or managed” (MEC, 2005 in ibid; p.33).  
These uncertainties, clearly present from the start, have had devastating results on 
the development of the education system in Timor Leste. First and foremost, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Coordinated by the World Bank, including representatives from major donors, UN agencies, multilateral 
institutions as well as East Timorese experts (Nicolai, 2004; p.72) and focusing on eight key sectors: economic 
management, civil service, community empowerment, justice system, agriculture, infrastructure, health and 
education (World Bank, 1999) 
The Impact of State Building on State Institutions 
218 	  
emphasis during the transitional period on phasing out completely Bahasa as a 
language of education and imposing Portuguese in its stead has meant that in 
addition to the burden of gathering and training a teaching force as soon as 
possible, the problem of training it in a language that less than 5% of the 
population spoke encumbered. As such, of the 3000 teachers recruited for primary 
and secondary education in August 2000, only 158 individuals achieved a pass 
mark in Portuguese proficiency tests (ibid; p.116); training was therefore crucial if 
Portuguese was to become the language of instruction. Nevertheless, despite 
early efforts from UNICEF and some Australian groups, as well as training offered 
since 2000 by Portuguese Instituto Camões and the Federation of Portuguese 
universities, to date training of the teaching workforce has remained highly 
inadequate – the former were blocked by the CNRT due to curriculum 
uncertainties whilst the latter has been characterised by high teacher drop out 
rates. Furthermore, the absence of curriculum at the beginning also meant that, 
although teaching was supposed to happen in Portuguese, no education books 
could be prepared to facilitate this task, thus “Indonesian textbooks were the only 
teaching resource available for quite some time” (Taylor-Leech, 2013; p.115), 
leading to further confusion for both teachers and students.  
Since 2004, at which point “fewer than 6% of teachers reported fluency in 
Portuguese” (World Bank, 2004 in Shah, 2012; p.35), education curricula have 
been a very sensitive point of debate between political decision-makers, and the 
very delicate balance between Portuguese and Tetun – based on a more 
transitional approach focused on slowly phasing out Tetun throughout grades for 
the benefit of Portuguese – has remained highly dependent on the political climate, 
continuing to create confusion both for the teachers and the students. APPENDIX IX 
provides an overview of the main policy decisions made in relation to the language 
of instruction between 1999 and 2012 and draws a very complex picture 
characterised by a clean shift in 2004, underpinned by the idea of acclimatising 
children to Portuguese through the use of Tetun in the early grades so as to 
prepare them to Portuguese-only education in later grades.  
A further key development in the country’s education policy has come with the 
introduction of the Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) 
programme in February 2011– currently being piloted in the districts of Lautem, 
Manatuto and Oecussi. The MTB-MLE comes as the result of unabated debate 
amongst Timorese political elite, policy makers and experts on the difficulties of 
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introducing children to primary education in a language they understand, and falls 
within the National Strategic Plan’s (NSP) priority recommendations for education. 
It proposes to take into consideration the multilingual nature of Timor Leste by 
introducing a school system whereby “a student’s mother tongue should be used 
as a medium of instruction in pre-primary education and in the first four years of 
primary schooling, thus enabling children to acquire the fundamental skills of 
reading and writing in the language they know best” (UNESCO, 2012; p.1). 
Whilst these developments show that there is intense and productive debate at 
policy level to improve the education system and solve the issue of language, two 
additional crucial challenges remain unaddressed. Firstly, secondary schools, 
already suffering from a lack of staff after 1999, continue to be characterised by 
poor quality of education as Bahasa textbooks as still being used in secondary 
school classes, all the while introducing Portuguese (World Bank, 2004; p.31) in 
order to accommodate the majority of young students who have thus far been 
taught in a mix of Portuguese, Tetun and Bahasa in their primary education. 
Secondly, according to national level interviewee – number 36 – “currently 
teachers self-select where they wish to be teaching; from a language point of view 
this most likely means that teachers choose to teach where they speak the 
language”. As a result, the quality of education across the country remains highly 
unequal as well performing teachers might select to go in schools with better 
infrastructure whilst others might choose to teach in their area or district of origin, 
in a language they master better. 
6.4.2. Vocational training and skills development 
The issues highlighted above in relation to education are particularly worrying, 
looking at Timor Leste’s investment in human capital, when compounded to the 
stark lack of training opportunities existing in the country. 
Indeed, vocational education and training, much like secondary education, “had 
little early success [after independence], with few instructor remaining and little 
equipment left that was of use” (Sanderson, 2001 in Nicolai, 2004; p.83). Whilst it 
has slowly gained in importance as a result of the large share of unemployed and 
underemployed population in the country, most of the activities continue to be 
financed by employers – on-the-job training – or through bilateral aid – for example 
Brazil and Australian Aid (AusAid) were the main donors involved in vocational 
training in 2002 (Nicolai, 2004; p.102). Furthermore, as Table 12 below illustrates 
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the majority of the vocational training offered is generally targeted to managers, 
professionals, technicians and clerical workers73 - which, however, make up for 
only 20% of the workforce in SEFOPE’s sample analysis of the Timor Leste’s 
labour force (2010; p.34); conversely, “the skills required for agricultural work, craft 
and related trades, machine operation, and elementary occupations, were most 
likely to be self-taught or acquired from family or friends” (ibid; p.22) – that is, 72% 
of the sample labour force. 
Table 12 – Percentage distribution of type of training received by those in employment 
Work trained 
for 
Formal 
schooling 
Vocational 
training 
programme 
Training 
programme 
provided 
by NGO 
On-the-
job 
training 
Learning 
from 
relative, 
friend 
Self-
taught 
Total 
Managers 25 43 7 8 - 17 100 
Professionals 33 47 5 8 5 2 100 
Technicians 6 13 3 6 26 46 100 
Clerical 10 49 6 15 20 - 100 
Service and 
sales 
1 11 2 23 23 39 100 
Skilled agric 
worker 
- 1 4 2 15 78 100 
Craft and 
related trades 
2 4 2 11 45 36 100 
Machine 
operators 
1 - - 10 72 18 100 
Elementary 
occupations 
0 4 1 3 21 70 100 
All 
occupations 
7 13 3 8 22 47 100 
Source: SEFOPE, 2010; p.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 These are usually found in the following sectors: information and communication, professional and scientific, 
public administration, education, health and social work, arts and entertainment, service industry (SEFOPE, 
2010; p.34) 
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In line with these findings, the interviews carried out during the fieldwork for the 
purpose of this research revealed that the vast majority of training undergone by 
people at local area level was promoted and organised by national – e.g. Ba 
Futuru74 – and international – Plan International, Caritas – organisations. By 
contrast, as highlighted by national level interviewee – number 31 – “there is very 
little promotion of training opportunities for youth by the government, and the 
budget currently being allocated to SEFOPE – approximately $2.5million for 2012 
– remains insufficient to implement any significant promotion campaign in the 
country”. 
Furthermore, employment policies at national level continue to be plagued by a 
significant statistical information gap in relation to the data necessary to identify the 
sectors where skilled labour is most in demand. Consequently, as pointed out by 
interviewee number 32, “with such lack of information, due in part to coordination 
issues between relevant ministries, the development of relevant training 
opportunities is rendered particularly difficult”. Number of interviewees within the 
two case study aldeias were also particularly concerned by such lack of 
information. 
As a result, the number of young people who have undergone vocational training 
since independence is close to non-existent, with only 0.1% of the male population 
5 years and older attending the academic year 2006/7 having registered for such 
programme (Ministry of Finance, 2008; pp.101). 
6.4.3. Education and training as investments in Timor Leste’s human capital 
In Timor Leste, however, the reduced share of education and training in the state’s 
budget, as highlighted in section 6.3, compounded with significant curriculum 
issues linked to policies on language of education, appear inadequate to achieve 
equal educational attainments (World Bank, 2013; p.6). Indeed, the lack of 
qualified teaching force and the constant changes in the curriculum – heavily 
dependent on the language policies determined by the state – have resulted in 
poor quality of education evidenced by poor literacy rates, especially in Portuguese 
and in rural areas – as shown in Table 13 below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 http://www.bafuturu.org/  
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Table 13 – Adult literacy rate (15 and over) in 2010 
Total Urban Rural 
Speak, read and write in Tetum 
51.6 80.9 44.6 
Speak, read and write in Portuguese 
25.2 40.1 18.3 
Speak, read and write in Bahasa 
45.3 74.1 31.8 
Speak, read and write in English 
14.6 24.7 7.6 
         Source: Ministry of Finance statistics, 2011; p.XVII 
Furthermore, “skills learnt in educational institutions appear to map poorly into 
what is required in the workplace” whilst the few formal training courses currently 
available “in both post-school and technical high school settings are poorly valued 
by employers” (ibid; p.8); as a result, the largest share of the population that young 
people represent – as shown in Figure 16 below – continues to arrive on the job 
market unskilled and unprepared. The consequence of this lack of adequate 
education and training is that a large number of the population 15 and over goes 
on to work in sectors where education and training are not crucial for accessing 
employment – 50.8% of the people surveyed by SEFOPE worked in agriculture, 
5.2% worked in construction and 17.6% worked in wholesale and retail trade 
(SEFOPE, 2010; p.39) – which incidentally also represent the sectors where the 
highest share of persons in vulnerable employment75 can be found – 97.8% in 
agriculture and 87.8% in wholesale and trade (ibid; p.41). Finally, although official 
statistics boast low unemployment rates throughout Timor Leste, a closer look at 
the share of people working in informal, vulnerable employment or that are inactive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 People unlikely to have formal work arrangements or access to benefits or social protection programmes, and 
they are more at risk to the effects of the economic cycles (SEFOPE, 2013; p.41) 
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reveals much deeper socio-economic issues linked to inequality – as shown in 
Table 14 below. 
 
Figure 16 – Age distribution of household population of Timor Leste in 2010 
 
Source: World Bank, 2013; p.VII 
Table 14 – Distribution of the labour force SEFOPE survey by employment status 
 Labour force 
participation 
rate  
Employment 
to population 
ratio 
Information 
employment 
rate 
Vulnerable 
employment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Inactivity 
rate 
Timor 
Leste 
41.7 40.2 17.8 69.9 3.6 57.4 
Urban 42.3 39.3 20 42.1 6.9 57.7 
Rural 41.5 40.6 16.9 80.3 2.2 58.5 
Source: SEFOPE, 2010; p.VIII 
The shortcomings highlighted above in relation to Timor Leste’s government’s 
investment in human capital have significant consequences for the country’s 
growth and the development of its political community. Concerning the country’s 
growth, the fact that the majority of the population continues to work in the informal 
sector and/or agriculture – a sector that should have been developed in order to 
ensure food security but has so far remained, as seen previously, mostly 
subsistence-based – means that a large share of the population is not contributing 
to the country’s economy. Furthermore, the lack of marketable skills, resulting from 
both the absence of information concerning what skills would be necessary to 
improve the country’s competitiveness and the lack of training opportunities, also 
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means that Timor Leste’s population is currently not attractive to foreign investors. 
As such, three of the main motivators for investors in a country – size of local 
market, growth of local market and skilled labour (UNCTAD in Beck, 2013) – are 
currently lacking in Timor Leste and fail to attract the much needed FDIs. Finally, 
the issues of literacy highlighted above also impact on the ability of the citizens to 
actively participate in the country’s political community. Indeed, inability to master 
Portuguese means that although Timor Leste’s state has made significant 
progress in terms of transparency in the past few years – for instance with the 
transparency portal for public budget, online consultation for laws and policies – a 
large share of the population remains unable to consult – if they lack access to 
internet, often as a result of socio-economic issues – and read these documents; 
as such, they are unable to critically assess them and contribute to debates. 
6.5. Conclusion – “Diligent and obedient boys”76  
This chapter aimed to understand how the decisions made during the transitional 
administration, in relation to state building, affected the institutional design of Timor 
Leste and, as a consequence, the way in which the policies emanating from the 
new state institutions affect its ability to exercise its core functions. Based on the 
analysis, carried out in chapter five, of the dynamics and interests pervading the 
state building decision-making processes, this chapter has highlighted how these 
have affected “the distribution of resources and power among societal groups, 
which quickly began to affect the state’s development” (Jones, 2010; p.560).  
The analysis of the state’s ability to maintain administrative control between 2002 
and 2012 revealed that UNTAET’s choice not to engage, or indeed even 
recognise, the power dynamics amongst Timor Leste’s political elite in the process 
of institutional design, had profound consequences for the future state’s legitimacy 
and sovereignty. Firstly, the political divisions that seeped through the electoral 
process for the Constituent Assembly played out in such a way that the 
subsequent drafting of the Constitution reflected essentially the interests and 
aspirations of one political party – FRETILIN. In fact, through a process that saw 
little consultation and opposition, the Constitution of Timor Leste shaped a political 
system “failed by design” (Richmond, 2014; p.17), institutionalising the main 
leaders’ political divisions that triggered a national crisis in 2006, nearly bringing 
the country to its knees. Secondly, the system of governance established through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Mari Alkatiri, May 18, 2004 in Hughes (2009), p.135 
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the Constitution, whilst modelled on previous societal organisation, did not, 
however, reflect any of its meanings for the population. This resulted in a decision-
making process that is essentially top-down, and leaves little room for voice. 
Consequently, unable to recognise themselves into, or even act within, a system 
marred by “basic problems with respect to political competition, the control of 
institutions such as the army or police, unemployment and poverty” (ibid; p.5), the 
population used the crisis of 2006 as a way to boycott institutions they perceived 
as illegitimate. Had UNTAET allowed more time to analyse the political dynamics 
at play, it could have avoided establishing a voting system for the Constituent 
Assembly that led to a majority of FRETILIN members and, therefore, essentially 
reflected FRETILIN’s interests. More consultation with the civil society, as the 
experience with the NDP demonstrated, could have resulted in the establishment 
of institutions that included local authorities more successfully – for instance, giving 
them more power77. 
The state’s ability to maintain a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, 
especially in the first six years of Timor Leste’s state building – both before and 
after independence in 2002 – was therefore severely undermined by the crisis of 
2006. The widespread violence that overtook the country, triggered by the 
politicisation of the security sector along deep political divisions and that spread in 
result of popular discontent with the state of the nation in general, highlighted to 
the population “the dangers for society when top leaders […] present themselves 
to the public solely as historic figures but are unable to perform their functions and 
assume their responsibilities as leaders” (CEPAD, 2009; p.38). In addition to being 
politicised, Timor Leste’s initial attempts at building a security sectors were also 
undermined by the lack of coherence and coordination that characterised 
successive international approaches to training the PNTL. As such, its inconsistent 
mandate with regard to community policing failed to penetrate the local level, 
resulting in Timorese relying essentially on customary and informal practices for 
conflict resolution and security, rather than trusting the state. A more coherent 
approach, where the PNTL works closely with the community, would have resulted 
in more trust toward state institutions, as already is the case in the areas where 
PNTL community units and local leaders have developed a positive relationship. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 This is currently being undertaken through a process of decentralization. 
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Timor Leste’s first two governments’ attempts at the management of public 
finance, whilst not directly affected by the decision-making processes made during 
the transitional administration, have nonetheless been significantly stirred by 
international state building practices post-independence in 2002. FRETILIN, under 
Mari Alkatiri, made initial attempts at avoiding aid dependence in order to maintain 
independence in its decision-making. However, the lack of resources that plagued 
its government, compounded with the necessity to garner international support in 
the negotiations with Australia over the Timor Gap, led to a series of decisions that 
took the management of public finance away from its initial focus – on education, 
health and livelihoods – and redirected it towards the more (neo)liberal 
administration style encouraged by donors. The subsequent government, AMP, 
continued in the same direction, focusing on investing to attract FDIs rather than 
redirecting newly accessible state oil revenues “towards strategic infrastructural 
investments and local-private sector development” (Barbara, 2008; p.309) to 
generate national development and growth.  
Investments in human capital, during the first twelve years of independence, 
suffered considerably from all the dynamics described above. Pressed with the 
necessity to “relinquish its recent colonial past and the baggage it included” (Shah, 
2012; p.34), Timorese leadership pushed for the establishment of Portuguese as a 
lingua franca, despite a widespread lack of knowledge of the language amongst 
the country’s population. This choice, already problematic for its colonial 
symbolism and lack of reach, proved even more challenging in a post-conflict 
context where the teaching force was not only lacking but also lacked, much like 
the population, the language skills. As such, whilst debates over the education 
curriculum slowed down and complicated the process of implementing such 
choice, the lack of investments in education characteristic of the (neo)liberal 
approaches adopted by the state only contributed to worsening the quality of 
education throughout the country. Compounded with a lack of investment in skills 
training, the resulting educational and training inequalities that came to 
characterise the population have led to severe social, political and economic 
disparities in the country. 
Hughes (2009; p.197) affirms that “the task of elites is to create not only a narrative 
that can elicit allegiance, but a web of practical connections that links the state to 
society, in a manner that can give form to claims of central representations, 
authority, and legitimacy, in the eyes of at least a section of the population”. It 
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transpires, from the analysis carried out in this chapter, that the process of state 
building has not only deeply affected the new state’s ability to carry out its core 
functions, but has also, as a result, led to the emergence of alternative, more local, 
“shared and deeply held, but historically contingent, desire[s] for community” 
(Jennings, 2011; p.43) amongst the population. The next chapter will explore, 
through the narratives emerging from the two case study aldeias, how the impact 
of the core functions on social cohesion contributed to this process.  
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CHAPTER 7 – THE IMPACT OF STATE BUILDING ON 
URBAN SOCIAL COHESION IN DILI 
 
“We wanted Western tastes without having Western skills, 
We undertook urbanization without industrialisation” 
(Joao Boavida, 2013) 	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7. The impact of state building on urban social cohesion in Dili 
This chapter aims to explore how the dynamics highlighted in chapters five and six 
affect citizens’ narratives of their everyday life, so as to understand how the 
decisions-making processes that characterise Timor Leste’s state building have 
contributed to shaping the construction of social cohesion in Dili, its capital. 
Through the use of social cohesion as an analytical tool that facilitates the 
exploration of Timorese citizens’ “major preoccupations, history, and how they are 
managing and responding to social, political, economic, environmental or cultural 
changes” (Grenfell et al, 2009; p.25), this chapter seeks to explore the disjunctions 
that can emerge between state building and the construction of a political 
community (Devant, 2009; p.170) when the institutions and politics are established 
within a framework of action strongly focused on top-down relations between the 
state and its citizens (ibid; p.159). 
In this light, this chapter begins by first introducing Dili’s urban space in its social, 
economic and political context, and subsequently offers a brief re-introduction of 
the elements of the analytical framework that will be used for the analysis of the 
two aldeias. The second part of this chapter provides the analysis of the two 
aldeias in order to understand how the urban fabric affects social cohesion and, 
therefore, how the spaces emerging from this interaction contribute to shaping the 
scales and spaces of people’s representation of citizenship in these aldeias – that 
is, research question number three. 
7.1. Introducing Dili and urban social cohesion 
7.1.1. Dili in its social, economic and political context 
Dili gained its importance in 1769, when the Portuguese were forced to leave 
Oecussi – which had remained a Portuguese enclave despite the significant Dutch 
presence on the Western part – due to ongoing struggles and wars with the local 
leaders (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; Cristalis, 2009). Initially of equal importance to 
Baucau, situated 122km East of Dili and preferred by the Portuguese for its cooler 
climate, its fishing and its beautiful sea, Dili was soon declared the capital of the 
Portuguese colony as a result of its much more accessible port and wider 
urbanisation potential – indeed, Dili is located at sea level whilst Baucau was built 
on a hill. Nonetheless, as shown in Map 8 below, Dili’s territorial expansion was 
minimal during Portuguese times: between 1951 and 1972 the maps show that the 
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main urbanised area around the harbour – delimited by the thick dark line in 1972 
– has remained unchanged and there has only been small additional construction 
around the main area – delimited by the thinner line in 1972.  
Map 8 – Dili Portuguese urbanisation plans 1951 and 1972 
	  
Source: Interviewee at the Ministry of Education, Timor Leste 
Dili really began developing during Indonesian military rule as a result of two 
factors: the higher number of Indonesian staff that lived in the country, and Dili 
more specifically, compared to Portuguese; and, the construction, as part of 
Indonesian population control policies, of small villages across the urban space 
where they relocated Timorese population they had captured in the mountains. 
But, as mentioned in section 4.3.1, it is essentially after independence from the 
Indonesian in 1999 that Dili became the main recipient of migration in Timor Leste, 
contributing to levels and speed of urbanisation that have had considerable 
impacts on the infrastructure as well as economic and social relations of the urban 
area. Indeed, between 2004 and 2010, the number of national migrants in Dili 
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increased by 37% (GDS, 2010; p.vii) and the average annual growth rate has been 
4.6%, that is double the national average annual growth rate of 2.4 % during the 
same period (ibid). 
As a result, the patterns of migration in the different sukus of the city have also 
contributed to creating both very mixed as well as very homogenised areas: where 
homogeneity is often due to certain areas being conveniently located on roads that 
lead to certain districts – e.g. eastern or southern – heterogeneity is often times the 
result of important historical changes and displacements in some areas – e.g. 
freed houses by the Portuguese and Indonesian staff, massive displacements 
during violent episodes in 1999 and 2006.  
Furthermore, its position as the capital of the country – and main urban area – has 
made Dili the centre of economic development in the country – since Portuguese 
and Indonesian times already, but more specifically since independence with the 
arrival of a large number of international organisations and NGOs. As such, it has 
attracted a significant number of people in search of better socio-economic 
prospects as well as better education opportunities, resulting in 21.3% of the 
country’s economically active population residing in the capital (GDS, 2014). 
However, the lack of skills of the active population combined with the lack of 
economic opportunities – which is only likely to increase as international 
organisations, Dili’s main employers, leave the country – have also resulted in Dili 
presenting the highest percentage of economically inactive – not employed or 
seeking employment78 – population in the country with 24%, as well as the highest 
share of unemployed population in the country with 40.7% (MoF, 2011). 
Nevertheless, despite these stark socio-economic contrasts, to date there is still no 
urban planning policy at any level of the state in order to manage these disparities 
(Reis Pequinho, 2010; p.55).  
Finally, as a consequence of both its historical political importance and its 
unregulated population growth (Jütersonke et al, 2010; p.17), Dili has from the very 
beginning of its existence as an urban space, “frequently served as a site of 
violence and resistance, both real and symbolic” (ibid; p.21). These episodes of 
violence started as far back as during Portuguese times, with the rebellion of Dom 
Boaventura, and remained the focus of much of the violence during the 1975 civil 
war, Indonesia’s 1999 scorched earth campaign, and the 2002, 2005 and 2006 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 E.g. homemakers, retirees, incapacitated people and full-time students (MoF, 2012; p.6) 
The Impact of State Building on Urban Social Cohesion in Dili 
232 	  
contestations against the newly independent state’s government – as mentioned in 
section 6.1.2. However, even the history of violence of the different 
neighbourhoods in Dili is diverse, as some areas were more severely hit than 
others during 1999 – e.g. areas known to be part of the resistance – whilst other 
suffered particularly during the Crisis of 2006 – e.g. areas with more diversity in 
relation to their population’s districts of origin. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to take into account these diversities within 
Dili’s urban space and understand how, in combination with the state policy issues 
highlighted in the previous chapter, they affect people’s relations with each other 
and their state. 
7.1.2. Social cohesion as a tool to explore social identities in Dili’s urban 
spaces 
The remainder of this chapther presents the findings of the investigation of social 
cohesion, in the two selected aldeias of Dili, following the two important steps 
highlighted in chapter three: the objective and the subjective readings of the urban 
fabric.  
As such, each section will provide an insight into the objective reading of the urban 
fabric of the aldeia. This will include an introduction to the geographical position of 
the area within Dili’s urban space, as well as an analysis of the main socio-
economic characteristics of the area through statistical evidence and personal 
observations supported by visual evidence – that is, photographs of the aldeias 
taken by the author. It will also present the historical development of the aldeias 
based on people’s narratives – since there is no other evidence available on such 
matters in Timor Leste – as well as an outline of the aldeias’ history of violence.  
Subsequently, for each aldeia the subjective reading will be presented through an 
investigation of each of the four domains of social cohesion. This investigation will 
be organised so as to intertwine the findings highlighted in Chapter six with the 
narratives emerging from people’s voices and opinions in relation to their daily 
lives within and between aldeias. More specifically, the subjective reading of urban 
social cohesion in each aldeia will organised as follows: 
 Common values and civic culture – this sub-section analyses how people 
relate to different layers of administrative control – both at local and national 
level –, the level of understanding they have concerning their ability to voice 
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their opinions, and the representations of their belonging to the political 
community these relations create in their minds; 
 Social order and social control – this sub-section explores social order in each 
aldeia through people’s narratives of the violence that occurred in 2006/7 and 
their understanding of the state’s actions to both end the violence and promote 
reconciliation. It also looks at social control through people’s relationships with 
each other and authority, attempting to understand people’s levels of trust in 
the state’s ability to maintain the monopoly over the means of violence and, as 
such, ensure justice; 
 Social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities – this sub-section 
investigates people’s understanding of the state’s management of public 
finance in relation to infrastructure and services as well as concerning 
investment in human capital. It offers an insight into the representations of the 
state that these narratives create at aldeia level; and, 
 Social networks and social capital – this sub-section looks more in depth into 
people’s representations of the state’s administrative control through their 
engagement into matters of public concern both at local and national level. It 
explores the type of information, trust and norms on which people rely to act 
within their aldeias so as to gather a sense of whether social capital is being 
bonded or bridged. 
Finally, this chapter’s conclusion analyses what social cohesion means for the 
spaces and scales at which people interact in the two aldeias, in order to then 
understand how these feed people’s representations of their attachment to place 
and construction of political identity in political, historical, cultural, territorial and 
psychological terms – that is, the elements that constitute the political community 
in the context of this research, as described in section 2.2.4.  
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7.2. Urban social cohesion in Liriu 
7.2.1. Objective reading of Liriu’s urban fabric 
a) Geographic position  
Liriu is situated in what can be considered the heart of Dili, in the suku of Motael 
and part of the sub-district of Vera Cruz – as shown in Map 9 below. 
Map 9 – Geographical location of Liriu (delineated in blue) within Dili’s urban area 
 
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google map 
The aldeia of Liriu – located in Map 10 below – began developing during 
Portuguese times, thus boasting a long history of urbanisation. It is located right by 
Dili port and between two of Dili’s main roads, that is, Avenida de Portugal – 
known to Dili residents as Beach Road because it runs along the sea – and 
Avenida Almirante Americo Tomas - known to Dili residents as Comoro road 
because it connects the city centre with the Comoro river bridge – both of which 
have high visibility by internationals, run across the urban space and are therefore 
regularly maintained – as illustrated in Picture 1 below. 
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Map 10 – Aerial view of Liriu  	  
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google satellite view 
Picture 1 – Beach road runs beside embassies and is regularly maintained 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
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b) Accessibility 
Liriu’s central location within Dili’s urban space means that it is also very well 
connected. As the mikrolet map below indicates, seven mikrolet routes pass by 
Liriu, providing easy transportation to its inhabitants at either end of the aldeia; 
furthermore, the aldeia is at the centre of routes 9 and 10 – respectively routes in 
white and blue in Map 11 below – which run from the West of Dili – past the 
airport – to the North – Lahane Hospital – and far East – Lecidere, where the main 
vegetable market is – through the centre – Katedral – thus considerably facilitating 
Liriu’s residents access to the majority of the key areas within Dili’s urban space. 
Finally, the high density of international and national organisations’ offices in the 
area, in addition to the high number of embassies being located in and around 
Liriu, mean that it is a generally safe area to walk around during day and night.  
Map 11 – Location of Liriu within the mikrolet route system 
 
Source: Fritz, S. (2014) 
As one of the oldest and most urbanised aldeias in Dili, Liriu is also characterised 
by a number of aspects that can be found in other urban areas around the world, 
such as paved roads, pedestrian crossings and pavements – all features that are 
not, however, a foregone conclusion in many other areas within Dili – as evidenced 
in Picture 2 below. To be sure, the roads within Liriu are not all as well maintained 
as Beach Road or Comoro Road, as the presence of big potholes can attest; 
however, these potholes are generally few and far between and whilst they could 
be considered a safety concern for cars, they remain easy to circumvent on 
motorbike – the means of transportation used by the majority of Timor Leste’s 
population. 
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Picture 2 – Liriu’s main roads are easily accessible to most means of transport 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
c) Socio-economic characteristics  
Motael is one of the sukus, within the sub-district of Vera Cruz, with the highest 
school attendance – 43.3% of people in age of going to school – and the lowest 
share of people who have never attended school – 6.4% (MoF, 2011; p.166) – and 
discussions with participants both in Liriu and other aldeias revealed that the 
school in Liriu is known to be one of the best ones in Dili. Furthermore, Motael is 
one of the sukus with the best levels of education in Vera Cruz, as 35% of the 
population have completed secondary education, 18.1% have a university degree 
– 6% higher than the other sukus in the sub-distrcit – and 2.3% have a diploma – a 
small share but the highest in the sub-district (MoF, 2011; p.228). Interestingly, 
when talking to the participants it appeared that the opportunity to go to university 
was not restricted to people living in good or high socio-economic status, but rather 
that the opportunity was available and taken up by many across the socio-
economic spectrum of the area. Moreover, the MoF statistics indicating that there 
is only 2% unemployment in Motael – the lowest level of unemployment in the sub-
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district – is confirmed by the fact that none of the participants to the study were 
unemployed – despite the author having searched for them during the week; 
rather, whilst some indicated that they were unemployed, in reality one owned a 
small kios and the other one a shop.  
The urban fabric that unfolds as one takes a walk through Liriu very much reflects 
that of an urban space in more developed countries; that is, the vast majority of the 
houses face onto the road, have a front porch as well as a front garden – big or 
small depending on the socio-economic status of the household – and there is a 
wall separating the property from the road. The presence of these walls is mainly 
due historically to the architecture inherited from the Portuguese colonisers. The 
type of walls, however, reflects immediately the socio-economic status of the 
household, as the photos and captions below illustrate: 
Picture 3 - High protective walls or fences are home to malae population or wealthy 
Timorese 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
Picture 4 - Smaller walls or fences reflect a good socio-economic status 
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Source: photograph taken by the author 
Picture 5 - Properties with makeshift fences host low socio-economic households 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
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In addition to these differences, there are also a number of pockets of poverty 
within the aldeia, generally clustered together, built in simple grey brick, without 
porches or gardens. In Picture 6 below, behind the sports grounds on the right 
hand side of the picture one can notice a grouping of low-income households and 
notice the absence of walls and the simplicity of the constructions. 
Picture 6 – Low-income households in Liriu 
 
Source: photograph taken by Jenny Asman 
Finally, when walking around Liriu one notices a high number of little kios that sell 
food and convenience products – some of those kios within formal buildings others 
within makeshift little huts, all of them along the road – and a hotel, therefore 
signifying the presence of business opportunities; moreover, aside for one house 
that boasted a big garden where corn is cultivated and chicken raised, in Liriu 
there appears to be no agriculture taking place, confirming once more the 
prevalent urban character of the aldeia. 
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d) Development of the area 
Liriu’s population comes from many different districts of origins in different parts of 
Timor Leste, and has arrived at different times, although it does appear that a large 
number of people have moved into Liriu post-1999, as a consequence of their 
houses burning down in other areas and attracted by the peaceful reputation of 
this aldeia.  
As illustrated in the maps below, Liriu is part of the original core of Dili’s urban area 
and started developing during the Portuguese times, although it appears that until 
the 1950s/60s most of the development took place along the seashore whereas by 
the 1970s it had been developed following the street layout that can still be 
observed nowadays. 
Map 12 – Portuguese urbanisation plans for 1951 (top) and 1972 (bottom) 
 
Source: Ministry of Education 
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According to interviewee 71, who grew up in Liriu, during Portuguese times “Liriu 
was home to both Portuguese administrative staff as well as Timorese who worked 
with the Portuguese, often as part of the teaching force or as part of the military79”. 
This description confirmed the memories other participants, who had grown up in 
the area or had moved there prior to Portuguese withdrawal from Timor Leste, also 
shared with the author. 
Upon Indonesia’s invasion, shortly after Portuguese withdrawal, the majority of the 
Timorese who had lived in Liriu fled to the mountains because they were afraid of 
the Indonesians; interviewee 42 that her father, who was Portuguese, “was killed 
by Indonesian militias”. Instead, as indicated by interviewee 47, Indonesian military 
personnel and administrative staff “moved into the empty houses and, as such, 
Liriu remained a centre of administrative control”. Most participants, however, 
indicated that unlike in other areas Indonesians made very little infrastructure 
upgrading in Liriu. 
e) History of violence since independence 
In 1999, as the Indonesians withdrew from Timor Leste, Liriu did not suffer from 
the scorched earth campaign as much as other areas of Dili, probably because the 
majority of the houses were actually occupied by Indonesians themselves; as 
such, most of the infrastructure built by the Portuguese is still being used today. 
Rather, as the situation improved and Timorese started coming back from the 
mountains into Dili, Liriu became one of the main areas of resettlement for the 
population; indeed, many of the participants in this research indicated that they 
have been living in the aldeia since 1999 because their house in other aldeias had 
been burnt down and they had nowhere to go.  
The result of this spontaneous resettlement movement in Liriu, however, is that 
many people now live on land that is being claimed by the state. Interviewee 45 
explained that the Motael is now also known as “the ‘red line’ of land disputes: 
many people here live on state land and are aware of it, but they have been living 
here for many years, sometimes decades, and if they have to vacate the land they 
expect to be compensated and/or relocated”. But the process of applying for 
compensation, relocation or land purchase is complex and protracted, therefore a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Colegio Militar, the military academy which used to stand in the street that now bears its name and where 
Liriu’s sede suku is now located 
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large number of people are in the same situation as interviewee 46, who said “I 
have been participating to all the meetings in the suku discussing this issue, I am 
aware of the process to apply for ownership or compensation and I have taken all 
the steps I was supposed to take, but so far I have not heard anything from the 
government”. 
Nevertheless, despite being referred to as the ‘red line’ of land disputes, the fact 
that in Liriu most of those disputes are taking place between the state and its 
citizens means that there are few issues between previous and current owners, 
none of which able to produce land titles80; this goes a long way in explaining why 
Liriu has mostly remained a peaceful area since independence.  
This does not mean that there haven’t been fights between youth or episodes of 
violence, but that these episodes have thus far been few and far between and not 
significant enough to cause a disruption in the life of the aldeia’s inhabitants. As a 
result of this peaceful reputation, Motael hosted one of the main IDP camps during 
the 2006 crisis and its church became a main destination for many other people 
fleeing the violence at the time. Many participants who lived in the area at the time 
remember seeing many people coming to Liriu’s church to seek refuge, although it 
is interesting to note that there is no animosity in relation to the situation, 
potentially because the IDPs did not resettle in the area. To date, Liriu’s 
inhabitants consider their aldeia to be a safe and peaceful environment to live in. 
7.2.2. Common values and civic culture 
Discussions with participants in Liriu in relation to their understanding of, and 
relationship with, state institutions revealed that there is a significant amount of 
interaction between Liriu’s residents and their state, resulting in a much deeper 
understanding of its functioning.  
Participants demonstrated a tendency to keep checks and balances on their state 
on the basis of the level of development and change their aldeia is subject to. The 
vast majority of participants indicated that the infrastructure being used in the 
aldeia has not been properly updated – or even changed – since Indonesian and, 
in some instances, Portuguese times. As a result, as noted interviewee 41, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Land titles in Timor Leste are a source of much conflict: whilst the Portuguese had proceeded to properly 
conferring those titles to owners, as the owner of the Vasco deGama restaurant in Liriu showed the author, the 
repeated violence and destruction during Indonesian rule – which contributed to much population movement – 
and the burning of the Portuguese archives as the Indonesians left, have resulted in many parcels of land being 
contested.  
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“although there has always been running water here – since it was installed by the 
Portuguese – the system has never been upgraded and the whole area sometimes 
goes for two or three weeks without any water”. When the water goes missing, 
Liriu’s inhabitants either go to Jardin81 like interviewee 41, or take their cars to go 
fetch water elsewhere like interviewee 45. The issue has been signalled repeatedly 
to the xefi suku and other government representatives, but interviewee 42 
indicated that “so far nothing has happened”. 
Nevertheless, participants in Liriu do not limit their judgement of the state solely on 
tangible infrastructure improvements; rather, a large number of participants 
demonstrated to have a good knowledge of the way in which state institutions 
operate, the political situation at national level and the main issues with the current 
functioning of the state system. For instance, a number of participants commented 
on the presence of corruption at state level, expressing their concerns in relation to 
how tender contracts, scholarships and other resources are allocated, and 
indicating that often it appears those with the connections to the government are 
the ones who manage to receive money from the state. Others, such as 
interviewee 51, criticised the multiparty system: “There are twenty-three political 
parties within the state, which can easily turn into a problem because they 
disagree with most of the actions undertaken by the party in power.” 
This ability to look at the state, as well as assess its functioning, from different 
points of views results in Liriu’s participants’ judgement of state actions and 
developments being more critical and yet less severe. Indeed, many participants, 
regardless of their socio-economic and employment status, indicated that whilst it 
was clear that there was still much progress to be done in relation to improving 
people’s everyday life, “the last government [AMP] did a good job, it managed to 
build some infrastructure despite the fact that we were a new nation and there was 
very little budget” – interviewee 51; many, such as interviewee 46, also indicated 
that “as a new nation it is normal to see slow progress”, but they can see things 
improving. 
Two important elements, which emerged through discussion with participants, 
appear to contribute to facilitating people’s interaction and understanding of the 
state system in Liriu. The first one is the important role of local leaders in actively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 ‘Jardin’ refers here to the ‘Jardin 5 de Maio’, which is also part of Motael and is located just opposite the 
entrance to Dili’s port 
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involving the population in all matters pertaining to the development and living 
standards of their aldeia; from making readily available all communication about 
community meetings – in which the majority of participants indicated they 
participated actively – to involving the residents in the development of proposals 
for initiatives to improve life in the aldeia, it became clear that the local leaders in 
Liriu play a significant role in portraying an image of local governance that reflects 
more positively on at least one layer of the state system. As such, youth, middle 
aged, elderly, as much as women and men, all indicated that they have been part 
in the development of proposals, whether “to be able to use the field along the 
beach, in Lecidere, as a football field to train and organise games” – interviewee 
39 – or as monthly proposals “to the government to improve the infrastructure of 
the area” – interviewee 43. 
The second element that appeared to contribute significantly to shaping people’s 
images of their state at different levels, was the active attitude of many 
participants, beyond that encouraged and initiated by the local leaders, in dealing 
with different state institutions and authorities. Whether participants were small 
business owners – e.g. the owner of a private shop selling air conditioning – or 
private contractors – e.g. the owner of a private company working in agribusiness, 
the owner of a private construction company – or whether they lived on state land 
and were trying to legalise their situation or apply for relocation compensations, a 
large number of Liriu participants had already interacted with different levels of 
state authorities more than once, therefore facilitating a certain level of 
understanding of state institutions. Similarly, interviewee 44 pointed out that 
“young people in this area participate actively in the development of a good 
governance and in creating a better environment for our community” and they do 
not depend on the state: “if they need something done they will apply for funding 
and if they do not succeed, often they will do it voluntarily”. 
Consequently, an investigation into participants’ understanding and judgment of 
their state revealed that their regular interaction with its institutions, at different 
levels, gives them a sense of belonging to both the aldeia polity and the wider 
Timorese political community. A number of participants shared insightful 
comments about what they think is problematic with the way in which their state is 
currently managing the country, and how this can significantly impact the 
construction of a Timorese political community needed to ensure the development 
of a strong state. For instance, interviewee 39 pointed out that there is currently a 
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significant gap between international and national consultants’ salaries, and “this 
should change in order to provide an incentive for Timorese to improve as well, 
because at the moment many people don’t look like they want to contribute”. 
Similarly, interviewee 40 argued that the state should empower the private sector 
in order to boost the country’s economy, but instead “at the moment the 
government is just using oil money to carry out the developments, and works very 
little on creating a Timorese identity”. These comments show that there is a sense 
of the importance of common aims, objectives and values at all levels, and that the 
state, through its policies, is seen as currently failing to promote those. 
7.2.3. Social order and social control 
According to participants in the research, social order in Liriu has been 
characterised, since independence, by a general lack of violence or threats to 
peaceful relations amongst its population. Even throughout the Crisis of 2006/7, all 
participants indicated that the aldeia managed to remain generally free from riots 
and violence, transforming it instead in a safe area where IDP camps were set up 
– one of the main IDP camps was set up in Jardim, just East of Liriu, by the port – 
to accommodate many people fleeing the violence in their aldeias, whilst no 
participants from Liriu indicated fleeing their house. This may partly be do to the 
fact that there are no known martial art groups active in the area; that is, there may 
be some martial art group members amongst the inhabitants of the aldeia but they 
are not causing problems or fighting amongst each other in Liriu. 
Today, social order in Liriu continues to be maintained, even if disrupted at times 
by issues related to young people provoking each other or some domestic 
violence, making the aldeia one of the safest ones in Dili. All the residents who 
participated in the research, agreed with interviewee 48 that since 1999 there have 
not been any significant episodes of violence in the aldeia “because most of the 
families are well educated and they educate their children, not only by sending 
them to school but also by teaching them respect for their community”. 
The vast majority of the participants agreed that the maintenance of social control 
is successful thanks to local leaders’ ability to “manage and organise the 
community” – interviewee 49. Furthermore, as indicated by interviewee 44, 
participants in Liriu believe that “the activities organised by the leadership, 
especially the xefi suku but also the youth leader, have a very good impact on the 
relationships and the behaviour of young people”. The relationship with the police 
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force, although generally omitted from discussions about social control, was 
described in relatively positive terms. Indeed, interviewee 43 mentioned the close 
relationship with the authorities, called upon “depending on the type of offence or 
issue that is being reported”, generally in order to “avoid problems escalating and 
going to court”.  
The more positive relationship of Liriu’s residents with the police force may be 
attributed, in no small part, to the fact that since much of the violence during the 
Crisis happened outside of the aldeia, little repression took place in Liriu, thus 
preventing a negative representation of the state monopoly over the means of 
violence. In combination with the fact, highlighted in the previous sub-section, that 
people in Liriu have regular interaction with state institutions and a relatively 
comprehensive vision of the state system, it is also likely that participants have a 
more critical approach to the state in relation to social control and the monopoly of 
the means of violence. For instance, a number of participants pointed out, like 
interviewee 49, that in 2006 “it should have been obvious that laying off 600 
policemen who had families to feed would have provoked an outcry not only 
amongst those policemen, but would also have been a trigger to protest against 
much larger socio-economic issues”. Since the crisis in 2006, interviewee 43 
indicated, “there has been a professionalization of the police, which means that 
they are now much better at responding to episodes of violence”. 
Finally, there are still a number of people in Liriu who have either worked with the 
Portuguese or Indonesian authorities, or whose parents did, resulting in a long-
standing relationship with security forces and state power. 
7.2.4. Social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities 
Despite visible wealth disparities in Liriu’s urban fabric, discussions with 
participants on economic and social development, as well as common standards, 
reveal that access to opportunities and services is relatively equal across all socio-
economic backgrounds within the aldeia. This was also confirmed by the socio-
economic statistics on the suku of Motael presented in section 7.2.1. 
Indeed, Motael is one of the very few sub-districts in Dili where only seven 
households out of the whole sub-district do not have access to electricity for 
lighting (MoF, 2011; p.434). Furthermore, while most households appear to have 
access to running water – whether in their houses or from a tap just outside their 
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house – access to drinking water appears to be much more of an issue for the 
majority of the participants, regardless of their socio-economic status: although 
statistics show that 61% of households can access drinking water from a public tap 
(ibid; p.454) – partly as a result of the water and sanitation projects for IDP camps 
in Motael82 during the Crisis – most participants, regardless of their socio-economic 
status, lamented like interviewee 46 that ““there have been no changes in our area 
in relation to clean water, we still have no access to it”. 
Access to transportation in the area also proved to transcend socio-economic 
boundaries within Liriu, as the position of the aldeia on a large number of mikrolet 
routes facilitates most participants’ movements across Dili’s urban space. The fact 
that most of these routes directly reach the main areas of the urban space, 
therefore keeping the costs low, also ensure more movement across Dili. Similarly, 
the proximity to Colmera – one of Dili’s areas with the highest density of shops – 
and Comoro – another area with many shops – facilitate many participants’ easy 
access to economic activity, thus contributing to an additional incentive for 
movement around the urban space. 
In relation to social solidarity, interviewees 48 and 49, who had both worked as 
civil servants with the Portuguese government, explained that they were receiving 
state pensions from both the Portuguese and the Timorese governments. Because 
he also worked as a civil servant for the Indonesian government, interviewee 49 
indicated also receiving an Indonesian pension. 
The findings highlighted in this sub-section reveal that whilst there are wealth 
disparities in Liriu, these do not lead to unequal access to opportunities. Indeed, 
the wide variety of different economic – e.g. construction company, farmer, selling 
food in government offices, security guards, civil servants from Portuguese, 
Indonesian and independence times, etc – and social activities in the area – 
organising events, applying for grants to improve infrastructure – showed that 
there are generally common standards across the aldeia, as well as good levels of 
social and economic development across the population. Furthermore, references 
to receiving pensions from the state demonstrated that there is a certain level of 
redistribution of public finances taking place in Liriu.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 These were located in the Motael camps of Jardim, Farol EP, Belun’s office and Fundacao Haburas. 
The Impact of State Building on Urban Social Cohesion in Dili 
249 	  
7.2.5. Social networks and social capital 
Fieldwork visits revealed that the nature of social interaction in Liriu is much more 
akin to that of an urban area in Western countries, rather than more traditionally 
taking place in the streets like in rural areas. During the weekend, people with high 
socio-economic status living in houses built during Portuguese times generally stay 
in their garden and invite family, friends and neighbours in their private sphere 
rather than meeting outside. A similar attitude was observed in relation to people 
with good socio-economic status living either in Portuguese or Indonesian houses. 
On the other hand, people from lower socio-economic backgrounds, living in small 
compounds of simple brick houses, appeared to interact a little more in or around 
public spaces – as illustrated in Picture 7 below showing people interacting 
around the sede suku. Interestingly, however, there are few children playing 
outside and rarely do so on the street, again reflecting a lifestyle much more akin 
to an urban space, rather than a rural area. 
Picture 7 – Youth chatting on the side of the road on a Saturday 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
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Picture 8 – Women interacting in public spaces around low-income housing 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
During the week the level of social interaction in the streets reflects the socio-
economic background of the area; as indicated by interviewee 42, people in Liriu 
“are busy with their jobs and with their lives, there are minimum relationships 
between neighbours”, and even though there is interactions amongst neighbours, 
interviewee 37 noted that “people who work generally like to go home to stay with 
their families”. 
Despite these varied approaches to social interaction discussions with participants, 
regarding the level of attendance and nature of the community meetings, revealed 
a high degree of civic engagement and associational activity in Liriu, confirming the 
findings regarding civic culture highlighted in sub-section 7.2.2 that emphasised 
Liriu’s residents engagement with their local authorities. Indeed, not only does the 
majority of people attend community meetings regularly, but they also appear to 
spark productive discussions on the improvement of living standards in the area. 
Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that civic engagement goes beyond local 
leaders leadership and can also be found at individual level, as many participants 
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indicated that they often sit with “friends to talk about politics”, like interviewee 39, 
or with their family such as interviewee 52 who is new to the area but indicated “I 
do discuss at length with my uncle here, because the decisions the government 
takes affect us every day and it is important to talk about it”. Finally, many 
interviewees pointed out like interviewee 41 that “there are no real issues in the 
aldeia so I don’t really discuss those, but I do like to discuss what happens at 
national level”. This was particularly striking amongst youth who, much like 
interviewee 40, indicated “we all have an interest in building our future nation: as 
youth, we reap what we sow”. 
Similarly, associational activity, under the leadership of local leaders, is vibrant in 
Liriu, and many of the activities taking place are generally targeted at youth. 
Interestingly, these activities are not limited to typical football games and other 
sports, but also include a number of “activities to build the capacity of our youth to 
ensure that even those who cannot go to university are capable of finding a job to 
make a living” – interviewee 39. Furthermore, confirming the findings of section 
7.2.2 highlighting the importance of making young people responsible, interviewee 
44 indicated that these activities “help them change their mentalities and create a 
better environment in which they can grow up.” 
Finally, the high degree of civic engagement within Liriu also translates into a well-
developed sense of responsibility toward each other; the levels of trust fostered 
amongst the community, as well as the networks developed between people 
through their regular civic engagement, significantly contribute to facilitating the 
resolution of collective action problems both under the leadership of the local 
leaders as well as simply amongst residents. For example, interviewee 39 
contributed to forming a group that “gives advice to the people in the area about 
land and property”, whilst interviewee 45 mentioned that, in order to tackle the 
water issues experienced in the aldeia, “some people have put money together to 
dig a well and put a pipe so that the whole community can benefit, while those that 
have not contributed to its creation can still benefit from it by paying for the water 
they take”. 
Consequently, the analysis above on the type of associational and civic relations 
developed amongst the population in Liriu shows that, despite varied levels and 
types of social interaction, there is a high degree of social capital in the aldeia. The 
peaceful relations that have characterised Liriu, generally, since independence, 
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combined with the ability of local leaders to successfully engage residents in 
common projects, activities and discussions, has contributed to the development of 
good levels of trust amongst people as well as the development of strong networks 
that are subsequently replicated even outside of formal local governance 
arrangements. Through discussions with participants and local leaders, it did not 
emerge that there were any significant efforts to bridge with other aldeias on a 
regular basis; however, the fact that Motael hosted one of the largest IDPs camps 
Dili and Liriu became an aldeia of refuge during 2006, compounded with the fact 
that people in Liriu are much better connected – through education, employment 
and mobility – to the rest of Dili’s urban space, resulted clearly in people’s ability to 
relate more easily to issues taking place at a wider scale than their aldeia’s. As 
such, social capital in Liriu is bridged at a much wider scale, reaching in certain 
instances the national scales, and therefore resulting in a sense of belonging both 
to a local polity and the Timorese political community. 
7.3. Urban social cohesion in Metin IV 
7.3.1. Objective reading of Metin IV’s urban fabric 
a) Geographical location  
Metin IV is situated in an isolated area of Dili’ urban spread, bordered on one side 
by the Comoro river – which regularly floods during rainy season – and by the sea 
on the other side. It is part of the suku of Comoro, within the sub-district of Dom 
Aleixo – as shown in Map 13 below. 
Map 13 – Geographical location of Metin IV (in blue) within Dili’s urban area  	  	  
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google map 
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The aldeia of Metin IV is the most recent one of the three analysed for the purpose 
of this research; it only emerged during Indonesian times and was built on what at 
the time was mostly vacant land. It has, however, been the focus of too little 
development attention – if at all – and is therefore the most isolated area of the 
three: not only is it situated at a corner with a regularly flooding river and the sea, 
but the main road that connects it to Comoro road – hereafter referred to as ‘main 
road’ – is considered unsafe – for cars and pedestrians – and long. The aldeia 
itself is quite spread out, particularly concentrated along the road connecting the 
river bank to the main road – hereafter referred to as ‘river road’ – and more 
spread out and rural as one moves towards the sea – as Map 14 and Picture 9 
below illustrate. 
Map 14 – Aerial view of Metin IV 	  
(Map removed for copyright purposes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google map 
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Picture 9 – Towards the river and the sea roads and houses look more rural 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
b) Accessibility 
Metin IV’s geographical isolation is worsened by its absence of connections to 
urban transportation. In relation to mikrolet routes, the aldeia is located away from 
any immediate connection – as Map 15 below illustrates – with a minimum of a 
fifteen minutes walk to reach Comoro road where the closest stop is. The main 
road that Metin IV’s residents need to walk on to reach Comoro road is very badly 
lit, in an area that is considered unsafe – particularly for women – which works as 
a deterrent in the evening. Moreover, even for cars and motorbikes it is a 
particularly bad road, riddled with deep potholes, at times unpaved and severely 
flooded during rainy season, thus contributing to many taxis refusing to take 
passengers to the aldeia – participants pointed out that generally, even during the 
dry season, taxis are reluctant to come to Metin IV because the area is known to 
be prone to violence. Consequently, Metin IV is not only geographically isolated 
from the rest of the urban area, but its lack of adequate infrastructure contributes 
to cut its population off further. 
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Map 15 – Location of Metin IV within the mikrolet route system 
	  
Source: Fritz, S. (2014) 
As indicated earlier, Metin IV is interesting in that there is a particularly dense 
population living along the two (generally) paved roads of the area – the main road 
and the river road, seen in Picture 10 – reflecting a slightly more urban landscape, 
but as one moves closer to the river or the sea, the population becomes sparser 
and the landscape slowly becomes that of a rural area, connected to the rest of the 
aldeia by unpaved roads or tracks – as illustrated in Picture 11 below83. It is also 
interesting to note that on one side of the river road the houses have been built 
behind a long brick wall: discussions with participants revealed that that side of the 
road is prone to regular episodes of violence and the wall was erected there as a 
protection – part of this wall can be seen Picture 10 below, behind the girl walking 
down the street.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In the middle is the road connecting the river to the main road, to its left is an unpaved road leading away 
from the first road and to the right is a track connecting houses in the more rural part of the area. 
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Picture 10 – On the urban side, two roads are paved, including river road 	  
 
Source: photographs taken by the author 
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Picture 11 – Moving away from paved roads, Metin IV is connected by dirt roads 
 
Source: photographs taken by the author 
c) Socio-economic characteristics 
When one looks at the statistics on education, the suku of Comoro appears to be 
fairing similarly to that of Motael, where Liriu is located: the share of school-age 
population that is at school is 43.6%, those who have left school represent 43%; 
similarities are also found in relation to the share of people who have graduated 
from secondary school, that is 32%, and from university, that is 16.5%. The only 
differences can be found in relation to the share of people who have never 
attended school – 12.6% in Comoro, incidentally also the second highest 
percentage in the sub-district of Dom Aleixo – and the share that have a diploma – 
that is 1.4%. The same resemblances between Motael and Comoro can also be 
found in relation to employment: the share of inactive population is 56.3% and 
those that are employed represent 35.7% – both quite close to Motael statistics.  
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Walking through both the urban and the rural parts of Metin IV, however, one can 
notice that the urban fabric of the aldeia is much more revealing of the low-income 
status of its citizens, than it did in Liriu. The houses are built as square blocks in 
grey bricks, some of them with a porch for people to sit and talk, but a vast majority 
without it – as seen in Picture 12 below. There are hardly any walls surrounding 
people’s front gardens, although one notices, when walking around the aldeia, that 
front gardens are absent along the roads, but become increasingly more common 
as one moves into the more rural side. 
Picture 12 – Low income houses in Metin IV are quite rudimentary 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
Similarly, as one moves away from the roads and into the more rural area of the 
aldeia, one notices the increasing presence of crops being grown in the gardens, a 
feature that is largely – though not completely – absent along the river road – as 
illustrated in Picture 13 below. Discussions with participants revealed that the 
crops being grown in these gardens serve both for household consumption and to 
sell either in the streets or in Dili vegetable markets as a form of livelihood. 
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Picture 13 – Vegetable garden in Metin IV 
 
Source: photographs taken by the author 
 
Metin IV’s urban fabric therefore is particularly interesting because of the 
urban/rural duality it reflects. The presence of two paved roads, along which one 
can find high density living and the numerous kios selling essential groceries are 
reminiscent of the urban life described in Liriu; however, the presence of 
agriculture as a source of livelihood, the unpaved tracks and the high number of 
street vegetable and fruit vendors on the roads and tracks suggests a more rural 
fabric. 
d) Development of the area 
Much like in Liriu the population of the aldeia is characterised by diversity in the 
districts of origin, which may be partly explained by the two different waves of 
urbanisation of the area. Indeed, Metin IV, compared to the two previous areas, is 
a relatively new area that remained a vastly vacant stretch of land during 
Portuguese times, as the absence of Metin IV – in fact, Dom Aleixo sub-district in 
general – on the Portuguese urbanisation maps, used to locate Liriu in section 
7.2.1, indicates. 
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Rather, the story of interviewee 56 indicates that the aldeia began emerging in the 
late 1970s, purposefully built by the Indonesians as a village where “they forced 
population from the nearby mountains to relocate in order to maintain control”. The 
Indonesian government, he says, “gave us a small patch of land where we could 
build a house and grow our own vegetables, so that we could be making a 
livelihood – and therefore not create problems – while also remaining under the 
surveillance of the Indonesian military personnel assigned to the area”. 
Interviewee 53 pointed out that “when the political tensions between Indonesians 
and Timorese resistance lowered in the mid-1980s, a number of people chose to 
move back to the mountains, selling their land to Indonesian military personnel”. 
As such, in the 1990s the population of the aldeia was a mix of Indonesians and 
Timorese, approximately 50-50 according to interviewee 56, but interviewee 60 
added that “the Indonesians had good control over the population and the 
relationships between Timorese and Indonesians in the area were generally 
peaceful”. 
These movements of people from the mountains to the area therefore account for 
a first wave of urbanisation involving people from different districts. The second 
wave happened after 1999, when the Indonesians withdrew from Timor Leste 
leaving behind the houses and land that had been sold to them; from then on, as 
indicated by interviewee 53, “the population has been increasing significantly, 
which has created significant problems in relation to land and property because 
many of the newcomers have moved into houses that had been sold to Indonesian 
personnel and that are now sometimes being claimed by the previous Timorese 
owners.” 
e) History of violence since independence  
Whilst the withdrawal of Indonesians from the area was not accompanied, in Metin 
IV, by the violence that characterised the scorched earth policy across most of Dili, 
the aldeia has been a hotspot for much violence since 1999. Indeed, the arrival in 
the area of large numbers of people from different districts, who have moved to 
houses that were previously owned by other Timorese and had been left vacant by 
the Indonesians who had purchased them, has led to a number of issues related to 
land and property claims. Furthermore, during Indonesian military occupation a 
number of social control tools were used by the military in order to maintain control 
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over, and in the long run indoctrinate, the population; one of these tools included 
the practice of martial arts, a strategy aimed particularly a Timorese youth because 
it not only facilitated control – through their organisation into martial art groups 
(MAGs) with Indonesian masters – but it also promoted indirectly the Indonesian 
government through the establishment of patronage networks, as “membership in 
a MAG was a pragmatic step to gain access to scholarships, jobs, and, most 
importantly, protection from the military and militias” (Scambary, 2012; p.212).  
Upon withdrawal of the Indonesians, these MAGs have continued to exist and, in 
fact, multiply, albeit without the same control over the type of philosophy that is 
being passed on, resulting in “a large number of MAGs in Metin IV that are trained 
by martial art trainers that do not have the right education or license to do so”, 
interviewee 53 pointed out, adding that “this is particularly problematic when the 
trainers have a negative mentality, prone to violence, and they teach martial arts 
as a weapon rather than as a philosophy, and often leading the way for very 
violent groups (and group clashes) to emerge”. 
The combination of land and property right issues and the significant presence of 
MAGs in the area contributed to making Metin IV one of the hotspots for violence 
in the 2006 crisis. Indeed, as the lorosae/loromonu rhetoric emerged and 
consolidated in the first months of the crisis, “occupation of the former Indonesian 
civil service housing [became] especially contentious, and east-west violence 
[became] particularly heated around the four main clusters of this housing in Dili” 
(Scambary, 2009; p.276). Metin IV, previously home to many Indonesian 
personnel, therefore became one of those aldeias where MAGs members began 
justifying violence against Easterners by claiming that they had no right to live in 
the houses and on the land they had moved into, becoming key players in the 
eviction process (ibid; p.277) and leading to much displacement in the area. As of 
2008, there were still a significant number of displaced that had not returned to the 
aldeia – see Figure 17 below – and the xefi aldeia signalled a number of issues 
that were contributing to such delays, including land, private disputes, MAGs and 
general violence.  
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Figure 17 – Number of displaced and returnees for each aldeia in suku Comoro in 
2008 
 
Source: IOM (2008), p.15 
 
By 2009, although there were still a number of displaced that had not returned to 
the area – see Figure 18 below – Metin IV was no longer considered an with 
major issues; according to interviewee 53 this was the positive result of a dialogue 
team organised by the MSS in 2008, which included the xefi aldeia himself who 
“applied the skills learnt in my previous post, in Dom Aleixo, and combined them 
with my knowledge of the area84 in order to promote dialogue in Metin IV and 
facilitate return.” 
Figure 18 - Number of displaced and returnees for each aldeia in suku Comoro in 2009 
 
Source: IOM (2009), p.3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Metin IV’s xefi aldeia has been living in the area since 1992 and was elected for the first time in 2004. He was 
reelected in 2009, proof of his positive influence in the area. 
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As such, Metin IV, became part of the National Recovery Strategy (NRS), carried 
out by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS)85, and benefitted from projects aimed 
at building youth resilience and improving their coping mechanisms in order to be 
able to deal with the violence in their area and move forward to build peaceful 
relations. Discussions with the participants have revealed that these projects, 
however, were only partially successful because they did not address the root 
causes of the violence, that is, land issues and MAGs, consequently, the role of 
the local leaders, as the forthcoming sections will indicate, has remained 
particularly important in containing violence and promoting social order in the 
aldeia. 
7.3.2. Common values and civic culture 
The issues highlighted above concerning gang related violence have emerged 
regularly in discussions with the participants as a starting point for keeping checks 
and balances on the state system and judging its functioning. The majority of the 
participants have indicated that there is a significant problem in the area with youth 
unemployment, which often leads, as indicated by interviewee 70, “to young 
people who are unemployed and have lost hope to join the MAGs in order to feel 
like they belong and find ways to express their anger”. Similarly, the majority of 
interviewees, and in particular women, thought like interviewee 71, that “the 
government doesn’t pay enough attention to what is going on with our youth at the 
local level, instead it should try to understand what skills are needed for the 
country by gathering more accurate data on employment statistics”. Finally, many 
participants indicated, like interviewee 70, that “there should be a youth centre 
and/or a training centre, but there is currently no programme to do that”. 
For Metin IV’s inhabitants this is not just a matter of poor national level decision 
making processes, but it relates more specifically to the failure of the state in 
connecting with the local level, understanding their issues and addressing them or 
providing them with the means to address them themselves. For participants in 
Metin IV there is a real problem, as indicated by interviewee 53, with the fact that 
“the government never comes to see the communities and see what the problems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 The NRS was implemented in the aftermath of the crisis of 2006 and focused on five pillars: housing, protection, 
security, socio-economic and trust-building (RDTL, 2012; p.9) 
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are”; interviewee’s 69’s lamenting that “the last government made many promises 
but nothing happened” was also echoed by the vast majority of participants. This is 
made even worse by the contrast between President Jose Ramos Horta 
succeeding in having river road fixed “within two weeks of his visit in 2008 after he 
noticed himself that it was in really bad conditions”, interviewee 53 said, whilst 
“people who try to go to government offices to ask for help get repeatedly ignored 
because government people think that we are ‘small people’86 in communities and 
we don’t know any better” – as pointed out by interviewee 69. Similarly, 
interviewee 53 noted that although the community tries to “work together and write 
proposals to get funds to improve living conditions”, they are never successful. 
These issues were not only evident in relation to youth and gang related violence, 
but participants repeatedly brought them up also in relation to the aldeia’s lack of 
adequate infrastructure. 
These comments reveal, therefore, that people are not limiting their judgement to 
the levels of social, economic and infrastructure development that takes place in 
their area; they are also aware that the state system is set up in a way that does 
not provide them with the room to voice their concern – or does not listen to their 
voice. This contributes to the development of a feeling of abandonment combined 
with resentment. Discussions with participants revealed that, in addition to judging 
their state on the basis of what is going on in their own aldeia, people also have a 
sense of what is going on at national level and realise that, compared to the levels 
of development in other part of Dili’s urban space, they are being particularly left 
out. For instance, interviewee 70 indicated that whilst “the last government [AMP] 
worked really hard and we started seeing changes in relation to health, education 
and peace through dialogues, there are still no infrastructure changes, all we see 
is new Ministry buildings and we know they are the priority because they are 
visible”. A large number of participants emphasised, like interviewee 64, that 
priorities at this stage should be “improving access to higher education, investing 
in skills training so that young people have also better access to employment 
opportunities, and improving the implementation of the law, because many of the 
problems we are having are the result of good but badly implemented laws.” 
As a result, discussions with participants have indicated that in Metin IV the role of 
local leaders is key in filling the gap between the needs of the aldeia and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 In opposition to the concept of ema boot, small people are not part of the political elite, do not have a 
particular important status. 
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shortcomings in state delivery. However, unlike in Liriu, the gap that is being filled 
does not contribute to shaping a positive image of the administrative control of the 
state; rather, while the state appears to remain detached from the issues 
concerning Metin IV’s residents, the local leaders have stepped up significantly to 
implement, with the community, initiatives and programmes to improve the living 
conditions in the area. The important role of the leaders in ensuring that the 
community works together was particularly evident in attendance to community 
meetings and the pattern that emerged along the lines of the urban/rural duality of 
the aldeia: whereas people closer to the sede indicated that they participate in all 
the meetings, a number of people in the more rural areas pointed out that they are 
not always aware of the meetings being organised and they do not always have 
the time to find out – unless they walk by and see that something is happening. 
These patterns reveal that people on their own do not necessarily actively seek to 
take part in aldeia life; rather, interviewee 80 noted that “the role of the local 
leaders remains crucial in ensuring everyone’s participation, thus putting significant 
pressure on a role that however cannot be performed full-time do to financial 
restrictions”87.  
Similarly, the role of local leaders in attempting to provide solutions for youth 
violence and unemployment has been widely recognised by the majority of the 
participants. Many of them have pointed out, as mentioned previously, that there 
should be much more involvement by the state to provide young people in the area 
with activities, skills training and employment opportunities, but since the state is 
not forthcoming on this front, the local leaders are being proactive in writing 
proposals to access funds in order to implement them at local level. For instance, 
interviewee 55 indicated that local leaders “have made many proposals to the 
government to bring skills training (to SEFOPE88, to the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports, the Ministry of Education), they have even gone to the Prime Minister’s 
office to try and get the fund, but so far they have often been unsuccessful”. 
Consequently, whilst the local leaders are stepping up to fill the gap left by a 
national state system that does not provide room for community voices to be 
heard, the attitude of higher levels of state structures toward the disbursement of 
funds is contributing to reinforcing an image of the state that remains strongly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Xefi aldeia are not remunerated for their work therefore many of them have a full-time job 
88 Secretariat of State of Professional Training and Employment 
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disconnected from the needs of the population, and fails to promote the idea of a 
Timorese political community with common aims and objectives that include 
everyone at all scales. In contrast to this attitude, local leaders are succeeding in 
creating an image of a cohesive local polity with common goals and objectives at 
aldeia level; their attitude toward the evictions that Metin IV’s residents are facing 
as a result of state plans to expand the airport – which is located on the other side 
of the river – illustrates very well this finding. According to interviewee 63, in order 
to find a solution to the issue the government sent “a team of consultants to talk to 
people in order to understand their position on the matter and what kind of 
solutions could be found (e.g. compensation, relocation, etc) but when they came it 
sent our area into chaos: everyone wanted something different, people were 
starting to argue”. By contrast, local leaders “called a general meeting and tried to 
mediate, showing everyone that we would be stronger if we stood together as a 
community rather than everyone on their own. It worked, the situation calmed 
down.” 
7.3.3. Social order and social control 
As mentioned in sub-section 7.3.1, the nature of social order in Metin IV has been 
characterised by recurrent episodes of violence since independence in 1999 and, 
despite a reduction noted by the participants since the end of 2012, the aldeia 
continues to be considered by its residents, and Dili’s population at large, as an 
area particularly prone to violence, a reputation that is “hard to turn around” as 
noted by interviewee 57. Discussions with participants revealed that, whilst the 
efforts made in the context of project implementation during the NRS were 
successful in restoring more peaceful relations in the area and allowing for the 
return of a number of IDPs, these projects failed to address the root causes of the 
violence in the area and therefore failed to eradicate it.  
Indeed, for them the issues are not merely related to violence emerging out of the 
politicisation of the lorosae and loromonu rhetoric, consequently potentially 
resolved through community dialogue; rather, the fact that so much violence took 
place in 2006 was for Metin IV’s population the symptom of the combination of 
both endemic and structural problems dating back to 1999: endemic, because the 
long standing presence of MAGs in the area has been a key factor in contributing 
to evictions and the propagation of violence, and structural because the lack of 
education and employment opportunities for young people in the area made it 
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easier to influence disenfranchised youth – and still does. This is particularly 
problematic in view of the lack of education not only for youth, but of the parents as 
well; number of interviewees noted, as interviewee 61 did, that “many families 
either don’t have the money to send their children to school (even if school is free, 
there is still a need to buy uniforms, books and supplies) or simply they are not 
educated enough to teach their children respect and understand the importance of 
sending their children to school”. As such, faced with significant lack of education 
and employment opportunities, combined with difficult family socio-economic 
situations, “many young people that don’t have jobs and don’t have access to 
education (because sometimes their parents cannot afford it) feel like they have no 
future, so they get drunk together and throw stones or create problems with people 
who are better off than them. There is a lot of social jealousy at the root of this 
violence now” – interviewee 56. 
Discussions with participants, therefore, revealed that not only are there significant 
issues with social order in their aldeia, but that state response to these issues has 
so far been inadequate. Failure of state institutions to consult the population and 
attempting to understand the root causes of violence, as opposed to limiting its 
interventions to repression, is yet another proof for Metin IV’s residents that state 
institutions are completely detached from the reality of people in communities.  
Instead, as noted in the previous sub-section, local leaders have stepped in to take 
up the responsibility to maintain social control in the area through both conflict 
resolution mechanisms and mediation; as a result, “problems in the area have 
slowly decreased”, as indicated by interviewee 67. Indeed, participants pointed out 
that, whilst it is not possible for local leaders alone to bring about the changes 
necessary for the improvement in employment and education the aldeia needs, 
they try instead to contribute to conflict resolution and mediation by taking the time, 
as often as necessary, “to sit together with the perpetrators and talk to them to 
understand why they did what they did, and to explain to them that they should be 
more responsible because this is also their community and they should not harm it” 
– interviewee 58. Furthermore, the strong connection of the local leaders with their 
aldeia significantly contributes to giving the leaders legitimacy in these processes. 
For example, interviewee 54 indicated that whilst he no longer is a youth leader, 
“everyone in the area still trusts me very much, they know me well, so that when 
there is a problem they come to talk to me, they ask me to mediate”. 
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The importance of local leaders in filling the gap left by the state was equally noted 
in relation to the other significant issue concerning Metin IV, that is, land rights. 
Although only two participants mentioned having had trouble with land rights, one 
of them – interviewee 57 – noted that he has taken the case to court “but the 
process to come to a decision is long and tensions between me and the other 
claimant were mounting, so we eventually sought the help of the xefi aldeia to 
bring us together and discuss the issue peacefully”. The other case, mentioned by 
interviewee 60, took so long to sort out that eventually he “gave up and found 
another piece of land where to built the house.” 
The importance of the local leaders in the process of conflict resolution and 
mediation, therefore, came across very clearly through most of the discussions 
with the participants. But discussions also pointed out that this was not only a 
result of the gap left by state institutions; rather, it was also a way to avoid dealing 
with security and judiciary systems that people in Metin IV appeared to distrust 
significantly. Interviewee 53 explained: “, if there is a big problem with violence, we 
call the police but their interventions are not satisfactory: either they arrive too late 
and we have already solved the problem or the damage has already been done; 
either they arrive on time, they arrest the people they believe responsible for the 
trouble, they detain them for 72h, make a report and then send it to the court that 
might (or might not) call to go to trial. This system is not effective because people 
don’t understand it. What they see is that the response rate is low and when it 
does happen a cumbersome, protracted process is set in motion, which no one 
explains to them; there is no reconciliation, no apologies from the perpetrator to 
the victim(s), no conflict resolution”.  
Contrary to the situation in Liriu, where relations with the policy force appeared 
positive most likely as a result of the lack of history of violence in the area since 
1999, in Metin IV discussions with participants made it clear that the high levels of 
disruption in the aldeia’s social order has resulted in a relationship with the police 
force that has practically constantly been characterised by repression and, what 
was felt like, unfairness. This was clearly reflected in interviewee 74’s comment 
that “while there is a little less violence in the area now it is because the police 
comes and represses the violence, scares young people into not engaging in 
violent activities”. Furthermore, this is particularly evident in the fact that, in order 
to convey an image of order and provide a presence in the area, a police post – 
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shown in Picture 14 – was erected in the heart of the aldeia where most of the 
confrontations between gangs take place; participants indicated, however, that 
actions taken by the police – during some time both national and international – 
were inadequate and, at times, repressive, contributing more to the representation 
of a state that represses rather than provides support. The fact that the post was 
left vacant when international forces withdrew in 2012 and PNTL became a force 
of its own again with a clearer mission, only contributes to shaping, in the minds of 
the aldeia’s population, the image of a state that does not provide the necessary 
and adequate support. 
Picture 14 – Metin IV’s police post conveys an image of repression, not authority 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
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7.3.4. Social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities 
As described in sub-section 7.3.1, and as confirmed by the issue of social jealousy 
raised in the previous sub-section, wealth disparities in Metin IV are important.  
Firstly, discussions with residents of the aldeia revealed that the isolated situation 
of Metin IV – both as a consequence of its geographic position and the lack of 
infrastructure development – contributes to significantly unequal common 
standards. Indeed, the lack of adequate connections with public transportation has 
been repeatedly pointed out as a major obstacle to their daily lives, for it not only 
prevents them from having ready access to the main shopping areas – food 
markets but also shops selling furniture, clothes, etc – and to economic 
opportunities – the difficulties presented by the inability to easily get out of the area 
imply that opportunities for finding employment are also hard to come by – but it is 
also a problem for accessing other services. For example, a number of participants 
indicated that access to electricity is a key challenge in the area because, as 
indicated by interviewee 71 “while we do have electricity in this area, there are 
people that cannot afford it or simply do not have the means to go and get the 
pulsa89 they need from the EDTL (Electricidade De Timor Leste) situated at the 
centre of town far from Metin IV, so they take it illegally from other people”. As a 
result, discussions revealed that unless they were employed outside of Metin IV or 
went to university, participants seldom left the aldeia; some female participants 
even indicated that they only left to do their monthly staples shopping at the 
markets or on Comoro road, whilst others said they only left the area once a week 
or once every two weeks. 
Similarly, the aldeia’s isolation and violent history also considerably hamper social 
and economic development in the area because they prevent a large share of the 
population from having equal access to opportunities. Whilst there is a school in 
Metin IV it is however located at the junction between the river road and the main 
road, a location that is also unfortunately known to be a trouble spot where a lot of 
the violence takes place. As a result, the school in Metin IV is often closed, 
contributing to increasing the gap in the children’s education. Furthermore, since 
teachers are left the choice by the Ministry as to where they wish to teach, not 
many teachers choose to go to Metin IV, whilst the few teachers that continue to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The system is set up so that people have keys on which they regularly have to put credit – known as pulsa – 
but this can only be done at building at the EDTL building 
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teach in Metin IV are “regularly sent to get further training on the constantly 
changing curriculum, leaving the children out of school very often”, as indicated by 
interviewee 67. As a result, interviewee 67 continued, “people who have money 
here can send their children to better schools outside the area, often private 
schools, but those of us that cannot afford it have to keep sending our children to 
this school, where they are not getting all the hours they should and we are very 
worried about their level of education because if it is not good enough, they cannot 
go to university.” 
The statistics of the MoF, however, do not reflect these significant disparities in 
access to opportunities, as demonstrated in section 7.3.1, indicating, therefore, 
that the information on which the state has so far been basing part of its national 
policies – statistics that have also only been produced twice so far, in 2004 and 
2010 and are not comparable – is not only insufficiently disaggregated, as 
statistics at aldeia level might better reflect the differences in sukus, but they also 
leave out significant challenges faced by the population residing in aldeias like 
Metin IV. One of the main challenges, as indicated by interviewee 63, is the fact 
that “the teaching of Portuguese is not yet well implemented but it remains a pre-
requisite for many jobs, and since the level of education our youth is receiving 
doesn’t allow them to develop good Portuguese skills, many of them face 
significant challenges in finding employment”. This is worsened by a significant 
lack of access to skills training programmes and the lack of motivation by the youth 
to attend them. As noted by interviewee 62, “there are occasionally training 
opportunities organised in the area by NGOs and some private organisations 
(nothing by the government) but there are many young people who could benefit 
from them and don’t bother to go”. 
State institutions’ approach to funding contrasts significantly, in the mind of Metin 
IV’s population, with state’s delivery of social solidarity. For a large number of 
participants, the big money approach displayed by the AMP government only 
managed to achieve one purpose, that is, showing people there is money to be 
spent; the fact, however, that such money is not spent on providing local leaders – 
arguably much better positioned to understand the needs of their aldeias – with the 
funds to support their youth and enable them to enable themselves, but rather is 
being disbursed through projects with debatable impacts or through social 
solidarity funds with opaque eligibility criteria, only contributes to the creation of an 
entitled population. As noted by interviewee 58, “the government has been trying 
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to help people out but it also really depends on how much people want to change. 
For example some of my friends don’t care about their future or the situation in the 
country, all they want to do is sit and chat”. Interviewee 60 similarly felt that people 
“should try harder to find a job, because it makes them more responsible, and not 
wait around for the government to hand out jobs”. 
Consequently, in view of the stark wealth disparities in the aldeia, accentuated by 
strong unequal access to opportunities, and the inability of state institutions to 
disburse the evidently available funds in a fashion that could give the chance to 
local leaders to enable social and economic development in Metin IV so as to 
improve common standards, results in an image of the state, in people’s minds, 
that continues to remain detached from their reality whilst ostentatiously displaying 
elsewhere the availability of funds that could otherwise improve their situation.  
7.3.5. Social networks and social capital  
During fieldwork visits in Metin IV, it became apparent that there were different 
degrees of social interaction in the aldeia, not only between weekdays and 
weekends, but also between different sections of the area. During weekends, high 
social interaction between neighbours, children playing in the streets and men 
washing their cars mostly characterise the urban part of Metin IV as well as some 
of the more rural areas; the more rural parts of the area appear to have less 
interaction between neighbours, which could possibly be a result of the increased 
distances between groups of houses. During weekdays, on the other hand, much 
like in Liriu, one notices essentially women in the streets, either going about their 
daily routines or also at times playing bingo by the sede aldeia – that is the local 
government building where meetings are held and where the xefi carries out many 
conflict resolution or mediation activities; streets are generally quieter everywhere 
in the aldeia. 
Much like high attendance to community meetings highlighted in section 7.3.2 did, 
investigation of the nature of conversations amongst people in Metin IV revealed 
that there is a high degree of civic engagement in the aldeia; it is interesting, 
however, to note that the scale of this civic engagement varies according to 
gender. The vast majority of male participants indicated that they liked to discuss 
politics with their friends and neighbours. Interviewee 58 indicated that he likes to 
sit with his friends and “talk about issues related both to the development of our 
area and our suku and to decisions made at government level”. Similarly, 
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interviewee 62 said that for him talking with his family and neighbours, about the 
decisions made by the government, is crucial because “citizens need to be 
involved and obey to government decisions; it is the highest component of our 
society and that’s where development happens”. 
Women, on the other hand, at the exception of one participant, tended to talk 
about more local issues like interviewee 67, “such as the education of their 
children or problems with accessing services such as electricity”.  Some of them 
indicated that they do participate actively in community meetings and in problem 
solving in the area because they feel the local leaders listen, whereas others 
simply stated, like interviewee 70, that talking to leaders “doesn’t make a 
difference”. These differences between as well as amongst men and women, 
reveal that civic engagement in the area is quite developed, but the scale at which 
one engages very much depends on one’s connection with other areas of the 
urban space and of the country; as such, men working or women interacting with 
other people generally engage much more about national scale issues than 
women living essentially within Metin IV and therefore engaging at a more local 
scale.  
Willingness to engage in debate about either national or local issues also 
appeared to be contingent upon one’s location within Metin IV. Interviewee 71, for 
example, noted: “I do not share my opinion on politics or the situation in the aldeia, 
because they could disagree with me and think it I am being offensive toward their 
own point of view”. Similarly, interviewee 66 stated that she doesn’t talk to her 
neighbour or family about areas issues or government decisions “because what we 
might end up discussing might become an issue with them or other neighbours”. 
Interestingly, these participants were all located close to one another and living in 
proximity to one of the areas where confrontations between gangs often take 
place. A similar, though less openly articulated, reluctance to open up to 
neighbours and malae – like the author and her interpreter – was also noticed on 
one stretch of the river road where stone throwing and violent confrontations are 
known to take place. Interviews at national level with national and international 
NGO staff provided an useful insight as to why such reluctance to voice dissent 
and concerns may take place in certain Timorese contexts: according to them, this 
type of behaviour is very often a consequence of centuries of colonial and military 
rule where dissent was not tolerated; furthermore, this could also be a result of the 
failure of the multiparty system so far in presenting a united front, for it is widely 
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known that many of the MAGs are affiliated to security forces and political parties 
(Scambary, 2012; p.213), which can be a significant deterrent for people to voice 
their opinions. 
In light of the many issues faced by the aldeia’s residents, combined with state 
institutions’ inability to provide support in resolving those issues, the role of the 
local leaders in fostering cohesion at the local scale was even more pronounced in 
Metin IV than it was in Liriu; because they have lived there for a long time and they 
know the issues and the people very well, Metin IV’s xefi aldeia as well as the 
other local leaders – including the traditional elder, lia nain, and the youth leader – 
are well respected in the area and people trust them to fulfil not only an informative 
role but also an active role. Indeed, interviewee 63 noted that “the government 
needs to implement the decision on decentralisation so that our leaders can work 
at improving our daily lives”. 
This role was evident in local leaders’ efforts to involve the whole aldeia’s 
population in organising, and participating to, associational activities that aim not 
only at bringing people together and creating networks of trust, but also at fostering 
responsibility for one another amongst the residents. As such, these activities 
ranged from engaging youth in sport events to involving the population in 
volunteering activities that can benefit the whole aldeia, such as women’s 
involvement in raising awareness about health issues through the SISCa 
programme (Integrated Community Health Service) implemented by the Ministry of 
Health.  
Finally, in contrast with a largely disconnected state, participants regularly 
highlighted the role on local leaders in encouraging the participation of the Metin 
IV’s residents in the resolution of collective problems, as the construction of the 
sede demonstrates: whilst the lia nain offered the land on which it is built to the 
community, the xefi aldeia and other leaders gathered money from the community 
in order to be able to get the equipment necessary to build it; furthermore, young 
people from the area were involved in the collection of sand from the river to make 
the cement used to build it, whilst the rest of the material was bought with the rest 
of the collective money. Consequently, the sede – shown in Picture 15 below – 
represents not only the local government but, perhaps more importantly, it is a 
symbol of the ability of the aldeia’s population to work together and be responsible 
for a common good as a local polity. 
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Picture 15 – Sede aldeia in Metin IV 
 
Source: photograph taken by the author 
The investigation into Metin IV’s social interaction, civic engagement and 
associational activities detailed above reveals an important outcome of the 
disjunction between national and local scale combined with geographical isolation. 
Indeed, it appears that for a large share of the aldeia’s population, the inability to 
access other parts of Dili’s urban space significantly reduces their spaces of 
interaction; rather, a lot of their daily activities and, consequently, debates and 
interests are focused around issues that touch upon the local scale, rather than the 
urban or national one. The population is widely aware of the invisibility of state 
institutions in their space, and the authority gained by the local leaders who have 
stepped up in order to fill such gap shone through many of the discussions with 
participants. Indeed, the local leaders are not only succeeding in engaging a vast 
majority of Metin IV’s population, thus building a local polity, but they have also 
shown considerable leadership and rallying skills in the construction of a 
government building; interestingly, however, far from contributing to restoring a frail 
link between local and national state institutions, the construction of the sede has 
contributed to further reinforcing, in the mind of the aldeia’s residents, the idea that 
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if they need something they need to get it done themselves. In this sense, the 
representation of the political community that is being constructed within Metin IV 
is one that is far removed and in stark contrast with the networks of trust and 
information that are developing within the aldeia; as such, the social capital 
emerging in Metin IV appears to be strictly bonded.  
7.4. Conclusion – Spaces and scales of social identity construction in Dili 
7.4.1. Substantive and formal citizenship in Liriu and Metin IV 
Research question number three aimed at understanding how the urban fabric 
emerging from successive state building processes contributed to shaping the 
spaces and scales of interaction within which people regularly construct, 
deconstruct and redefine their social identity. To answer this question, social 
cohesion was introduced in the analytical framework as a tool that could articulate 
the connection between the impact of state building processes on the core 
functions of the state, the urban spaces they contributed to shaping and the 
spaces and scales of interaction that emerged as a result. The outcome of these 
interactions is analysed hereafter using the notions of substantive and formal 
citizenship: substantive citizenship facilitates the establishment of a connection 
between the impact of the core functions of the state on access to opportunities 
and the resulting spaces of social justice/injustice; formal citizenship links these 
spaces of social justice/injustice with people’s ability to cope with them in order to 
exercise their rights – social cohesion and social capital – as such defining their 
scales of interaction. See APPENDIX X for detailed links between state building, 
core functions of the state and social cohesion, leading to the following analysis. 
a) Urban fabric 
The research carried out within the aldeias of Liriu and Metin IV revealed that post-
1999 state building had a significant impact on the urban fabric of these aldeias, an 
urban fabric that had already been significantly shaped by the two previous 
external state building attempts carried out by Portugal and Indonesia. Arguably, 
the decisions made in relation to management of public finance have had the most 
tangible impacts on the aldeias’ urban fabric; the historical developments of each 
one – not only in terms of geographical position and infrastructure, but in terms of 
history of violence – have significantly contributed to determine whether they would 
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attract investment in infrastructure and services, especially following the 
establishment of AMP’s (neo)liberal laissez-faire market approach to investment.  
Indeed, Liriu’s central position within Dili’s urban space, its national and 
international visibility and its historical link with authority – which has resulted in 
many embassies being located in the aldeia and the suku in general – have made 
the aldeia particularly attractive for investment; as such, it has benefitted more 
than many other aldeias in Dili, of improvements in infrastructure and services. 
Conversely, Metin IV’s isolated geographical situation, its precarious position in 
relation to plans for airport extension and its violent reputation have thus far 
severely limited the amount of investments in the aldeia; much of the infrastructure 
needs significant upgrading and services are either non-existent or prove so 
difficult to secure that they lead to alternative, at times community-led, solutions.  
The decision-making processes followed by UNTAET in relation to the drafting of 
Timor Leste’s constitution, combined with the (neo)liberal, highly externally 
oriented nature of investments carried out by the AMP government, have only 
contributed to further entrenching these differences. Firstly, the decision to adopt 
Portuguese as one of the national languages – whilst Tetun is being developed – 
without however having successfully developed a coherent approach to its 
introduction in the education system, has resulted in a shortage of skilled teachers 
capable of compensating for a still weak education curriculum. Combined with the 
fact that teachers within the education system are free to choose which schools 
they wish to teach in, this has meant that the most skilled teachers generally 
choose schools with the best infrastructure. Consequently, whilst Liriu boasts one 
of the schools with the best reputation in Dili, therefore attracting better quality 
teaching and teaching conditions, the population of Metin IV continues to send 
their children to a school with bad infrastructure, lower quality teaching and which 
closes regularly due to episodes of violence in the area.  
Additionally, investment in skills training has remained significantly wanting in 
Timor Leste. Whilst the first government considerably lacked the resources to 
adequately assess the skills needed in order to transition from a primarily oriented 
agricultural society into a more industrial and/or service oriented labour market, the 
second government’s focus on infrastructure investment in order to attract FDIs, 
rather than skills training, has only contributed to further increasing the share of the 
labour force lacking the adequate skills to participate in the country’s economy and 
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growth. As a result, whilst Liriu’s urban fabric – central, connected and close to 
economic opportunities – continues nonetheless to provide its population with 
other accessible economic opportunities, in Metin IV population’s lack of mobility, 
combined with their lack of skills and/or adequate education, contributes to 
crystallising these contrasts between their urban fabric and other areas of Dili.  
Finally, the issues associated with the state’s monopoly over the means of 
violence, considered in the widely diverging historical contexts of Liriu and Metin 
IV, has led to noticeably different approaches to violence by state security forces. 
Metin IV’s violent reputation since 1999, which was only further established during 
the 2006 crisis, has resulted in the presence of police or military forces being 
generally associated to repression, unfairness and additional violence. Conversely, 
Liriu’s generally peaceful reputation – even during the crisis of 2006 – has resulted 
into much less interaction with security forces and authority; the good relationship 
established between the local leaders and the PNTL also contributes to fostering a 
more positive image of state authority. 
b) Substantive citizenship 
The consequences of these impacts on Liriu’s and Metin IV’s populations’ ability to 
access opportunities has considerably contributed to redefining their spaces of 
interaction. In Metin IV, fieldwork findings have revealed that a vast majority of the 
population seldom ventures outside of the confines of their aldeia; in discussions 
with participants it transpired that the reasons for such reduction in the spaces of 
interaction were primarily a result of a combination of all the above-mentioned 
factors. Indeed, the lack of adequate and readily accessible transportation means 
that, unless people need to leave, they will generally remain in their aldeia, for to 
move people need to be able to afford the cost of travel or have their own means 
of transportation; however, either of these options involves having a job that 
provides enough money, and to achieve that, it requires skills that are difficult to 
achieve considering the low level and quality of education identified in Metin IV. 
Even more constricting for the aldeia’s population is that this lack of opportunities 
creates a vicious circle: lack of education and skills prevents them from accessing 
well-paid employment, which prevents them from affording transportation, which 
prevents them from moving and therefore prevents them from seeking other 
opportunities or better education. Substantive citizenship in Metin IV is therefore 
characterised by a restricted space of social injustice.  
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By contrast, in Liriu, the urban fabric itself allows access to most opportunities. 
Indeed, the presence of a good school in the aldeia provides better quality 
education for the children, thus allowing them better access to higher education or 
skills training later on. Furthermore, although there is still a large share of the 
population that may not have the necessary skills and/or education to access a job 
that pays well, the aldeia’s central position allows them to access travel easily 
nonetheless, as well as a facility to access other economic opportunities in nearby 
aldeias or open their own businesses in an urban space that sees much movement 
and therefore provides better opportunities. Consequently, whether through 
education, skills training, employment or economic opportunities, Liriu’s population 
creates wider spaces of interaction that reach beyond the limits of their aldeia. 
Substantive citizenship in Liriu is characterised by more social justice than Metin 
IV.  
c) Formal citizenship 
The analysis of social cohesion carried out within these settings revealed important 
consequences for people’s scales of interaction, especially when correlated to the 
impact of the state building process on the fourth core function of the state 
explored in the context of this research, that is, administrative control. Indeed, the 
top-down system of governance that has emerged from the state building process 
tends, in theory, to create very little room for people’s voices to be heard – other 
than through elections; if aldeias have significant issues they need to voice, the 
onus is therefore on local leaders to demonstrate that they are capable of stepping 
in. The ability of the local leaders to become channels for voicing the concerns of 
their community, however, varies significantly from one aldeia to the next, not only 
as an obvious result of their leadership skills, but also because the urban fabric of 
the aldeia itself can considerably affect the local leaders’ influence at higher 
administrative levels.  
Thus in Liriu, as previously established, the urban fabric has always been 
conducive, including after independence, to receiving investments for infrastructure 
upgrading or other initiatives that could improve its image. Within this setting, the 
analysis of social cohesion in the aldeia has revealed that the local leaders put 
considerable efforts into the development of proposals for initiatives targeting 
priorities they have identified with their community; as such, local leaders are 
succeeding in creating a social capital in Liriu that is both bonded – as the 
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community works together to establish priorities – and bridged – as they work with 
authorities to secure funding. Whilst not all proposals are necessarily successful in 
accessing the funds required, the fact that local leaders work with national 
authorities, in an attempt to secure access to more opportunities, establishes a 
connection between the local polity and the Timorese political community. 
Moreover, the analysis of substantive citizenship presented above highlighted the 
fact that the vast majority of the population in Liriu could exercise – albeit 
admittedly to varying degrees – their rights: access to quality education and 
common housing standards guarantees their social rights and cultural rights – 
learning Portuguese; access to quality education, as well as geographical location, 
allows most people to access good employment, in safe conditions, thus 
guaranteeing their economic rights; and, the presence of local leaders that are 
generally successful in voicing their community’s concerns, together with a good 
education that provides language and critical thinking skills and a good relationship 
with authority, allows Liriu’s population to exercise their political rights. Formal 
citizenship in Liriu therefore enables the establishment of a scale of interaction that 
also reaches to the national level.  
In Metin IV, a very different scenario emerges from the urban fabric of the aldeia 
and its impact on substantive citizenship. Lack of access to quality education and 
employment opportunities, combined with the isolation of the area, are preventing 
most of the population from exercising their social and economic rights – many 
continue to work in informal, low-paying and unsafe jobs. Similarly, lack of access 
to quality education also prevents them from exercising their cultural rights since 
they are unable to properly “learn about forms of expression and dissemination 
through any technical medium of information or communication, to follow a way of 
life associated with the use of […] language” (UN, 2009; p.4). In relation to their 
political rights, participants in Metin IV highlighted the fact that the violent history of 
the aldeia has contributed to shaping the image of a repressive system where 
people do not feel they have a right to procedural fairness, whilst the continued 
violence in some areas of Metin IV prevents people from freely discussing, with 
their neighbours and community, about local or national issues. In light of these 
issues, analysis of social cohesion in Metin IV revealed that the role of the local 
leaders is key in defining their scales of interaction. Indeed, although they have 
repeatedly attempted to write proposals in order to improve the economic, social 
and infrastructure characteristics of their aldeia, the local leaders have thus far 
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been essentially unsuccessful in securing the necessary funds from the state; this 
is most likely a result of the aldeia’s reputation and its precarious position in view 
of the potential airport extension. As such, local leaders have resorted to filling the 
gap left by institutions – including in relation to conflict mediation and resolution – 
bringing the population together in a coherent polity, thus creating a significantly 
bonded social capital but failing to bridge it at urban or national level. Combined 
with the inability of the population to exercise their rights, the scales of interaction 
shaped by Metin IV’s formal citizenship are therefore essentially local, excluded 
from the Timorese political community.  
7.4.2. Place attachment and identity: “A large share of the population 
remains unaware of the elite’s dream for the country”90 
On the basis of the analysis of substantive and formal citizenship presented above, 
this section aims to look at how these different spaces and scales of citizenship 
affected the construction of social identity at the scale of Dili. The introduction to 
section 3.3 indicates that social cohesion is used in this research’s analytical 
framework as a tool to understand how state building policies have impacted the 
social construction of local polity and, consequently, the construction of a political 
community understood as being constituted of nested socially constructed polities 
that start at the local and, if the right conditions are in place, gradually come to be 
encompassed in the wider political community. As such, the elements that 
characterise a local polity in the context of this research are used here to 
understand whether the spaces and scales of interaction, emerging from the 
analysis of the urban fabric and citizenship in the two aldeias, provide a basis for 
the development of a Timorese political community or not. These elements are: 
psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political. 
a) Liriu 
The analysis of citizenship and the urban fabric in Liriu revealed that local leaders’ 
role in the aldeia has considerably contributed to creating significant awareness of 
the functioning of the state system; an awareness that, the fieldwork indicated, is 
subsequently carried into more individual interests – such as applying for funds for 
economic activities, dealing with state authorities in relation to land claims – 
contributing to increasing the level of understanding of, and interaction with, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Interview with Roque Rodrigues (26/10/12), Special advisor to the President of the Republic of Timor Leste 
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state system. Furthermore, the peaceful relations that have characterised the 
aldeia since independence have also contributed, if not to creating a closer 
relationship with authorities, at least to building an image of state authority that is 
not tainted by negative feelings. As such, whilst it was clear from discussions with 
participants that there was still significant room for improving their participation to 
the country’s political life, their opinions of the state indicated that the local 
leaders have succeeded in making the population feel part of the political 
community.  
Historically, Liriu is closely linked to the Portuguese history of the country. Home 
to the administrative colonial staff, its architecture is reminiscent of that period and 
a number of its inhabitants have worked, or have parents that have worked, as civil 
servants for the Portuguese colonial administration. Its history during Indonesian 
times is uncertain, but the fact that post-1999 it has become an aldeia that attracts 
number of international staff – and therefore development – continues to closely 
intertwine its history with national administration and power. As such, throughout 
the history it appears that Liriu has maintained a strong link with the various forms 
of authority in the coutrny, a link that continues today with a connection between 
local polity and the Timorese political community, as the previous section has 
highlighted. 
The analysis of substantive and formal citizenship in Liriu also revealed that 
access to education is not only a reality for the vast majority of the aldeia’s 
population, but also that the urban fabric of the aldeia lends it sufficient importance 
to warrant good educational infrastructure and, consequently, attract more quality 
teaching. Thus, whilst the curriculum remains the same in Liriu as anywhere else 
in the country, the better quality of education in Liriu’s school – as indicated in 
section 7.2.1 – gives its population better access to the cultural life of the country; 
the fact that Liriu is located in one of the sub-districts with the highest school and 
university attendance, as well as the highest literacy rates in Portuguese and 
Bahasa, means that its population has easier access to elements of culture such 
as language, literature and methods of production. Additionally, the strong 
involvement of local leaders in developing sports facilities also facilitates the 
population’s access to sport and games. 
Finally, as a result of the facilitated access to transportation, economic activity and 
opportunities, one important feature of Liriu’s residents is their mobility across Dili’s 
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urban space. Through work, education or simply for necessity – such as grocery 
shopping – participants have the opportunity to interact outside their own aldeia, 
therefore meeting more people as well as gathering a better sense of social and 
economic development elsewhere; consequently, the construction of their social 
reality goes beyond the spaces defined by their aldeia’s boundaries, extending to 
Dili’s urban territory. 
Therefore, whilst the majority of the population in Liriu has arrived after 1999 – a 
fact that could have contributed to the fragmentation of social identity in the aldeia 
– the positive impact of the local leaders on the development of social capital, 
combined with multiple opportunities to confront other social realities than their 
own, has resulted in both the development of a local polity and the inclusion of this 
polity in the wider Timorese political community. That is, although people are 
aware of the different shortcomings of the state – reflected in the discussions with 
participants – they understand its functioning and feel psychologically part of a 
wider, state project to which they can contribute. 
b) Metin IV 
The analysis of citizenship and urban fabric in Metin IV has highlighted the 
important role of the local leaders in filling the gap left by the state in terms of 
security, infrastructure and opportunities. Interestingly, however, the strong 
presence of the local leaders on all fronts of social cohesion, combined with their 
ability to mediate and transcend differences to bring people together for collective 
problem resolution, does not contribute to restoring the link between the local polity 
and the Timorese political community; rather, the former has developed in stark 
contrast with the latter as a result of the invisibility of the state, creating an 
interaction of the aldeia population with a form of authority that is not part of the 
representation of the state but exists in its stead. Moreover, the history of violence 
and police repression that characterises Metin IV, contributes to creating the image 
of a state that fails to understand the situation and is unfair in its proceedings 
instead. As such, the scale of interaction with the polity is bonded to the local, 
detached from a national scale that bears no internal point of reference common to 
the aldeia’s population, who feel cut out of the political sphere of their country. 
Historically, Metin IV is in significant contrast with Liriu on all points. Firstly, the 
aldeia was created, during Indonesian military rule, by the Indonesians for the 
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purpose of controlling the population; therefore, whilst no participant made specific 
reference to any climate of fear or violence characterising the aldeia back then, it is 
clear that Metin IV is related to a historical chapter of the country that the political 
elite wished to archive and move on from with the selection of Portuguese as a 
national language and by strengthening ties with lusophone countries. Secondly, 
the persistent presence of MAGs, created during Indonesian rule, and their crucial 
role in the violence that pervaded the aldeia during the 2006 crisis – and which 
have contributed to the disruption of social order before and after – is also a 
reminder that the population of Metin IV is still suffering from the consequences of 
its past; the inability of state institutions, however, to efficiently deal with the 
situation – through dialogue and by addressing socio-economic problems – only 
serves to remind the aldeia’s inhabitants that the collective memory they hold of 
authority is somewhat different from the national framework being promoted.  
The analysis of substantive and formal citizenship in Metin IV demonstrated that, in 
contrast with Liriu, the vast majority of the population does not have access to 
quality education. Indeed, the lack of adequate infrastructure for the school, 
compounded with the fact that it often closes as a result of episodes of violence in 
the area, result in poor teaching conditions that are unlikely to attract quality 
teachers. Consequently, the majority of the population in the aldeia does not speak 
Portuguese, and remains therefore unable to access the country’s cultural life 
through “technical medi[a] of information or communication […] language or 
specific institutions” (UN, 2009; p.4). 
Finally, the combination of geographical isolation, poor road infrastructure and lack 
of access to public transportation contribute to making Metin IV one of the most 
isolated aldeias East of the Comoro river. Discussions with participants have 
highlighted that this is not only an objective characteristic of the aldeia, but it is 
also the way in which they themselves represent their spaces of interaction. 
Indeed, as indicated in section 7.3.3, for a large share of the population that does 
not engage in economic activities and/or does not have access to education 
outside the area, interaction with other aldeias and across Dili’s urban space, is an 
occasional occurrence, largely limiting therefore their spaces of interaction to the 
territory of Metin IV. 
As a result, for a large share of Metin IV’s population, the significant challenges 
they face in terms of access to opportunities, both in their aldeia and in the country 
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in general, reflects an image of the state that remains strongly disconnected from 
the reality of people at the local scale. Furthermore, widespread awareness in the 
aldeia that there are state funds available for development, but that those funds 
are not being disbursed to provide them with the support they need to improve 
social justice in the aldeia, combined with people’s inability to contribute politically, 
socially and economically to the country, triggers the feeling of being cut out from 
the Timorese political community. Thus, psychologically, Metin IV’s inhabitants 
are constructing a representation of a state that does not reflect their needs and 
expectations in a binding social contract, resulting instead in a local polity that is 
constructed around a strongly bonded social capital at aldeia level.  
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CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF STATE 
BUILDING ON POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN URBAN 
SPACES 
“Belongings are not important, but belonging is” 
(Anonymous refugee, London 2014) 
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8. Conclusions – the impact of state building on political community in 
urban spaces 
This research set out to understand the impact of exogenous state building 
processes on political community construction in post-conflict countries. It argued 
that, within the ideal-type state of the liberal peace at the heart of state building, 
the state and its political community are inherently intertwined through the notions 
of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship, and sought to demonstrate that 
international state building’s ahistorical and decontextualised approach can 
significantly damage this relationship, thus compromising both state building and 
the construction of a political community.  
To explore these dynamics, the research set out to understand the relationship 
between state building and political community in the context of post-conflict urban 
spaces. It argued that, in an increasingly globalised world, where demands to meet 
international market standards and growth expectations weight heavily on 
countries recovering from conflicts, the role of cities as engines of economic 
growth and competitiveness has propelled them at the centre-stage of post-conflict 
international attention and state-wide development. The inequalities resulting from 
the largely (neo)liberal approach to development applied to these cities, however, 
converge with widely different spaces of urban history and development to further 
entrench society’s cleavages, thus shaping new spaces of interaction and scales 
of belonging that may run counter to the image being promoted by political elites. 
Situating the research within post-conflict urban spaces, therefore, provided the 
opportunity to draw the link between state building decision-making at state level 
and local level processes of polity construction; it favours the analysis of the 
impact of the construction of virtual spaces and scales of local polity on the 
actualisation of state’s legitimacy, sovereignty and territory. 
This concluding chapter consequently seeks to provide a closing discussion based 
on the literature review, analytical framework and findings presented in this 
research. The first part uses the fieldwork findings to answer the three main 
research questions identified in order to analyse the dynamics outlined above, that 
is: how do international state building practices affect the nature of post-conflict 
state institutions? How do the policies emanating from these institutions affect the 
core functions of the state? How does the relationship between the urban 
environment emerging from state policies and social cohesion affect the spaces 
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and scales of socially constructed polities? The second part highlights the 
importance of these findings for the disciplines of international relations, political 
science and urban development. It does so by outlining the advantages and 
limitations of the analytical framework and, on this basis, provides a selection of 
recommendations for further research that could contribute to strengthening the 
relevance and importance of this research in the context of international state 
building processes. 
8.1. From state building to political community – answering the research 
questions in Dili, Timor Leste 
8.1.1. Research question one  
The first research question aimed at understanding, through an exploration of state 
building decision-making processes, how international state building affects the 
nature of post-conflict state institutions. The literature review carried out for the 
purpose of this research draws attention to the fact that in the past 70 years 
international post-conflict assistance has veered from merely providing conditional 
financial assistance for the reconstruction of conflict-affected countries to a much 
more interventionist approach concerned with the nature of post-conflict state 
institutions. Throughout this shift, international assistance has attempted to 
maintain a neutral, apolitical and ahistorical attitude toward its task, premised on 
the assumption that the implementation of liberal peace, and the democratic 
process within, would bring about the societal changes necessary for the 
development of peaceful relations. However, this research argues, such attitude 
remains blind to the fact that any intervention aimed at developing state institutions 
is inherently tied to political and historical dynamics and, as such, is bound to have 
profound effects on the scale of the polities the state is meant to control and 
organise, that is the construction of a political community across the whole 
territory. 
In this context, the fieldwork carried out in Timor Leste aimed at understanding 
how UNTAET apprehended the state building process between 1999 and 2002. 
Using the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship which 
underpin the relationship between state building and political community, it 
explored who was involved in the process, how, and to what extent the historical 
and political dynamics, that had come to characterise the country upon 
independence in 1999, were taken into account. The findings revealed that, caught 
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between the imperative to govern Timor Leste in the short-term and the long-term 
objective to lay the foundations for democratic self-government, UNTAET took a 
series of steps that have severely affected the nature of state institutions. Firstly, 
the very short timetable dictating the Timorese state building process during the 
transitional administration not only prevented decision-makers from adequately 
understanding the consequences of the Portuguese colonial administration and 
Indonesian military rule on Timorese society; it also precluded adequate and 
thorough consultation of the Timorese population.  
Secondly, still cognisant of the very short time available for the task ahead and 
focused on protecting the neutrality of the process, UNTAET decision-makers 
declined to engage in the politics characterising Timor Leste’s history, thus failing 
to fully comprehend the deep-seated rivalries that strongly opposed a number of 
political leaders. As a result, the institutions and Constitution that emerged from 
the process bore very little resemblance with the way in which Timorese society 
had organised thus far, and reflected little of the expectations and dreams of the 
population. On the contrary, they reflected a vision pertaining essentially to the 
Timorese political elite – itself badly communicated to the public, such as decisions 
regarding national languages – inadvertently institutionalising deep-seated rivalries 
in the process. 
8.1.2. Research question two 
The second research question sought to draw a link between the way in which 
state building processes shaped state institutions, on the basis of the previous 
findings, and the impact of those dynamics on the core functions of the state. In 
the section of the literature review that outlines the main impacts of state building 
on the construction of political community it was argued that state legitimacy in the 
framework of international state building interventions is expected to derive from 
two processes. Firstly, since existing forms of authority are assumed to be 
inherently dysfunctional for having failed to prevent the country to descend into 
conflict, new states are approached as a terra nulli where new institutions are to be 
built in order to carry out the core functions of the state that will ensure 
administrative capability and, as such, democracy91 (Ghani, Lockhart and 
Carnahan, 2005; p.6). Secondly, once these institutions are set-up to carry out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; administrative control; management of public finance; 
investment in human capital; delineation of citizenship rights and duties; provision of infrastructure services; 
formation of the market; management of state’s assets; international relations; and, rule of law. 
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their functions, national elections are held so that the population can choose their 
leaders. This approach to state building, this research maintains, has negative 
consequences on legitimacy as it is understood in the framework of the ideal-type 
liberal democratic state these interventions are modelled on; that is, failure to 
integrate existing forms of authority can easily result into the population’s lack of 
recognition of state’s authority, whilst the institutionalisation of political differences 
can result in the development of a political elite which legitimacy hardly reaches 
beyond electoral processes.  
In the context of Timor Leste, the fieldwork revealed that the state building process 
had particular impacts on four of the ten core functions of the state. The 
governance arrangements designed for the administrative control of the territory 
are a direct result of the state building decision-making processes. On the one 
hand, the distribution of power at state level is a direct reflection of FRETILIN’s 
political interests at the time the Constitution was drafted: executive and legislative 
powers rest with the Prime Minister and its national parliament – at the time 
expected to be FRETILIN – whilst the function of President of the Republic retains 
essentially a public figure role with a right to veto – a reflection of FRETILIN 
leaders’ desire to sideline Xanana Gusmão without incurring the wrath of the 
population for whom he represented a hero. The result has been a state decision-
making system that is constantly stalled by political skirmishes amongst its elite. 
On the other hand, the organisation of local level governance reflects the 
distribution of authoritative power prior to 1999, without however retaining its 
original legitimacy and with no link to the state decision-making structures.  
The same issues were noted in relation to the organisation of the legitimate 
monopoly on the means of violence. The political divisions that characterise 
Timorese political elite were reproduced in the division of the security sector into a 
military and a police force, and further aggravated by the exclusion of the primarily 
concerned group – the veterans – in the decision making process, thus laying the 
foundations for the political crisis of 2006. Furthermore, failure to integrate pre-
existing customary systems of organisation and social control has resulted in the 
development of a security sector that remains alien to the population’s 
understanding of conflict mediation, resolution and justice. As such, the majority of 
the population continues to rely on these customary sources of authority rather 
than relying on a security system they do not trust or understand.  
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Finally, the external influence that continued to affect the management of public 
finances from 2002 to 2012 resulted in a primarily (neo)liberal approach to 
investment, which has continuously prioritised policies aimed at attracting 
international capital investment over crucially needed investment in human capital. 
This has been an issue particularly in relation to education and training, as a large 
majority of the population remains unable, to this day, to speak Portuguese, the 
pre-requisite language to access one of the main sources of formal employment – 
the state – and to participate in the political life of the country. 
8.1.3. Research question three 
The third research question set out to explore how the policies, resulting from the 
processes identified in the two previous spheres, interact within contrasting 
historical and development urban contexts to produce different spaces of 
interaction and, consequently, shape different processes of local polity 
construction. The analytical framework developed for the purpose of this research 
served as a tool to carry out the fieldwork in the two selected aldeias of Dili – Liriu 
and Metin IV. The use of the four domains of social cohesion provided the 
analytical structure necessary to identify how state policies contributed to shaping 
widely different urban fabrics that either enabled or hindered people’s access to 
political, social and economic opportunities. The development of different types of 
substantive and formal citizenship within these urban fabrics, therefore, produces 
distinct spaces and scales of polity construction. Indeed, the literature review for 
this research argues that for local polities to scale up from the local to the urban 
and state level, the spaces and scales at which people interact need to transcend 
the local. This does not necessarily entail physical travel across the territory of the 
state; rather it emphasises the role of state institutions in building representations, 
in people’s minds, of a territory where local rhythms are often coordinated and 
synchronised with other rhythms across the territory, local customs are 
incorporated into the wider cultural mosaic, and state institutions penetrate local 
worlds (Edensor, 2006; p.537), so that the population can feel that they are 
participating in the political, historical, economic and cultural life of the state 
project.  
The analysis of social cohesion in Liriu shows that the influence of the exogenous 
state building process on state institutions and policies is not having a negative 
effect on the spaces and scales of polity construction. Instead, a combination of 
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active local leaders and favourable urban fabric has facilitated the population’s 
identification with the historical, cultural and political images of the state project. 
The ability to participate economically and socially allows Liriu’s population to feel 
as citizens taking part in activities alongside other people they have never met, 
whilst their ability to participate, albeit somewhat still restrictively, to decision-
making makes them feel part of the Timorese political community, contributing to 
giving legitimacy to the state and recognising the authority of its institutions, both at 
local and at national level.  
In contrast to Liriu, Metin IV displays spaces and scales of social cohesion that are 
essentially limited to the aldeia. The historical, cultural and political points of 
reference of the aldeia’s population find very little counterpoints in the Timorese 
political community as it is being represented by political elites; the inability to 
speak Portuguese, compounded with a violent history since independence that has 
been criminalised rather than addressed by the state, contribute to building 
representations of a state that bears little connection with people’s daily realities. 
Consequently, the analysis of substantive and formal citizenship has demonstrated 
that the policies and actions emanating from the state institutions, and resulting 
from the state building process, are essentially inadequate for Metin IV’s 
population, resulting in spaces of social injustice; conversely, the important role of 
the local leaders as providers for their population is affording them the legitimacy 
and authority that the aldeia’s population is not granting to the state, leading to a 
strong local polity. 
Dili, therefore, is not cohering into an urban space where state institutions are 
successfully including the majority of the population by affording them access to 
the opportunities that would facilitate them exercising their rights. Diverging 
representations of history, culture and belonging, as well as differing urban fabrics 
contributing to reproducing isolation or inclusion, are combining to produce 
fragmented senses of citizenship and belonging to polities that result in uneven 
representations of state legitimacy and sovereignty at varying scales within 
different spaces. Given the importance of Dili in the context of Timor Leste as a 
centre of growth, administration and development, the fact that the state is 
currently unable to establish its legitimacy and sovereignty through a unified sense 
of citizenship across one urban space can potentially be significantly damaging for 
the sustainability of the state in the long term.  
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The crisis that brought the country to its knees in 2006 is but one clear example of 
the power of divisive discourse in a highly unequal society. The way in which 
events that started within Dili’s urban space have quickly escalated into a nation-
wide attack against state institutions, and what they represented to people, shows 
that exogenous state building’s inability to account for historical differences and 
customary practices in its project can have significant consequences on society’s 
cleavages. Perhaps even more striking is how the analysis of social cohesion in 
two distinctively different urban spaces has revealed the extent of the impact of 
state building decision-making on the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state ten 
years after the celebration of an independence that had brought the entire country 
together against one enemy. Kearns and Forrest (2000; p.1001) noted that “one 
place’s cohesion may be society’s deconstruction”; this analysis has revealed that 
currently the differences in the spaces and scales of social cohesion that 
characterise Liriu and Metin IV may become just that, Timorese political 
community’s deconstruction. 
8.2. Implications for international state building and urban post-conflict 
reconstruction 
The rationale for the development of this research lay in the gap, identified by the 
author, in the literature pertaining to two distinct fields that share, however, an 
interest for the reconstruction of peaceful and cohesive societies in the aftermath 
of conflict, namely: international relations and urbanism. In chapter four, it was 
argued that despite this common interest, the two fields did not appear to reconcile 
on a common ground: the field of international relations remains locked within a 
polarised state/local worldview that defines the state in realist terms, characterised 
by security of international state boundaries, and detached from societal 
processes; conversely, the realm of urbanism has produced a wealth of research 
in relation to the role of cities in shaping divided/cohesive societies, but it has thus 
far lacked the connection with the national and international processes contributing 
to building the institutions that will then produce the institutional framework within 
which urban spaces are shaped.  
This research comes in as an attempt to bridge the two fields, maintaining that the 
way in which international state building processes are currently being designed 
and carried out bears important consequences for the processes of polity 
construction that shape the development of a political community. These 
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consequences can in turn severely undermine the capacity of the new states to 
sustainably govern the population within their territory. As such, in order to analyse 
the relationship between the local, urban and state-wide dynamics underpinning 
these processes, an analytical framework has been developed as a tool to 
investigate the effects of international state building processes on the development 
of citizenship within post-conflict urban spaces. Its aim is twofold.  
Firstly, it places the ideal-type state, used to frame international state building 
processes, back in its historical context where the mutually constitutive relationship 
between states and their political community is restored to its central position. It 
does so by establishing the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and 
citizenship as the parameters around which this relationship is articulated. 
Secondly, it introduces social cohesion as an analytical tool to understand the 
impact of state building decisions on the social construction of polities in different 
urban spaces. This facilitates an understanding of how indigenous structures and 
societal processes (Lemay-Hebert, 2011; Richmond, 2014) are used by the 
population to cope with the internationally shaped state institutions, creating hybrid 
forms of governance (Richmond, 2014) that create “complex relationships between 
the state and the nonstate” (Fregonese, 2012; p.2). Figure 19 below shows the 
analytical framework of the research, which was then used to analyse the fieldwork 
findings – see APPENDIX X for the detailed introduction of the findings in the 
framework. 
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Figure 19 – Analytical framework of the research 
	  
The analysis of the findings showed that, in the context of Timor Leste, the 
analytical framework highlighted three important elements. Firstly, it confirmed that 
the terra nulli approach, taken by the international community in carrying out state 
building processes, has significant implications for the urban environment. When 
interacting in contexts charged with diverging histories of violence, development 
and cohesion, the policies emanating from the new state institutions actually 
contribute to further entrenching differences in social justice. Secondly, the 
analysis of social cohesion in the two aldeia has revealed that these differences 
shape the way in which citizens interact with each other and their state. In the 
absence of a system of government they can relate to, citizens adapt by re-
appropriating new institutional arrangements through customary means. The role 
of local leaders, in the context of Timor Leste, was clearly evidenced in their ability 
to bond and/or bridge social capital and, consequently, to develop a local polity in 
opposition with, or connected to, the Timorese political community. Thirdly, 
comparing the findings on social cohesion with the five elements characterising the 
political community, the framework has highlighted how the spatial scales 
emerging from the state/urban/local interaction affect place attachment and 
identity.  
Conclusions 
296 	  
Consequently, as highlighted in Figure 20 below, the analytical framework 
developed in this research has successfully brought to the fore the 
interconnectedness of the state/urban/local dynamics emerging from the state 
building process, and their effect on the construction of political community. 
Figure 20 – Highlighting the national/urban/local interconnectedness  
 
Source: elaborated by the author 
Within the field of international relations, therefore, the framework has brought the  
political community back into the state. Likewise, for the field of urbanism, the 
framework has highlighted the dynamics and processes that affect all the decisions 
made at urban planning level. There are however four areas of further research 
that could contribute to strengthen the analytical framework in bridging the gap 
between the fields: 
 The role of urban space has been put forward in this research as an interesting 
site for analysing the dynamics at stake. The findings have also highlighted the 
importance of local leaders in these dynamics. Further discussions, at a recent 
conference, with interviewees 34 and 35 have brought to the fore, however, 
that local leaders have very different sources of legitimacy in urban and rural 
contexts: whilst the former is more akin to Western state’s legitimacy – based 
on state impacts and outputs – the latter continue to retain a customary form of 
leadership. Further research should therefore look at comparing these tensions 
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between urban/rural, Western/customary, in order to reinforce the role of urban 
space as a site for exploring potential issues that may spread across the wider 
territory if no action is taken. 
 The research has demonstrated that the way in which state building was 
carried out in Timor Leste resulted, in certain areas such as Metin IV, in more 
local forms of polity that do not fit within the Timorese political community. This 
tension between the Timorese political community and the local polities, and 
the impact it has on the development of the country, has been increasingly 
recognised by international institutions in the past years (OECD, 2010; UNDP, 
2012; World Bank, 2011). Further research could use social cohesion and 
social capital, as they have been inserted in the analytical framework of this 
research, to prove that local polities can bring about development in their own 
space, but if this potential is extended through a more formal inclusion of the 
communities in the political community then development within an urban area 
is likely to bring about more economic and social development, and 
consequently more growth. 
 There has been no room in the context of this research to tackle more in depth 
issues such as corruption. Nevertheless, a number of interviewees, both at 
community and national level, have mentioned that this is likely to play an 
important role in the ability of local leaders to bridge social capital. Since 
corruption is an oft-cited issue in post-conflict states, the analytical framework 
would be a useful tool to further explore the impact of state building decisions 
on the construction of a polity at urban level. 
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APPENDIX I –  POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 	  
Political – right to procedural fairness (Claiming Human Rights, 2011) 
Economic – right to work92 (Amnesty International, 2014) 
Social – right to adequate housing, food and water (ibid) 
Cultural rights - right to learn about forms of expression and dissemination through 
any technical medium of information or communication, to follow a way of life 
associated with the use of […] language or specific institutions, and to benefit from 
the cultural heritage and the creation of other individuals and communities (UN, 2009; 
p.4). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Particularly just and fair conditions of employment, protection against forced or compulsory labour and the 
right to form and join trade unions (Amnesty International, 2014)  
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APPENDIX II –  DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE LITERATURE 
Source: Adler & Kwon (2002), p.20 
External 
versus 
internal 
Authors Definitions of social capital 
Baker “A resource that actors derive from specific social structures 
and then use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes 
in the relationship among actors” (1990; p.619) 
Belliveau, O’Reilly & 
Wade 
“An individual’s personal network and elite institutional 
affiliations” (1996; p.1572) 
Bourdieu  “The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalise relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition” (1985; p.248) 
“Made up of social obligations (“connections”), which is 
convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and 
may be institutionalised in the form of a title of nobility” (1985; 
p.243) 
Bourdieu & Wacquant “The sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network 
of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition” (1992; p.119) 
Boxman, De Graaf & 
Flap 
“The number of people who can be expected to provide 
support and the resources those people have at their disposal” 
(1991; p.52) 
Burt “Friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through 
whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and 
human capital” (1992; p.9) 
Knoke “The process by which social actors create and mobilise their 
network connections within and between organisations to gain 
access to other social actors’ resources” (1999; p.18) 
External 
Portes “The ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structures” 
(1998; p.6) 
Internal Brehm & Rahn “The web of cooperative relationships between citizens that 
facilitate resolution of collective action problems” (1997; p.999) 
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External 
versus 
internal 
Authors Definitions of social capital 
Coleman “Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, 
but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in 
common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, 
and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within 
the structure” (1990; p.302) 
Fukuyama “The ability of people to work together for common purposes 
in groups and organisations” (1995; p.10) 
“Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a 
certain set of informal values or norms shared among 
members of a group that permit cooperation among them” 
(1997) 
Inglehart “A culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks 
of voluntary associations emerge” (1997; p.188) 
Portes & Sensenbrenner “Those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect 
the economic goals and goal-seeking behaviour of its 
members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward 
the economic sphere” (1993; p.1323) 
Putnam “Features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit” (1995; p.67) 
 
Thomas “Those voluntary means and processes developed within civil 
society which promote development for the collective whole” 
(1996; p.11) 
Loury “Naturally occurring social relationships among persons which 
promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in 
the marketplace… an asset which may be as significant as 
financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of 
inequality in our society” (1992; p.100) 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal “The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social 
capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that 
may be mobilised through that network” (1998; p.243) 
Both 
Pennar “The web of social relationships that influences individual 
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External 
versus 
internal 
Authors Definitions of social capital 
behaviour and thereby affects economic growth” (1997; p.154) 
Schiff “The set of elements of the social structure that affects 
relations among people and are inputs or arguments of the 
production and/or utility function” (1992; p.160) 
 
Woolcock “The information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in 
one’s social networks” (1998; p.153) 
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APPENDIX III – PRBANISATION RATES IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
Source: Kilroy (2007), p.2 
 
(GRAPHS REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT PURPOSES) 
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APPENDIX IV –  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AT NATIONAL AND RESEARCH AREA LEVEL 
 
National level 
Interviewee 
reference number 
Organisation Interview Date 
1 UNDP 15/05/2012 
2 UNDP 15/05/2012 
3 Asia Foundation 18/05/2012 & 14/03/2013 
4 Asia Foundation 25/05/2012 
5 Asia Foundation 18/05/2012 
6 Timorese Freelance consultant/grassroot 
activist 
20/05/12 & 05/02/2013 
7 National Parliament/UNPAZ 24/05/12 & 12/11/2012 
8 Lao Hamutuk 28/05/2012 & 15/03/2013 
9 UNMIT 18/10/2012 
10 UNMIT 25/10/2012 
11 UNMIT 08/10/2012 
12 Timorese Freelance consultant 18/10/2012 
13 Presidential advisor 26/10/2012 
14 Researcher at IRASEC 19/10/2012 
15  BELUN 06/10/2012 
16 Ministry of Culture 20/11/2012  
17 Ministry of Culture 05/11/2012  
18 Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, Geneva 
18/12/2012  
19 Catholic Relief Services 29/11/2012  
20 (ex) Catholic Relief Services 21/01/2013 
21 Community Housing Ltd 24/01/2013 
22 CEPAD 30/01/2013 
23 Presidential adviser (researcher) 19/02/2013 
24 Director of CEPAD 12/02/2013 & 15/07/2013 
25 Lecturer at UNTL (department of political 
science) 
01/03/2013 
26 World Bank, Country Representative 11/03/2013 
27 Parliamentarian 11/03/2013 
28  AusAid (governance) 12/03/2013 
29 Ministry of public works, housing and urban 
planning department 
20/03/2013 
30 World Bank, Social Protection 20/03/2013 
31 ILO, Youth employment and community 
empowerment 
03/04/2013 
32 Lecturer at Monash University, Australia 15/04/2013 
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33 Chief of staff, Presidential Adviser Office 15/04/2013 
34 Associate professor in politics and public 
policy & Chair of department 
16/04/2013 
35 Director Globalism Research Centre  17/12/2013 
36 Ministry of Education, Timor Leste 25/05/2014 
Research area level 
Liriu (Motael) 
37 Xefi Aldeia February 2013 
38 Youth leader February 2013 
39 Employed, government (28, male) March 2013 
40 Employed, government (28, male) March 2013 
41 Employed, government (29, female) March 2013 
42 Employed, selling food (45, female) March 2013 
43 Employed, private sector (53, male) April 2013 
44 Employed, private sector (46, male) March 2013 
45 Unemployed (38, female) March 2013 
46 Unemployed (36, female) March 2013 
47 Unemployed (55, female), owns land April 2013 
48 Elderly, unemployed (82, female) March 2013 
49 Elderly, unemployed (65, male) March 2013 
50 Youth (21, male), unemployed March 2013 
51 Youth (32, male), employed security March 2013 
52 Youth (25, male), university March 2013 
Bebonuk (Comoro) 
53 Xefi Aldeia March 2013 
54 De facto community leader March 2013 
55 Employed, INGO (45, male) March 2013 
56 Elderly, farmer (68, male) April 2013 
57 Employed, government (35, male) April 2013 
58 Employed, NGO (29, male) April 2013 
59 Employed, private (29, male) April 2013 
60 Employed, government (45, male) April 2013 
61 Employed, government (39, male) April 2013 
62 Employed, government & NGO (35, 
male) 
April 2013 
63 Employed, INGO (32, male) April 2013 
64 Employed, private (34, male) April 2013 
65 Employed, government (61, male) April 2013 
66 Employed, private (48, woman) April 2013 
67 Unemployed, volunteer (34, female) April 2013 
68 Unemployed (23, female) April 2013 
69 Unemployed (29, female) April 2013 
70 Unemployed (32, woman) April 2013 
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71 Unemployed (41, woman) April 2013 
72 Youth (18, male) April 2013 
73 Youth (21, male), university (+ 3 other 
female same age) 
April 2013 
74 Youth (19, female), high school April 2013 
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APPENDIX V –  SURVEY GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH AREA INTERVIEWS 
 
(1) Participant’s basic information: 
a. Age? 
b. District of origin? 
c. How long have they lived in the area? 
d. Why did they move to the area? 
e. Where does their family come from? 
 
(2) Educational background: 
a. Did they go to school? 
b. What level of education did they achieve? 
 
(3) Employment information: 
a. Are they employed? 
b. If so where? 
c. If not, why not?  
d. If not, have they tried to look for opportunities, programmes, etc which facilitate 
access to employment? Are they aware of any such programme? 
 
(4) Participation in community activities: 
a. Are there many activities organised in the community (e.g. sport events, etc)? 
b. Do they take part in those activities? Why (not)? 
 
(5) Participation in community meetings: 
a. Are they informed of all the community meetings taking place in their area? 
b. If so, do they participate? Do they feel like they are being heard? 
c. If not, why not? Do they do anything to find out if there is anything going on? 
 
(6) Perception of the violence in their area: 
a. Is there a lot of violence? 
b. If so, why? Who is responsible? 
c. If not, why not? 
d. Do they feel like the government is trying to solve the problems related to the 
violence? Or do they feel this is being dealt with at the local level? 
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(7) Main issues in the area: 
a. What are the main issues in their area? 
b. Have they complained about those issues and if so, to whom? 
c. Do they feel like their complaint was heard by their local leaders? 
d. Do they feel like the government is trying to solve the issue if it is beyond the scope 
of a local leader’s mandate? 
e. Do they discuss those issues with their neighbours? 
 
(8) Evolution of their area: 
a. Have they witnessed many changes in the area since they have moved in/for as 
long as they have lived there? 
b. Do they know the history of the area? 
 
(9) Movement across Dili: 
a. Do they often travel outside of their area? 
b. If so, what is their mean of transportation? Where do they go? 
c. If not, why not? 
d. Do they participate in activities in other areas of the city? 
 
(10) Involvement in urban-wide, national issues? 
a. Do they follow what is going on in Dili and in the country? 
b. If so, do they discuss these issues with their neighbours, friends and/or family? 
 
(11) Perception of the government: 
a. How do they perceive the governments since independence? i.e. have they tried to 
improve the situation of everyone in the country, have they worked toward peace, 
have they worked to create a sense of togetherness, of nation. 
b. What do they think is the most important issue to solve at the moment in Timor 
Leste to ensure peace and for the future generations? 
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APPENDIX VI –  MAIN MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN TIMOR 
LESTE 
Type of organisation Name of organisation/mission 
UN missions: 
UNMISET (UN Mission in Support of East Timor) – May 2002 to May 2005 
UNOTIL (UN Office in Timor Leste) – May 2005 to August 2006 
UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste) – August 2006 to December 
2012 
UN agencies: 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
UN Childrens Fund (UNICEF) 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
UN Population Fund (UNFPA) 
World Bank (WB) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
Multilateral 
World Health Organisation (WHO) 
Australian Aid (AusAid) 
Japan International Organisation Agency (JICA) 
German Cooperation (GTZ) 
Bilateral 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
N.B. This table only represents the main international organisations that have been significantly involved in Timor 
Leste and are still present in the country to this day93. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 For a comprehensive account of all the international and national organizations active in Timor Leste, please 
refer to: http://www.easttimorgovernment.com/usefullinks.htm  
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APPENDIX VII –  CHRONOLOGY OF THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN F-FDTL AND 
PNTL IN 2006 
Source: UN 2006 in Scambary (2009), p.272 
Date Event 
16 March Dismissal of 594 soldiers from F-FDTL for desertion 
24 April Group of sacked soldiers who became known as the Petitioners and their supporters 
stage demonstrations outside Parliament 
28 April Demonstration turns into riot and two people are killed 
3 May Major Alfredo Reinado (popularly known as Alfredo) abandons the F-FDTL Military 
Police, taking with him other military police officers, PNTL officers and weapons 
23 May Five killed in armed confrontation between F-FDTL and Major Alfredo 
24 May Attack on residence of F-FDTL Commander Brigadier General Ruak by 10 PNTL 
officers led by PNTL Deputy Commander Abilio Mesquita, (also a PSHT warga or 
master) and MP Leandro Isaac. One person was killed and two injured 
24–25 May Nine people killed when the Petitioners and group led by ex-F-FDTL member Vicente 
de Conceicao aka Railos attacks F-FDTL base in Tasi Tolu 
25 May Nine PNTL members killed in confrontation between F-FDTL and PNTL at the PNTL 
Dili headquarters; PNTL largely disintegrates as a force in Dili 
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APPENDIX VIII –  MAJOR FEATURES OF THE CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES  
Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of World Bank, 2013; p.27 
Name Target 
population 
Benefit amount Coverage Conditionality Implementing 
agency 
Elderly Elderly 
(60+) 
US$30/month, paid 
in a lump sum once 
per year 
84,569 
(2012) 
None National 
Directorate of 
Social Security 
(MSS) 
Disabled 18+ with 
severe 
disabilities 
(Class III or IV 
per WHO) 
US$30/month, paid 
in a lump sum once 
per year 
5,558 
(2012) 
None National 
Directorate of 
Social Security 
(MSS) 
Bolsa da 
Mãe 
School-going 
children who 
are orphans, 
living in 
single-parent 
households or 
in large 
families 
Primary students: 
US$40/year; Pre- 
Secondary and 
Secondary: 
US$80/year; 
University 
(domestic/ 
international): 
US$160/240 per 
year, paid once per 
year 
15,150 
(2012) 
School 
attendance, 
proven through 
submission of 
report card and 
letter from 
school 
headmaster 
National 
Directorate for 
Social 
Reinsertion 
(MSS) 
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APPENDIX IX –  EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION POLICIES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2012 
1999 - 2004 2004 – 2006/7 2006/7 2008 - 2012 
Phasing out Bahasa: 
Focusing on PT 
Transitional model: allowing Tetun 
& introducing PT  
Build national unity: PT & Tetun as 
language of instruction 
Tetun in primary school and PT in 
secondary school 
Compulsory school grades 
PT T PT T PT T PT T 
Grade 1 30% TS + LOI 70% TS + OE 
Grade 2 
TS three hours 
per week 
TS five hours 
per week 
50% TS + LOI 50% TS + OE 
Grade 3  70% TS + LOI 30% TS + OE 
N.T 
Priority TS  (3-4 
periods/week) 
Grade 4 
Grade 5 
Incrementally reverse hours, but no 
mention of LOI 
Primary school 
Grade 6 
LOI + TS 
four hours 
per week 
Not to be 
used in the 
classroom 
TS six hours per 
week 
TS two 
hours per 
week 
LOI + only 
written language 
OE only 
Incrementally reverse priority TS 
 
Grade 7 
Grade 8 
Secondary 
school 
(compulsory 
since 2008) Grade 9 
N.I. 
 
N.I. 
 
N.I. 
 
N.I. 
 
N.I. 
 
N.I. 
 
Priority TS  (5 
periods/week) 
N.T 
Notes: PT = Portuguese; T = Tetun; LOI = Language of Instruction; TS = Taught Subject; N.I. = No Information; OE = Oral Explanation; N.T = Not Taught 
Source: elaborated by author on the basis of Taylor-Leech, 2013; pp.115-118 
Appendices 
 338 
APPENDIX X –  UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF STATE BUILDING ON SUBSTANTIVE AND FORMAL CITIZENSHIP IN LIRIU AND METIN IV 
Figure 21 – Impact of administrative control issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two aldeias 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 	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Figure 22 - Impact of monopoly over the means of violence issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two aldeias 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
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Figure 23 - Impact of management of public finance issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two aldeias 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
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Figure 24 – Impact of investment in human capital issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two aldeias 
 
	  
Source: Elaborated by the author 
